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Port mmiotrace to ARM #2

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neuschaefer opened this issue Jun 2, 2022 · 0 comments
Open
5 tasks

Port mmiotrace to ARM #2

neuschaefer opened this issue Jun 2, 2022 · 0 comments
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@neuschaefer

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@neuschaefer
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mmiotrace can be useful in RE'ing closed-source kernel modules. It works by marking pages mapped for MMIO (via ioremap) as invalid in the pagetable, and catching the resulting page faults. The implementation is spread over a few files:

mmiotrace is currently tied to x86, but it doesn't have to be.

Action plan

  • Move testmmiotrace.c to common code, as it isn't x86-specific
  • Copy kmmio.c and mmio-mod.c to ARM, with a few adjustments
  • Write instruction decoder for ARM

Other considerations

  • Not sure about the use of DR_STEP (single stepping mode)
  • avoid too much code duplication :)
@neuschaefer neuschaefer self-assigned this Jun 2, 2022
neuschaefer added a commit that referenced this issue Jun 3, 2022
@neuschaefer
refactor #2
b2a997b
neuschaefer added a commit that referenced this issue Jun 19, 2022
@neuschaefer
refactor #2
bcf8f03
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 22, 2022
@bcodding-rh @amschuma-ntap
NFSv4: Fix free of uninitialized nfs4_label on referral lookup.
c3ed222 
Send along the already-allocated fattr along with nfs4_fs_locations, and
drop the memcpy of fattr.  We end up growing two more allocations, but this
fixes up a crash as:

PID: 790    TASK: ffff88811b43c000  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "ls"
 #0 [ffffc90000857920] panic at ffffffff81b9bfde
 #1 [ffffc900008579c0] do_trap at ffffffff81023a9b
 #2 [ffffc90000857a10] do_error_trap at ffffffff81023b78
 #3 [ffffc90000857a58] exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81be1f45
 #4 [ffffc90000857a80] asm_exc_stack_segment at ffffffff81c009de
 #5 [ffffc90000857b08] nfs_lookup at ffffffffa0302322 [nfs]
 #6 [ffffc90000857b70] __lookup_slow at ffffffff813a4a5f
 #7 [ffffc90000857c60] walk_component at ffffffff813a86c4
 #8 [ffffc90000857cb8] path_lookupat at ffffffff813a9553
 torvalds#9 [ffffc90000857cf0] filename_lookup at ffffffff813ab86b

Suggested-by: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com>
Fixes: 9558a00 ("NFS: Remove the label from the nfs4_lookup_res struct")
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Coddington <bcodding@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 22, 2022
@brenns10 @torvalds
assoc_array: Fix BUG_ON during garbage collect
d1dc877 
A rare BUG_ON triggered in assoc_array_gc:

    [3430308.818153] kernel BUG at lib/assoc_array.c:1609!

Which corresponded to the statement currently at line 1593 upstream:

    BUG_ON(assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(p));

Using the data from the core dump, I was able to generate a userspace
reproducer[1] and determine the cause of the bug.

[1]: https://github.com/brenns10/kernel_stuff/tree/master/assoc_array_gc

After running the iterator on the entire branch, an internal tree node
looked like the following:

    NODE (nr_leaves_on_branch: 3)
      SLOT [0] NODE (2 leaves)
      SLOT [1] NODE (1 leaf)
      SLOT [2..f] NODE (empty)

In the userspace reproducer, the pr_devel output when compressing this
node was:

    -- compress node 0x5607cc089380 --
    free=0, leaves=0
    [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0]
    [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0]
    [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2]
    [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2]
    [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2]
    [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2]
    [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2]
    [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2]
    [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2]
    [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2]
    [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2]
    [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2]
    [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2]
    [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2]
    [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2]
    [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2]
    after: 3

At slot 0, an internal node with 2 leaves could not be folded into the
node, because there was only one available slot (slot 0). Thus, the
internal node was retained. At slot 1, the node had one leaf, and was
able to be folded in successfully. The remaining nodes had no leaves,
and so were removed. By the end of the compression stage, there were 14
free slots, and only 3 leaf nodes. The tree was ascended and then its
parent node was compressed. When this node was seen, it could not be
folded, due to the internal node it contained.

The invariant for compression in this function is: whenever
nr_leaves_on_branch < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT, the node should contain all
leaf nodes. The compression step currently cannot guarantee this, given
the corner case shown above.

To fix this issue, retry compression whenever we have retained a node,
and yet nr_leaves_on_branch < ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_OUT. This second
compression will then allow the node in slot 1 to be folded in,
satisfying the invariant. Below is the output of the reproducer once the
fix is applied:

    -- compress node 0x560e9c562380 --
    free=0, leaves=0
    [0] retain node 2/1 [nx 0]
    [1] fold node 1/1 [nx 0]
    [2] fold node 0/1 [nx 2]
    [3] fold node 0/2 [nx 2]
    [4] fold node 0/3 [nx 2]
    [5] fold node 0/4 [nx 2]
    [6] fold node 0/5 [nx 2]
    [7] fold node 0/6 [nx 2]
    [8] fold node 0/7 [nx 2]
    [9] fold node 0/8 [nx 2]
    [10] fold node 0/9 [nx 2]
    [11] fold node 0/10 [nx 2]
    [12] fold node 0/11 [nx 2]
    [13] fold node 0/12 [nx 2]
    [14] fold node 0/13 [nx 2]
    [15] fold node 0/14 [nx 2]
    internal nodes remain despite enough space, retrying
    -- compress node 0x560e9c562380 --
    free=14, leaves=1
    [0] fold node 2/15 [nx 0]
    after: 3

Changes
=======
DH:
 - Use false instead of 0.
 - Reorder the inserted lines in a couple of places to put retained before
   next_slot.

ver #2)
 - Fix typo in pr_devel, correct comparison to "<="

Fixes: 3cb9895 ("Add a generic associative array implementation.")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Brennan <stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220511225517.407935-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220512215045.489140-1-stephen.s.brennan@oracle.com/ # v2
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jun 22, 2022
@dhowells @torvalds
netfs: Fix gcc-12 warning by embedding vfs inode in netfs_i_context
874c8ca 
While randstruct was satisfied with using an open-coded "void *" offset
cast for the netfs_i_context <-> inode casting, __builtin_object_size() as
used by FORTIFY_SOURCE was not as easily fooled.  This was causing the
following complaint[1] from gcc v12:

  In file included from include/linux/string.h:253,
                   from include/linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h:7,
                   from fs/ceph/inode.c:2:
  In function 'fortify_memset_chk',
      inlined from 'netfs_i_context_init' at include/linux/netfs.h:326:2,
      inlined from 'ceph_alloc_inode' at fs/ceph/inode.c:463:2:
  include/linux/fortify-string.h:242:25: warning: call to '__write_overflow_field' declared with attribute warning: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Wattribute-warning]
    242 |                         __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size);
        |                         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Fix this by embedding a struct inode into struct netfs_i_context (which
should perhaps be renamed to struct netfs_inode).  The struct inode
vfs_inode fields are then removed from the 9p, afs, ceph and cifs inode
structs and vfs_inode is then simply changed to "netfs.inode" in those
filesystems.

Further, rename netfs_i_context to netfs_inode, get rid of the
netfs_inode() function that converted a netfs_i_context pointer to an
inode pointer (that can now be done with &ctx->inode) and rename the
netfs_i_context() function to netfs_inode() (which is now a wrapper
around container_of()).

Most of the changes were done with:

  perl -p -i -e 's/vfs_inode/netfs.inode/'g \
        `git grep -l 'vfs_inode' -- fs/{9p,afs,ceph,cifs}/*.[ch]`

Kees suggested doing it with a pair structure[2] and a special
declarator to insert that into the network filesystem's inode
wrapper[3], but I think it's cleaner to embed it - and then it doesn't
matter if struct randomisation reorders things.

Dave Chinner suggested using a filesystem-specific VFS_I() function in
each filesystem to convert that filesystem's own inode wrapper struct
into the VFS inode struct[4].

Version #2:
 - Fix a couple of missed name changes due to a disabled cifs option.
 - Rename nfs_i_context to nfs_inode
 - Use "netfs" instead of "nic" as the member name in per-fs inode wrapper
   structs.

[ This also undoes commit 507160f ("netfs: gcc-12: temporarily
  disable '-Wattribute-warning' for now") that is no longer needed ]

Fixes: bc899ee ("netfs: Add a netfs inode context")
Reported-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com>
cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
cc: Dominique Martinet <asmadeus@codewreck.org>
cc: Christian Schoenebeck <linux_oss@crudebyte.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
cc: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com>
cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org>
cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
cc: v9fs-developer@lists.sourceforge.net
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: samba-technical@lists.samba.org
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/d2ad3a3d7bdd794c6efb562d2f2b655fb67756b9.camel@kernel.org/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517210230.864239-1-keescook@chromium.org/ [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220518202212.2322058-1-keescook@chromium.org/ [3]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220524101205.GI2306852@dread.disaster.area/ [4]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165296786831.3591209.12111293034669289733.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165305805651.4094995.7763502506786714216.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk # v2
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 1, 2022
@dhowells
rxrpc: Fix ICMP/ICMP6 error handling
ac56a0b 
Because rxrpc pretends to be a tunnel on top of a UDP/UDP6 socket, allowing
it to siphon off UDP packets early in the handling of received UDP packets
thereby avoiding the packet going through the UDP receive queue, it doesn't
get ICMP packets through the UDP ->sk_error_report() callback.  In fact, it
doesn't appear that there's any usable option for getting hold of ICMP
packets.

