Retiring certain usernames. #1

mhoye · 2014-03-01T02:21:01Z

This patch retires some usernames from common use.

This patch retires the following usernames: * dmr - Dennis MacAlistair Ritchie (September 9, 1941 - October 12, 2011) * mrc - Mark Reed Crispin (July 19, 1956 - December 28, 2012) * jmc - John McCarthy (September 4, 1927 – October 24, 2011)

Cleanup the comments in the patch.

nekral · 2014-03-02T16:38:26Z

I don't think those 3 letters usernames should be forbidden.

mhoye · 2014-03-03T18:43:47Z

Really? Just like that?

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A crypt method needs to be specified before the rounds can set: #0 __strcmp_sse42 () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcmp-sse4_2.S:227 shadow-maint#1 0x0000555555557755 in process_flags (argv=0x7fffffffe4d8, argc=3) at chgpasswd.c:188 shadow-maint#2 main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4d8) at chgpasswd.c:427 chgpasswd.c:188:42: warning: use of NULL where non-null expected [CWE-476] [-Wanalyzer-null-argument]

Free the actual struct of the removed entry. Example userdel report: Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x55b230efe857 in reallocarray (./src/userdel+0xda857) shadow-maint#1 0x55b230f6041f in mallocarray ./lib/./alloc.h:97:9 shadow-maint#2 0x55b230f6041f in commonio_open ./lib/commonio.c:563:7 shadow-maint#3 0x55b230f39098 in open_files ./src/userdel.c:555:6 shadow-maint#4 0x55b230f39098 in main ./src/userdel.c:1189:2 shadow-maint#5 0x7f9b48c64189 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16

Destroying the handle does not actually disconnect, see [1]. Also free the key on user removal. [1]: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/blob/e9072e7d45f4559887d11b518099135cbe564163/libsemanage/src/direct_api.c#L330 Example adduser leak: Direct leak of 1008 byte(s) in 14 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae) shadow-maint#1 0x7fb5cfffad09 in dbase_file_init src/database_file.c:170:45 Direct leak of 392 byte(s) in 7 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae) shadow-maint#1 0x7fb5cfffc929 in dbase_policydb_init src/database_policydb.c:187:27 Direct leak of 144 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae) shadow-maint#1 0x7fb5cfffb519 in dbase_join_init src/database_join.c:249:28 [...]

A crypt method needs to be specified before the rounds can set: #0 __strcmp_sse42 () at ../sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/strcmp-sse4_2.S:227 shadow-maint#1 0x0000555555557755 in process_flags (argv=0x7fffffffe4d8, argc=3) at chgpasswd.c:188 shadow-maint#2 main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe4d8) at chgpasswd.c:427 chgpasswd.c:188:42: warning: use of NULL where non-null expected [CWE-476] [-Wanalyzer-null-argument]

Free the actual struct of the removed entry. Example userdel report: Direct leak of 40 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x55b230efe857 in reallocarray (./src/userdel+0xda857) #1 0x55b230f6041f in mallocarray ./lib/./alloc.h:97:9 #2 0x55b230f6041f in commonio_open ./lib/commonio.c:563:7 #3 0x55b230f39098 in open_files ./src/userdel.c:555:6 #4 0x55b230f39098 in main ./src/userdel.c:1189:2 #5 0x7f9b48c64189 in __libc_start_call_main csu/../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58:16

Destroying the handle does not actually disconnect, see [1]. Also free the key on user removal. [1]: https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/blob/e9072e7d45f4559887d11b518099135cbe564163/libsemanage/src/direct_api.c#L330 Example adduser leak: Direct leak of 1008 byte(s) in 14 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae) #1 0x7fb5cfffad09 in dbase_file_init src/database_file.c:170:45 Direct leak of 392 byte(s) in 7 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae) #1 0x7fb5cfffc929 in dbase_policydb_init src/database_policydb.c:187:27 Direct leak of 144 byte(s) in 2 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x5638f2e782ae in __interceptor_malloc (./src/useradd+0xee2ae) #1 0x7fb5cfffb519 in dbase_join_init src/database_join.c:249:28 [...]

During coverity scan, there are reported four issues with unbounded source buffer for each usage of input arg directly with syslog function. Sample coverity test report for chsh.c file: 1. string_size_argv: argv contains strings with unknown size. int main (int argc, char **argv) [...] 4. var_assign_var: Assigning: user = argv[optind]. Both are now tainted. user = argv[optind]; [...] CID 5771784: (shadow-maint#1 of 1): Unbounded source buffer (STRING_SIZE) 15. string_size: Passing string user of unknown size to syslog. SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "changed user '%s' shell to '%s'", user, loginsh)); Similar issue is reported three times more: File: chfn.c, function: main, variable: user File: passwd.c, function: main, variable: name File: newgrp.c, function: main, variable: group The proposed commit is a try to fix the reported issues.

During coverity scan, there are reported four issues with unbounded source buffer for each usage of input arg directly with syslog function. Sample coverity test report for chsh.c file: 1. string_size_argv: argv contains strings with unknown size. int main (int argc, char **argv) [...] 4. var_assign_var: Assigning: user = argv[optind]. Both are now tainted. user = argv[optind]; [...] CID 5771784: (shadow-maint#1 of 1): Unbounded source buffer (STRING_SIZE) 15. string_size: Passing string user of unknown size to syslog. SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "changed user '%s' shell to '%s'", user, loginsh)); Similar issue is reported three times more: File: chfn.c, function: main, variable: user File: passwd.c, function: main, variable: name File: newgrp.c, function: main, variable: group The proposed commit is a try to fix the reported issues by adding a check for a valid user or group names.

