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Update README #2

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Update README #2

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@ghost ghost commented Dec 15, 2020

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jelly commented Dec 15, 2020

This is a mirror which follows upstream and does not accept pull requests.

@jelly jelly closed this Dec 15, 2020
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 7, 2021
Like other tunneling interfaces, the bareudp doesn't need TXLOCK.
So, It is good to set the NETIF_F_LLTX flag to improve performance and
to avoid lockdep's false-positive warning.

Test commands:
    ip netns add A
    ip netns add B
    ip link add veth0 netns A type veth peer name veth1 netns B
    ip netns exec A ip link set veth0 up
    ip netns exec A ip a a 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth0
    ip netns exec B ip link set veth1 up
    ip netns exec B ip a a 10.0.0.2/24 dev veth1

    for i in {2..1}
    do
            let A=$i-1
            ip netns exec A ip link add bareudp$i type bareudp \
		    dstport $i ethertype ip
            ip netns exec A ip link set bareudp$i up
            ip netns exec A ip a a 10.0.$i.1/24 dev bareudp$i
            ip netns exec A ip r a 10.0.$i.2 encap ip src 10.0.$A.1 \
		    dst 10.0.$A.2 via 10.0.$i.2 dev bareudp$i

            ip netns exec B ip link add bareudp$i type bareudp \
		    dstport $i ethertype ip
            ip netns exec B ip link set bareudp$i up
            ip netns exec B ip a a 10.0.$i.2/24 dev bareudp$i
            ip netns exec B ip r a 10.0.$i.1 encap ip src 10.0.$A.2 \
		    dst 10.0.$A.1 via 10.0.$i.1 dev bareudp$i
    done
    ip netns exec A ping 10.0.2.2

Splat looks like:
[   96.992803][  T822] ============================================
[   96.993954][  T822] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[   96.995102][  T822] 5.10.0+ torvalds#819 Not tainted
[   96.995927][  T822] --------------------------------------------
[   96.997091][  T822] ping/822 is trying to acquire lock:
[   96.998083][  T822] ffff88810f753898 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   96.999813][  T822]
[   96.999813][  T822] but task is already holding lock:
[   97.001192][  T822] ffff88810c385498 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.002908][  T822]
[   97.002908][  T822] other info that might help us debug this:
[   97.004401][  T822]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[   97.004401][  T822]
[   97.005784][  T822]        CPU0
[   97.006407][  T822]        ----
[   97.007010][  T822]   lock(_xmit_NONE#2);
[   97.007779][  T822]   lock(_xmit_NONE#2);
[   97.008550][  T822]
[   97.008550][  T822]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[   97.008550][  T822]
[   97.010057][  T822]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[   97.010057][  T822]
[   97.011594][  T822] 7 locks held by ping/822:
[   97.012426][  T822]  #0: ffff888109a144f0 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: raw_sendmsg+0x12f7/0x2b00
[   97.014191][  T822]  #1: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x249/0x2020
[   97.016045][  T822]  #2: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1fd/0x2960
[   97.017897][  T822]  #3: ffff88810c385498 (_xmit_NONE#2){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.019684][  T822]  #4: ffffffffbce2f600 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: bareudp_xmit+0x31b/0x3690 [bareudp]
[   97.021573][  T822]  #5: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x249/0x2020
[   97.023424][  T822]  #6: ffffffffbce2f5a0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x1fd/0x2960
[   97.025259][  T822]
[   97.025259][  T822] stack backtrace:
[   97.026349][  T822] CPU: 3 PID: 822 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.10.0+ torvalds#819
[   97.027609][  T822] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
[   97.029407][  T822] Call Trace:
[   97.030015][  T822]  dump_stack+0x99/0xcb
[   97.030783][  T822]  __lock_acquire.cold.77+0x149/0x3a9
[   97.031773][  T822]  ? stack_trace_save+0x81/0xa0
[   97.032661][  T822]  ? register_lock_class+0x1910/0x1910
[   97.033673][  T822]  ? register_lock_class+0x1910/0x1910
[   97.034679][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x91/0xc0
[   97.035697][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0xa0/0xa0
[   97.036690][  T822]  lock_acquire+0x1b2/0x730
[   97.037515][  T822]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.038466][  T822]  ? check_flags+0x50/0x50
[   97.039277][  T822]  ? netif_skb_features+0x296/0x9c0
[   97.040226][  T822]  ? validate_xmit_skb+0x29/0xb10
[   97.041151][  T822]  _raw_spin_lock+0x30/0x70
[   97.041977][  T822]  ? __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.042927][  T822]  __dev_queue_xmit+0x1f52/0x2960
[   97.043852][  T822]  ? netdev_core_pick_tx+0x290/0x290
[   97.044824][  T822]  ? mark_held_locks+0xb7/0x120
[   97.045712][  T822]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12c/0x3e0
[   97.046824][  T822]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
[   97.047771][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.048710][  T822]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x41/0x120
[   97.049626][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.050556][  T822]  ? __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa5/0xf0
[   97.051509][  T822]  ? ___neigh_create+0x12a8/0x1eb0
[   97.052443][  T822]  ? check_chain_key+0x244/0x5f0
[   97.053352][  T822]  ? rcu_read_lock_bh_held+0x56/0xa0
[   97.054317][  T822]  ? ip_finish_output2+0x6ea/0x2020
[   97.055263][  T822]  ? pneigh_lookup+0x410/0x410
[   97.056135][  T822]  ip_finish_output2+0x6ea/0x2020
[ ... ]

Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com>
Fixes: 571912c ("net: UDP tunnel encapsulation module for tunnelling different protocols like MPLS, IP, NSH etc.")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201228152136.24215-1-ap420073@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 9, 2021
ASD and TA share the same firmware in SIENNA_CICHLID and only TA
firmware is requested during boot, so only need release TA firmware when
remove device.

[   83.877150] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x1269f97e6ed04095: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[   83.888076] CPU: 0 PID: 1312 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G        W  OE     5.9.0-rc5-deli-amd-vangogh-0.0.6.6-114-gdd99d5669a96-dirty #2
[   83.901160] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/TUF Z370-PLUS GAMING II, BIOS 0411 09/21/2018
[   83.912353] RIP: 0010:free_fw_priv+0xc/0x120
[   83.917531] Code: e8 99 cd b0 ff b8 a1 ff ff ff eb 9f 4c 89 f7 e8 8a cd b0 ff b8 f4 ff ff ff eb 90 0f 1f 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 54 53 <4c> 8b 67 18 48 89 fb 4c 89 e7 e8 45 94 41 00 b8 ff ff ff ff f0 0f
[   83.937576] RSP: 0018:ffffbc34c13a3ce0 EFLAGS: 00010206
[   83.943699] RAX: ffffffffbb681850 RBX: ffffa047f117eb60 RCX: 0000000080800055
[   83.951879] RDX: ffffbc34c1d5f000 RSI: 0000000080800055 RDI: 1269f97e6ed04095
[   83.959955] RBP: ffffbc34c13a3cf0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[   83.968107] R10: ffffbc34c13a3cc8 R11: 00000000ffffff00 R12: ffffa047d6b23378
[   83.976166] R13: ffffa047d6b23338 R14: ffffa047d6b240c8 R15: 0000000000000000
[   83.984295] FS:  00007f74f6712540(0000) GS:ffffa047fbe00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[   83.993323] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[   84.000056] CR2: 0000556a1cca4e18 CR3: 000000021faa8004 CR4: 00000000003706f0
[   84.008128] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[   84.016155] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[   84.024174] Call Trace:
[   84.027514]  release_firmware.part.11+0x4b/0x70
[   84.033017]  release_firmware+0x13/0x20
[   84.037803]  psp_sw_fini+0x77/0xb0 [amdgpu]
[   84.042857]  amdgpu_device_fini+0x38c/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[   84.048815]  amdgpu_driver_unload_kms+0x43/0x70 [amdgpu]
[   84.055055]  drm_dev_unregister+0x73/0xb0 [drm]
[   84.060499]  drm_dev_unplug+0x28/0x30 [drm]
[   84.065598]  amdgpu_dev_uninit+0x1b/0x40 [amdgpu]
[   84.071223]  amdgpu_pci_remove+0x4e/0x70 [amdgpu]
[   84.076835]  pci_device_remove+0x3e/0xc0
[   84.081609]  device_release_driver_internal+0xfb/0x1c0
[   84.087558]  driver_detach+0x4d/0xa0
[   84.092041]  bus_remove_driver+0x5f/0xe0
[   84.096854]  driver_unregister+0x2f/0x50
[   84.101594]  pci_unregister_driver+0x22/0xa0
[   84.106806]  amdgpu_exit+0x15/0x2b [amdgpu]

Signed-off-by: Dennis Li <Dennis.Li@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Hawking Zhang <Hawking.Zhang@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 9, 2021
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
nexthop: Various fixes

This series contains various fixes for the nexthop code. The bugs were
uncovered during the development of resilient nexthop groups.

Patches #1-#2 fix the error path of nexthop_create_group(). I was not
able to trigger these bugs with current code, but it is possible with
the upcoming resilient nexthop groups code which adds a user
controllable memory allocation further in the function.

Patch #3 fixes wrong validation of netlink attributes.

Patch #4 fixes wrong invocation of mausezahn in a selftest.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210107144824.1135691-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 13, 2021
We had kernel panic, it is caused by unload module and last
close confirmation.

call trace:
[1196029.743127]  free_sess+0x15/0x50 [rtrs_client]
[1196029.743128]  rtrs_clt_close+0x4c/0x70 [rtrs_client]
[1196029.743129]  ? rnbd_clt_unmap_device+0x1b0/0x1b0 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743130]  close_rtrs+0x25/0x50 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743131]  rnbd_client_exit+0x93/0xb99 [rnbd_client]
[1196029.743132]  __x64_sys_delete_module+0x190/0x260

And in the crashdump confirmation kworker is also running.
PID: 6943   TASK: ffff9e2ac8098000  CPU: 4   COMMAND: "kworker/4:2"
 #0 [ffffb206cf337c30] __schedule at ffffffff9f93f891
 #1 [ffffb206cf337cc8] schedule at ffffffff9f93fe98
 #2 [ffffb206cf337cd0] schedule_timeout at ffffffff9f943938
 #3 [ffffb206cf337d50] wait_for_completion at ffffffff9f9410a7
 #4 [ffffb206cf337da0] __flush_work at ffffffff9f08ce0e
 #5 [ffffb206cf337e20] rtrs_clt_close_conns at ffffffffc0d5f668 [rtrs_client]
 #6 [ffffb206cf337e48] rtrs_clt_close at ffffffffc0d5f801 [rtrs_client]
 #7 [ffffb206cf337e68] close_rtrs at ffffffffc0d26255 [rnbd_client]
 #8 [ffffb206cf337e78] free_sess at ffffffffc0d262ad [rnbd_client]
 torvalds#9 [ffffb206cf337e88] rnbd_clt_put_dev at ffffffffc0d266a7 [rnbd_client]

The problem is both code path try to close same session, which lead to
panic.

To fix it, just skip the sess if the refcount already drop to 0.

Fixes: f7a7a5c ("block/rnbd: client: main functionality")
Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@cloud.ionos.com>
Reviewed-by: Gioh Kim <gi-oh.kim@cloud.ionos.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2021
The buffer list can have zero skb as following path:
tipc_named_node_up()->tipc_node_xmit()->tipc_link_xmit(), so
we need to check the list before casting an &sk_buff.

Fault report:
 [] tipc: Bulk publication failure
 [] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical [#1] PREEMPT [...]
 [] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000c8-0x00000000000000cf]
 [] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.10.0-rc4+ #2
 [] Hardware name: Bochs ..., BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
 [] RIP: 0010:tipc_link_xmit+0xc1/0x2180
 [] Code: 24 b8 00 00 00 00 4d 39 ec 4c 0f 44 e8 e8 d7 0a 10 f9 48 [...]
 [] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006ea0 EFLAGS: 00010202
 [] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8880224da000 RCX: 1ffff11003d3cc0d
 [] RDX: 0000000000000019 RSI: ffffffff886007b9 RDI: 00000000000000c8
 [] RBP: ffffc90000007018 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffff52000000ded
 [] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: fffff52000000dec R12: ffffc90000007148
 [] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffc90000007018
 [] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888037400000(0000) knlGS:000[...]
 [] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
 [] CR2: 00007fffd2db5000 CR3: 000000002b08f000 CR4: 00000000000006f0

Fixes: af9b028 ("tipc: make media xmit call outside node spinlock context")
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hoang Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108071337.3598-1-hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2021
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: core: Thermal control fixes

This series includes two fixes for thermal control in mlxsw.

Patch #1 validates that the alarm temperature threshold read from a
transceiver is above the warning temperature threshold. If not, the
current thresholds are maintained. It was observed that some transceiver
might be unreliable and sometimes report a too low alarm temperature
threshold which would result in thermal shutdown of the system.

Patch #2 increases the temperature threshold above which thermal
shutdown is triggered for the ASIC thermal zone. It is currently too low
and might result in thermal shutdown under perfectly fine operational
conditions.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210108145210.1229820-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 23, 2021
While testing the error paths of relocation I hit the following lockdep
splat:

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  5.10.0-rc6+ torvalds#217 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  mount/779 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffffa0e676945418 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #2 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}:
	 down_read_nested+0x43/0x130
	 __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100
	 btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x31/0x40
	 btrfs_search_slot+0x462/0x8f0
	 btrfs_update_root+0x55/0x2b0
	 btrfs_drop_snapshot+0x398/0x750
	 clean_dirty_subvols+0xdf/0x120
	 btrfs_recover_relocation+0x534/0x5a0
	 btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0xcb/0x170
	 open_ctree+0x151f/0x1726
	 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
	 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 path_mount+0x433/0xc10
	 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #1 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}:
	 start_transaction+0x444/0x700
	 insert_balance_item.isra.0+0x37/0x320
	 btrfs_balance+0x354/0xf40
	 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x2cf/0x380
	 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x83/0xb0
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  -> #0 (&fs_info->balance_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
	 __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10
	 lock_acquire+0x116/0x370
	 __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0
	 btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
	 open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726
	 btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
	 btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380
	 legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
	 vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
	 path_mount+0x433/0xc10
	 __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
	 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
	 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

  other info that might help us debug this:

  Chain exists of:
    &fs_info->balance_mutex --> sb_internal#2 --> btrfs-root-00

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

	 CPU0                    CPU1
	 ----                    ----
    lock(btrfs-root-00);
				 lock(sb_internal#2);
				 lock(btrfs-root-00);
    lock(&fs_info->balance_mutex);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  2 locks held by mount/779:
   #0: ffffa0e60dc040e0 (&type->s_umount_key#47/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xb5/0x380
   #1: ffffa0e60ee31da8 (btrfs-root-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x27/0x100

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 779 Comm: mount Not tainted 5.10.0-rc6+ torvalds#217
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0
   check_noncircular+0xcf/0xf0
   ? trace_call_bpf+0x139/0x260
   __lock_acquire+0x1120/0x1e10
   lock_acquire+0x116/0x370
   ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   __mutex_lock+0x7e/0x7b0
   ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   ? btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80
   ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x2c4/0x2f0
   ? btrfs_get_64+0x5e/0x100
   btrfs_recover_balance+0x2f0/0x340
   open_ctree+0x1095/0x1726
   btrfs_mount_root.cold+0x12/0xea
   ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x80
   legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
   vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
   vfs_kern_mount.part.0+0x71/0xb0
   btrfs_mount+0x10d/0x380
   ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x2f2/0x320
   legacy_get_tree+0x30/0x50
   vfs_get_tree+0x28/0xc0
   ? capable+0x3a/0x60
   path_mount+0x433/0xc10
   __x64_sys_mount+0xe3/0x120
   do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

This is straightforward to fix, simply release the path before we setup
the balance_ctl.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 23, 2021
In Linux, if a driver does disable_irq() and later does enable_irq()
on its interrupt, I believe it's expecting these properties:
* If an interrupt was pending when the driver disabled then it will
  still be pending after the driver re-enables.
* If an edge-triggered interrupt comes in while an interrupt is
  disabled it should assert when the interrupt is re-enabled.

If you think that the above sounds a lot like the disable_irq() and
enable_irq() are supposed to be masking/unmasking the interrupt
instead of disabling/enabling it then you've made an astute
observation.  Specifically when talking about interrupts, "mask"
usually means to stop posting interrupts but keep tracking them and
"disable" means to fully shut off interrupt detection.  It's
unfortunate that this is so confusing, but presumably this is all the
way it is for historical reasons.

Perhaps more confusing than the above is that, even though clients of
IRQs themselves don't have a way to request mask/unmask
vs. disable/enable calls, IRQ chips themselves can implement both.
...and yet more confusing is that if an IRQ chip implements
disable/enable then they will be called when a client driver calls
disable_irq() / enable_irq().

It does feel like some of the above could be cleared up.  However,
without any other core interrupt changes it should be clear that when
an IRQ chip gets a request to "disable" an IRQ that it has to treat it
like a mask of that IRQ.

In any case, after that long interlude you can see that the "unmask
and clear" can break things.  Maulik tried to fix it so that we no
longer did "unmask and clear" in commit 71266d9 ("pinctrl: qcom:
Move clearing pending IRQ to .irq_request_resources callback"), but it
only handled the PDC case and it had problems (it caused
sc7180-trogdor devices to fail to suspend).  Let's fix.

>From my understanding the source of the phantom interrupt in the
were these two things:
1. One that could have been introduced in msm_gpio_irq_set_type()
   (only for the non-PDC case).
2. Edges could have been detected when a GPIO was muxed away.

Fixing case #1 is easy.  We can just add a clear in
msm_gpio_irq_set_type().

Fixing case #2 is harder.  Let's use a concrete example.  In
sc7180-trogdor.dtsi we configure the uart3 to have two pinctrl states,
sleep and default, and mux between the two during runtime PM and
system suspend (see geni_se_resources_{on,off}() for more
details). The difference between the sleep and default state is that
the RX pin is muxed to a GPIO during sleep and muxed to the UART
otherwise.