Fix this by adding a new UDP encap hook to distribute error messages for
UDP tunnels.  If the hook is set, then the tunnel driver will be able to
see ICMP packets.  The hook provides the offset into the packet of the UDP
header of the original packet that caused the notification.

An alternative would be to call the ->error_handler() hook - but that
requires that the skbuff be cloned (as ip_icmp_error() or ipv6_cmp_error()
do, though isn't really necessary or desirable in rxrpc's case is we want
to parse them there and then, not queue them).

Changes
=======
ver #3)
 - Fixed an uninitialised variable.

ver #2)
 - Fixed some missing CONFIG_AF_RXRPC_IPV6 conditionals.

Fixes: 5271953 ("rxrpc: Use the UDP encap_rcv hook")
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 1, 2022
@anguy11
i40e: Fix kernel crash during module removal
fb8396a 
The driver incorrectly frees client instance and subsequent
i40e module removal leads to kernel crash.

Reproducer:
1. Do ethtool offline test followed immediately by another one
host# ethtool -t eth0 offline; ethtool -t eth0 offline
2. Remove recursively irdma module that also removes i40e module
host# modprobe -r irdma

Result:
[ 8675.035651] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: offline testing starting
[ 8675.193774] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: testing finished
[ 8675.201316] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: offline testing starting
[ 8675.358921] i40e 0000:3d:00.0 eno1: testing finished
[ 8675.496921] i40e 0000:3d:00.0: IRDMA hardware initialization FAILED init_state=2 status=-110
[ 8686.188955] i40e 0000:3d:00.1: i40e_ptp_stop: removed PHC on eno2
[ 8686.943890] i40e 0000:3d:00.1: Deleted LAN device PF1 bus=0x3d dev=0x00 func=0x01
[ 8686.952669] i40e 0000:3d:00.0: i40e_ptp_stop: removed PHC on eno1
[ 8687.761787] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000030
[ 8687.768755] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 8687.773895] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 8687.779034] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 8687.781575] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ 8687.785935] CPU: 51 PID: 172891 Comm: rmmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G        W I        5.19.0+ #2
[ 8687.794800] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFD/S2600WFD, BIOS SE5C620.86B.0X.02.0001.051420190324 05/14/2019
[ 8687.805222] RIP: 0010:i40e_lan_del_device+0x13/0xb0 [i40e]
[ 8687.810719] Code: d4 84 c0 0f 84 b8 25 01 00 e9 9c 25 01 00 41 bc f4 ff ff ff eb 91 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 41 54 55 53 48 8b 87 58 08 00 00 48 89 fb <48> 8b 68 30 48 89 ef e8 21 8a 0f d5 48 89 ef e8 a9 78 0f d5 48 8b
[ 8687.829462] RSP: 0018:ffffa604072efce0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 8687.834689] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8f43833b2000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 8687.841821] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8f4b0545b298 RDI: ffff8f43833b2000
[ 8687.848955] RBP: ffff8f43833b2000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 8687.856086] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 000ffffffffff000 R12: ffff8f43833b2ef0
[ 8687.863218] R13: ffff8f43833b2ef0 R14: ffff915103966000 R15: ffff8f43833b2008
[ 8687.870342] FS:  00007f79501c3740(0000) GS:ffff8f4adffc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 8687.878427] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 8687.884174] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 000000014276e004 CR4: 00000000007706e0
[ 8687.891306] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 8687.898441] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 8687.905572] PKRU: 55555554
[ 8687.908286] Call Trace:
[ 8687.910737]  <TASK>
[ 8687.912843]  i40e_remove+0x2c0/0x330 [i40e]
[ 8687.917040]  pci_device_remove+0x33/0xa0
[ 8687.920962]  device_release_driver_internal+0x1aa/0x230
[ 8687.926188]  driver_detach+0x44/0x90
[ 8687.929770]  bus_remove_driver+0x55/0xe0
[ 8687.933693]  pci_unregister_driver+0x2a/0xb0
[ 8687.937967]  i40e_exit_module+0xc/0xf48 [i40e]

Two offline tests cause IRDMA driver failure (ETIMEDOUT) and this
failure is indicated back to i40e_client_subtask() that calls
i40e_client_del_instance() to free client instance referenced
by pf->cinst and sets this pointer to NULL. During the module
removal i40e_remove() calls i40e_lan_del_device() that dereferences
pf->cinst that is NULL -> crash.
Do not remove client instance when client open callbacks fails and
just clear __I40E_CLIENT_INSTANCE_OPENED bit. The driver also needs
to take care about this situation (when netdev is up and client
is NOT opened) in i40e_notify_client_of_netdev_close() and
calls client close callback only when __I40E_CLIENT_INSTANCE_OPENED
is set.

Fixes: 0ef2d5a ("i40e: KISS the client interface")
Signed-off-by: Ivan Vecera <ivecera@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Helena Anna Dubel <helena.anna.dubel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 1, 2022
@davem330
ipv6: sr: fix out-of-bounds read when setting HMAC data.
84a5358 
The SRv6 layer allows defining HMAC data that can later be used to sign IPv6
Segment Routing Headers. This configuration is realised via netlink through
four attributes: SEG6_ATTR_HMACKEYID, SEG6_ATTR_SECRET, SEG6_ATTR_SECRETLEN and
SEG6_ATTR_ALGID. Because the SECRETLEN attribute is decoupled from the actual
length of the SECRET attribute, it is possible to provide invalid combinations
(e.g., secret = "", secretlen = 64). This case is not checked in the code and
with an appropriately crafted netlink message, an out-of-bounds read of up
to 64 bytes (max secret length) can occur past the skb end pointer and into
skb_shared_info:

Breakpoint 1, seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
208		memcpy(hinfo->secret, secret, slen);
(gdb) bt
 #0  seg6_genl_sethmac (skb=<optimized out>, info=<optimized out>) at net/ipv6/seg6.c:208
 #1  0xffffffff81e012e9 in genl_family_rcv_msg_doit (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=nlh@entry=0xffff88800b1b7600,
    extack=extack@entry=0xffffc90000ba7af0, ops=ops@entry=0xffffc90000ba7a80, hdrlen=4, net=0xffffffff84237580 <init_net>, family=<optimized out>,
    family=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:731
 #2  0xffffffff81e01435 in genl_family_rcv_msg (extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00,
    family=0xffffffff82fef6c0 <seg6_genl_family>) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:775
 #3  genl_rcv_msg (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, nlh=0xffff88800b1b7600, extack=0xffffc90000ba7af0) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:792
 #4  0xffffffff81dfffc3 in netlink_rcv_skb (skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, cb=cb@entry=0xffffffff81e01350 <genl_rcv_msg>)
    at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2501
 #5  0xffffffff81e00919 in genl_rcv (skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00) at net/netlink/genetlink.c:803
 #6  0xffffffff81dff6ae in netlink_unicast_kernel (ssk=0xffff888010eec800, skb=0xffff88800b1f9f00, sk=0xffff888004aed000)
    at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1319
 #7  netlink_unicast (ssk=ssk@entry=0xffff888010eec800, skb=skb@entry=0xffff88800b1f9f00, portid=portid@entry=0, nonblock=<optimized out>)
    at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1345
 #8  0xffffffff81dff9a4 in netlink_sendmsg (sock=<optimized out>, msg=0xffffc90000ba7e48, len=<optimized out>) at net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1921
...
(gdb) p/x ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->head + ((struct sk_buff *)0xffff88800b1f9f00)->end
$1 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p/x secret
$2 = 0xffff88800b1b76c0
(gdb) p slen
$3 = 64 '@'

The OOB data can then be read back from userspace by dumping HMAC state. This
commit fixes this by ensuring SECRETLEN cannot exceed the actual length of
SECRET.

Reported-by: Lucas Leong <wmliang.tw@gmail.com>
Tested: verified that EINVAL is correctly returned when secretlen > len(secret)
Fixes: 4f4853d ("ipv6: sr: implement API to control SR HMAC structure")
Signed-off-by: David Lebrun <dlebrun@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 1, 2022
@dmertman @anguy11
ice: Don't double unplug aux on peer initiated reset
23c6191 
In the IDC callback that is accessed when the aux drivers request a reset,
the function to unplug the aux devices is called.  This function is also
called in the ice_prepare_for_reset function. This double call is causing
a "scheduling while atomic" BUG.