During coverity scan, there are reported four issues with unbounded source buffer for each usage of input arg directly with syslog function. Sample coverity test report for chsh.c file: 1. string_size_argv: argv contains strings with unknown size. int main (int argc, char **argv) [...] 4. var_assign_var: Assigning: user = argv[optind]. Both are now tainted. user = argv[optind]; [...] CID 5771784: (shadow-maint#1 of 1): Unbounded source buffer (STRING_SIZE) 15. string_size: Passing string user of unknown size to syslog. SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "changed user '%s' shell to '%s'", user, loginsh)); Similar issue is reported three times more: File: chfn.c, function: main, variable: user File: passwd.c, function: main, variable: name File: newgrp.c, function: main, variable: group The proposed commit is a try to fix the reported issues.

During coverity scan, there are reported four issues with unbounded source buffer for each usage of input arg directly with syslog function. Sample coverity test report for chsh.c file: 1. string_size_argv: argv contains strings with unknown size. int main (int argc, char **argv) [...] 4. var_assign_var: Assigning: user = argv[optind]. Both are now tainted. user = argv[optind]; [...] CID 5771784: (shadow-maint#1 of 1): Unbounded source buffer (STRING_SIZE) 15. string_size: Passing string user of unknown size to syslog. SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "changed user '%s' shell to '%s'", user, loginsh)); Similar issue is reported three times more: File: chfn.c, function: main, variable: user File: passwd.c, function: main, variable: name File: newgrp.c, function: main, variable: group This commit is the first approach to fix the reported issues. The proposed changes add conditions verifing size of passed arguments for users and groups names. This will not fix the coverity reports, but the change causes that they are irrelevant and could be ignored.

During coverity scan, there are reported four issues with unbounded source buffer for each usage of input arg directly with syslog function. Sample coverity test report for chsh.c file: 1. string_size_argv: argv contains strings with unknown size. int main (int argc, char **argv) [...] 4. var_assign_var: Assigning: user = argv[optind]. Both are now tainted. user = argv[optind]; [...] CID 5771784: (shadow-maint#1 of 1): Unbounded source buffer (STRING_SIZE) 15. string_size: Passing string user of unknown size to syslog. SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "changed user '%s' shell to '%s'", user, loginsh)); Similar issue is reported three times more: File: chfn.c, function: main, variable: user File: passwd.c, function: main, variable: name File: newgrp.c, function: main, variable: group This commit is the first approach to fix the reported issues. The proposed changes add conditions, which verify the user and group names arguments, including their sizes. This will not fix the coverity reports, but the change causes that they are irrelevant and could be ignored.

During coverity scan, there are reported four issues with unbounded source buffer for each usage of input arg directly with syslog function. Sample coverity test report for chsh.c file: 1. string_size_argv: argv contains strings with unknown size. int main (int argc, char **argv) [...] 4. var_assign_var: Assigning: user = argv[optind]. Both are now tainted. user = argv[optind]; [...] CID 5771784: (shadow-maint#1 of 1): Unbounded source buffer (STRING_SIZE) 15. string_size: Passing string user of unknown size to syslog. SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "changed user '%s' shell to '%s'", user, loginsh)); Similar issue is reported three times more: File: chfn.c, function: main, variable: user File: passwd.c, function: main, variable: name File: newgrp.c, function: main, variable: group This commit is the first approach to fix the reported issues. The proposed changes add conditions, which verify the user and group names arguments, including their lengths. This will not silence the coverity reports, but the change causes that they are irrelevant and could be ignored.

During coverity scan, there are reported four issues with unbounded source buffer for each usage of input arg directly with syslog function. Sample coverity test report for chsh.c file: 1. string_size_argv: argv contains strings with unknown size. int main (int argc, char **argv) [...] 4. var_assign_var: Assigning: user = argv[optind]. Both are now tainted. user = argv[optind]; [...] CID 5771784: (#1 of 1): Unbounded source buffer (STRING_SIZE) 15. string_size: Passing string user of unknown size to syslog. SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "changed user '%s' shell to '%s'", user, loginsh)); Similar issue is reported three times more: File: chfn.c, function: main, variable: user File: passwd.c, function: main, variable: name File: newgrp.c, function: main, variable: group This commit is the first approach to fix the reported issues. The proposed changes add conditions, which verify the user and group names arguments, including their lengths. This will not silence the coverity reports, but the change causes that they are irrelevant and could be ignored.

mhoye added 2 commits February 28, 2014 16:38

Retires certain usernames.

c7df1c9

This patch retires the following usernames: * dmr - Dennis MacAlistair Ritchie (September 9, 1941 - October 12, 2011) * mrc - Mark Reed Crispin (July 19, 1956 - December 28, 2012) * jmc - John McCarthy (September 4, 1927 – October 24, 2011)

Update chkname.c

a860941

Cleanup the comments in the patch.

nekral closed this Mar 2, 2014

hallyn pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 25, 2016

Merge pull request #1 from m4sk1n/pl-translation-update

05563a7

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vcaputo mentioned this pull request May 9, 2020

'--' flag doesn't work as advertised for 'su' command #253

Open

juyin mentioned this pull request Mar 30, 2022

Segmentation fault when changing password with chpasswd #514

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MarcinDigitic mentioned this pull request Jun 25, 2024

Fix coverity unbounded source buffer issues #989

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JonnyWhatshisface mentioned this pull request Dec 22, 2024

Default subordinate ID configuration in /etc/login.defs could lead to compromise #1157

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Retiring certain usernames. #1

Retiring certain usernames. #1

mhoye commented Mar 1, 2014

nekral commented Mar 2, 2014

mhoye commented Mar 3, 2014

Retiring certain usernames. #1

Retiring certain usernames. #1

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mhoye commented Mar 1, 2014

nekral commented Mar 2, 2014

mhoye commented Mar 3, 2014