As per Qualcomm, when we mux the pin over to the UART function the PDC
(or the non-PDC interrupt detection logic) is still watching it /
latching edges.  These edges don't cause interrupts because the
current code masks the interrupt unless we're entering suspend.
However, as soon as we enter suspend we unmask the interrupt and it's
counted as a wakeup.

Let's deal with the problem like this:
* When we mux away, we'll mask our interrupt.  This isn't necessary in
  the above case since the client already masked us, but it's a good
  idea in general.
* When we mux back will clear any interrupts and unmask.

Fixes: 4b7618f ("pinctrl: qcom: Add irq_enable callback for msm gpio")
Fixes: 71266d9 ("pinctrl: qcom: Move clearing pending IRQ to .irq_request_resources callback")
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maulik Shah <mkshah@codeaurora.org>
Tested-by: Maulik Shah <mkshah@codeaurora.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Boyd <swboyd@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210114191601.v7.4.I7cf3019783720feb57b958c95c2b684940264cd1@changeid
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2021
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 5.11, take #2

- Don't allow tagged pointers to point to memslots
- Filter out ARMv8.1+ PMU events on v8.0 hardware
- Hide PMU registers from userspace when no PMU is configured
- More PMU cleanups
- Don't try to handle broken PSCI firmware
- More sys_reg() to reg_to_encoding() conversions
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 31, 2021
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Various fixes

Patch #1 fixes wrong invocation of mausezahn in a couple of selftests.
The tests started failing after Fedora updated their libnet package from
version 1.1.6 to 1.2.1. With the fix the tests pass regardless of libnet
version.

Patch #2 fixes an issue in the mirroring to CPU code that results in
policer configuration being overwritten.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210128144820.3280295-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2021
Similar to commit 165ae7a ("igb: Report speed and duplex as unknown
when device is runtime suspended"), if we try to read speed and duplex
sysfs while the device is runtime suspended, igc will complain and
stops working:

[  123.449883] igc 0000:03:00.0 enp3s0: PCIe link lost, device now detached
[  123.450052] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
[  123.450056] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[  123.450058] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[  123.450059] PGD 0 P4D 0
[  123.450064] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[  123.450068] CPU: 0 PID: 2525 Comm: udevadm Tainted: G     U  W  OE     5.10.0-1002-oem #2+rkl2-Ubuntu
[  123.450078] RIP: 0010:igc_rd32+0x1c/0x90 [igc]
[  123.450080] Code: c0 5d c3 b8 fd ff ff ff c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89 f0 48 89 e5 41 56 41 55 41 54 49 89 c4 53 48 8b 57 08 48 01 d0 <44> 8b 28 41 83 fd ff 74 0c 5b 44 89 e8 41 5c 41 5d 4

[  123.450083] RSP: 0018:ffffb0d100d6fcc0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[  123.450085] RAX: 0000000000000008 RBX: ffffb0d100d6fd30 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  123.450087] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: ffff945a12716c10
[  123.450089] RBP: ffffb0d100d6fce0 R08: ffff945a12716550 R09: ffff945a09874000
[  123.450090] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000008
[  123.450092] R13: ffff945a12716000 R14: ffff945a037da280 R15: ffff945a037da290
[  123.450094] FS:  00007f3b34c868c0(0000) GS:ffff945b89200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  123.450096] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  123.450098] CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 00000001144de006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[  123.450100] PKRU: 55555554
[  123.450101] Call Trace:
[  123.450111]  igc_ethtool_get_link_ksettings+0xd6/0x1b0 [igc]
[  123.450118]  __ethtool_get_link_ksettings+0x71/0xb0
[  123.450123]  duplex_show+0x74/0xc0
[  123.450129]  dev_attr_show+0x1d/0x40
[  123.450134]  sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xa1/0x100
[  123.450137]  kernfs_seq_show+0x27/0x30
[  123.450142]  seq_read+0xb7/0x400
[  123.450148]  ? common_file_perm+0x72/0x170
[  123.450151]  kernfs_fop_read+0x35/0x1b0
[  123.450155]  vfs_read+0xb5/0x1b0
[  123.450157]  ksys_read+0x67/0xe0
[  123.450160]  __x64_sys_read+0x1a/0x20
[  123.450164]  do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
[  123.450168]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[  123.450170] RIP: 0033:0x7f3b351fe142
[  123.450173] Code: c0 e9 c2 fe ff ff 50 48 8d 3d 3a ca 0a 00 e8 f5 19 02 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 56 c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24
[  123.450174] RSP: 002b:00007fffef2ec138 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
[  123.450177] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3b351fe142
[  123.450179] RDX: 0000000000001001 RSI: 00005644c047f070 RDI: 0000000000000003
[  123.450180] RBP: 00007fffef2ec340 R08: 00005644c047f070 R09: 00007f3b352d9320
[  123.450182] R10: 00005644c047c010 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005644c047cbf0
[  123.450184] R13: 00005644c047e6d0 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 00007fffef2ec140
[  123.450189] Modules linked in: rfcomm ccm cmac algif_hash algif_skcipher af_alg bnep toshiba_acpi industrialio toshiba_haps hp_accel lis3lv02d btusb btrtl btbcm btintel bluetooth ecdh_generic ecc joydev input_leds nls_iso8859_1 snd_sof_pci snd_sof_intel_byt snd_sof_intel_ipc snd_sof_intel_hda_common snd_soc_hdac_hda snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_sof_xtensa_dsp snd_sof_intel_hda snd_sof snd_hda_ext_core snd_soc_acpi_intel_match snd_soc_acpi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic ledtrig_audio snd_hda_intel snd_intel_dspcfg soundwire_intel soundwire_generic_allocation soundwire_cadence snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core ath10k_pci snd_hwdep intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common ath10k_core soundwire_bus snd_soc_core x86_pkg_temp_thermal ath intel_powerclamp snd_compress ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine mac80211 snd_pcm coretemp snd_seq_midi snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi kvm_intel cfg80211 snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_timer mei_hdcp kvm libarc4 snd crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel
 mei_me dell_wmi
[  123.450266]  dell_smbios soundcore sparse_keymap dcdbas crypto_simd cryptd mei dell_uart_backlight glue_helper ee1004 wmi_bmof intel_wmi_thunderbolt dell_wmi_descriptor mac_hid efi_pstore acpi_pad acpi_tad intel_cstate sch_fq_codel parport_pc ppdev lp parport ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log hid_generic usbhid hid i915 i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops cec crc32_pclmul rc_core drm intel_lpss_pci i2c_i801 ahci igc intel_lpss i2c_smbus idma64 xhci_pci libahci virt_dma xhci_pci_renesas wmi video pinctrl_tigerlake
[  123.450335] CR2: 0000000000000008
[  123.450338] ---[ end trace 9f731e38b53c35cc ]---

The more generic approach will be wrap get_link_ksettings() with begin()
and complete() callbacks, and calls runtime resume and runtime suspend
routine respectively. However, igc is like igb, runtime resume routine
uses rtnl_lock() which upper ethtool layer also uses.

So to prevent a deadlock on rtnl, take a different approach, use
pm_runtime_suspended() to avoid reading register while device is runtime
suspended.

Fixes: 8c5ad0d ("igc: Add ethtool support")
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Sasha Neftin <sasha.neftin@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 4, 2021
Patch series "Fix the compatibility of zsmalloc and zswap".

Patch #1 adds a flag to zpool, then zswap used to determine if zpool
drivers such as zbud/z3fold/zsmalloc will enter an atomic context after
mapping.

The difference between zbud/z3fold and zsmalloc is that zsmalloc requires
an atomic context that since its map function holds a preempt-disabled,
but zbud/z3fold don't require an atomic context.  So patch #2 sets flag
sleep_mapped to true indicating that zbud/z3fold can sleep after mapping.
zsmalloc didn't support sleep after mapping, so don't set that flag to
true.

This patch (of 2):

Add a flag to zpool, named is "can_sleep_mapped", and have it set true for
zbud/z3fold, not set this flag for zsmalloc, so its default value is
false.  Then zswap could go the current path if the flag is true; and if
it's false, copy data from src to a temporary buffer, then unmap the
handle, take the mutex, process the buffer instead of src to avoid
sleeping function called from atomic context.

[natechancellor@gmail.com: add return value in zswap_frontswap_load]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210121214804.926843-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
[tiantao6@hisilicon.com: fix potential memory leak]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1611538365-51811-1-git-send-email-tiantao6@hisilicon.com
[colin.king@canonical.com: fix potential uninitialized pointer read on tmp]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210128141728.639030-1-colin.king@canonical.com
[tiantao6@hisilicon.com: fix variable 'entry' is uninitialized when used]
  Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1611223030-58346-1-git-send-email-tiantao6@hisilicon.comLink: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1611035683-12732-1-git-send-email-tiantao6@hisilicon.com

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1611035683-12732-2-git-send-email-tiantao6@hisilicon.com
Signed-off-by: Tian Tao <tiantao6@hisilicon.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Wool <vitaly.wool@konsulko.com>
Acked-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reported-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Barry Song <song.bao.hua@hisilicon.com>
Cc: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
Cc: Seth Jennings <sjenning@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 7, 2021
Calling btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta_prealloc from
btrfs_delayed_inode_reserve_metadata can result in flushing delalloc
while holding a transaction and delayed node locks. This is deadlock
prone. In the past multiple commits:

 * ae5e070 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't try to wait flushing if we're
already holding a transaction")

 * 6f23277 ("btrfs: qgroup: don't commit transaction when we already
 hold the handle")

Tried to solve various aspects of this but this was always a
whack-a-mole game. Unfortunately those 2 fixes don't solve a deadlock
scenario involving btrfs_delayed_node::mutex. Namely, one thread
can call btrfs_dirty_inode as a result of reading a file and modifying
its atime:

  PID: 6963   TASK: ffff8c7f3f94c000  CPU: 2   COMMAND: "test"
  #0  __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d
  #1  schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff
  #2  schedule_timeout at ffffffffa52a1bdd
  #3  wait_for_completion at ffffffffa529eeea             <-- sleeps with delayed node mutex held
  #4  start_delalloc_inodes at ffffffffc0380db5
  #5  btrfs_start_delalloc_snapshot at ffffffffc0393836
  #6  try_flush_qgroup at ffffffffc03f04b2
  #7  __btrfs_qgroup_reserve_meta at ffffffffc03f5bb6     <-- tries to reserve space and starts delalloc inodes.
  #8  btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e31aa      <-- acquires delayed node mutex
  torvalds#9  btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8
 torvalds#10  btrfs_dirty_inode at ffffffffc038627b               <-- TRANSACTIION OPENED
 torvalds#11  touch_atime at ffffffffa4cf0000
 torvalds#12  generic_file_read_iter at ffffffffa4c1f123
 torvalds#13  new_sync_read at ffffffffa4ccdc8a
 torvalds#14  vfs_read at ffffffffa4cd0849
 torvalds#15  ksys_read at ffffffffa4cd0bd1
 torvalds#16  do_syscall_64 at ffffffffa4a052eb
 torvalds#17  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffffa540008c

This will cause an asynchronous work to flush the delalloc inodes to
happen which can try to acquire the same delayed_node mutex:

  PID: 455    TASK: ffff8c8085fa4000  CPU: 5   COMMAND: "kworker/u16:30"
  #0  __schedule at ffffffffa529e07d
  #1  schedule at ffffffffa529e4ff
  #2  schedule_preempt_disabled at ffffffffa529e80a
  #3  __mutex_lock at ffffffffa529fdcb                    <-- goes to sleep, never wakes up.
  #4  btrfs_delayed_update_inode at ffffffffc03e3143      <-- tries to acquire the mutex
  #5  btrfs_update_inode at ffffffffc0385ba8              <-- this is the same inode that pid 6963 is holding
  #6  cow_file_range_inline.constprop.78 at ffffffffc0386be7
  #7  cow_file_range at ffffffffc03879c1
  #8  btrfs_run_delalloc_range at ffffffffc038894c
  torvalds#9  writepage_delalloc at ffffffffc03a3c8f
 torvalds#10  __extent_writepage at ffffffffc03a4c01
 torvalds#11  extent_write_cache_pages at ffffffffc03a500b
 torvalds#12  extent_writepages at ffffffffc03a6de2
 torvalds#13  do_writepages at ffffffffa4c277eb
 torvalds#14  __filemap_fdatawrite_range at ffffffffa4c1e5bb
 torvalds#15  btrfs_run_delalloc_work at ffffffffc0380987         <-- starts running delayed nodes
 torvalds#16  normal_work_helper at ffffffffc03b706c
 torvalds#17  process_one_work at ffffffffa4aba4e4
 torvalds#18  worker_thread at ffffffffa4aba6fd
 torvalds#19  kthread at ffffffffa4ac0a3d
 torvalds#20  ret_from_fork at ffffffffa54001ff

To fully address those cases the complete fix is to never issue any
flushing while holding the transaction or the delayed node lock. This
patch achieves it by calling qgroup_reserve_meta directly which will
either succeed without flushing or will fail and return -EDQUOT. In the
latter case that return value is going to be propagated to
btrfs_dirty_inode which will fallback to start a new transaction. That's
fine as the majority of time we expect the inode will have
BTRFS_DELAYED_NODE_INODE_DIRTY flag set which will result in directly
copying the in-memory state.

Fixes: c53e965 ("btrfs: qgroup: try to flush qgroup space when we get -EDQUOT")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2021
…t context

Running "perf mem record" in powerpc platforms with selinux enabled
resulted in soft lockup's. Below call-trace was seen in the logs:

  CPU: 58 PID: 3751 Comm: sssd_nss Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7+ #2
  NIP:  c000000000dff3d4 LR: c000000000dff3d0 CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c000007fffab7d60 TRAP: 0100   Not tainted  (5.11.0-rc7+)
  ...
  NIP _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x94/0x120
  LR  _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0x120
  Call Trace:
    0xc00000000fd47260 (unreliable)
    skb_queue_tail+0x3c/0x90
    audit_log_end+0x6c/0x180
    common_lsm_audit+0xb0/0xe0
    slow_avc_audit+0xa4/0x110
    avc_has_perm+0x1c4/0x260
    selinux_perf_event_open+0x74/0xd0
    security_perf_event_open+0x68/0xc0
    record_and_restart+0x6e8/0x7f0
    perf_event_interrupt+0x22c/0x560
    performance_monitor_exception0x4c/0x60
    performance_monitor_common_virt+0x1c8/0x1d0
  interrupt: f00 at _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x38/0x120
  NIP:  c000000000dff378 LR: c000000000b5fbbc CTR: c0000000007d47f0
  REGS: c00000000fd47860 TRAP: 0f00   Not tainted  (5.11.0-rc7+)
  ...
  NIP _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x38/0x120
  LR  skb_queue_tail+0x3c/0x90
  interrupt: f00
    0x38 (unreliable)
    0xc00000000aae6200
    audit_log_end+0x6c/0x180
    audit_log_exit+0x344/0xf80
    __audit_syscall_exit+0x2c0/0x320
    do_syscall_trace_leave+0x148/0x200
    syscall_exit_prepare+0x324/0x390
    system_call_common+0xfc/0x27c

The above trace shows that while the CPU was handling a performance
monitor exception, there was a call to security_perf_event_open()
function. In powerpc core-book3s, this function is called from
perf_allow_kernel() check during recording of data address in the
sample via perf_get_data_addr().

Commit da97e18 ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux
checks") introduced security enhancements to perf. As part of this
commit, the new security hook for perf_event_open() was added in all
places where perf paranoid check was previously used. In powerpc
core-book3s code, originally had paranoid checks in
perf_get_data_addr() and power_pmu_bhrb_read(). So
perf_paranoid_kernel() checks were replaced with perf_allow_kernel()
in these PMU helper functions as well.

The intention of paranoid checks in core-book3s was to verify
privilege access before capturing some of the sample data. Along with
paranoid checks, perf_allow_kernel() also does a
security_perf_event_open(). Since these functions are accessed while
recording a sample, we end up calling selinux_perf_event_open() in PMI
context. Some of the security functions use spinlock like
sidtab_sid2str_put(). If a perf interrupt hits under a spin lock and
if we end up in calling selinux hook functions in PMI handler, this
could cause a dead lock.

Since the purpose of this security hook is to control access to
perf_event_open(), it is not right to call this in interrupt context.

The paranoid checks in powerpc core-book3s were done at interrupt time
which is also not correct.

Reference commits:
  Commit cd1231d ("powerpc/perf: Prevent kernel address leak via perf_get_data_addr()")
  Commit bb19af8 ("powerpc/perf: Prevent kernel address leak to userspace via BHRB buffer")

We only allow creation of events that have already passed the
privilege checks in perf_event_open(). So these paranoid checks are
not needed at event time. As a fix, patch uses
'event->attr.exclude_kernel' check to prevent exposing kernel address
for userspace only sampling.

Fixes: cd1231d ("powerpc/perf: Prevent kernel address leak via perf_get_data_addr()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.17+
Suggested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Athira Rajeev <atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1614247839-1428-1-git-send-email-atrajeev@linux.vnet.ibm.com
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2021
The evlist has the maps with its own refcounts so we don't need to set
the pointers to NULL.  Otherwise following error was reported by Asan.

  # perf test -v 4
   4: Read samples using the mmap interface      :
  --- start ---
  test child forked, pid 139782
  mmap size 528384B

  =================================================================
  ==139782==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f1f76daee8f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145
    #1 0x564ba21a0fea in cpu_map__trim_new /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:79
    #2 0x564ba21a1a0f in perf_cpu_map__read /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:149
    #3 0x564ba21a21cf in cpu_map__read_all_cpu_map /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:166
    #4 0x564ba21a21cf in perf_cpu_map__new /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:181
    #5 0x564ba1e48298 in test__basic_mmap tests/mmap-basic.c:55
    #6 0x564ba1e278fb in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:428
    #7 0x564ba1e278fb in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:458
    #8 0x564ba1e29a53 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:679
    torvalds#9 0x564ba1e29a53 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:825
    torvalds#10 0x564ba1e95cb4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313
    torvalds#11 0x564ba1d1fa88 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365
    torvalds#12 0x564ba1d1fa88 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409
    torvalds#13 0x564ba1d1fa88 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539
    torvalds#14 0x7f1f768e4d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

    ...
  test child finished with 1
  ---- end ----
  Read samples using the mmap interface: FAILED!
  failed to open shell test directory: /home/namhyung/libexec/perf-core/tests/shell

Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301140409.184570-2-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2021
The evlist has the maps with its own refcounts so we don't need to set
the pointers to NULL.  Otherwise following error was reported by Asan.