[  662.676430] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: cqp opcode = 0x1 maj_err_code = 0xffff min_err_code = 0x8003

[  662.676609] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: [Modify QP Cmd Error][op_code=8] status=-29 waiting=1 completion_err=1 maj=0xffff min=0x8003

[  662.815006] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: ICE OICR event notification: oicr = 0x10000003

[  662.815014] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: critical PE Error, GLPE_CRITERR=0x00011424

[  662.815017] ice 0000:4c:00.0 rocep76s0: Requesting a reset

[  662.815475] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/37/0/0x00010002

[  662.815475] BUG: scheduling while atomic: swapper/37/0/0x00010002
[  662.815477] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs rfkill 8021q garp mrp stp llc vfat fat rpcrdma intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common sunrpc i10nm_edac rdma_ucm nfit ib_srpt libnvdimm ib_isert iscsi_target_mod x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp target_core_mod snd_hda_intel ib_iser snd_intel_dspcfg libiscsi snd_intel_sdw_acpi scsi_transport_iscsi kvm_intel iTCO_wdt rdma_cm snd_hda_codec kvm iw_cm ipmi_ssif iTCO_vendor_support snd_hda_core irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hwdep snd_seq snd_seq_device rapl snd_pcm snd_timer isst_if_mbox_pci pcspkr isst_if_mmio irdma intel_uncore idxd acpi_ipmi joydev isst_if_common snd mei_me idxd_bus ipmi_si soundcore i2c_i801 mei ipmi_devintf i2c_smbus i2c_ismt ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad rv(OE) ib_uverbs ib_cm ib_core xfs libcrc32c ast i2c_algo_bit drm_vram_helper drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops drm_ttm_helpe
 r ttm
[  662.815546]  nvme nvme_core ice drm crc32c_intel i40e t10_pi wmi pinctrl_emmitsburg dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse
[  662.815557] Preemption disabled at:
[  662.815558] [<0000000000000000>] 0x0
[  662.815563] CPU: 37 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S         OE     5.17.1 #2
[  662.815566] Hardware name: Intel Corporation D50DNP/D50DNP, BIOS SE5C6301.86B.6624.D18.2111021741 11/02/2021
[  662.815568] Call Trace:
[  662.815572]  <IRQ>
[  662.815574]  dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42
[  662.815581]  __schedule_bug.cold.147+0x7d/0x8a
[  662.815588]  __schedule+0x798/0x990
[  662.815595]  schedule+0x44/0xc0
[  662.815597]  schedule_preempt_disabled+0x14/0x20
[  662.815600]  __mutex_lock.isra.11+0x46c/0x490
[  662.815603]  ? __ibdev_printk+0x76/0xc0 [ib_core]
[  662.815633]  device_del+0x37/0x3d0
[  662.815639]  ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice]
[  662.815674]  ice_schedule_reset+0x3c/0xd0 [ice]
[  662.815693]  irdma_iidc_event_handler.cold.7+0xb6/0xd3 [irdma]
[  662.815712]  ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x45/0xa0
[  662.815719]  ice_send_event_to_aux+0x54/0x70 [ice]
[  662.815741]  ice_misc_intr+0x21d/0x2d0 [ice]
[  662.815756]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4c/0x180
[  662.815762]  handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf/0x40
[  662.815764]  handle_irq_event+0x34/0x60
[  662.815766]  handle_edge_irq+0x9a/0x1c0
[  662.815770]  __common_interrupt+0x62/0x100
[  662.815774]  common_interrupt+0xb4/0xd0
[  662.815779]  </IRQ>
[  662.815780]  <TASK>
[  662.815780]  asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[  662.815785] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd6/0x380
[  662.815789] Code: 49 89 c4 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 65 d7 95 ff 45 84 ff 74 12 9c 58 f6 c4 02 0f 85 64 02 00 00 31 ff e8 ae c5 9c ff fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 12 01 00 00 49 63 d6 4c 2b 24 24 48 8d 04 52 48 8d 04 82 49
[  662.815791] RSP: 0018:ff2c2c4f18edbe80 EFLAGS: 00000202
[  662.815793] RAX: ff280805df140000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000001f
[  662.815795] RDX: 0000009a52da2d08 RSI: ffffffff93f8240b RDI: ffffffff93f53ee7
[  662.815796] RBP: ff5e2bd11ff41928 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000002f8c0
[  662.815797] R10: 0000010c3f18e2cf R11: 000000000000000f R12: 0000009a52da2d08
[  662.815798] R13: ffffffff94ad7e20 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000
[  662.815801]  cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40
[  662.815803]  do_idle+0x261/0x2b0
[  662.815807]  cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
[  662.815809]  start_secondary+0x114/0x150
[  662.815813]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xd5/0xdb
[  662.815818]  </TASK>
[  662.815846] bad: scheduling from the idle thread!
[  662.815849] CPU: 37 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/37 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G S      W  OE     5.17.1 #2
[  662.815852] Hardware name: Intel Corporation D50DNP/D50DNP, BIOS SE5C6301.86B.6624.D18.2111021741 11/02/2021
[  662.815853] Call Trace:
[  662.815855]  <IRQ>
[  662.815856]  dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x42
[  662.815860]  dequeue_task_idle+0x20/0x30
[  662.815863]  __schedule+0x1c3/0x990
[  662.815868]  schedule+0x44/0xc0
[  662.815871]  schedule_preempt_disabled+0x14/0x20
[  662.815873]  __mutex_lock.isra.11+0x3a8/0x490
[  662.815876]  ? __ibdev_printk+0x76/0xc0 [ib_core]
[  662.815904]  device_del+0x37/0x3d0
[  662.815909]  ice_unplug_aux_dev+0x1a/0x40 [ice]
[  662.815937]  ice_schedule_reset+0x3c/0xd0 [ice]
[  662.815961]  irdma_iidc_event_handler.cold.7+0xb6/0xd3 [irdma]
[  662.815979]  ? bitmap_find_next_zero_area_off+0x45/0xa0
[  662.815985]  ice_send_event_to_aux+0x54/0x70 [ice]
[  662.816011]  ice_misc_intr+0x21d/0x2d0 [ice]
[  662.816033]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4c/0x180
[  662.816037]  handle_irq_event_percpu+0xf/0x40
[  662.816039]  handle_irq_event+0x34/0x60
[  662.816042]  handle_edge_irq+0x9a/0x1c0
[  662.816045]  __common_interrupt+0x62/0x100
[  662.816048]  common_interrupt+0xb4/0xd0
[  662.816052]  </IRQ>
[  662.816053]  <TASK>
[  662.816054]  asm_common_interrupt+0x1e/0x40
[  662.816057] RIP: 0010:cpuidle_enter_state+0xd6/0x380
[  662.816060] Code: 49 89 c4 0f 1f 44 00 00 31 ff e8 65 d7 95 ff 45 84 ff 74 12 9c 58 f6 c4 02 0f 85 64 02 00 00 31 ff e8 ae c5 9c ff fb 45 85 f6 <0f> 88 12 01 00 00 49 63 d6 4c 2b 24 24 48 8d 04 52 48 8d 04 82 49
[  662.816063] RSP: 0018:ff2c2c4f18edbe80 EFLAGS: 00000202
[  662.816065] RAX: ff280805df140000 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000001f
[  662.816067] RDX: 0000009a52da2d08 RSI: ffffffff93f8240b RDI: ffffffff93f53ee7
[  662.816068] RBP: ff5e2bd11ff41928 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000002f8c0
[  662.816070] R10: 0000010c3f18e2cf R11: 000000000000000f R12: 0000009a52da2d08
[  662.816071] R13: ffffffff94ad7e20 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: 0000000000000000
[  662.816075]  cpuidle_enter+0x29/0x40
[  662.816077]  do_idle+0x261/0x2b0
[  662.816080]  cpu_startup_entry+0x19/0x20
[  662.816083]  start_secondary+0x114/0x150
[  662.816087]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xd5/0xdb
[  662.816091]  </TASK>
[  662.816169] bad: scheduling from the idle thread!

The correct place to unplug the aux devices for a reset is in the
prepare_for_reset function, as this is a common place for all reset flows.
It also has built in protection from being called twice in a single reset
instance before the aux devices are replugged.

Fixes: f9f5301 ("ice: Register auxiliary device to provide RDMA")
Signed-off-by: Dave Ertman <david.m.ertman@intel.com>
Tested-by: Helena Anna Dubel <helena.anna.dubel@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 1, 2022
@arndb
Merge tag 'at91-fixes-6.0-2' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/…
aaa5814 
…kernel/git/at91/linux into arm/fixes

AT91 fixes for 6.0 #2

It contains a fix for LAN966 SoCs that corrects the interrupt
number for internal PHYs.

* tag 'at91-fixes-6.0-2' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/at91/linux:
  ARM: dts: lan966x: Fix the interrupt number for internal PHYs

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220915105833.4159850-1-claudiu.beznea@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 1, 2022
@kuba-moo
Merge branch 'ipmr-always-call-ip-6-_mr_forward-from-rcu-read-side-cr…
68fe503 
…itical-section'

Ido Schimmel says:

====================
ipmr: Always call ip{,6}_mr_forward() from RCU read-side critical section

Patch #1 fixes a bug in ipmr code.

Patch #2 adds corresponding test cases.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220914075339.4074096-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 1, 2022
@bonzini
Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.0-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/…
b4ac28a 
…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.0, take #2

- Fix kmemleak usage in Protected KVM (again)
neuschaefer added a commit that referenced this issue Nov 3, 2022
@neuschaefer
refactor #2
2ab0e32
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 4, 2022
@sudeep-holla
coresight: Fix possible deadlock with lock dependency
23722fb 
With lockdeps enabled, we get the following warning:

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
------------------------------------------------------
kworker/u12:1/53 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff80000adce220 (coresight_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: coresight_set_assoc_ectdev_mutex+0x3c/0x5c
but task is already holding lock:
ffff80000add1f60 (ect_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: cti_probe+0x318/0x394

which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (ect_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __mutex_lock_common+0xd8/0xe60
       mutex_lock_nested+0x44/0x50
       cti_add_assoc_to_csdev+0x4c/0x184
       coresight_register+0x2f0/0x314
       tmc_probe+0x33c/0x414

-> #0 (coresight_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1a20/0x32d0
       lock_acquire+0x160/0x308
       __mutex_lock_common+0xd8/0xe60
       mutex_lock_nested+0x44/0x50
       coresight_set_assoc_ectdev_mutex+0x3c/0x5c
       cti_update_conn_xrefs+0x6c/0xf8
       cti_probe+0x33c/0x394

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(ect_mutex);
                               lock(coresight_mutex);
                               lock(ect_mutex);
  lock(coresight_mutex);
 *** DEADLOCK ***

4 locks held by kworker/u12:1/53:
 #0: ((wq_completion)events_unbound){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x1fc/0x63c
 #1: (deferred_probe_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work+0x228/0x63c
 #2: (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x48/0x1a8
 #3: (ect_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: cti_probe+0x318/0x394

To fix the same, call cti_add_assoc_to_csdev without the holding
coresight_mutex and confine the locking while setting the associated
ect / cti device using coresight_set_assoc_ectdev_mutex().

Fixes: 177af82 ("coresight: cti: Enable CTI associated with devices")
Cc: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Leach <mike.leach@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220721130329.3787211-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 4, 2022
Merge branch 'Wait for busy refill_work when destroying bpf memory al…
bed54ae 
…locator'

Hou Tao says:

====================

From: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>

Hi,

The patchset aims to fix one problem of bpf memory allocator destruction
when there is PREEMPT_RT kernel or kernel with arch_irq_work_has_interrupt()
being false (e.g. 1-cpu arm32 host or mips). The root cause is that
there may be busy refill_work when the allocator is destroying and it
may incur oops or other problems as shown in patch #1. Patch #1 fixes
the problem by waiting for the completion of irq work during destroying
and patch #2 is just a clean-up patch based on patch #1. Please see
individual patches for more details.

Comments are always welcome.

Change Log:
v2:
  * patch 1: fix typos and add notes about the overhead of irq_work_sync()
  * patch 1 & 2: add Acked-by tags from sdf@google.com

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221019115539.983394-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/T/#t
====================

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 4, 2022
@bonzini
Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.1-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/…
ebccb53 
…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.1, take #2

- Fix a bug preventing restoring an ITS containing mappings
  for very large and very sparse device topology

- Work around a relocation handling error when compiling
  the nVHE object with profile optimisation
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 4, 2022
@sagigrimberg
nvme-tcp: fix possible circular locking when deleting a controller un…
83e1226 
…der memory pressure

When destroying a queue, when calling sock_release, the network stack
might need to allocate an skb to send a FIN/RST. When that happens
during memory pressure, there is a need to reclaim memory, which
in turn may ask the nvme-tcp device to write out dirty pages, however
this is not possible due to a ctrl teardown that is going on.

Set PF_MEMALLOC to the task that releases the socket to grant access
to PF_MEMALLOC reserves. In addition, do the same for the nvme-tcp
thread as this may also originate from the swap itself and should
be more resilient to memory pressure situations.

This fixes the following lockdep complaint:
--
======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.0.0-rc2+ torvalds#25 Tainted: G        W
 ------------------------------------------------------
 kswapd0/92 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888114003240 (sk_lock-AF_INET-NVME){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_sendpage+0x23/0xa0

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffffffff97e95ca0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x987/0x10d0

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #1 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        fs_reclaim_acquire+0x11e/0x160
        kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x44/0x530
        __alloc_skb+0x158/0x230
        tcp_send_active_reset+0x7e/0x730
        tcp_disconnect+0x1272/0x1ae0
        __tcp_close+0x707/0xd90
        tcp_close+0x26/0x80
        inet_release+0xfa/0x220
        sock_release+0x85/0x1a0
        nvme_tcp_free_queue+0x1fd/0x470 [nvme_tcp]
        nvme_do_delete_ctrl+0x130/0x13d [nvme_core]
        nvme_sysfs_delete.cold+0x8/0xd [nvme_core]
        kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x356/0x530
        vfs_write+0x4e8/0xce0
        ksys_write+0xfd/0x1d0
        do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

 -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_INET-NVME){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        __lock_acquire+0x2a0c/0x5690
        lock_acquire+0x18e/0x4f0
        lock_sock_nested+0x37/0xc0
        tcp_sendpage+0x23/0xa0
        inet_sendpage+0xad/0x120
        kernel_sendpage+0x156/0x440
        nvme_tcp_try_send+0x48a/0x2630 [nvme_tcp]
        nvme_tcp_queue_rq+0xefb/0x17e0 [nvme_tcp]
        __blk_mq_try_issue_directly+0x452/0x660
        blk_mq_plug_issue_direct.constprop.0+0x207/0x700
        blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x6f5/0xc70
        __blk_flush_plug+0x264/0x410
        blk_finish_plug+0x4b/0xa0
        shrink_lruvec+0x1263/0x1ea0
        shrink_node+0x736/0x1a80
        balance_pgdat+0x740/0x10d0
        kswapd+0x5f2/0xaf0
        kthread+0x256/0x2f0
        ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30

other info that might help us debug this:

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(fs_reclaim);
                               lock(sk_lock-AF_INET-NVME);
                               lock(fs_reclaim);
  lock(sk_lock-AF_INET-NVME);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kswapd0/92:
 #0: ffffffff97e95ca0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0x987/0x10d0
 #1: ffff88811f21b0b0 (q->srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x6b3/0xc70
 #2: ffff888170b11470 (&queue->send_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: nvme_tcp_queue_rq+0xeb9/0x17e0 [nvme_tcp]

Fixes: 3f2304f ("nvme-tcp: add NVMe over TCP host driver")
Reported-by: Daniel Wagner <dwagner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Tested-by: Daniel Wagner <dwagner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 18, 2022
@ctmarinas
arm64: entry: avoid kprobe recursion
024f4b2 
The cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() function is called when
handling debug exceptions (and synchronous exceptions from BRK
instructions), and so is called when a probed function executes. If the
compiler does not inline cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler(), it
can be probed.

If cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() is probed, any debug
exception or software breakpoint exception will result in recursive
exceptions leading to a stack overflow. This can be triggered with the
ftrace multiple_probes selftest, and as per the example splat below.

This is a regression caused by commit:

  6459b84 ("arm64: entry: consolidate Cortex-A76 erratum 1463225 workaround")

... which removed the NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() annotation associated with the
function.

My intent was that cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() would be
inlined into its caller, el1_dbg(), which is marked noinstr and cannot
be probed. Mark cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() as
__always_inline to ensure this.

Example splat prior to this patch (with recursive entries elided):

| # echo p cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
| # echo p do_el0_svc >> /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
| # echo 1 > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kprobes/enable
| Insufficient stack space to handle exception!
| ESR: 0x0000000096000047 -- DABT (current EL)
| FAR: 0xffff800009cefff0
| Task stack:     [0xffff800009cf0000..0xffff800009cf4000]
| IRQ stack:      [0xffff800008000000..0xffff800008004000]
| Overflow stack: [0xffff00007fbc00f0..0xffff00007fbc10f0]
| CPU: 0 PID: 145 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.0.0 #2
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 604003c5 (nZCv DAIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : arm64_enter_el1_dbg+0x4/0x20
| lr : el1_dbg+0x24/0x5c
| sp : ffff800009cf0000
| x29: ffff800009cf0000 x28: ffff000002c74740 x27: 0000000000000000
| x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
| x23: 00000000604003c5 x22: ffff80000801745c x21: 0000aaaac95ac068
| x20: 00000000f2000004 x19: ffff800009cf0040 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
| x11: 0000000000000010 x10: ffff800008c87190 x9 : ffff800008ca00d0
| x8 : 000000000000003c x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
| x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 00000000000043a4
| x2 : 00000000f2000004 x1 : 00000000f2000004 x0 : ffff800009cf0040
| Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow
| CPU: 0 PID: 145 Comm: sh Not tainted 6.0.0 #2
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Call trace:
|  dump_backtrace+0xe4/0x104
|  show_stack+0x18/0x4c
|  dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x7c
|  dump_stack+0x18/0x38
|  panic+0x14c/0x338
|  test_taint+0x0/0x2c
|  panic_bad_stack+0x104/0x118
|  handle_bad_stack+0x34/0x48
|  __bad_stack+0x78/0x7c
|  arm64_enter_el1_dbg+0x4/0x20
|  el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
|  el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
|  cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34
...
|  el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
|  el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
|  cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34
...
|  el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
|  el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
|  cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler+0x0/0x34
|  el1h_64_sync_handler+0x40/0x98
|  el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
|  do_el0_svc+0x0/0x28
|  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0
|  el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190
| Kernel Offset: disabled
| CPU features: 0x0080,00005021,19001080
| Memory Limit: none
| ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: kernel stack overflow ]---