Also change the goto label since it doesn't need to have two.

  # perf test -v 24
  24: Number of exit events of a simple workload :
  --- start ---
  test child forked, pid 145915
  mmap size 528384B

  =================================================================
  ==145915==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fc44e50d1f8 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164
    #1 0x561cf50f4d2e in perf_thread_map__realloc /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/threadmap.c:23
    #2 0x561cf4eeb949 in thread_map__new_by_tid util/thread_map.c:63
    #3 0x561cf4db7fd2 in test__task_exit tests/task-exit.c:74
    #4 0x561cf4d798fb in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:428
    #5 0x561cf4d798fb in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:458
    #6 0x561cf4d7ba53 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:679
    #7 0x561cf4d7ba53 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:825
    #8 0x561cf4de7d04 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313
    torvalds#9 0x561cf4c71a88 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365
    torvalds#10 0x561cf4c71a88 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409
    torvalds#11 0x561cf4c71a88 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539
    torvalds#12 0x7fc44e042d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

    ...
  test child finished with 1
  ---- end ----
  Number of exit events of a simple workload: FAILED!

Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301140409.184570-4-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2021
The evlist has the maps with its own refcounts so we don't need to set
the pointers to NULL.  Otherwise following error was reported by Asan.

Also change the goto label since it doesn't need to have two.

  # perf test -v 25
  25: Software clock events period values        :
  --- start ---
  test child forked, pid 149154
  mmap size 528384B
  mmap size 528384B

  =================================================================
  ==149154==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fef5cd071f8 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164
    #1 0x56260d5e8b8e in perf_thread_map__realloc /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/threadmap.c:23
    #2 0x56260d3df7a9 in thread_map__new_by_tid util/thread_map.c:63
    #3 0x56260d2ac6b2 in __test__sw_clock_freq tests/sw-clock.c:65
    #4 0x56260d26d8fb in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:428
    #5 0x56260d26d8fb in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:458
    #6 0x56260d26fa53 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:679
    #7 0x56260d26fa53 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:825
    #8 0x56260d2dbb64 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313
    torvalds#9 0x56260d165a88 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365
    torvalds#10 0x56260d165a88 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409
    torvalds#11 0x56260d165a88 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539
    torvalds#12 0x7fef5c83cd09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

    ...
  test child finished with 1
  ---- end ----
  Software clock events period values      : FAILED!

Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301140409.184570-5-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2021
The evlist and the cpu/thread maps should be released together.
Otherwise following error was reported by Asan.

Note that this test still has memory leaks in DSOs so it still fails
even after this change.  I'll take a look at that too.

  # perf test -v 26
  26: Object code reading                        :
  --- start ---
  test child forked, pid 154184
  Looking at the vmlinux_path (8 entries long)
  symsrc__init: build id mismatch for vmlinux.
  symsrc__init: cannot get elf header.
  Using /proc/kcore for kernel data
  Using /proc/kallsyms for symbols
  Parsing event 'cycles'
  mmap size 528384B
  ...
  =================================================================
  ==154184==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 439 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fcb66e77037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154
    #1 0x55ad9b7e821e in dso__new_id util/dso.c:1256
    #2 0x55ad9b8cfd4a in __machine__addnew_vdso util/vdso.c:132
    #3 0x55ad9b8cfd4a in machine__findnew_vdso util/vdso.c:347
    #4 0x55ad9b845b7e in map__new util/map.c:176
    #5 0x55ad9b8415a2 in machine__process_mmap2_event util/machine.c:1787
    #6 0x55ad9b8fab16 in perf_tool__process_synth_event util/synthetic-events.c:64
    #7 0x55ad9b8fab16 in perf_event__synthesize_mmap_events util/synthetic-events.c:499
    #8 0x55ad9b8fbfdf in __event__synthesize_thread util/synthetic-events.c:741
    torvalds#9 0x55ad9b8ff3e3 in perf_event__synthesize_thread_map util/synthetic-events.c:833
    torvalds#10 0x55ad9b738585 in do_test_code_reading tests/code-reading.c:608
    torvalds#11 0x55ad9b73b25d in test__code_reading tests/code-reading.c:722
    torvalds#12 0x55ad9b6f28fb in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:428
    torvalds#13 0x55ad9b6f28fb in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:458
    torvalds#14 0x55ad9b6f4a53 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:679
    torvalds#15 0x55ad9b6f4a53 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:825
    torvalds#16 0x55ad9b760cc4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313
    torvalds#17 0x55ad9b5eaa88 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365
    torvalds#18 0x55ad9b5eaa88 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409
    torvalds#19 0x55ad9b5eaa88 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539
    torvalds#20 0x7fcb669acd09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

    ...
  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 471 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
  test child finished with 1
  ---- end ----
  Object code reading: FAILED!

Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301140409.184570-6-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2021
The evlist and the cpu/thread maps should be released together.
Otherwise following error was reported by Asan.

  $ perf test -v 28
  28: Use a dummy software event to keep tracking:
  --- start ---
  test child forked, pid 156810
  mmap size 528384B

  =================================================================
  ==156810==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f637d2bce8f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145
    #1 0x55cc6295cffa in cpu_map__trim_new /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:79
    #2 0x55cc6295da1f in perf_cpu_map__read /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:149
    #3 0x55cc6295e1df in cpu_map__read_all_cpu_map /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:166
    #4 0x55cc6295e1df in perf_cpu_map__new /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:181
    #5 0x55cc626287cf in test__keep_tracking tests/keep-tracking.c:84
    #6 0x55cc625e38fb in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:428
    #7 0x55cc625e38fb in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:458
    #8 0x55cc625e5a53 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:679
    torvalds#9 0x55cc625e5a53 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:825
    torvalds#10 0x55cc62651cc4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313
    torvalds#11 0x55cc624dba88 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365
    torvalds#12 0x55cc624dba88 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409
    torvalds#13 0x55cc624dba88 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539
    torvalds#14 0x7f637cdf2d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 72 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
  test child finished with 1
  ---- end ----
  Use a dummy software event to keep tracking: FAILED!

Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301140409.184570-7-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2021
The evlist and cpu/thread maps should be released together.
Otherwise the following error was reported by Asan.

  $ perf test -v 35
  35: Track with sched_switch                    :
  --- start ---
  test child forked, pid 159287
  Using CPUID GenuineIntel-6-8E-C
  mmap size 528384B
  1295 events recorded

  =================================================================
  ==159287==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fa28d9a2e8f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145
    #1 0x5652f5a5affa in cpu_map__trim_new /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:79
    #2 0x5652f5a5ba1f in perf_cpu_map__read /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:149
    #3 0x5652f5a5c1df in cpu_map__read_all_cpu_map /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:166
    #4 0x5652f5a5c1df in perf_cpu_map__new /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:181
    #5 0x5652f5723bbf in test__switch_tracking tests/switch-tracking.c:350
    #6 0x5652f56e18fb in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:428
    #7 0x5652f56e18fb in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:458
    #8 0x5652f56e3a53 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:679
    torvalds#9 0x5652f56e3a53 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:825
    torvalds#10 0x5652f574fcc4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313
    torvalds#11 0x5652f55d9a88 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365
    torvalds#12 0x5652f55d9a88 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409
    torvalds#13 0x5652f55d9a88 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539
    torvalds#14 0x7fa28d4d8d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 72 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
  test child finished with 1
  ---- end ----
  Track with sched_switch: FAILED!

Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301140409.184570-8-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2021
It missed to call perf_thread_map__put() after using the map.

  $ perf test -v 43
  43: Synthesize thread map                      :
  --- start ---
  test child forked, pid 162640

  =================================================================
  ==162640==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fd48cdaa1f8 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164
    #1 0x563e6d5f8d0e in perf_thread_map__realloc /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/threadmap.c:23
    #2 0x563e6d3ef69a in thread_map__new_by_pid util/thread_map.c:46
    #3 0x563e6d2cec90 in test__thread_map_synthesize tests/thread-map.c:97
    #4 0x563e6d27d8fb in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:428
    #5 0x563e6d27d8fb in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:458
    #6 0x563e6d27fa53 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:679
    #7 0x563e6d27fa53 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:825
    #8 0x563e6d2ebce4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313
    torvalds#9 0x563e6d175a88 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365
    torvalds#10 0x563e6d175a88 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409
    torvalds#11 0x563e6d175a88 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539
    torvalds#12 0x7fd48c8dfd09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 8224 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
  test child finished with 1
  ---- end ----
  Synthesize thread map: FAILED!

Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301140409.184570-9-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2021
It should be released after printing the map.

  $ perf test -v 52
  52: Print cpu map                              :
  --- start ---
  test child forked, pid 172233

  =================================================================
  ==172233==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 156 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fc472518e8f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145
    #1 0x55e63b378f7a in cpu_map__trim_new /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:79
    #2 0x55e63b37a05c in perf_cpu_map__new /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:237
    #3 0x55e63b056d16 in cpu_map_print tests/cpumap.c:102
    #4 0x55e63b056d16 in test__cpu_map_print tests/cpumap.c:120
    #5 0x55e63afff8fb in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:428
    #6 0x55e63afff8fb in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:458
    #7 0x55e63b001a53 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:679
    #8 0x55e63b001a53 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:825
    torvalds#9 0x55e63b06dc44 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313
    torvalds#10 0x55e63aef7a88 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365
    torvalds#11 0x55e63aef7a88 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409
    torvalds#12 0x55e63aef7a88 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539
    torvalds#13 0x7fc47204ed09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
  ...

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 448 byte(s) leaked in 7 allocation(s).
  test child finished with 1
  ---- end ----
  Print cpu map: FAILED!

Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301140409.184570-11-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2021
It should release the maps at the end.

  $ perf test -v 71
  71: Convert perf time to TSC                   :
  --- start ---
  test child forked, pid 178744
  mmap size 528384B
  1st event perf time 59207256505278 tsc 13187166645142
  rdtsc          time 59207256542151 tsc 13187166723020
  2nd event perf time 59207256543749 tsc 13187166726393

  =================================================================
  ==178744==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

  Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7faf601f9e8f in __interceptor_malloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145
    #1 0x55b620cfc00a in cpu_map__trim_new /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:79
    #2 0x55b620cfca2f in perf_cpu_map__read /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:149
    #3 0x55b620cfd1ef in cpu_map__read_all_cpu_map /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:166
    #4 0x55b620cfd1ef in perf_cpu_map__new /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/cpumap.c:181
    #5 0x55b6209ef1b2 in test__perf_time_to_tsc tests/perf-time-to-tsc.c:73
    #6 0x55b6209828fb in run_test tests/builtin-test.c:428
    #7 0x55b6209828fb in test_and_print tests/builtin-test.c:458
    #8 0x55b620984a53 in __cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:679
    torvalds#9 0x55b620984a53 in cmd_test tests/builtin-test.c:825
    torvalds#10 0x55b6209f0cd4 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313
    torvalds#11 0x55b62087aa88 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365
    torvalds#12 0x55b62087aa88 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409
    torvalds#13 0x55b62087aa88 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539
    torvalds#14 0x7faf5fd2fd09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 72 byte(s) leaked in 2 allocation(s).
  test child finished with 1
  ---- end ----
  Convert perf time to TSC: FAILED!

Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301140409.184570-12-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 9, 2021
I got a segfault when using -r option with event groups.  The option
makes it run the workload multiple times and it will reuse the evlist
and evsel for each run.

While most of resources are allocated and freed properly, the id hash
in the evlist was not and it resulted in the bug.  You can see it with
the address sanitizer like below:

  $ perf stat -r 100 -e '{cycles,instructions}' true
  =================================================================
  ==693052==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on
      address 0x6080000003d0 at pc 0x558c57732835 bp 0x7fff1526adb0 sp 0x7fff1526ada8
  WRITE of size 8 at 0x6080000003d0 thread T0
    #0 0x558c57732834 in hlist_add_head /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/include/linux/list.h:644
    #1 0x558c57732834 in perf_evlist__id_hash /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/evlist.c:237
    #2 0x558c57732834 in perf_evlist__id_add /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/evlist.c:244
    #3 0x558c57732834 in perf_evlist__id_add_fd /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/lib/perf/evlist.c:285
    #4 0x558c5747733e in store_evsel_ids util/evsel.c:2765
    #5 0x558c5747733e in evsel__store_ids util/evsel.c:2782
    #6 0x558c5730b717 in __run_perf_stat /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:895
    #7 0x558c5730b717 in run_perf_stat /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:1014
    #8 0x558c5730b717 in cmd_stat /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/builtin-stat.c:2446
    torvalds#9 0x558c57427c24 in run_builtin /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313
    torvalds#10 0x558c572b1a48 in handle_internal_command /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365
    torvalds#11 0x558c572b1a48 in run_argv /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409
    torvalds#12 0x558c572b1a48 in main /home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539
    torvalds#13 0x7fcadb9f7d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
    torvalds#14 0x558c572b60f9 in _start (/home/namhyung/project/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x45d0f9)

Actually the nodes in the hash table are struct perf_stream_id and
they were freed in the previous run.  Fix it by resetting the hash.

Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225035148.778569-2-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 11, 2021
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Various fixes

This patchset contains various fixes for mlxsw.

Patch #1 fixes a race condition in a selftest. The race and fix are
explained in detail in the changelog.

Patch #2 re-adds a link mode that was wrongly removed, resulting in a
regression in some setups.

Patch #3 fixes a race condition in route installation with nexthop
objects.

Please consider patches #2 and #3 for stable.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225165721.1322424-1-idosch@idosch.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 11, 2021
Michael Chan says:

====================
bnxt_en: Error recovery bug fixes.

Two error recovery related bug fixes for 2 corner cases.

Please queue patch #2 for -stable.  Thanks.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1614332590-17865-1-git-send-email-michael.chan@broadcom.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 11, 2021
label err_eni_release is reachable when eni_start() fail.
In eni_start() it calls dev->phy->start() in the last step, if start()
fail we don't need to call phy->stop(), if start() is never called, we
neither need to call phy->stop(), otherwise null-ptr-deref will happen.

In order to fix this issue, don't call phy->stop() in label err_eni_release

[    4.875714] ==================================================================
[    4.876091] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.876433] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000030 by task modprobe/95
[    4.876778]
[    4.876862] CPU: 0 PID: 95 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-00090-gdcc0b49040c7 #2
[    4.877290] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-48-gd94
[    4.877876] Call Trace:
[    4.878009]  dump_stack+0x7d/0xa3
[    4.878191]  kasan_report.cold+0x10c/0x10e
[    4.878410]  ? __slab_free+0x2f0/0x340
[    4.878612]  ? suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.878832]  suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.879043]  eni_do_release+0x3b/0x70 [eni]
[    4.879269]  eni_init_one.cold+0x1152/0x1747 [eni]
[    4.879528]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7b/0xd0
[    4.879768]  ? eni_ioctl+0x270/0x270 [eni]
[    4.879990]  ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[    4.880226]  ? eni_ioctl+0x270/0x270 [eni]
[    4.880448]  local_pci_probe+0x6f/0xb0
[    4.880650]  pci_device_probe+0x171/0x240
[    4.880864]  ? pci_device_remove+0xe0/0xe0
[    4.881086]  ? kernfs_create_link+0xb6/0x110
[    4.881315]  ? sysfs_do_create_link_sd.isra.0+0x76/0xe0
[    4.881594]  really_probe+0x161/0x420
[    4.881791]  driver_probe_device+0x6d/0xd0
[    4.882010]  device_driver_attach+0x82/0x90
[    4.882233]  ? device_driver_attach+0x90/0x90
[    4.882465]  __driver_attach+0x60/0x100
[    4.882671]  ? device_driver_attach+0x90/0x90
[    4.882903]  bus_for_each_dev+0xe1/0x140
[    4.883114]  ? subsys_dev_iter_exit+0x10/0x10
[    4.883346]  ? klist_node_init+0x61/0x80
[    4.883557]  bus_add_driver+0x254/0x2a0
[    4.883764]  driver_register+0xd3/0x150
[    4.883971]  ? 0xffffffffc0038000
[    4.884149]  do_one_initcall+0x84/0x250
[    4.884355]  ? trace_event_raw_event_initcall_finish+0x150/0x150
[    4.884674]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.884875]  ? ____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x84/0xa0
[    4.885150]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.885352]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.885557]  do_init_module+0xf8/0x350
[    4.885760]  load_module+0x3fe6/0x4340
[    4.885960]  ? vm_unmap_ram+0x1d0/0x1d0
[    4.886166]  ? ____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x84/0xa0
[    4.886441]  ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[    4.886697]  ? __do_sys_finit_module+0x108/0x170
[    4.886941]  __do_sys_finit_module+0x108/0x170
[    4.887178]  ? __ia32_sys_init_module+0x40/0x40
[    4.887419]  ? file_open_root+0x200/0x200
[    4.887634]  ? do_sys_open+0x85/0xe0
[    4.887826]  ? filp_open+0x50/0x50
[    4.888009]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x4d/0x60
[    4.888287]  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2f/0x130
[    4.888547]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[    4.888739]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[    4.889010] RIP: 0033:0x7ff62fcf1cf7
[    4.889202] Code: 48 89 57 30 48 8b 04 24 48 89 47 38 e9 1d a0 02 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f71
[    4.890172] RSP: 002b:00007ffe6644ade8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[    4.890570] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000f2ca70 RCX: 00007ff62fcf1cf7
[    4.890944] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000f2b9e0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[    4.891318] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[    4.891691] R10: 00007ff62fd55300 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000f2b9e0
[    4.892064] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000f2bdd0 R15: 0000000000000001
[    4.892439] ==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 19, 2024
Guangguan Wang says:

====================
net: several fixes for smc

v1 -> v2:
rewrite patch #2 suggested by Paolo.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 2, 2025
[ Upstream commit 05aa156 ]

The mapping VMA address is saved in VAS window struct when the
paste address is mapped. This VMA address is used during migration
to unmap the paste address if the window is active. The paste
address mapping will be removed when the window is closed or with
the munmap(). But the VMA address in the VAS window is not updated
with munmap() which is causing invalid access during migration.