With this patch, cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler() is inlined
into el1_dbg(), and el1_dbg() cannot be probed:

| # echo p cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
| sh: write error: No such file or directory
| # grep -w cortex_a76_erratum_1463225_debug_handler /proc/kallsyms | wc -l
| 0
| # echo p el1_dbg > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/kprobe_events
| sh: write error: Invalid argument
| # grep -w el1_dbg /proc/kallsyms | wc -l
| 1

Fixes: 6459b84 ("arm64: entry: consolidate Cortex-A76 erratum 1463225 workaround")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.12.x
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221017090157.2881408-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 18, 2022
@roidayan
net/mlx5e: TC, Fix slab-out-of-bounds in parse_tc_actions
7f1a6d4 
esw_attr is only allocated if namespace is fdb.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in parse_tc_actions+0xdc6/0x10e0 [mlx5_core]
Write of size 4 at addr ffff88815f185b04 by task tc/2135

CPU: 5 PID: 2135 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2+ #2
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
 print_report+0x170/0x471
 ? parse_tc_actions+0xdc6/0x10e0 [mlx5_core]
 kasan_report+0xbc/0xf0
 ? parse_tc_actions+0xdc6/0x10e0 [mlx5_core]
 parse_tc_actions+0xdc6/0x10e0 [mlx5_core]

Fixes: 94d6517 ("net/mlx5e: TC, Fix cloned flow attr instance dests are not zeroed")
Signed-off-by: Roi Dayan <roid@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Maor Dickman <maord@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@nvidia.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 18, 2022
Merge branch 'stmmac-dwmac-loongson-fixes-three-leaks'
63eec6f 
Yang Yingliang says:

====================
stmmac: dwmac-loongson: fixes three leaks

patch #2 fixes missing pci_disable_device() in the error path in probe()
patch #1 and pach #3 fix missing pci_disable_msi() and of_node_put() in
error and remove() path.
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221108114647.4144952-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Nov 24, 2022
@dhowells
netfs: Fix missing xas_retry() calls in xarray iteration
7e043a8 
netfslib has a number of places in which it performs iteration of an xarray
whilst being under the RCU read lock.  It *should* call xas_retry() as the
first thing inside of the loop and do "continue" if it returns true in case
the xarray walker passed out a special value indicating that the walk needs
to be redone from the root[*].

Fix this by adding the missing retry checks.

[*] I wonder if this should be done inside xas_find(), xas_next_node() and
    suchlike, but I'm told that's not an simple change to effect.

This can cause an oops like that below.  Note the faulting address - this
is an internal value (|0x2) returned from xarray.

BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000402
...
RIP: 0010:netfs_rreq_unlock+0xef/0x380 [netfs]
...
Call Trace:
 netfs_rreq_assess+0xa6/0x240 [netfs]
 netfs_readpage+0x173/0x3b0 [netfs]
 ? init_wait_var_entry+0x50/0x50
 filemap_read_page+0x33/0xf0
 filemap_get_pages+0x2f2/0x3f0
 filemap_read+0xaa/0x320
 ? do_filp_open+0xb2/0x150
 ? rmqueue+0x3be/0xe10
 ceph_read_iter+0x1fe/0x680 [ceph]
 ? new_sync_read+0x115/0x1a0
 new_sync_read+0x115/0x1a0
 vfs_read+0xf3/0x180
 ksys_read+0x5f/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0x38/0x90
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae

Changes:
========
ver #2)
 - Changed an unsigned int to a size_t to reduce the likelihood of an
   overflow as per Willy's suggestion.
 - Added an additional patch to fix the maths.

Fixes: 3d3c950 ("netfs: Provide readahead and readpage netfs helpers")
Reported-by: George Law <glaw@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jingbo Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
cc: linux-cachefs@redhat.com
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166749229733.107206.17482609105741691452.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166757987929.950645.12595273010425381286.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 2, 2023
@bonzini
Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.3-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/…
8607daa 
…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.3, part #2

Fixes for a rather interesting set of bugs relating to the MMU:

 - Read the MMU notifier seq before dropping the mmap lock to guard
   against reading a potentially stale VMA

 - Disable interrupts when walking user page tables to protect against
   the page table being freed

 - Read the MTE permissions for the VMA within the mmap lock critical
   section, avoiding the use of a potentally stale VMA pointer

Additionally, some fixes targeting the vPMU:

 - Return the sum of the current perf event value and PMC snapshot for
   reads from userspace

 - Don't save the value of guest writes to PMCR_EL0.{C,P}, which could
   otherwise lead to userspace erroneously resetting the vPMU during VM
   save/restore
neuschaefer added a commit that referenced this issue Apr 16, 2023
@neuschaefer
refactor #2
43db3e8
neuschaefer added a commit that referenced this issue Apr 16, 2023
@neuschaefer
refactor #2
fc354bd
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 29, 2023
@jbrun3t @broonie
ASoC: meson: axg-tdm-formatter: fix channel slot allocation
c1f848f 
When the tdm lane mask is computed, the driver currently fills the 1st lane
before moving on to the next. If the stream has less channels than the
lanes can accommodate, slots will be disabled on the last lanes.

Unfortunately, the HW distribute channels in a different way. It distribute
channels in pair on each lanes before moving on the next slots.

This difference leads to problems if a device has an interface with more
than 1 lane and with more than 2 slots per lane.

For example: a playback interface with 2 lanes and 4 slots each (total 8
slots - zero based numbering)
- Playing a 8ch stream:
  - All slots activated by the driver
  - channel #2 will be played on lane #1 - slot #0 following HW placement
- Playing a 4ch stream:
  - Lane #1 disabled by the driver
  - channel #2 will be played on lane #0 - slot #2

This behaviour is obviously not desirable.

Change the way slots are activated on the TDM lanes to follow what the HW
does and make sure each channel always get mapped to the same slot/lane.

Fixes: 1a11d88 ("ASoC: meson: add tdm formatter base driver")
Signed-off-by: Jerome Brunet <jbrunet@baylibre.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809171931.1244502-1-jbrunet@baylibre.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 29, 2023
@nathanlynch @mpe
powerpc/rtas_flash: allow user copy to flash block cache objects
4f31759 
With hardened usercopy enabled (CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y), using the
/proc/powerpc/rtas/firmware_update interface to prepare a system
firmware update yields a BUG():

  kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
  Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1]
  LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Hash SMP NR_CPUS=2048 NUMA pSeries
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 2232 Comm: dd Not tainted 6.5.0-rc3+ #2
  Hardware name: IBM,8408-E8E POWER8E (raw) 0x4b0201 0xf000004 of:IBM,FW860.50 (SV860_146) hv:phyp pSeries
  NIP:  c0000000005991d0 LR: c0000000005991cc CTR: 0000000000000000
  REGS: c0000000148c76a0 TRAP: 0700   Not tainted  (6.5.0-rc3+)
  MSR:  8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE>  CR: 24002242  XER: 0000000c
  CFAR: c0000000001fbd34 IRQMASK: 0
  [ ... GPRs omitted ... ]
  NIP usercopy_abort+0xa0/0xb0
  LR  usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0
  Call Trace:
    usercopy_abort+0x9c/0xb0 (unreliable)
    __check_heap_object+0x1b4/0x1d0
    __check_object_size+0x2d0/0x380
    rtas_flash_write+0xe4/0x250
    proc_reg_write+0xfc/0x160
    vfs_write+0xfc/0x4e0
    ksys_write+0x90/0x160
    system_call_exception+0x178/0x320
    system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4

The blocks of the firmware image are copied directly from user memory
to objects allocated from flash_block_cache, so flash_block_cache must
be created using kmem_cache_create_usercopy() to mark it safe for user
access.

Fixes: 6d07d1c ("usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Lynch <nathanl@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
[mpe: Trim and indent oops]
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230810-rtas-flash-vs-hardened-usercopy-v2-1-dcf63793a938@linux.ibm.com
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 23, 2023
@torvalds
Merge tag 'arc-6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/…
3f86ed6 
…git/vgupta/arc

Pull ARC updates from Vineet Gupta:

 - fixes for -Wmissing-prototype warnings

 - missing compiler barrier in relaxed atomics

 - some uaccess simplification, declutter

 - removal of massive glocal struct cpuinfo_arc from bootlog code

 - __switch_to consolidation (removal of inline asm variant)

 - use GP to cache task pointer (vs. r25)

 - misc rework of entry code

* tag 'arc-6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vgupta/arc: (24 commits)
  ARC: boot log: fix warning
  arc: Explicitly include correct DT includes
  ARC: pt_regs: create seperate type for ecr
  ARCv2: entry: rearrange pt_regs slightly
  ARC: entry: replace 8 byte ADD.ne with 4 byte ADD2.ne
  ARC: entry: replace 8 byte OR with 4 byte BSET
  ARC: entry: Add more common chores to EXCEPTION_PROLOGUE
  ARC: entry: EV_MachineCheck dont re-read ECR
  ARC: entry: ARcompact EV_ProtV to use r10 directly
  ARC: entry: rework (non-functional)
  ARC: __switch_to: move ksp to thread_info from thread_struct
  ARC: __switch_to: asm with dwarf ops (vs. inline asm)
  ARC: kernel stack: INIT_THREAD need not setup @init_stack in @ksp
  ARC: entry: use gp to cache task pointer (vs. r25)
  ARC: boot log: eliminate struct cpuinfo_arc #4: boot log per ISA
  ARC: boot log: eliminate struct cpuinfo_arc #3: don't export
  ARC: boot log: eliminate struct cpuinfo_arc #2: cache
  ARC: boot log: eliminate struct cpuinfo_arc #1: mm
  ARCv2: memset: don't prefetch for len == 0 which happens a alot
  ARC: uaccess: elide unaliged handling if hardware supports
  ...
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 23, 2023
@akpm00
rcu: dump vmalloc memory info safely
c83ad36 
Currently, for double invoke call_rcu(), will dump rcu_head objects memory
info, if the objects is not allocated from the slab allocator, the
vmalloc_dump_obj() will be invoke and the vmap_area_lock spinlock need to
be held, since the call_rcu() can be invoked in interrupt context,
therefore, there is a possibility of spinlock deadlock scenarios.

And in Preempt-RT kernel, the rcutorture test also trigger the following
lockdep warning:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/spinlock_rt.c:48
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 1
3 locks held by swapper/0/1:
 #0: ffffffffb534ee80 (fullstop_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: torture_init_begin+0x24/0xa0
 #1: ffffffffb5307940 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: rcu_torture_init+0x1ec7/0x2370
 #2: ffffffffb536af40 (vmap_area_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: find_vmap_area+0x1f/0x70
irq event stamp: 565512
hardirqs last  enabled at (565511): [<ffffffffb379b138>] __call_rcu_common+0x218/0x940
hardirqs last disabled at (565512): [<ffffffffb5804262>] rcu_torture_init+0x20b2/0x2370
softirqs last  enabled at (399112): [<ffffffffb36b2586>] __local_bh_enable_ip+0x126/0x170
softirqs last disabled at (399106): [<ffffffffb43fef59>] inet_register_protosw+0x9/0x1d0
Preemption disabled at:
[<ffffffffb58040c3>] rcu_torture_init+0x1f13/0x2370
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W          6.5.0-rc4-rt2-yocto-preempt-rt+ torvalds#15
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-0-gea1b7a073390-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xb0
 dump_stack+0x14/0x20
 __might_resched+0x1aa/0x280
 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_err_cb+0x10/0x10
 rt_spin_lock+0x53/0x130
 ? find_vmap_area+0x1f/0x70
 find_vmap_area+0x1f/0x70
 vmalloc_dump_obj+0x20/0x60
 mem_dump_obj+0x22/0x90
 __call_rcu_common+0x5bf/0x940
 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30
 call_rcu_hurry+0x14/0x20
 rcu_torture_init+0x1f82/0x2370
 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_leak_cb+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_leak_cb+0x10/0x10
 ? __pfx_rcu_torture_init+0x10/0x10
 do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x300
 ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x1b/0x30
 kernel_init_freeable+0x2b9/0x540
 ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
 kernel_init+0x1f/0x150
 ret_from_fork+0x40/0x50
 ? __pfx_kernel_init+0x10/0x10
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
 </TASK>

The previous patch fixes this by using the deadlock-safe best-effort
version of find_vm_area.  However, in case of failure print the fact that
the pointer was a vmalloc pointer so that we print at least something.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230904180806.1002832-2-joel@joelfernandes.org
Fixes: 98f1808 ("mm: Make mem_dump_obj() handle vmalloc() memory")
Signed-off-by: Zqiang <qiang.zhang1211@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Reported-by: Zhen Lei <thunder.leizhen@huaweicloud.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Uladzislau Rezki (Sony) <urezki@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 23, 2023
@fdmanana @kdave
btrfs: fix lockdep splat and potential deadlock after failure running…
e110f89 
… delayed items

When running delayed items we are holding a delayed node's mutex and then
we will attempt to modify a subvolume btree to insert/update/delete the
delayed items. However if have an error during the insertions for example,
btrfs_insert_delayed_items() may return with a path that has locked extent
buffers (a leaf at the very least), and then we attempt to release the
delayed node at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(), which requires taking the
delayed node's mutex, causing an ABBA type of deadlock. This was reported
by syzbot and the lockdep splat is the following:

  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  syz-executor.2/13257 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff88801835c0c0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}:
         __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5475 [inline]
         lock_release+0x36f/0x9d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5781
         up_write+0x79/0x580 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625
         btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline]
         btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x179/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:239
         search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1986 [inline]
         btrfs_search_slot+0x2511/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2230
         btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4376
         btrfs_insert_delayed_item fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746 [inline]
         btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline]
         __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xd24/0x2410 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111
         __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x1db/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153
         flush_space+0x269/0xe70 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:723
         btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x106/0x350 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1078
         process_one_work+0x92c/0x12c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2600
         worker_thread+0xa63/0x1210 kernel/workqueue.c:2751
         kthread+0x2b8/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:389
         ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:145
         ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304

  -> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
         check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
         check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
         validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
         __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
         lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
         __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603
         __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline]
         mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799
         __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256
         btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline]
         __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156
         btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276
         btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988
         vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline]
         vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline]
         do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline]
         __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline]
         __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline]
         __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218
         do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
         do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

  other info that might help us debug this:

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    lock(btrfs-tree-00);
                                 lock(&delayed_node->mutex);
                                 lock(btrfs-tree-00);
    lock(&delayed_node->mutex);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  3 locks held by syz-executor.2/13257:
   #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: spin_unlock include/linux/spinlock.h:391 [inline]
   #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xb87/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:287
   #1: ffff88802c1ee398 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xbb2/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288
   #2: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 13257 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
   dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
   check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195
   check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
   check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
   validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
   __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
   lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
   __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603
   __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline]
   mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799
   __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256
   btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline]
   __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156
   btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276
   btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988
   vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline]
   vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline]
   do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline]
   __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline]
   __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline]
   __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  RIP: 0033:0x7f3ad047cae9
  Code: 28 00 00 00 75 (...)
  RSP: 002b:00007f3ad12510c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3ad059bf80 RCX: 00007f3ad047cae9
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005
  RBP: 00007f3ad04c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f3ad059bf80 R15: 00007ffe56af92f8
   </TASK>
  ------------[ cut here ]------------

Fix this by releasing the path before releasing the delayed node in the
error path at __btrfs_run_delayed_items().

Reported-by: syzbot+a379155f07c134ea9879@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000abba27060403b5bd@google.com/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 23, 2023
@github-cygwin @davem330
igb: clean up in all error paths when enabling SR-IOV
bc6ed2f 
After commit 50f3034 ("igb: Enable SR-IOV after reinit"), removing
the igb module could hang or crash (depending on the machine) when the
module has been loaded with the max_vfs parameter set to some value != 0.

In case of one test machine with a dual port 82580, this hang occurred:

[  232.480687] igb 0000:41:00.1: removed PHC on enp65s0f1
[  233.093257] igb 0000:41:00.1: IOV Disabled
[  233.329969] pcieport 0000:40:01.0: AER: Multiple Uncorrected (Non-Fatal) err0
[  233.340302] igb 0000:41:00.0: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fata)
[  233.352248] igb 0000:41:00.0:   device [8086:1516] error status/mask=00100000
[  233.361088] igb 0000:41:00.0:    [20] UnsupReq               (First)
[  233.368183] igb 0000:41:00.0: AER:   TLP Header: 40000001 0000040f cdbfc00c c
[  233.376846] igb 0000:41:00.1: PCIe Bus Error: severity=Uncorrected (Non-Fata)
[  233.388779] igb 0000:41:00.1:   device [8086:1516] error status/mask=00100000
[  233.397629] igb 0000:41:00.1:    [20] UnsupReq               (First)
[  233.404736] igb 0000:41:00.1: AER:   TLP Header: 40000001 0000040f cdbfc00c c
[  233.538214] pci 0000:41:00.1: AER: can't recover (no error_detected callback)
[  233.538401] igb 0000:41:00.0: removed PHC on enp65s0f0
[  233.546197] pcieport 0000:40:01.0: AER: device recovery failed
[  234.157244] igb 0000:41:00.0: IOV Disabled
[  371.619705] INFO: task irq/35-aerdrv:257 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
[  371.627489]       Not tainted 6.4.0-dirty #2
[  371.632257] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this.
[  371.641000] task:irq/35-aerdrv   state:D stack:0     pid:257   ppid:2      f0
[  371.650330] Call Trace:
[  371.653061]  <TASK>
[  371.655407]  __schedule+0x20e/0x660
[  371.659313]  schedule+0x5a/0xd0
[  371.662824]  schedule_preempt_disabled+0x11/0x20
[  371.667983]  __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x372/0x6c0
[  371.673237]  ? __pfx_aer_root_reset+0x10/0x10
[  371.678105]  report_error_detected+0x25/0x1c0
[  371.682974]  ? __pfx_report_normal_detected+0x10/0x10
[  371.688618]  pci_walk_bus+0x72/0x90
[  371.692519]  pcie_do_recovery+0xb2/0x330
[  371.696899]  aer_process_err_devices+0x117/0x170
[  371.702055]  aer_isr+0x1c0/0x1e0
[  371.705661]  ? __set_cpus_allowed_ptr+0x54/0xa0
[  371.710723]  ? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
[  371.715496]  irq_thread_fn+0x20/0x60
[  371.719491]  irq_thread+0xe6/0x1b0
[  371.723291]  ? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10
[  371.728255]  ? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10
[  371.732731]  kthread+0xe2/0x110
[  371.736243]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  371.740430]  ret_from_fork+0x2c/0x50
[  371.744428]  </TASK>

The reproducer was a simple script:

  #!/bin/sh
  for i in `seq 1 5`; do
    modprobe -rv igb
    modprobe -v igb max_vfs=1
    sleep 1
    modprobe -rv igb
  done

It turned out that this could only be reproduce on 82580 (quad and
dual-port), but not on 82576, i350 and i210.  Further debugging showed
that igb_enable_sriov()'s call to pci_enable_sriov() is failing, because
dev->is_physfn is 0 on 82580.

Prior to commit 50f3034 ("igb: Enable SR-IOV after reinit"),
igb_enable_sriov() jumped into the "err_out" cleanup branch.  After this
commit it only returned the error code.

So the cleanup didn't take place, and the incorrect VF setup in the
igb_adapter structure fooled the igb driver into assuming that VFs have
been set up where no VF actually existed.

Fix this problem by cleaning up again if pci_enable_sriov() fails.

Fixes: 50f3034 ("igb: Enable SR-IOV after reinit")
Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Akihiko Odaki <akihiko.odaki@daynix.com>
Tested-by: Rafal Romanowski <rafal.romanowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 23, 2023
@davem330
Merge branch 'hsr-supervisor-frames'
af21b94 
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior says:

====================
net: hsr: Properly parse HSRv1 supervisor frames.

this is a follow-up to
	https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230825153111.228768-1-lukma@denx.de/
replacing
	https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230914124731.1654059-1-lukma@denx.de/

by grabing/ adding tags and reposting with a commit message plus a
missing __packed to a struct (#2) plus extending the testsuite to sover
HSRv1 which is what broke here (#3-#5).

HSRv0 is (was) not affected.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 6, 2024
@kuba-moo
net/mlx5: DPLL, Fix possible use after free after delayed work timer …
aa1eec2 
…triggers

I managed to hit following use after free warning recently:

[ 2169.711665] ==================================================================
[ 2169.714009] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.716293] Write of size 8 at addr ffff88812b326a70 by task swapper/4/0

[ 2169.719022] CPU: 4 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2jiri+ #2
[ 2169.720974] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 2169.722457] Call Trace:
[ 2169.722756]  <IRQ>
[ 2169.723024]  dump_stack_lvl+0x58/0xb0
[ 2169.723417]  print_report+0xc5/0x630
[ 2169.723807]  ? __virt_addr_valid+0x126/0x2b0
[ 2169.724268]  kasan_report+0xbe/0xf0
[ 2169.724667]  ? __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.725116]  ? __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.725570]  __run_timers.part.0+0x179/0x4c0
[ 2169.726003]  ? call_timer_fn+0x320/0x320
[ 2169.726404]  ? lock_downgrade+0x3a0/0x3a0
[ 2169.726820]  ? kvm_clock_get_cycles+0x14/0x20
[ 2169.727257]  ? ktime_get+0x92/0x150
[ 2169.727630]  ? lapic_next_deadline+0x35/0x60
[ 2169.728069]  run_timer_softirq+0x40/0x80
[ 2169.728475]  __do_softirq+0x1a1/0x509
[ 2169.728866]  irq_exit_rcu+0x95/0xc0
[ 2169.729241]  sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6b/0x80
[ 2169.729718]  </IRQ>
[ 2169.729993]  <TASK>
[ 2169.730259]  asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20
[ 2169.730755] RIP: 0010:default_idle+0x13/0x20
[ 2169.731190] Code: c0 08 00 00 00 4d 29 c8 4c 01 c7 4c 29 c2 e9 72 ff ff ff cc cc cc cc 8b 05 9a 7f 1f 02 85 c0 7e 07 0f 00 2d cf 69 43 00 fb f4 <fa> c3 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 65 48 8b 04 25 c0 93 04 00
[ 2169.732759] RSP: 0018:ffff888100dbfe10 EFLAGS: 00000242
[ 2169.733264] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888100d9c200 RCX: ffffffff8241bd62
[ 2169.733925] RDX: ffffed109a848b15 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: ffffffff8127ac55
[ 2169.734566] RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffed109a848b14
[ 2169.735200] R10: ffff8884d42458a3 R11: 000000000000ba7e R12: ffffffff83d7d3a0
[ 2169.735835] R13: 1ffff110201b7fc6 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff888100d9c200
[ 2169.736478]  ? ct_kernel_exit.constprop.0+0xa2/0xc0
[ 2169.736954]  ? do_idle+0x285/0x290
[ 2169.737323]  default_idle_call+0x63/0x90
[ 2169.737730]  do_idle+0x285/0x290
[ 2169.738089]  ? arch_cpu_idle_exit+0x30/0x30
[ 2169.738511]  ? mark_held_locks+0x1a/0x80
[ 2169.738917]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x12e/0x200
[ 2169.739417]  cpu_startup_entry+0x30/0x40
[ 2169.739825]  start_secondary+0x19a/0x1c0
[ 2169.740229]  ? set_cpu_sibling_map+0xbd0/0xbd0
[ 2169.740673]  secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x15d/0x16b
[ 2169.741179]  </TASK>

[ 2169.741686] Allocated by task 1098:
[ 2169.742058]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.742456]  kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[ 2169.742852]  __kasan_kmalloc+0x83/0x90
[ 2169.743246]  mlx5_dpll_probe+0xf5/0x3c0 [mlx5_dpll]
[ 2169.743730]  auxiliary_bus_probe+0x62/0xb0
[ 2169.744148]  really_probe+0x127/0x590
[ 2169.744534]  __driver_probe_device+0xd2/0x200
[ 2169.744973]  device_driver_attach+0x6b/0xf0
[ 2169.745402]  bind_store+0x90/0xe0
[ 2169.745761]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1df/0x2a0
[ 2169.746210]  vfs_write+0x41f/0x790
[ 2169.746579]  ksys_write+0xc7/0x160
[ 2169.746947]  do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
[ 2169.747333]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e

[ 2169.748049] Freed by task 1220:
[ 2169.748393]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.748789]  kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30
[ 2169.749188]  kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x50
[ 2169.749621]  poison_slab_object+0x106/0x180
[ 2169.750044]  __kasan_slab_free+0x14/0x50
[ 2169.750451]  kfree+0x118/0x330
[ 2169.750792]  mlx5_dpll_remove+0xf5/0x110 [mlx5_dpll]
[ 2169.751271]  auxiliary_bus_remove+0x2e/0x40
[ 2169.751694]  device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0
[ 2169.752191]  unbind_store+0xa6/0xb0
[ 2169.752563]  kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1df/0x2a0
[ 2169.753004]  vfs_write+0x41f/0x790
[ 2169.753381]  ksys_write+0xc7/0x160
[ 2169.753750]  do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x140
[ 2169.754132]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e

[ 2169.754847] Last potentially related work creation:
[ 2169.755315]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.755709]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9b/0xf0
[ 2169.756165]  __queue_work+0x382/0x8f0
[ 2169.756552]  call_timer_fn+0x126/0x320
[ 2169.756941]  __run_timers.part.0+0x2ea/0x4c0
[ 2169.757376]  run_timer_softirq+0x40/0x80
[ 2169.757782]  __do_softirq+0x1a1/0x509

[ 2169.758387] Second to last potentially related work creation:
[ 2169.758924]  kasan_save_stack+0x1c/0x40
[ 2169.759322]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x9b/0xf0
[ 2169.759773]  __queue_work+0x382/0x8f0
[ 2169.760156]  call_timer_fn+0x126/0x320
[ 2169.760550]  __run_timers.part.0+0x2ea/0x4c0
[ 2169.760978]  run_timer_softirq+0x40/0x80
[ 2169.761381]  __do_softirq+0x1a1/0x509