The KASAN report shows:
[16386.254991] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8
[16386.255043] Read of size 8 at addr c00000014a819670 by task drmgr/696928

[16386.255096] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 696928 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B              6.11.0-rc5-nxgzip #2
[16386.255128] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
[16386.255148] Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX Power11 (architected) 0x820200 0xf000007 of:IBM,FW1110.00 (NH1110_016) hv:phyp pSeries
[16386.255181] Call Trace:
[16386.255202] [c00000016b297660] [c0000000018ad0ac] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe8 (unreliable)
[16386.255246] [c00000016b297690] [c0000000006e8a90] print_report+0x19c/0x764
[16386.255285] [c00000016b297760] [c0000000006e9490] kasan_report+0x128/0x1f8
[16386.255309] [c00000016b297880] [c0000000006eb5c8] __asan_load8+0xac/0xe0
[16386.255326] [c00000016b2978a0] [c00000000013f898] reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8
[16386.255343] [c00000016b297990] [c000000000140e58] vas_migration_handler+0x3a4/0x3fc
[16386.255368] [c00000016b297a90] [c000000000128848] pseries_migrate_partition+0x4c/0x4c4
...

[16386.256136] Allocated by task 696554 on cpu 31 at 16377.277618s:
[16386.256149]  kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256163]  kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80
[16386.256175]  kasan_save_alloc_info+0x58/0x74
[16386.256196]  __kasan_slab_alloc+0xb8/0xdc
[16386.256209]  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x200/0x3d0
[16386.256225]  vm_area_alloc+0x44/0x150
[16386.256245]  mmap_region+0x214/0x10c4
[16386.256265]  do_mmap+0x5fc/0x750
[16386.256277]  vm_mmap_pgoff+0x14c/0x24c
[16386.256292]  ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x20c/0x348
[16386.256303]  sys_mmap+0xd0/0x160
...

[16386.256350] Freed by task 0 on cpu 31 at 16386.204848s:
[16386.256363]  kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256374]  kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80
[16386.256384]  kasan_save_free_info+0x64/0x10c
[16386.256396]  __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x204
[16386.256415]  kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x450
[16386.256428]  vm_area_free_rcu_cb+0xa8/0xd8
[16386.256441]  rcu_do_batch+0x2c8/0xcf0
[16386.256458]  rcu_core+0x378/0x3c4
[16386.256473]  handle_softirqs+0x20c/0x60c
[16386.256495]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x6c/0x88
[16386.256509]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x58/0x88
[16386.256521]  __irq_exit_rcu+0x1a4/0x20c
[16386.256533]  irq_exit+0x20/0x38
[16386.256544]  interrupt_async_exit_prepare.constprop.0+0x18/0x2c
...

[16386.256717] Last potentially related work creation:
[16386.256729]  kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256741]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xcc/0x12c
[16386.256753]  __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x94/0xd04
[16386.256766]  vm_area_free+0x28/0x3c
[16386.256778]  remove_vma+0xf4/0x114
[16386.256797]  do_vmi_align_munmap.constprop.0+0x684/0x870
[16386.256811]  __vm_munmap+0xe0/0x1f8
[16386.256821]  sys_munmap+0x54/0x6c
[16386.256830]  system_call_exception+0x1a0/0x4a0
[16386.256841]  system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec

[16386.256868] The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000014a819670
                which belongs to the cache vm_area_struct of size 168
[16386.256887] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
                freed 168-byte region [c00000014a819670, c00000014a819718)

[16386.256915] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[16386.256928] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14a81
[16386.256950] memcg:c0000000ba430001
[16386.256961] anon flags: 0x43ffff800000000(node=4|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff)
[16386.256975] page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab)
[16386.256990] raw: 043ffff800000000 c00000000501c080 0000000000000000 5deadbee00000001
[16386.257003] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000011a011a 00000001fdffffff c0000000ba430001
[16386.257018] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

This patch adds close() callback in vas_vm_ops vm_operations_struct
which will be executed during munmap() before freeing VMA. The VMA
address in the VAS window is set to NULL after holding the window
mmap_mutex.

Fixes: 37e6764 ("powerpc/pseries/vas: Add VAS migration handler")
Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241214051758.997759-1-haren@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 2, 2025
The mapping VMA address is saved in VAS window struct when the
paste address is mapped. This VMA address is used during migration
to unmap the paste address if the window is active. The paste
address mapping will be removed when the window is closed or with
the munmap(). But the VMA address in the VAS window is not updated
with munmap() which is causing invalid access during migration.

The KASAN report shows:
[16386.254991] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8
[16386.255043] Read of size 8 at addr c00000014a819670 by task drmgr/696928

[16386.255096] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 696928 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B              6.11.0-rc5-nxgzip #2
[16386.255128] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
[16386.255148] Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX Power11 (architected) 0x820200 0xf000007 of:IBM,FW1110.00 (NH1110_016) hv:phyp pSeries
[16386.255181] Call Trace:
[16386.255202] [c00000016b297660] [c0000000018ad0ac] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe8 (unreliable)
[16386.255246] [c00000016b297690] [c0000000006e8a90] print_report+0x19c/0x764
[16386.255285] [c00000016b297760] [c0000000006e9490] kasan_report+0x128/0x1f8
[16386.255309] [c00000016b297880] [c0000000006eb5c8] __asan_load8+0xac/0xe0
[16386.255326] [c00000016b2978a0] [c00000000013f898] reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8
[16386.255343] [c00000016b297990] [c000000000140e58] vas_migration_handler+0x3a4/0x3fc
[16386.255368] [c00000016b297a90] [c000000000128848] pseries_migrate_partition+0x4c/0x4c4
...

[16386.256136] Allocated by task 696554 on cpu 31 at 16377.277618s:
[16386.256149]  kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256163]  kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80
[16386.256175]  kasan_save_alloc_info+0x58/0x74
[16386.256196]  __kasan_slab_alloc+0xb8/0xdc
[16386.256209]  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x200/0x3d0
[16386.256225]  vm_area_alloc+0x44/0x150
[16386.256245]  mmap_region+0x214/0x10c4
[16386.256265]  do_mmap+0x5fc/0x750
[16386.256277]  vm_mmap_pgoff+0x14c/0x24c
[16386.256292]  ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x20c/0x348
[16386.256303]  sys_mmap+0xd0/0x160
...

[16386.256350] Freed by task 0 on cpu 31 at 16386.204848s:
[16386.256363]  kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256374]  kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80
[16386.256384]  kasan_save_free_info+0x64/0x10c
[16386.256396]  __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x204
[16386.256415]  kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x450
[16386.256428]  vm_area_free_rcu_cb+0xa8/0xd8
[16386.256441]  rcu_do_batch+0x2c8/0xcf0
[16386.256458]  rcu_core+0x378/0x3c4
[16386.256473]  handle_softirqs+0x20c/0x60c
[16386.256495]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x6c/0x88
[16386.256509]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x58/0x88
[16386.256521]  __irq_exit_rcu+0x1a4/0x20c
[16386.256533]  irq_exit+0x20/0x38
[16386.256544]  interrupt_async_exit_prepare.constprop.0+0x18/0x2c
...

[16386.256717] Last potentially related work creation:
[16386.256729]  kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256741]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xcc/0x12c
[16386.256753]  __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x94/0xd04
[16386.256766]  vm_area_free+0x28/0x3c
[16386.256778]  remove_vma+0xf4/0x114
[16386.256797]  do_vmi_align_munmap.constprop.0+0x684/0x870
[16386.256811]  __vm_munmap+0xe0/0x1f8
[16386.256821]  sys_munmap+0x54/0x6c
[16386.256830]  system_call_exception+0x1a0/0x4a0
[16386.256841]  system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec

[16386.256868] The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000014a819670
                which belongs to the cache vm_area_struct of size 168
[16386.256887] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
                freed 168-byte region [c00000014a819670, c00000014a819718)

[16386.256915] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[16386.256928] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14a81
[16386.256950] memcg:c0000000ba430001
[16386.256961] anon flags: 0x43ffff800000000(node=4|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff)
[16386.256975] page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab)
[16386.256990] raw: 043ffff800000000 c00000000501c080 0000000000000000 5deadbee00000001
[16386.257003] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000011a011a 00000001fdffffff c0000000ba430001
[16386.257018] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

This patch adds close() callback in vas_vm_ops vm_operations_struct
which will be executed during munmap() before freeing VMA. The VMA
address in the VAS window is set to NULL after holding the window
mmap_mutex.

Fixes: 37e6764 ("powerpc/pseries/vas: Add VAS migration handler")
Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241214051758.997759-1-haren@linux.ibm.com
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 10, 2025
Access to genmask field in struct nft_set_ext results in unaligned
atomic read:

[   72.130109] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff0000c2bb708c
[   72.131036] Mem abort info:
[   72.131213]   ESR = 0x0000000096000021
[   72.131446]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   72.132209]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   72.133216]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   72.134080]   FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
[   72.135593] Data abort info:
[   72.137194]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000021, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[   72.142351]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[   72.145989]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[   72.150115] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000237d27000
[   72.154893] [ffff0000c2bb708c] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=180000023ffff403, pud=180000023f84b403, pmd=180000023f835403,
+pte=0068000102bb7707
[   72.163021] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] SMP
[...]
[   72.170041] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/7:0 Tainted: G            E      6.13.0-rc3+ #2
[   72.170509] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[   72.170720] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-stable202302-for-qemu 03/01/2023
[   72.171192] Workqueue: events_power_efficient nft_rhash_gc [nf_tables]
[   72.171552] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   72.171915] pc : nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables]
[   72.172166] lr : nft_rhash_gc+0x128/0x2d8 [nf_tables]
[   72.172546] sp : ffff800081f2bce0
[   72.172724] x29: ffff800081f2bd40 x28: ffff0000c2bb708c x27: 0000000000000038
[   72.173078] x26: ffff0000c6780ef0 x25: ffff0000c643df00 x24: ffff0000c6778f78
[   72.173431] x23: 000000000000001a x22: ffff0000c4b1f000 x21: ffff0000c6780f78
[   72.173782] x20: ffff0000c2bb70dc x19: ffff0000c2bb7080 x18: 0000000000000000
[   72.174135] x17: ffff0000c0a4e1c0 x16: 0000000000003000 x15: 0000ac26d173b978
[   72.174485] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000030 x12: ffff0000c6780ef0
[   72.174841] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff800081f2bcf8 x9 : ffff0000c3000000
[   72.175193] x8 : 00000000000004be x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[   72.175544] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff0000c3000010 x3 : 0000000000000000
[   72.175871] x2 : 0000000000003a98 x1 : ffff0000c2bb708c x0 : 0000000000000004
[   72.176207] Call trace:
[   72.176316]  nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables] (P)
[   72.176653]  process_one_work+0x178/0x3d0
[   72.176831]  worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0
[   72.176995]  kthread+0xe8/0xf8
[   72.177130]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[   72.177289] Code: 54fff984 d503201f d2800080 91003261 (f820303f)
[   72.177557] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Align struct nft_set_ext to word size to address this and
documentation it.

pahole reports that this increases the size of elements for rhash and
pipapo in 8 bytes on x86_64.

Fixes: 7ffc748 ("netfilter: nft_set_hash: skip duplicated elements pending gc run")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 10, 2025
syzbot reports that a recent fix causes nesting issues between the (now)
raw timeoutlock and the eventfd locking:

=============================
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f torvalds#29 Not tainted
-----------------------------
kworker/u32:0/68094 is trying to lock:
ffff000014d7a520 (&ctx->wqh#2){..-.}-{3:3}, at: eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
6 locks held by kworker/u32:0/68094:
 #0: ffff0000c1d98148 ((wq_completion)iou_exit){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x4e8/0xfc0
 #1: ffff80008d927c78 ((work_completion)(&ctx->exit_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x53c/0xfc0
 #2: ffff0000c59bc3d8 (&ctx->completion_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x40/0x180
 #3: ffff0000c59bc358 (&ctx->timeout_lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: io_kill_timeouts+0x48/0x180
 #4: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38
 #5: ffff800085127aa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x8/0x38
stack backtrace:
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 68094 Comm: kworker/u32:0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4-00080-g9828a4c0901f torvalds#29
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: iou_exit io_ring_exit_work
Call trace:
 show_stack+0x1c/0x30 (C)
 __dump_stack+0x24/0x30
 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x80
 dump_stack+0x14/0x20
 __lock_acquire+0x19f8/0x60c8
 lock_acquire+0x1a4/0x540
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x90/0xd0
 eventfd_signal_mask+0x64/0x180
 io_eventfd_signal+0x64/0x108
 io_req_local_work_add+0x294/0x430
 __io_req_task_work_add+0x1c0/0x270
 io_kill_timeout+0x1f0/0x288
 io_kill_timeouts+0xd4/0x180
 io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x2e8/0x388
 io_ring_exit_work+0x150/0x550
 process_one_work+0x5e8/0xfc0
 worker_thread+0x7ec/0xc80
 kthread+0x24c/0x300
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

because after the preempt-rt fix for the timeout lock nesting inside
the io-wq lock, we now have the eventfd spinlock nesting inside the
raw timeout spinlock.

Rather than play whack-a-mole with other nesting on the timeout lock,
split the deletion and killing of timeouts so queueing the task_work
for the timeout cancelations can get done outside of the timeout lock.

Reported-by: syzbot+b1fc199a40b65d601b65@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 020b40f ("io_uring: make ctx->timeout_lock a raw spinlock")
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 10, 2025
…le_direct_reclaim()

The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false.  

 #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac
 #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c
 #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c
 #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550
 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68
 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660
 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98
 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8
 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974
 torvalds#9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4

At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones:

        NODE: 4  ZONE: 0  ADDR: ffff00817fffe540  NAME: "DMA32"
          SIZE: 20480  MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45
          VM_STAT:
                NR_FREE_PAGES: 359
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0
          NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
        NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
                     NR_MLOCK: 0
                    NR_BOUNCE: 0
                   NR_ZSPAGES: 0
            NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0

        NODE: 4  ZONE: 1  ADDR: ffff00817fffec00  NAME: "Normal"
          SIZE: 8454144  PRESENT: 98304  MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264
          VM_STAT:
                NR_FREE_PAGES: 146
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78
          NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
        NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
                     NR_MLOCK: 0
                    NR_BOUNCE: 0
                   NR_ZSPAGES: 0
            NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0

In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of
inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages()
based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero.  

Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/
active anonymous pages is skipped.

        crash> p nr_swap_pages
        nr_swap_pages = $1937 = {
          counter = 0
        }

As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to
the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having
free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark.

The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented.

        crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures
        $1935 = 0x0

This is because the node deemed balanced.  The node balancing logic in
balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively.  If one or more zones
(e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the
entire node is deemed balanced.  This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early
before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall
memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain
under significant pressure.


The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are
available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages).  This change prevents
zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being
mistakenly deemed unreclaimable.  By doing so, the patch ensures proper
node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL,
and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false.


The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused
by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain
zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL.  This issue arises from
zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file-
backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient
free pages to be skipped.

The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored
during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones.  Consequently,
pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback
mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an
infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim().

This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist.  This ensures zones
with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and
reclaim behavior.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130164346.436469-1-snishika@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130161236.433747-2-snishika@redhat.com
Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations")
Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <snishika@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 10, 2025
We found a timeout problem with the pldm command on our system.  The
reason is that the MCTP-I3C driver has a race condition when receiving
multiple-packet messages in multi-thread, resulting in a wrong packet
order problem.

We identified this problem by adding a debug message to the
mctp_i3c_read function.

According to the MCTP spec, a multiple-packet message must be composed
in sequence, and if there is a wrong sequence, the whole message will be
discarded and wait for the next SOM.
For example, SOM → Pkt Seq #2 → Pkt Seq #1 → Pkt Seq #3 → EOM.

Therefore, we try to solve this problem by adding a mutex to the
mctp_i3c_read function.  Before the modification, when a command
requesting a multiple-packet message response is sent consecutively, an
error usually occurs within 100 loops.  After the mutex, it can go
through 40000 loops without any error, and it seems to run well.

Fixes: c8755b2 ("mctp i3c: MCTP I3C driver")
Signed-off-by: Leo Yang <Leo-Yang@quantatw.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250107031529.3296094-1-Leo-Yang@quantatw.com
[pabeni@redhat.com: dropped already answered question from changelog]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 10, 2025
[ Upstream commit 542ed81 ]

Access to genmask field in struct nft_set_ext results in unaligned
atomic read:

[   72.130109] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff0000c2bb708c
[   72.131036] Mem abort info:
[   72.131213]   ESR = 0x0000000096000021
[   72.131446]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   72.132209]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   72.133216]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   72.134080]   FSC = 0x21: alignment fault
[   72.135593] Data abort info:
[   72.137194]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000021, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[   72.142351]   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[   72.145989]   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[   72.150115] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000237d27000
[   72.154893] [ffff0000c2bb708c] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=180000023ffff403, pud=180000023f84b403, pmd=180000023f835403,
+pte=0068000102bb7707
[   72.163021] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000021 [#1] SMP
[...]
[   72.170041] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kworker/7:0 Tainted: G            E      6.13.0-rc3+ #2
[   72.170509] Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
[   72.170720] Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS edk2-stable202302-for-qemu 03/01/2023
[   72.171192] Workqueue: events_power_efficient nft_rhash_gc [nf_tables]
[   72.171552] pstate: 21400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[   72.171915] pc : nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables]
[   72.172166] lr : nft_rhash_gc+0x128/0x2d8 [nf_tables]
[   72.172546] sp : ffff800081f2bce0
[   72.172724] x29: ffff800081f2bd40 x28: ffff0000c2bb708c x27: 0000000000000038
[   72.173078] x26: ffff0000c6780ef0 x25: ffff0000c643df00 x24: ffff0000c6778f78
[   72.173431] x23: 000000000000001a x22: ffff0000c4b1f000 x21: ffff0000c6780f78
[   72.173782] x20: ffff0000c2bb70dc x19: ffff0000c2bb7080 x18: 0000000000000000
[   72.174135] x17: ffff0000c0a4e1c0 x16: 0000000000003000 x15: 0000ac26d173b978
[   72.174485] x14: ffffffffffffffff x13: 0000000000000030 x12: ffff0000c6780ef0
[   72.174841] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff800081f2bcf8 x9 : ffff0000c3000000
[   72.175193] x8 : 00000000000004be x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[   72.175544] x5 : 0000000000000040 x4 : ffff0000c3000010 x3 : 0000000000000000
[   72.175871] x2 : 0000000000003a98 x1 : ffff0000c2bb708c x0 : 0000000000000004
[   72.176207] Call trace:
[   72.176316]  nft_rhash_gc+0x200/0x2d8 [nf_tables] (P)
[   72.176653]  process_one_work+0x178/0x3d0
[   72.176831]  worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0
[   72.176995]  kthread+0xe8/0xf8
[   72.177130]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[   72.177289] Code: 54fff984 d503201f d2800080 91003261 (f820303f)
[   72.177557] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Align struct nft_set_ext to word size to address this and
documentation it.

pahole reports that this increases the size of elements for rhash and
pipapo in 8 bytes on x86_64.

Fixes: 7ffc748 ("netfilter: nft_set_hash: skip duplicated elements pending gc run")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 10, 2025
[ Upstream commit 4d94f05 ]

This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs
like the bellow:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070:
 #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #2: ffff8880665d0078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915
CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 __might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline]
 hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939
 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline]
 hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569
 hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
 </TASK>

Reported-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2fb0835e0c9cefc34614
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 10, 2025
…le_direct_reclaim()

commit 6aaced5 upstream.

The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false.

 #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac
 #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c
 #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c
 #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550
 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68
 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660
 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98
 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8
 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974
 torvalds#9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4

At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones:

        NODE: 4  ZONE: 0  ADDR: ffff00817fffe540  NAME: "DMA32"
          SIZE: 20480  MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45
          VM_STAT:
                NR_FREE_PAGES: 359
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0
          NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
        NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
                     NR_MLOCK: 0
                    NR_BOUNCE: 0
                   NR_ZSPAGES: 0
            NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0

        NODE: 4  ZONE: 1  ADDR: ffff00817fffec00  NAME: "Normal"
          SIZE: 8454144  PRESENT: 98304  MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264
          VM_STAT:
                NR_FREE_PAGES: 146
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78
          NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
        NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
                     NR_MLOCK: 0
                    NR_BOUNCE: 0
                   NR_ZSPAGES: 0
            NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0

In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of
inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages()
based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero.

Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/
active anonymous pages is skipped.

        crash> p nr_swap_pages
        nr_swap_pages = $1937 = {
          counter = 0
        }

As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to
the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having
free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark.

The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented.

        crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures
        $1935 = 0x0

This is because the node deemed balanced.  The node balancing logic in
balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively.  If one or more zones
(e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the
entire node is deemed balanced.  This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early
before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall
memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain
under significant pressure.


The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are
available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages).  This change prevents
zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being
mistakenly deemed unreclaimable.  By doing so, the patch ensures proper
node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL,
and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false.


The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused
by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain
zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL.  This issue arises from
zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file-
backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient
free pages to be skipped.

The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored
during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones.  Consequently,
pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback
mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an
infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim().

This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist.  This ensures zones
with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and
reclaim behavior.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130164346.436469-1-snishika@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130161236.433747-2-snishika@redhat.com
Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations")
Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <snishika@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2025
This commit addresses a circular locking dependency issue within the GFX
isolation mechanism. The problem was identified by a warning indicating
a potential deadlock due to inconsistent lock acquisition order.

- The `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use` and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_end_use` functions previously
  acquired `enforce_isolation_mutex` and called `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl`,
  leading to potential deadlocks. ie., If `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is
  called while `enforce_isolation_mutex` is held, and
  `amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler` is called while `kfd_sch_mutex` is
  held, it can create a circular dependency.

By ensuring consistent lock usage, this fix resolves the issue:

[  606.297333] ======================================================
[  606.297343] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  606.297353] 6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof torvalds#19 Tainted: G           OE
[  606.297365] ------------------------------------------------------
[  606.297375] kworker/u96:3/3825 is trying to acquire lock:
[  606.297385] ffff9aa64e431cb8 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.297413]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  606.297423] ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.297725]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  606.297738]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  606.297749]
               -> #2 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.297765]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.297776]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.297786]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298007]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298225]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.298412]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298603]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.298866]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.298880]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.298890]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.298899]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.298908]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.298919]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.298929]
               -> #1 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  606.298947]        __mutex_lock+0x85/0x930
[  606.298956]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  606.298966]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_handler+0x87/0x370 [amdgpu]
[  606.299190]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.299199]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.299208]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.299217]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.299227]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.299236]
               -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  606.299257]        __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.299267]        lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.299276]        __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.299286]        cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.299296]        amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299509]        amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.299723]        amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.299909]        amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300101]        amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300355]        drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.300369]        process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.300378]        worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.300387]        kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.300396]        ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.300406]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.300416]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  606.300428] Chain exists of:
                 (work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work) --> &adev->enforce_isolation_mutex --> &adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex

[  606.300458]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  606.300468]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  606.300476]        ----                    ----
[  606.300484]   lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300494]                                lock(&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex);
[  606.300508]                                lock(&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex);
[  606.300521]   lock((work_completion)(&(&adev->gfx.enforce_isolation[i].work)->work));
[  606.300536]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[  606.300546] 5 locks held by kworker/u96:3/3825:
[  606.300555]  #0: ffff9aa5aa1f5d58 ((wq_completion)comp_1.1.0){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x3f5/0x680
[  606.300577]  #1: ffffaa53c3c97e40 ((work_completion)(&sched->work_run_job)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1d6/0x680
[  606.300600]  #2: ffff9aa64e463c98 (&adev->enforce_isolation_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x1c3/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.300837]  #3: ffff9aa64e432338 (&adev->gfx.kfd_sch_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x51/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301062]  #4: ffffffff8c1a5660 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x70/0x610
[  606.301083]
               stack backtrace:
[  606.301092] CPU: 14 PID: 3825 Comm: kworker/u96:3 Tainted: G           OE      6.10.0-amd-mlkd-610-311224-lof torvalds#19
[  606.301109] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. X570S GAMING X/X570S GAMING X, BIOS F7 03/22/2024
[  606.301124] Workqueue: comp_1.1.0 drm_sched_run_job_work [gpu_sched]
[  606.301140] Call Trace:
[  606.301146]  <TASK>
[  606.301154]  dump_stack_lvl+0x9b/0xf0
[  606.301166]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[  606.301175]  print_circular_bug+0x26c/0x340
[  606.301187]  check_noncircular+0x157/0x170
[  606.301197]  ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x490
[  606.301213]  __lock_acquire+0x16f9/0x2810
[  606.301230]  lock_acquire+0xd1/0x300
[  606.301239]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301250]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301261]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301274]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301284]  __flush_work+0x250/0x610
[  606.301293]  ? __flush_work+0x232/0x610
[  606.301305]  ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
[  606.301318]  ? mark_held_locks+0x54/0x90
[  606.301331]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.301345]  cancel_delayed_work_sync+0x71/0x80
[  606.301356]  amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl+0x287/0x4d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.301661]  amdgpu_gfx_enforce_isolation_ring_begin_use+0x2a4/0x5d0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302050]  ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[  606.302069]  amdgpu_ring_alloc+0x48/0x70 [amdgpu]
[  606.302452]  amdgpu_ib_schedule+0x176/0x8a0 [amdgpu]
[  606.302862]  ? drm_sched_entity_error+0x82/0x190 [gpu_sched]
[  606.302890]  amdgpu_job_run+0xac/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
[  606.303366]  drm_sched_run_job_work+0x24f/0x430 [gpu_sched]
[  606.303388]  process_one_work+0x21e/0x680
[  606.303409]  worker_thread+0x190/0x350
[  606.303424]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303437]  kthread+0xe7/0x120
[  606.303449]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303463]  ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
[  606.303476]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  606.303489]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[  606.303512]  </TASK>

v2: Refactor lock handling to resolve circular dependency (Alex)

- Introduced a `sched_work` flag to defer the call to
  `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` until after releasing
  `enforce_isolation_mutex`.
- This change ensures that `amdgpu_gfx_kfd_sch_ctrl` is called outside
  the critical section, preventing the circular dependency and deadlock.
- The `sched_work` flag is set within the mutex-protected section if
  conditions are met, and the actual function call is made afterward.
- This approach ensures consistent lock acquisition order.

Fixes: afefd6f ("drm/amdgpu: Implement Enforce Isolation Handler for KGD/KFD serialization")
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Srinivasan Shanmugam <srinivasan.shanmugam@amd.com>
Suggested-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0b6b2dd)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2025
syz reports an out of bounds read:

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334
[inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0
fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88804d8b9982 by task syz-executor.2/14802

CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 14802 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc4 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1
04/01/2014
Sched_ext: serialise (enabled+all), task: runnable_at=-10ms
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x229/0x350 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0x164/0x530 mm/kasan/report.c:489
kasan_report+0x147/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:602
ocfs2_match fs/ocfs2/dir.c:334 [inline]
ocfs2_search_dirblock+0x283/0x6e0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:367
ocfs2_find_entry_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:414 [inline]
ocfs2_find_entry+0x1143/0x2db0 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1078
ocfs2_find_files_on_disk+0x18e/0x530 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:1981
ocfs2_lookup_ino_from_name+0xb6/0x110 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:2003
ocfs2_lookup+0x30a/0xd40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:122
lookup_open fs/namei.c:3627 [inline]
open_last_lookups fs/namei.c:3748 [inline]
path_openat+0x145a/0x3870 fs/namei.c:3984
do_filp_open+0xe9/0x1c0 fs/namei.c:4014
do_sys_openat2+0x135/0x1d0 fs/open.c:1402
do_sys_open fs/open.c:1417 [inline]
__do_sys_openat fs/open.c:1433 [inline]
__se_sys_openat fs/open.c:1428 [inline]
__x64_sys_openat+0x15d/0x1c0 fs/open.c:1428
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf6/0x210 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f01076903ad
Code: c3 e8 a7 2b 00 00 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89
f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01
f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f01084acfc8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000101
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f01077cbf80 RCX: 00007f01076903ad
RDX: 0000000000105042 RSI: 0000000020000080 RDI: ffffffffffffff9c
RBP: 00007f01077cbf80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000001ff R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f01077cbf80 R14: 00007f010764fc90 R15: 00007f010848d000
</TASK>
==================================================================

And a general protection fault in ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert:

==================================================================
loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 32768
JBD2: Ignoring recovery information on journal
ocfs2: Mounting device (7,0) on (node local, slot 0) with ordered data
mode.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5096 Comm: syz-executor792 Not tainted
6.11.0-rc4-syzkaller-00002-gb0da640826ba #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_find_dir_space_id fs/ocfs2/dir.c:3406 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert+0x3309/0x5c70 fs/ocfs2/dir.c:4280
Code: 00 00 e8 2a 25 13 fe e9 ba 06 00 00 e8 20 25 13 fe e9 4f 01 00 00
e8 16 25 13 fe 49 8d 7f 08 49 8d 5f 09 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6
04 20 84 c0 0f 85 bd 23 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 0f
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000af9f020 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000009 RCX: ffff88801e27a440
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000400 RDI: 0000000000000008
RBP: ffffc9000af9f830 R08: ffffffff8380395b R09: ffffffff838090a7
R10: 0000000000000002 R11: ffff88801e27a440 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: ffff88803c660878 R14: f700000000000088 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  000055555a677380(0000) GS:ffff888020800000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000560bce569178 CR3: 000000001de5a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ocfs2_mknod+0xcaf/0x2b40 fs/ocfs2/namei.c:292
vfs_mknod+0x36d/0x3b0 fs/namei.c:4088
do_mknodat+0x3ec/0x5b0
__do_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4166 [inline]
__se_sys_mknodat fs/namei.c:4163 [inline]
__x64_sys_mknodat+0xa7/0xc0 fs/namei.c:4163
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f2dafda3a99
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 f1 17 00 00 90 48 89
f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08
0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8
64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffe336a6658 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
0000000000000103
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX:
00007f2dafda3a99
RDX: 00000000000021c0 RSI: 0000000020000040 RDI:
00000000ffffff9c
RBP: 00007f2dafe1b5f0 R08: 0000000000004480 R09:
000055555a6784c0
R10: 0000000000000103 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
00007ffe336a6680
R13: 00007ffe336a68a8 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15:
00007f2dafdec03b
</TASK>
==================================================================

The two reports are all caused invalid negative i_size of dir inode.  For
ocfs2, dir_inode can't be negative or zero.

Here add a check in which is called by ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry().  It
fixes the second report as ocfs2_check_dir_for_entry() must be called
before ocfs2_prepare_dir_for_insert().  Also set a up limit for dir with
OCFS2_INLINE_DATA_FL.  The i_size can't be great than blocksize.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250106140640.92260-1-glass.su@suse.com
Reported-by: Jiacheng Xu <stitch@zju.edu.cn>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ocfs2-devel/17a04f01.1ae74.19436d003fc.Coremail.stitch@zju.edu.cn/T/#u
Reported-by: syzbot+5a64828fcc4c2ad9b04f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/0000000000005894f3062018caf1@google.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Su Yue <glass.su@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2025
Fix a lockdep warning [1] observed during the write combining test.

The warning indicates a potential nested lock scenario that could lead
to a deadlock.

However, this is a false positive alarm because the SF lock and its
parent lock are distinct ones.

The lockdep confusion arises because the locks belong to the same object
class (i.e., struct mlx5_core_dev).

To resolve this, the code has been refactored to avoid taking both
locks. Instead, only the parent lock is acquired.

[1]
raw_ethernet_bw/2118 is trying to acquire lock:
[  213.619032] ffff88811dd75e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
               mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.620270]
[  213.620270] but task is already holding lock:
[  213.620943] ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at:
               mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.622045]
[  213.622045] other info that might help us debug this:
[  213.622778]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  213.622778]
[  213.623465]        CPU0
[  213.623815]        ----
[  213.624148]   lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[  213.624615]   lock(&dev->wc_state_lock);
[  213.625071]
[  213.625071]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[  213.625071]
[  213.625805]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation
[  213.625805]
[  213.626522] 4 locks held by raw_ethernet_bw/2118:
[  213.627019]  #0: ffff88813f80d578 (&uverbs_dev->disassociate_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0},
                at: ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.628088]  #1: ffff88810fb23930 (&file->hw_destroy_rwsem){.+.+}-{3:3},
                at: ib_init_ucontext+0x2d/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.629094]  #2: ffff88810fb23878 (&file->ucontext_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
                at: ib_init_ucontext+0x49/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.630106]  #3: ffff88810b585e08 (&dev->wc_state_lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
                at: mlx5_wc_support_get+0x10c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.631185]
[  213.631185] stack backtrace:
[  213.631718] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2118 Comm: raw_ethernet_bw Not tainted
               6.12.0-rc7_internal_net_next_mlx5_89a0ad0 #1
[  213.632722] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
               rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  213.633785] Call Trace:
[  213.634099]
[  213.634393]  dump_stack_lvl+0x7e/0xc0
[  213.634806]  print_deadlock_bug+0x278/0x3c0
[  213.635265]  __lock_acquire+0x15f4/0x2c40
[  213.635712]  lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[  213.636120]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.636722]  ? mlx5_ib_enable_lb+0x24/0xa0 [mlx5_ib]
[  213.637277]  __mutex_lock+0x81/0xda0
[  213.637697]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.638305]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.638902]  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x3f/0x70
[  213.639400]  ? mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.640016]  mlx5_wc_support_get+0x18c/0x210 [mlx5_core]
[  213.640615]  set_ucontext_resp+0x68/0x2b0 [mlx5_ib]
[  213.641144]  ? debug_mutex_init+0x33/0x40
[  213.641586]  mlx5_ib_alloc_ucontext+0x18e/0x7b0 [mlx5_ib]
[  213.642145]  ib_init_ucontext+0xa0/0xf0 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.642679]  ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_GET_CONTEXT+0x95/0xc0
                [ib_uverbs]
[  213.643426]  ? _copy_from_user+0x46/0x80
[  213.643878]  ib_uverbs_cmd_verbs+0xa6b/0xc80 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.644426]  ? ib_uverbs_handler_UVERBS_METHOD_INVOKE_WRITE+0x130/0x130
               [ib_uverbs]
[  213.645213]  ? __lock_acquire+0xa99/0x2c40
[  213.645675]  ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x2d0
[  213.646101]  ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.646625]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0xcf/0x1f0
[  213.647102]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x45d/0x770
[  213.647586]  ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xe0/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.648102]  ? ib_uverbs_ioctl+0xc4/0x170 [ib_uverbs]
[  213.648632]  __x64_sys_ioctl+0x4d3/0xaa0
[  213.649060]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x4a8/0x770
[  213.649528]  do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
[  213.649947]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
[  213.650478] RIP: 0033:0x7fa179b0737b
[  213.650893] Code: ff ff ff 85 c0 79 9b 49 c7 c4 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d 4c
               89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8
               10 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d
               7d 2a 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[  213.652619] RSP: 002b:00007ffd2e6d46e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX:
               0000000000000010
[  213.653390] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd2e6d47f8 RCX:
               00007fa179b0737b
[  213.654084] RDX: 00007ffd2e6d47e0 RSI: 00000000c0181b01 RDI:
               0000000000000003
[  213.654767] RBP: 00007ffd2e6d47c0 R08: 00007fa1799be010 R09:
               0000000000000002
[  213.655453] R10: 00007ffd2e6d4960 R11: 0000000000000246 R12:
               00007ffd2e6d487c
[  213.656170] R13: 0000000000000027 R14: 0000000000000001 R15:
               00007ffd2e6d4f70

Fixes: d98995b ("net/mlx5: Reimplement write combining test")
Signed-off-by: Yishai Hadas <yishaih@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael Guralnik <michaelgur@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Larysa Zaremba <larysa.zaremba@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2025
Clear the port select structure on error so no stale values left after
definers are destroyed. That's because the mlx5_lag_destroy_definers()
always try to destroy all lag definers in the tt_map, so in the flow
below lag definers get double-destroyed and cause kernel crash:

  mlx5_lag_port_sel_create()
    mlx5_lag_create_definers()
      mlx5_lag_create_definer()     <- Failed on tt 1
        mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets destroyed
  mlx5_lag_port_sel_create()
    mlx5_lag_create_definers()
      mlx5_lag_create_definer()     <- Failed on tt 0
        mlx5_lag_destroy_definers() <- definers[tt=0] gets double-destroyed

 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008
 Mem abort info:
   ESR = 0x0000000096000005
   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
   SET = 0, FnV = 0
   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
   FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
 Data abort info:
   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
   CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
   GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
 user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=0000000112ce2e00
 [0000000000000008] pgd=0000000000000000, p4d=0000000000000000, pud=0000000000000000
 Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
 Modules linked in: iptable_raw bonding ip_gre ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 geneve ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel ipip tunnel4 ip_tunnel rdma_ucm(OE) rdma_cm(OE) iw_cm(OE) ib_ipoib(OE) ib_cm(OE) ib_umad(OE) mlx5_ib(OE) ib_uverbs(OE) mlx5_fwctl(OE) fwctl(OE) mlx5_core(OE) mlxdevm(OE) ib_core(OE) mlxfw(OE) memtrack(OE) mlx_compat(OE) openvswitch nsh nf_conncount psample xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xfrm_user xfrm_algo xt_addrtype iptable_filter iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc netconsole overlay efi_pstore sch_fq_codel zram ip_tables crct10dif_ce qemu_fw_cfg fuse ipv6 crc_ccitt [last unloaded: mlx_compat(OE)]
  CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 217 Comm: kworker/u53:2 Tainted: G           OE      6.11.0+ #2
  Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
  Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Workqueue: mlx5_lag mlx5_do_bond_work [mlx5_core]
  pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
  pc : mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]
  lr : mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core]
  sp : ffff800085fafb00
  x29: ffff800085fafb00 x28: ffff0000da0c8000 x27: 0000000000000000
  x26: ffff0000da0c8000 x25: ffff0000da0c8000 x24: ffff0000da0c8000
  x23: ffff0000c31f81a0 x22: 0400000000000000 x21: ffff0000da0c8000
  x20: 0000000000000000 x19: 0000000000000001 x18: 0000000000000000
  x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000ffff8b0c9350
  x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800081390d18 x12: ffff800081dc3cc0
  x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000000b10 x9 : ffff80007ab7304c
  x8 : ffff0000d00711f0 x7 : 0000000000000004 x6 : 0000000000000190
  x5 : ffff00027edb3010 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
  x2 : ffff0000d39b8000 x1 : ffff0000d39b8000 x0 : 0400000000000000
  Call trace:
   mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x24/0x2c0 [mlx5_core]
   mlx5_lag_destroy_definer+0x54/0x100 [mlx5_core]
   mlx5_lag_destroy_definers+0xa0/0x108 [mlx5_core]
   mlx5_lag_port_sel_create+0x2d4/0x6f8 [mlx5_core]
   mlx5_activate_lag+0x60c/0x6f8 [mlx5_core]
   mlx5_do_bond_work+0x284/0x5c8 [mlx5_core]
   process_one_work+0x170/0x3e0
   worker_thread+0x2d8/0x3e0
   kthread+0x11c/0x128
   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
  Code: a9025bf5 aa0003f6 a90363f7 f90023f9 (f9400400)
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fixes: dc48516 ("net/mlx5: Lag, add support to create definers for LAG")
Signed-off-by: Mark Zhang <markzhang@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 7, 2025
When COWing a relocation tree path, at relocation.c:replace_path(), we
can trigger a lockdep splat while we are in the btrfs_search_slot() call
against the relocation root. This happens in that callchain at
ctree.c:read_block_for_search() when we happen to find a child extent
buffer already loaded through the fs tree with a lockdep class set to
the fs tree. So when we attempt to lock that extent buffer through a
relocation tree we have to reset the lockdep class to the class for a
relocation tree, since a relocation tree has extent buffers that used
to belong to a fs tree and may currently be already loaded (we swap
extent buffers between the two trees at the end of replace_path()).

However we are missing calls to btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() to reset
the lockdep class at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() before we read lock
an extent buffer, just like we did for btrfs_search_slot() in commit
b40130b ("btrfs: fix lockdep splat with reloc root extent buffers").

So add the missing btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() calls before the
attempts to read lock an extent buffer at ctree.c:read_block_for_search().

The lockdep splat was reported by syzbot and it looks like this:

   ======================================================
   WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
   6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Not tainted
   ------------------------------------------------------
   syz.0.0/5335 is trying to acquire lock:
   ffff8880545dbc38 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146

   but task is already holding lock:
   ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

   -> #2 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}:
          reacquire_held_locks+0x3eb/0x690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5374
          __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5563 [inline]
          lock_release+0x396/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870
          up_write+0x79/0x590 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1629
          btrfs_force_cow_block+0x14b3/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:660
          btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755
          btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153
          replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
          merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
          merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
          relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
          btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
          btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
          __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
          btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
          btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
          vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
          __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
          __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   -> #1 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}:
          lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
          down_write_nested+0xa2/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1693
          btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189
          btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5052 [inline]
          btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x41c/0x1440 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5132
          btrfs_force_cow_block+0x526/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:573
          btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755
          btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153
          btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4351
          btrfs_insert_empty_item fs/btrfs/ctree.h:688 [inline]
          btrfs_insert_inode_ref+0x2bb/0xf80 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:330
          btrfs_rename_exchange fs/btrfs/inode.c:7990 [inline]
          btrfs_rename2+0xcb7/0x2b90 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8374
          vfs_rename+0xbdb/0xf00 fs/namei.c:5067
          do_renameat2+0xd94/0x13f0 fs/namei.c:5224
          __do_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5258 [inline]
          __se_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5255 [inline]
          __x64_sys_renameat2+0xce/0xe0 fs/namei.c:5255
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}:
          check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
          check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
          validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
          __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
          lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
          down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649
          btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146
          btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline]
          read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610
          btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237
          replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
          merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
          merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
          relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
          btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
          btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
          __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
          btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
          btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
          vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
          __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
          __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   other info that might help us debug this:

   Chain exists of:
     btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1 --> btrfs-treloc-02/1

    Possible unsafe locking scenario:

          CPU0                    CPU1
          ----                    ----
     lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1);
                                  lock(btrfs-tree-01/1);
                                  lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1);
     rlock(btrfs-tree-01);

    *** DEADLOCK ***

   8 locks held by syz.0.0/5335:
    #0: ffff88801e3ae420 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x5e/0x200 fs/namespace.c:559
    #1: ffff888052c760d0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __btrfs_balance+0x4c2/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4183
    #2: ffff888052c74850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x775/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4086
    #3: ffff88801e3ae610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xf11/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1659
    #4: ffff888052c76470 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288
    #5: ffff888052c76498 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288
    #6: ffff8880545db878 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189
    #7: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189

   stack backtrace:
   CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5335 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
    dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
    print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074
    check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206
    check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
    check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
    validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
    __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
    lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
    down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649
    btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146
    btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline]
    read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610
    btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237
    replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
    merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
    merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
    relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
    btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
    btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
    __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
    btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
    btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
    vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
    __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
    __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   RIP: 0033:0x7f1ac6985d29
   Code: ff ff c3 (...)
   RSP: 002b:00007f1ac63fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1ac6b76160 RCX: 00007f1ac6985d29
   RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000007
   RBP: 00007f1ac6a01b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
   R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f1ac6b76160 R15: 00007fffda145a88
    </TASK>

Reported-by: syzbot+63913e558c084f7f8fdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/677b3014.050a0220.3b53b0.0064.GAE@google.com/
Fixes: 9978599 ("btrfs: reduce lock contention when eb cache miss for btree search")
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 7, 2025
In "one-shot" mode, turbostat
1. takes a counter snapshot
2. forks and waits for a child
3. takes the end counter snapshot and prints the result.

But turbostat counter snapshots currently use affinity to travel
around the system so that counter reads are "local", and this
affinity must be cleared between #1 and #2 above.

The offending commit removed that reset that allowed the child
to run on cpu_present_set.

Fix that issue, and improve upon the original by using
cpu_possible_set for the child.  This allows the child
to also run on CPUs that hotplug online during its runtime.

Reported-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Fixes: 7bb3fe2 ("tools/power/turbostat: Obey allowed CPUs during startup")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2025
[ Upstream commit be7a6a7 ]

It isn't guaranteed that NETWORK_INTERFACE_INFO::LinkSpeed will always
be set by the server, so the client must handle any values and then
prevent oopses like below from happening:

Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1323 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.13.0-rc7 #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41
04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs] Code: 00 00 48
89 df e8 3b cd 1b c1 41 f6 44 24 2c 04 0f 84 50 01 00 00 48 89 ef e8
e7 d0 1b c1 49 8b 44 24 18 31 d2 49 8d 7c 24 28 <48> f7 74 24 18 48 89
c3 e8 6e cf 1b c1 41 8b 6c 24 28 49 8d 7c 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001817be0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88811230022c RCX: ffffffffc041bd99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000567 RDI: ffff888112300228
RBP: ffff888112300218 R08: fffff52000302f5f R09: ffffed1022fa58ac
R10: ffff888117d2c566 R11: 00000000fffffffe R12: ffff888112300200
R13: 000000012a15343f R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff888113f2db58
FS: 00007fe27119e740(0000) GS:ffff888148600000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fe2633c5000 CR3: 0000000124da0000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __die_body.cold+0x19/0x27
 ? die+0x2e/0x50
 ? do_trap+0x159/0x1b0
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? do_error_trap+0x90/0x130
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? exc_divide_error+0x39/0x50
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? asm_exc_divide_error+0x1a/0x20
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa39/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? cifs_debug_data_proc_show+0xa45/0x1460 [cifs]
 ? seq_read_iter+0x42e/0x790
 seq_read_iter+0x19a/0x790
 proc_reg_read_iter+0xbe/0x110
 ? __pfx_proc_reg_read_iter+0x10/0x10
 vfs_read+0x469/0x570
 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x398/0x760
 ? __pfx_vfs_read+0x10/0x10
 ? find_held_lock+0x8a/0xa0
 ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
 ksys_read+0xd3/0x170
 ? __pfx_ksys_read+0x10/0x10
 ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x50/0x270
 ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x90
 do_syscall_64+0xbb/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fe271288911
Code: 00 48 8b 15 01 25 10 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bd e8
20 ad 01 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d b5 a7 10 00 00 74 13 31 c0 0f 05 <48> 3d
00 f0 ff ff 77 4f c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec
RSP: 002b:00007ffe87c079d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000000
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000040000 RCX: 00007fe271288911
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: 00007fe2633c6000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffe87c07a00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fe2713e6380
R10: 0000000000000022 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000040000
R13: 00007fe2633c6000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>

Fix this by setting cifs_server_iface::speed to a sane value (1Gbps)
by default when link speed is unset.

Cc: Shyam Prasad N <nspmangalore@gmail.com>
Cc: Tom Talpey <tom@talpey.com>
Fixes: a6d8fb5 ("cifs: distribute channels across interfaces based on speed")
Reported-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jay Shin <jaeshin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (Red Hat) <pc@manguebit.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2025
[ Upstream commit 58f038e ]

During the update procedure, when overwrite element in a pre-allocated
htab, the freeing of old_element is protected by the bucket lock. The
reason why the bucket lock is necessary is that the old_element has
already been stashed in htab->extra_elems after alloc_htab_elem()
returns. If freeing the old_element after the bucket lock is unlocked,
the stashed element may be reused by concurrent update procedure and the
freeing of old_element will run concurrently with the reuse of the
old_element. However, the invocation of check_and_free_fields() may
acquire a spin-lock which violates the lockdep rule because its caller
has already held a raw-spin-lock (bucket lock). The following warning
will be reported when such race happens:

  BUG: scheduling while atomic: test_progs/676/0x00000003
  3 locks held by test_progs/676:
  #0: ffffffff864b0240 (rcu_read_lock_trace){....}-{0:0}, at: bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x2c0/0x830
  #1: ffff88810e961188 (&htab->lockdep_key){....}-{2:2}, at: htab_map_update_elem+0x306/0x1500
  #2: ffff8881f4eac1b8 (&base->softirq_expiry_lock){....}-{2:2}, at: hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0
  Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(O)
  Preemption disabled at:
  [<ffffffff817837a3>] htab_map_update_elem+0x293/0x1500
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 676 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G ... 6.12.0+ torvalds#11
  Tainted: [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)...
  Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x70
  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
  __schedule_bug+0x120/0x170
  __schedule+0x300c/0x4800
  schedule_rtlock+0x37/0x60
  rtlock_slowlock_locked+0x6d9/0x54c0
  rt_spin_lock+0x168/0x230
  hrtimer_cancel_wait_running+0xe9/0x1b0
  hrtimer_cancel+0x24/0x30
  bpf_timer_delete_work+0x1d/0x40
  bpf_timer_cancel_and_free+0x5e/0x80
  bpf_obj_free_fields+0x262/0x4a0
  check_and_free_fields+0x1d0/0x280
  htab_map_update_elem+0x7fc/0x1500
  bpf_prog_9f90bc20768e0cb9_overwrite_cb+0x3f/0x43
  bpf_prog_ea601c4649694dbd_overwrite_timer+0x5d/0x7e
  bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x322/0x830
  __sys_bpf+0x135d/0x3ca0
  __x64_sys_bpf+0x75/0xb0
  x64_sys_call+0x1b5/0xa10
  do_syscall_64+0x3b/0xc0
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
  ...
  </TASK>

It seems feasible to break the reuse and refill of per-cpu extra_elems
into two independent parts: reuse the per-cpu extra_elems with bucket
lock being held and refill the old_element as per-cpu extra_elems after
the bucket lock is unlocked. However, it will make the concurrent
overwrite procedures on the same CPU return unexpected -E2BIG error when
the map is full.

Therefore, the patch fixes the lock problem by breaking the cancelling
of bpf_timer into two steps for PREEMPT_RT:
1) use hrtimer_try_to_cancel() and check its return value
2) if the timer is running, use hrtimer_cancel() through a kworker to
   cancel it again
Considering that the current implementation of hrtimer_cancel() will try
to acquire a being held softirq_expiry_lock when the current timer is
running, these steps above are reasonable. However, it also has
downside. When the timer is running, the cancelling of the timer is
delayed when releasing the last map uref. The delay is also fixable
(e.g., break the cancelling of bpf timer into two parts: one part in
locked scope, another one in unlocked scope), it can be revised later if
necessary.

It is a bit hard to decide the right fix tag. One reason is that the
problem depends on PREEMPT_RT which is enabled in v6.12. Considering the
softirq_expiry_lock lock exists since v5.4 and bpf_timer is introduced
in v5.15, the bpf_timer commit is used in the fixes tag and an extra
depends-on tag is added to state the dependency on PREEMPT_RT.

Fixes: b00628b ("bpf: Introduce bpf timers.")
Depends-on: v6.12+ with PREEMPT_RT enabled
Reported-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20241106084527.4gPrMnHt@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250117101816.2101857-5-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2025
[ Upstream commit 396f016 ]

Add read memory barrier to ensure the order of operations when accessing
control queue descriptors. Specifically, we want to avoid cases where loads
can be reordered:

1. Load #1 is dispatched to read descriptor flags.
2. Load #2 is dispatched to read some other field from the descriptor.
3. Load #2 completes, accessing memory/cache at a point in time when the DD
   flag is zero.
4. NIC DMA overwrites the descriptor, now the DD flag is one.
5. Any fields loaded before step 4 are now inconsistent with the actual
   descriptor state.

Add read memory barrier between steps 1 and 2, so that load #2 is not
executed until load #1 has completed.

Fixes: 8077c72 ("idpf: add controlq init and reset checks")
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sridhar Samudrala <sridhar.samudrala@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Lance Richardson <rlance@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil Tantilov <emil.s.tantilov@intel.com>
Tested-by: Krishneil Singh <krishneil.k.singh@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2025
[ Upstream commit c7b87ce ]

libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes
larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr",
idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6
elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is
found by UBsan. The error message:

  $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1
  builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]'
    #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966
    #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110
    #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436
    #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897
    #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335
    #5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502
    #6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351
    #7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404
    #8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448
    torvalds#9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556
    torvalds#10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6)

     0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1)                                      = 1

Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint")
Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250122025519.361873-1-howardchu95@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 8, 2025
[ Upstream commit b32c369 ]

In "one-shot" mode, turbostat
1. takes a counter snapshot
2. forks and waits for a child
3. takes the end counter snapshot and prints the result.

But turbostat counter snapshots currently use affinity to travel
around the system so that counter reads are "local", and this
affinity must be cleared between #1 and #2 above.

The offending commit removed that reset that allowed the child
to run on cpu_present_set.

Fix that issue, and improve upon the original by using
cpu_possible_set for the child.  This allows the child
to also run on CPUs that hotplug online during its runtime.

Reported-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Fixes: 7bb3fe2 ("tools/power/turbostat: Obey allowed CPUs during startup")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 17, 2025
[ Upstream commit a216542 ]

When COWing a relocation tree path, at relocation.c:replace_path(), we
can trigger a lockdep splat while we are in the btrfs_search_slot() call
against the relocation root. This happens in that callchain at
ctree.c:read_block_for_search() when we happen to find a child extent
buffer already loaded through the fs tree with a lockdep class set to
the fs tree. So when we attempt to lock that extent buffer through a
relocation tree we have to reset the lockdep class to the class for a
relocation tree, since a relocation tree has extent buffers that used
to belong to a fs tree and may currently be already loaded (we swap
extent buffers between the two trees at the end of replace_path()).

However we are missing calls to btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() to reset
the lockdep class at ctree.c:read_block_for_search() before we read lock
an extent buffer, just like we did for btrfs_search_slot() in commit
b40130b ("btrfs: fix lockdep splat with reloc root extent buffers").

So add the missing btrfs_maybe_reset_lockdep_class() calls before the
attempts to read lock an extent buffer at ctree.c:read_block_for_search().

The lockdep splat was reported by syzbot and it looks like this:

   ======================================================
   WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
   6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0 Not tainted
   ------------------------------------------------------
   syz.0.0/5335 is trying to acquire lock:
   ffff8880545dbc38 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146

   but task is already holding lock:
   ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

   -> #2 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}:
          reacquire_held_locks+0x3eb/0x690 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5374
          __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5563 [inline]
          lock_release+0x396/0xa30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5870
          up_write+0x79/0x590 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1629
          btrfs_force_cow_block+0x14b3/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:660
          btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755
          btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153
          replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
          merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
          merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
          relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
          btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
          btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
          __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
          btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
          btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
          vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
          __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
          __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   -> #1 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}:
          lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
          down_write_nested+0xa2/0x220 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1693
          btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189
          btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5052 [inline]
          btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x41c/0x1440 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:5132
          btrfs_force_cow_block+0x526/0x1fd0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:573
          btrfs_cow_block+0x371/0x830 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:755
          btrfs_search_slot+0xc01/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2153
          btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x1a0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4351
          btrfs_insert_empty_item fs/btrfs/ctree.h:688 [inline]
          btrfs_insert_inode_ref+0x2bb/0xf80 fs/btrfs/inode-item.c:330
          btrfs_rename_exchange fs/btrfs/inode.c:7990 [inline]
          btrfs_rename2+0xcb7/0x2b90 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8374
          vfs_rename+0xbdb/0xf00 fs/namei.c:5067
          do_renameat2+0xd94/0x13f0 fs/namei.c:5224
          __do_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5258 [inline]
          __se_sys_renameat2 fs/namei.c:5255 [inline]
          __x64_sys_renameat2+0xce/0xe0 fs/namei.c:5255
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   -> #0 (btrfs-tree-01){++++}-{4:4}:
          check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
          check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
          validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
          __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
          lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
          down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649
          btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146
          btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline]
          read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610
          btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237
          replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
          merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
          merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
          relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
          btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
          btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
          __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
          btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
          btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
          vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
          __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
          __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
          do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
          do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
          entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

   other info that might help us debug this:

   Chain exists of:
     btrfs-tree-01 --> btrfs-tree-01/1 --> btrfs-treloc-02/1

    Possible unsafe locking scenario:

          CPU0                    CPU1
          ----                    ----
     lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1);
                                  lock(btrfs-tree-01/1);
                                  lock(btrfs-treloc-02/1);
     rlock(btrfs-tree-01);

    *** DEADLOCK ***

   8 locks held by syz.0.0/5335:
    #0: ffff88801e3ae420 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x5e/0x200 fs/namespace.c:559
    #1: ffff888052c760d0 (&fs_info->reclaim_bgs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __btrfs_balance+0x4c2/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4183
    #2: ffff888052c74850 (&fs_info->cleaner_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x775/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4086
    #3: ffff88801e3ae610 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: merge_reloc_root+0xf11/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1659
    #4: ffff888052c76470 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288
    #5: ffff888052c76498 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x405/0xda0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288
    #6: ffff8880545db878 (btrfs-tree-01/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189
    #7: ffff8880545dba58 (btrfs-treloc-02/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: btrfs_tree_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:189

   stack backtrace:
   CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5335 Comm: syz.0.0 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5-syzkaller-00163-gab75170520d4 #0
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline]
    dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120
    print_circular_bug+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2074
    check_noncircular+0x36a/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2206
    check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3161 [inline]
    check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3280 [inline]
    validate_chain+0x18ef/0x5920 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3904
    __lock_acquire+0x1397/0x2100 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5226
    lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5849
    down_read_nested+0xb5/0xa50 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1649
    btrfs_tree_read_lock_nested+0x2f/0x250 fs/btrfs/locking.c:146
    btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.h:188 [inline]
    read_block_for_search+0x718/0xbb0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1610
    btrfs_search_slot+0x1274/0x3180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2237
    replace_path+0x1243/0x2740 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1224
    merge_reloc_root+0xc46/0x1ad0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1692
    merge_reloc_roots+0x3b3/0x980 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:1942
    relocate_block_group+0xb0a/0xd40 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3754
    btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x77d/0xd90 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4087
    btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x12c/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3494
    __btrfs_balance+0x1b0f/0x26b0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4278
    btrfs_balance+0xbdc/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4655
    btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3670
    vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
    __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
    __se_sys_ioctl+0xf5/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:892
    do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
    do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
   RIP: 0033:0x7f1ac6985d29
   Code: ff ff c3 (...)
   RSP: 002b:00007f1ac63fe038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
   RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1ac6b76160 RCX: 00007f1ac6985d29
   RDX: 0000000020000180 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000007
   RBP: 00007f1ac6a01b08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
   R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
   R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007f1ac6b76160 R15: 00007fffda145a88
    </TASK>

Reported-by: syzbot+63913e558c084f7f8fdc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/677b3014.050a0220.3b53b0.0064.GAE@google.com/
Fixes: 9978599 ("btrfs: reduce lock contention when eb cache miss for btree search")
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 17, 2025
commit 3599bae upstream.

The 32-bit Debian kernel 6.12 fails to boot and crashes like this:

 init (pid 65): Protection id trap (code 7)
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 65 Comm: init Not tainted 6.12.9 #2
 Hardware name: 9000/778/B160L

      YZrvWESTHLNXBCVMcbcbcbcbOGFRQPDI
 PSW: 00000000000001000000000000001111 Not tainted
 r00-03  0004000f 110d39d0 109a6558 12974400
 r04-07  12a810e0 12a810e0 00000000 12a81144
 r08-11  12a81174 00000007 00000000 00000002
 r12-15  f8c55c08 0000006c 00000001 f8c55c08
 r16-19  00000002 f8c58620 002da3a8 0000004e
 r20-23  00001a46 0000000f 10754f84 00000000
 r24-27  00000000 00000003 12ae6980 1127b9d0
 r28-31  00000000 00000000 12974440 109a6558
 sr00-03  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000010
 sr04-07  00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

 IASQ: 00000000 00000000 IAOQ: 110d39d0 110d39d4
  IIR: baadf00d    ISR: 00000000  IOR: 110d39d0
  CPU:        0   CR30: 128740c0 CR31: 00000000
  ORIG_R28: 000003f3
  IAOQ[0]: 0x110d39d0
  IAOQ[1]: 0x110d39d4
  RP(r2): security_sk_free+0x70/0x1a4
 Backtrace:
  [<10d8c844>] __sk_destruct+0x2bc/0x378
  [<10d8e33c>] sk_destruct+0x68/0x8c
  [<10d8e3dc>] __sk_free+0x7c/0x148
  [<10d8e560>] sk_free+0xb8/0xf0
  [<10f6420c>] unix_release_sock+0x3ac/0x50c
  [<10f643b8>] unix_release+0x4c/0x7c
  [<10d832f8>] __sock_release+0x5c/0xf8
  [<10d833b4>] sock_close+0x20/0x44
  [<107ba52c>] __fput+0xf8/0x468
  [<107baa08>] __fput_sync+0xb4/0xd4
  [<107b471c>] sys_close+0x44/0x94
  [<10405334>] syscall_exit+0x0/0x10

Bisecting points to this commit which triggers the issue:
	commit  417c564
	Author: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
	Date:   Fri Aug 16 17:43:07 2024 +0200
	        lsm: replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls

After more analysis it seems that we don't fully implement the static calls
and jump tables yet. Additionally the functions which mark kernel memory
read-only or read-write-executable needs to be further enhanced to be able to
fully support static calls.

Enabling CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y was one possibility to trigger the issue,
although YAMA isn't the reason for the fault.

As a temporary solution disable JUMP_LABEL functionality to
avoid the crashes.

Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Reviewed-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.12+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 17, 2025
We have several places across the kernel where we want to access another
task's syscall arguments, such as ptrace(2), seccomp(2), etc., by making
a call to syscall_get_arguments().

This works for register arguments right away by accessing the task's
`regs' member of `struct pt_regs', however for stack arguments seen with
32-bit/o32 kernels things are more complicated.  Technically they ought
to be obtained from the user stack with calls to an access_remote_vm(),
but we have an easier way available already.

So as to be able to access syscall stack arguments as regular function
arguments following the MIPS calling convention we copy them over from
the user stack to the kernel stack in arch/mips/kernel/scall32-o32.S, in
handle_sys(), to the current stack frame's outgoing argument space at
the top of the stack, which is where the handler called expects to see
its incoming arguments.  This area is also pointed at by the `pt_regs'
pointer obtained by task_pt_regs().

Make the o32 stack argument space a proper member of `struct pt_regs'
then, by renaming the existing member from `pad0' to `args' and using
generated offsets to access the space.  No functional change though.

With the change in place the o32 kernel stack frame layout at the entry
to a syscall handler invoked by handle_sys() is therefore as follows:

$sp + 68 -> |         ...         | <- pt_regs.regs[9]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 64 -> |         $t0         | <- pt_regs.regs[8]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 60 -> |   $a3/argument #4   | <- pt_regs.regs[7]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 56 -> |   $a2/argument #3   | <- pt_regs.regs[6]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 52 -> |   $a1/argument #2   | <- pt_regs.regs[5]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 48 -> |   $a0/argument #1   | <- pt_regs.regs[4]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 44 -> |         $v1         | <- pt_regs.regs[3]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 40 -> |         $v0         | <- pt_regs.regs[2]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 36 -> |         $at         | <- pt_regs.regs[1]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 32 -> |        $zero        | <- pt_regs.regs[0]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 28 -> |  stack argument #8  | <- pt_regs.args[7]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 24 -> |  stack argument #7  | <- pt_regs.args[6]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 20 -> |  stack argument #6  | <- pt_regs.args[5]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 16 -> |  stack argument #5  | <- pt_regs.args[4]
            +---------------------+
$sp + 12 -> | psABI space for $a3 | <- pt_regs.args[3]
            +---------------------+
$sp +  8 -> | psABI space for $a2 | <- pt_regs.args[2]
            +---------------------+
$sp +  4 -> | psABI space for $a1 | <- pt_regs.args[1]
            +---------------------+
$sp +  0 -> | psABI space for $a0 | <- pt_regs.args[0]
            +---------------------+

holding user data received and with the first 4 frame slots reserved by
the psABI for the compiler to spill the incoming arguments from $a0-$a3
registers (which it sometimes does according to its needs) and the next
4 frame slots designated by the psABI for any stack function arguments
that follow.  This data is also available for other tasks to peek/poke
at as reqired and where permitted.

Signed-off-by: Maciej W. Rozycki <macro@orcam.me.uk>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 17, 2025
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.14, take #2

- Large set of fixes for vector handling, specially in the interactions
  between host and guest state. This fixes a number of bugs affecting
  actual deployments, and greatly simplifies the FP/SIMD/SVE handling.
  Thanks to Mark Rutland for dealing with this thankless task.

- Fix an ugly race between vcpu and vgic creation/init, resulting in
  unexpected behaviours.

- Fix use of kernel VAs at EL2 when emulating timers with nVHE.

- Small set of pKVM improvements and cleanups.
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 22, 2025
Since commit 6037802 ("power: supply: core: implement extension API")
there is the following ABBA deadlock (simplified) between the LED trigger
code and the power-supply code:

1) When registering a power-supply class device, power_supply_register()
calls led_trigger_register() from power_supply_create_triggers() in
a scoped_guard(rwsem_read, &psy->extensions_sem) context.
led_trigger_register() then in turn takes a LED subsystem lock.
So here we have the following locking order:

* Read-lock extensions_sem
* Lock LED subsystem lock(s)

2) When registering a LED class device, with its default trigger set
to a power-supply LED trigger (which has already been registered)
The LED class code calls power_supply_led_trigger_activate() when
setting up the default trigger. power_supply_led_trigger_activate()
calls power_supply_get_property() to determine the initial value of
to assign to the LED and that read-locks extensions_sem. So now we
have the following locking order:

* Lock LED subsystem lock(s)
* Read-lock extensions_sem

Fixing this is easy, there is no need to hold the extensions_sem when
calling power_supply_create_triggers() since all triggers are always
created rather then checking for the presence of certain attributes as
power_supply_add_hwmon_sysfs() does. Move power_supply_create_triggers()
out of the guard block to fix this.

Here is the lockdep report fixed by this change:

[   31.249343] ======================================================
[   31.249378] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   31.249413] 6.13.0-rc6+ torvalds#251 Tainted: G         C  E
[   31.249440] ------------------------------------------------------
[   31.249471] (udev-worker)/553 is trying to acquire lock:
[   31.249501] ffff892adbcaf660 (&psy->extensions_sem){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: power_supply_get_property.part.0+0x22/0x150
[   31.249574]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   31.249603] ffff892adbc0bad0 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0
[   31.249657]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[   31.249696]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   31.249735]
               -> #2 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[   31.249778]        down_write+0x3b/0xd0
[   31.249803]        led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0
[   31.249833]        led_classdev_register_ext+0x311/0x3a0
[   31.249863]        input_leds_connect+0x1dc/0x2a0
[   31.249889]        input_attach_handler.isra.0+0x75/0x90
[   31.249921]        input_register_device.cold+0xa1/0x150
[   31.249955]        hidinput_connect+0x8a2/0xb80
[   31.249982]        hid_connect+0x582/0x5c0
[   31.250007]        hid_hw_start+0x3f/0x60
[   31.250030]        hid_device_probe+0x122/0x1f0
[   31.250053]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.250080]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.250105]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.250132]        __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110
[   31.250160]        bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0
[   31.250184]        __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0
[   31.250207]        bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0
[   31.250230]        device_add+0x64a/0x860
[   31.250252]        hid_add_device+0xe5/0x240
[   31.250279]        usbhid_probe+0x4dc/0x620
[   31.250303]        usb_probe_interface+0xe4/0x2a0
[   31.250329]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.250353]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.250377]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.250404]        __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110
[   31.250431]        bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0
[   31.250455]        __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0
[   31.250478]        bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0
[   31.250501]        device_add+0x64a/0x860
[   31.250523]        usb_set_configuration+0x606/0x8a0
[   31.250552]        usb_generic_driver_probe+0x3e/0x60
[   31.250579]        usb_probe_device+0x3d/0x120
[   31.250605]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.250629]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.250653]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.250680]        __device_attach_driver+0x85/0x110
[   31.250707]        bus_for_each_drv+0x78/0xc0
[   31.250731]        __device_attach+0xb0/0x1b0
[   31.250753]        bus_probe_device+0x94/0xb0
[   31.250776]        device_add+0x64a/0x860
[   31.250798]        usb_new_device.cold+0x141/0x38f
[   31.250828]        hub_event+0x1166/0x1980
[   31.250854]        process_one_work+0x20f/0x580
[   31.250879]        worker_thread+0x1d1/0x3b0
[   31.250904]        kthread+0xee/0x120
[   31.250926]        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50
[   31.250954]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[   31.250982]
               -> #1 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
[   31.251022]        down_write+0x3b/0xd0
[   31.251045]        led_trigger_register+0x40/0x1b0
[   31.251074]        power_supply_register_led_trigger+0x88/0x150
[   31.251107]        power_supply_create_triggers+0x55/0xe0
[   31.251135]        __power_supply_register.part.0+0x34e/0x4a0
[   31.251164]        devm_power_supply_register+0x70/0xc0
[   31.251190]        bq27xxx_battery_setup+0x1a1/0x6d0 [bq27xxx_battery]
[   31.251235]        bq27xxx_battery_i2c_probe+0xe5/0x17f [bq27xxx_battery_i2c]
[   31.251272]        i2c_device_probe+0x125/0x2b0
[   31.251299]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.251324]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.251348]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.251375]        __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0
[   31.251398]        bus_for_each_dev+0x6b/0xb0
[   31.251421]        bus_add_driver+0x111/0x1f0
[   31.251445]        driver_register+0x6e/0xc0
[   31.251470]        i2c_register_driver+0x41/0xb0
[   31.251498]        do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x3a0
[   31.251522]        do_init_module+0x60/0x220
[   31.251550]        __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190
[   31.251575]        do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
[   31.251598]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   31.251629]
               -> #0 (&psy->extensions_sem){.+.+}-{4:4}:
[   31.251668]        __lock_acquire+0x13ce/0x21c0
[   31.251694]        lock_acquire+0xcf/0x2e0
[   31.251719]        down_read+0x3e/0x170
[   31.251741]        power_supply_get_property.part.0+0x22/0x150
[   31.251774]        power_supply_update_leds+0x8d/0x230
[   31.251804]        power_supply_led_trigger_activate+0x18/0x20
[   31.251837]        led_trigger_set+0x1fc/0x300
[   31.251863]        led_trigger_set_default+0x90/0xe0
[   31.251892]        led_classdev_register_ext+0x311/0x3a0
[   31.251921]        devm_led_classdev_multicolor_register_ext+0x6e/0xb80 [led_class_multicolor]
[   31.251969]        ktd202x_probe+0x464/0x5c0 [leds_ktd202x]
[   31.252002]        i2c_device_probe+0x125/0x2b0
[   31.252027]        really_probe+0xde/0x340
[   31.252052]        __driver_probe_device+0x78/0x110
[   31.252076]        driver_probe_device+0x1f/0xa0
[   31.252103]        __driver_attach+0xba/0x1c0
[   31.252125]        bus_for_each_dev+0x6b/0xb0
[   31.252148]        bus_add_driver+0x111/0x1f0
[   31.252172]        driver_register+0x6e/0xc0
[   31.252197]        i2c_register_driver+0x41/0xb0
[   31.252225]        do_one_initcall+0x5e/0x3a0
[   31.252248]        do_init_module+0x60/0x220
[   31.252274]        __do_sys_init_module+0x15f/0x190
[   31.253986]        do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
[   31.255826]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   31.257614]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[   31.257619] Chain exists of:
                 &psy->extensions_sem --> triggers_list_lock --> &led_cdev->trigger_lock

[   31.257630]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[   31.257632]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   31.257633]        ----                    ----
[   31.257634]   lock(&led_cdev->trigger_lock);
[   31.257637]                                lock(triggers_list_lock);
[   31.257640]                                lock(&led_cdev->trigger_lock);
[   31.257643]   rlock(&psy->extensions_sem);
[   31.257646]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[   31.289433] 4 locks held by (udev-worker)/553:
[   31.289443]  #0: ffff892ad9658108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0xaf/0x1c0
[   31.289463]  #1: ffff892adbc0bbc8 (&led_cdev->led_access){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_classdev_register_ext+0x1c7/0x3a0
[   31.289476]  #2: ffffffffad0e30b0 (triggers_list_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x2c/0xe0
[   31.289487]  #3: ffff892adbc0bad0 (&led_cdev->trigger_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: led_trigger_set_default+0x34/0xe0

Fixes: 6037802 ("power: supply: core: implement extension API")
Cc: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Cc: Armin Wolf <W_Armin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Weißschuh <linux@weissschuh.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250130140035.20636-1-hdegoede@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Reichel <sebastian.reichel@collabora.com>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 22, 2025
…ea as VM_ALLOC

Erhard reported the following KASAN hit while booting his PowerMac G4
with a KASAN-enabled kernel 6.13-rc6:

  BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
  Write of size 8 at addr f1000000 by task chronyd/1293

  CPU: 0 UID: 123 PID: 1293 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G        W          6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4 #2
  Tainted: [W]=WARN
  Hardware name: PowerMac3,6 7455 0x80010303 PowerMac
  Call Trace:
  [c2437590] [c1631a84] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x8c (unreliable)
  [c24375b0] [c0504998] print_report+0xdc/0x504
  [c2437610] [c050475c] kasan_report+0xf8/0x108
  [c2437690] [c0505a3c] kasan_check_range+0x24/0x18c
  [c24376a0] [c03fb5e4] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
  [c24376c0] [c004c014] patch_instructions+0x15c/0x16c
  [c2437710] [c00731a8] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x60/0x7c
  [c2437730] [c0281168] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x50/0xac
  [c2437750] [c0073cf4] bpf_int_jit_compile+0xb30/0xdec
  [c2437880] [c0280394] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x15c/0x478
  [c24378d0] [c1263428] bpf_prepare_filter+0xbf8/0xc14
  [c2437990] [c12677ec] bpf_prog_create_from_user+0x258/0x2b4
  [c24379d0] [c027111c] do_seccomp+0x3dc/0x1890
  [c2437ac0] [c001d8e0] system_call_exception+0x2dc/0x420
  [c2437f30] [c00281ac] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2c
  --- interrupt: c00 at 0x5a1274
  NIP:  005a1274 LR: 006a3b3c CTR: 005296c8
  REGS: c2437f40 TRAP: 0c00   Tainted: G        W           (6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4)
  MSR:  0200f932 <VEC,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 24004422  XER: 00000000

  GPR00: 00000166 af8f3fa0 a7ee3540 00000001 00000000 013b6500 005a5858 0200f932
  GPR08: 00000000 00001fe9 013d5fc8 005296c8 2822244c 00b2fcd8 00000000 af8f4b57
  GPR16: 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000002
  GPR24: 00afdbb0 00000000 00000000 00000000 006e0004 013ce060 006e7c1c 00000001
  NIP [005a1274] 0x5a1274
  LR [006a3b3c] 0x6a3b3c
  --- interrupt: c00

  The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
   [f1000000, f1002000) created by:
   text_area_cpu_up+0x20/0x190

  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x76e30
  flags: 0x80000000(zone=2)
  raw: 80000000 00000000 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001
  raw: 00000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   f0ffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   f0ffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  >f1000000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
             ^
   f1000080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
   f1000100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
  ==================================================================

f8 corresponds to KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID which means the area is not
initialised hence not supposed to be used yet.

Powerpc text patching infrastructure allocates a virtual memory area
using get_vm_area() and flags it as VM_ALLOC. But that flag is meant
to be used for vmalloc() and vmalloc() allocated memory is not
supposed to be used before a call to __vmalloc_node_range() which is
never called for that area.

That went undetected until commit e4137f0 ("mm, kasan, kmsan:
instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault")

The area allocated by text_area_cpu_up() is not vmalloc memory, it is
mapped directly on demand when needed by map_kernel_page(). There is
no VM flag corresponding to such usage, so just pass no flag. That way
the area will be unpoisonned and usable immediately.

Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112135832.57c92322@yea/
Fixes: 37bc3e5 ("powerpc/lib/code-patching: Use alternate map for patch_instruction()")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06621423da339b374f48c0886e3a5db18e896be8.1739342693.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 22, 2025
[ Upstream commit e4b6b66 ]

When using touchscreen and framebuffer, Nokia 770 crashes easily with:

    BUG: scheduling while atomic: irq/144-ads7846/82/0x00010000
    Modules linked in: usb_f_ecm g_ether usb_f_rndis u_ether libcomposite configfs omap_udc ohci_omap ohci_hcd
    CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 82 Comm: irq/144-ads7846 Not tainted 6.12.7-770 #2
    Hardware name: Nokia 770
    Call trace:
     unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x10/0x14
     show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x54/0x5c
     dump_stack_lvl from __schedule_bug+0x50/0x70
     __schedule_bug from __schedule+0x4d4/0x5bc
     __schedule from schedule+0x34/0xa0
     schedule from schedule_preempt_disabled+0xc/0x10
     schedule_preempt_disabled from __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x218/0x3b4
     __mutex_lock.constprop.0 from clk_prepare_lock+0x38/0xe4
     clk_prepare_lock from clk_set_rate+0x18/0x154
     clk_set_rate from sossi_read_data+0x4c/0x168
     sossi_read_data from hwa742_read_reg+0x5c/0x8c
     hwa742_read_reg from send_frame_handler+0xfc/0x300
     send_frame_handler from process_pending_requests+0x74/0xd0
     process_pending_requests from lcd_dma_irq_handler+0x50/0x74
     lcd_dma_irq_handler from __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x44/0x130
     __handle_irq_event_percpu from handle_irq_event+0x28/0x68
     handle_irq_event from handle_level_irq+0x9c/0x170
     handle_level_irq from generic_handle_domain_irq+0x2c/0x3c
     generic_handle_domain_irq from omap1_handle_irq+0x40/0x8c
     omap1_handle_irq from generic_handle_arch_irq+0x28/0x3c
     generic_handle_arch_irq from call_with_stack+0x1c/0x24
     call_with_stack from __irq_svc+0x94/0xa8
    Exception stack(0xc5255da0 to 0xc5255de8)
    5da0: 00000001 c22fc620 00000000 00000000 c08384a8 c106fc00 00000000 c240c248
    5dc0: c113a600 c3f6ec30 00000001 00000000 c22fc620 c5255df0 c22fc620 c0279a94
    5de0: 60000013 ffffffff
     __irq_svc from clk_prepare_lock+0x4c/0xe4
     clk_prepare_lock from clk_get_rate+0x10/0x74
     clk_get_rate from uwire_setup_transfer+0x40/0x180
     uwire_setup_transfer from spi_bitbang_transfer_one+0x2c/0x9c
     spi_bitbang_transfer_one from spi_transfer_one_message+0x2d0/0x664
     spi_transfer_one_message from __spi_pump_transfer_message+0x29c/0x498
     __spi_pump_transfer_message from __spi_sync+0x1f8/0x2e8
     __spi_sync from spi_sync+0x24/0x40
     spi_sync from ads7846_halfd_read_state+0x5c/0x1c0
     ads7846_halfd_read_state from ads7846_irq+0x58/0x348
     ads7846_irq from irq_thread_fn+0x1c/0x78
     irq_thread_fn from irq_thread+0x120/0x228
     irq_thread from kthread+0xc8/0xe8
     kthread from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28

As a quick fix, switch to a threaded IRQ which provides a stable system.

Signed-off-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi>
Reviewed-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 22, 2025
[ Upstream commit 6d00234 ]

Function xen_pin_page calls xen_pte_lock, which in turn grab page
table lock (ptlock). When locking, xen_pte_lock expect mm->page_table_lock
to be held before grabbing ptlock, but this does not happen when pinning
is caused by xen_mm_pin_all.

This commit addresses lockdep warning below, which shows up when
suspending a Xen VM.

[ 3680.658422] Freezing user space processes
[ 3680.660156] Freezing user space processes completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds)
[ 3680.660182] OOM killer disabled.
[ 3680.660192] Freezing remaining freezable tasks
[ 3680.661485] Freezing remaining freezable tasks completed (elapsed 0.001 seconds)
[ 3680.685254]
[ 3680.685265] ==================================
[ 3680.685269] WARNING: Nested lock was not taken
[ 3680.685274] 6.12.0+ torvalds#16 Tainted: G        W
[ 3680.685279] ----------------------------------
[ 3680.685283] migration/0/19 is trying to lock:
[ 3680.685288] ffff88800bac33c0 (ptlock_ptr(ptdesc)#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685303]
[ 3680.685303] but this task is not holding:
[ 3680.685308] init_mm.page_table_lock
[ 3680.685311]
[ 3680.685311] stack backtrace:
[ 3680.685316] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 19 Comm: migration/0 Tainted: G        W          6.12.0+ torvalds#16
[ 3680.685324] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 3680.685328] Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x120 <- __stop_cpus.constprop.0+0x8c/0xd0
[ 3680.685339] Call Trace:
[ 3680.685344]  <TASK>
[ 3680.685347]  dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
[ 3680.685356]  __lock_acquire+0x917/0x2310
[ 3680.685364]  lock_acquire+0xce/0x2c0
[ 3680.685369]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685373]  _raw_spin_lock_nest_lock+0x2f/0x70
[ 3680.685381]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685386]  xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685390]  ? __pfx_xen_pin_page+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685394]  __xen_pgd_walk+0x233/0x2c0
[ 3680.685401]  ? stop_one_cpu+0x91/0x100
[ 3680.685405]  __xen_pgd_pin+0x5d/0x250
[ 3680.685410]  xen_mm_pin_all+0x70/0xa0
[ 3680.685415]  xen_pv_pre_suspend+0xf/0x280
[ 3680.685420]  xen_suspend+0x57/0x1a0
[ 3680.685428]  multi_cpu_stop+0x6b/0x120
[ 3680.685432]  ? update_cpumasks_hier+0x7c/0xa60
[ 3680.685439]  ? __pfx_multi_cpu_stop+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685443]  cpu_stopper_thread+0x8c/0x140
[ 3680.685448]  ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x20/0x1f0
[ 3680.685454]  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685458]  smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x1f0
[ 3680.685462]  kthread+0xde/0x110
[ 3680.685467]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685471]  ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
[ 3680.685478]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685482]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 3680.685489]  </TASK>
[ 3680.685491]
[ 3680.685491] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 3680.685497] 1 lock held by migration/0/19:
[ 3680.685500]  #0: ffffffff8284df38 (pgd_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xen_mm_pin_all+0x14/0xa0
[ 3680.685512]
[ 3680.685512] stack backtrace:
[ 3680.685518] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 19 Comm: migration/0 Tainted: G        W          6.12.0+ torvalds#16
[ 3680.685528] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ 3680.685531] Stopper: multi_cpu_stop+0x0/0x120 <- __stop_cpus.constprop.0+0x8c/0xd0
[ 3680.685538] Call Trace:
[ 3680.685541]  <TASK>
[ 3680.685544]  dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
[ 3680.685549]  __lock_acquire+0x93c/0x2310
[ 3680.685554]  lock_acquire+0xce/0x2c0
[ 3680.685558]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685562]  _raw_spin_lock_nest_lock+0x2f/0x70
[ 3680.685568]  ? xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685572]  xen_pin_page+0x175/0x1d0
[ 3680.685578]  ? __pfx_xen_pin_page+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685582]  __xen_pgd_walk+0x233/0x2c0
[ 3680.685588]  ? stop_one_cpu+0x91/0x100
[ 3680.685592]  __xen_pgd_pin+0x5d/0x250
[ 3680.685596]  xen_mm_pin_all+0x70/0xa0
[ 3680.685600]  xen_pv_pre_suspend+0xf/0x280
[ 3680.685607]  xen_suspend+0x57/0x1a0
[ 3680.685611]  multi_cpu_stop+0x6b/0x120
[ 3680.685615]  ? update_cpumasks_hier+0x7c/0xa60
[ 3680.685620]  ? __pfx_multi_cpu_stop+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685625]  cpu_stopper_thread+0x8c/0x140
[ 3680.685629]  ? smpboot_thread_fn+0x20/0x1f0
[ 3680.685634]  ? __pfx_smpboot_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685638]  smpboot_thread_fn+0xed/0x1f0
[ 3680.685642]  kthread+0xde/0x110
[ 3680.685645]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685649]  ret_from_fork+0x2f/0x50
[ 3680.685654]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 3680.685657]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 3680.685662]  </TASK>
[ 3680.685267] xen:grant_table: Grant tables using version 1 layout
[ 3680.685921] OOM killer enabled.
[ 3680.685934] Restarting tasks ... done.

Signed-off-by: Maksym Planeta <maksym@exostellar.io>
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Message-ID: <20241204103516.3309112-1-maksym@exostellar.io>
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
heftig pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 27, 2025
…ea as VM_ALLOC

[ Upstream commit d262a19 ]

Erhard reported the following KASAN hit while booting his PowerMac G4
with a KASAN-enabled kernel 6.13-rc6:

  BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
  Write of size 8 at addr f1000000 by task chronyd/1293

  CPU: 0 UID: 123 PID: 1293 Comm: chronyd Tainted: G        W          6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4 #2
  Tainted: [W]=WARN
  Hardware name: PowerMac3,6 7455 0x80010303 PowerMac
  Call Trace:
  [c2437590] [c1631a84] dump_stack_lvl+0x70/0x8c (unreliable)
  [c24375b0] [c0504998] print_report+0xdc/0x504
  [c2437610] [c050475c] kasan_report+0xf8/0x108
  [c2437690] [c0505a3c] kasan_check_range+0x24/0x18c
  [c24376a0] [c03fb5e4] copy_to_kernel_nofault+0xd8/0x1c8
  [c24376c0] [c004c014] patch_instructions+0x15c/0x16c
  [c2437710] [c00731a8] bpf_arch_text_copy+0x60/0x7c
  [c2437730] [c0281168] bpf_jit_binary_pack_finalize+0x50/0xac
  [c2437750] [c0073cf4] bpf_int_jit_compile+0xb30/0xdec
  [c2437880] [c0280394] bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x15c/0x478
  [c24378d0] [c1263428] bpf_prepare_filter+0xbf8/0xc14
  [c2437990] [c12677ec] bpf_prog_create_from_user+0x258/0x2b4
  [c24379d0] [c027111c] do_seccomp+0x3dc/0x1890
  [c2437ac0] [c001d8e0] system_call_exception+0x2dc/0x420
  [c2437f30] [c00281ac] ret_from_syscall+0x0/0x2c
  --- interrupt: c00 at 0x5a1274
  NIP:  005a1274 LR: 006a3b3c CTR: 005296c8
  REGS: c2437f40 TRAP: 0c00   Tainted: G        W           (6.13.0-rc6-PMacG4)
  MSR:  0200f932 <VEC,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI>  CR: 24004422  XER: 00000000

  GPR00: 00000166 af8f3fa0 a7ee3540 00000001 00000000 013b6500 005a5858 0200f932
  GPR08: 00000000 00001fe9 013d5fc8 005296c8 2822244c 00b2fcd8 00000000 af8f4b57
  GPR16: 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000001 00000000 00000002
  GPR24: 00afdbb0 00000000 00000000 00000000 006e0004 013ce060 006e7c1c 00000001
  NIP [005a1274] 0x5a1274
  LR [006a3b3c] 0x6a3b3c
  --- interrupt: c00

  The buggy address belongs to the virtual mapping at
   [f1000000, f1002000) created by:
   text_area_cpu_up+0x20/0x190

  The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
  page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x76e30
  flags: 0x80000000(zone=2)
  raw: 80000000 00000000 00000122 00000000 00000000 00000000 ffffffff 00000001
  raw: 00000000
  page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

  Memory state around the buggy address:
   f0ffff00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
   f0ffff80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  >f1000000: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
             ^
   f1000080: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
   f1000100: f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8 f8
  ==================================================================

f8 corresponds to KASAN_VMALLOC_INVALID which means the area is not
initialised hence not supposed to be used yet.

Powerpc text patching infrastructure allocates a virtual memory area
using get_vm_area() and flags it as VM_ALLOC. But that flag is meant
to be used for vmalloc() and vmalloc() allocated memory is not
supposed to be used before a call to __vmalloc_node_range() which is
never called for that area.

That went undetected until commit e4137f0 ("mm, kasan, kmsan:
instrument copy_from/to_kernel_nofault")

The area allocated by text_area_cpu_up() is not vmalloc memory, it is
mapped directly on demand when needed by map_kernel_page(). There is
no VM flag corresponding to such usage, so just pass no flag. That way
the area will be unpoisonned and usable immediately.

Reported-by: Erhard Furtner <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250112135832.57c92322@yea/
Fixes: 37bc3e5 ("powerpc/lib/code-patching: Use alternate map for patch_instruction()")
Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/06621423da339b374f48c0886e3a5db18e896be8.1739342693.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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