[ 2169.761998] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88812b326a00
                which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256
[ 2169.763061] The buggy address is located 112 bytes inside of
                freed 256-byte region [ffff88812b326a00, ffff88812b326b00)

[ 2169.764346] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[ 2169.764866] page:000000000f2b1e89 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12b324
[ 2169.765731] head:000000000f2b1e89 order:2 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
[ 2169.766484] anon flags: 0x200000000000840(slab|head|node=0|zone=2)
[ 2169.767048] page_type: 0xffffffff()
[ 2169.767422] raw: 0200000000000840 ffff888100042b40 0000000000000000 dead000000000001
[ 2169.768183] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
[ 2169.768899] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

[ 2169.769649] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 2169.770116]  ffff88812b326900: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2169.770805]  ffff88812b326980: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2169.771485] >ffff88812b326a00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 2169.772173]                                                              ^
[ 2169.772787]  ffff88812b326a80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
[ 2169.773477]  ffff88812b326b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 2169.774160] ==================================================================
[ 2169.774845] ==================================================================

I didn't manage to reproduce it. Though the issue seems to be obvious.
There is a chance that the mlx5_dpll_remove() calls
cancel_delayed_work() when the work runs and manages to re-arm itself.
In that case, after delay timer triggers next attempt to queue it,
it works with freed memory.

Fix this by using cancel_delayed_work_sync() instead which makes sure
that work is done when it returns.

Fixes: 496fd0a ("mlx5: Implement SyncE support using DPLL infrastructure")
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240206164328.360313-1-jiri@resnulli.us
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 6, 2024
Merge branch 'fix-the-read-of-vsyscall-page-through-bpf'
54d46c9 
Hou Tao says:

====================
Fix the read of vsyscall page through bpf

From: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>

Hi,

As reported by syzboot [1] and [2], when trying to read vsyscall page
by using bpf_probe_read_kernel() or bpf_probe_read(), oops may happen.

Thomas Gleixner had proposed a test patch [3], but it seems that no
formal patch is posted after about one month [4], so I post it instead
and add an Originally-by tag in patch #2.

Patch #1 makes is_vsyscall_vaddr() being a common helper. Patch #2 fixes
the problem by disallowing vsyscall page read for
copy_from_kernel_nofault(). Patch #3 adds one test case to ensure the
read of vsyscall page through bpf is rejected. Please see individual
patches for more details.

Comments are always welcome.

[1]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAG48ez06TZft=ATH1qh2c5mpS5BT8UakwNkzi6nvK5_djC-4Nw@mail.gmail.com/
[2]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CABOYnLynjBoFZOf3Z4BhaZkc5hx_kHfsjiW+UWLoB=w33LvScw@mail.gmail.com/
[3]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/87r0jwquhv.ffs@tglx/
[4]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/e24b125c-8ff4-9031-6c53-67ff2e01f316@huaweicloud.com/

Change Log:
v3:
 * rephrase commit message for patch #1 & #2 (Sohil)
 * reword comments in copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() (Sohil)
 * add Rvb tag for patch #1 and Acked-by tag for patch #3 (Sohil, Yonghong)

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240126115423.3943360-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/
  * move is_vsyscall_vaddr to asm/vsyscall.h instead (Sohil)
  * elaborate on the reason for disallowing of vsyscall page read in
    copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() (Sohil)
  * update the commit message of patch #2 to more clearly explain how
    the oops occurs. (Sohil)
  * update the commit message of patch #3 to explain the expected return
    values of various bpf helpers (Yonghong)

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240119073019.1528573-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com/
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202103935.3154011-1-houtao@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 6, 2024
@bonzini
Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.8-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/…
9895cee 
…kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.8, take #2

- Avoid dropping the page refcount twice when freeing an unlinked
  page-table subtree.
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 6, 2024
@vdsh-sc @palmer-dabbelt
drivers: perf: ctr_get_width function for legacy is not defined
682dc13 
With parameters CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_LEGACY=y and CONFIG_RISCV_PMU_SBI=n
linux kernel crashes when you try perf record:

$ perf record ls
[ 46.749286] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[ 46.750199] Oops [#1]
[ 46.750342] Modules linked in:
[ 46.750608] CPU: 0 PID: 107 Comm: perf-exec Not tainted 6.6.0 #2
[ 46.750906] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 46.751184] epc : 0x0
[ 46.751430] ra : arch_perf_update_userpage+0x54/0x13e
[ 46.751680] epc : 0000000000000000 ra : ffffffff8072ee52 sp : ff2000000022b8f0
[ 46.751958] gp : ffffffff81505988 tp : ff6000000290d400 t0 : ff2000000022b9c0
[ 46.752229] t1 : 0000000000000001 t2 : 0000000000000003 s0 : ff2000000022b930
[ 46.752451] s1 : ff600000028fb000 a0 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ff600000028fb000
[ 46.752673] a2 : 0000000ae2751268 a3 : 00000000004fb708 a4 : 0000000000000004
[ 46.752895] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 000000000017ffe3 a7 : 00000000000000d2
[ 46.753117] s2 : ff600000028fb000 s3 : 0000000ae2751268 s4 : 0000000000000000
[ 46.753338] s5 : ffffffff8153e290 s6 : ff600000863b9000 s7 : ff60000002961078
[ 46.753562] s8 : ff60000002961048 s9 : ff60000002961058 s10: 0000000000000001
[ 46.753783] s11: 0000000000000018 t3 : ffffffffffffffff t4 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 46.754005] t5 : ff6000000292270c t6 : ff2000000022bb30
[ 46.754179] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 000000000000000c
[ 46.754653] Code: Unable to access instruction at 0xffffffffffffffec.
[ 46.754939] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 46.755131] note: perf-exec[107] exited with irqs disabled
[ 46.755546] note: perf-exec[107] exited with preempt_count 4

This happens because in the legacy case the ctr_get_width function was not
defined, but it is used in arch_perf_update_userpage.

Also remove extra check in riscv_pmu_ctr_get_width_mask

Signed-off-by: Vadim Shakirov <vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Atish Patra <atishp@rivosinc.com>
Fixes: cc4c07c ("drivers: perf: Implement perf event mmap support  in the SBI backend")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240227170002.188671-3-vadim.shakirov@syntacore.com
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 6, 2024
Merge tag 'nf-24-02-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/…
b611b77 
…git/netfilter/nf

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

Patch #1 restores NFPROTO_INET with nft_compat, from Ignat Korchagin.

Patch #2 fixes an issue with bridge netfilter and broadcast/multicast
packets.

There is a day 0 bug in br_netfilter when used with connection tracking.

Conntrack assumes that an nf_conn structure that is not yet added to
hash table ("unconfirmed"), is only visible by the current cpu that is
processing the sk_buff.

For bridge this isn't true, sk_buff can get cloned in between, and
clones can be processed in parallel on different cpu.

This patch disables NAT and conntrack helpers for multicast packets.

Patch #3 adds a selftest to cover for the br_netfilter bug.

netfilter pull request 24-02-29

* tag 'nf-24-02-29' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
  selftests: netfilter: add bridge conntrack + multicast test case
  netfilter: bridge: confirm multicast packets before passing them up the stack
  netfilter: nf_tables: allow NFPROTO_INET in nft_(match/target)_validate()
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240229000135.8780-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
neuschaefer added a commit that referenced this issue Mar 11, 2024
@neuschaefer
refactor #2
1f7fc0f
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 1, 2024
@hfreude @hcahca
s390/zcrypt: fix reference counting on zcrypt card objects
50ed48c 
Tests with hot-plugging crytpo cards on KVM guests with debug
kernel build revealed an use after free for the load field of
the struct zcrypt_card. The reason was an incorrect reference
handling of the zcrypt card object which could lead to a free
of the zcrypt card object while it was still in use.

This is an example of the slab message:

    kernel: 0x00000000885a7512-0x00000000885a7513 @offset=1298. First byte 0x68 instead of 0x6b
    kernel: Allocated in zcrypt_card_alloc+0x36/0x70 [zcrypt] age=18046 cpu=3 pid=43
    kernel:  kmalloc_trace+0x3f2/0x470
    kernel:  zcrypt_card_alloc+0x36/0x70 [zcrypt]
    kernel:  zcrypt_cex4_card_probe+0x26/0x380 [zcrypt_cex4]
    kernel:  ap_device_probe+0x15c/0x290
    kernel:  really_probe+0xd2/0x468
    kernel:  driver_probe_device+0x40/0xf0
    kernel:  __device_attach_driver+0xc0/0x140
    kernel:  bus_for_each_drv+0x8c/0xd0
    kernel:  __device_attach+0x114/0x198
    kernel:  bus_probe_device+0xb4/0xc8
    kernel:  device_add+0x4d2/0x6e0
    kernel:  ap_scan_adapter+0x3d0/0x7c0
    kernel:  ap_scan_bus+0x5a/0x3b0
    kernel:  ap_scan_bus_wq_callback+0x40/0x60
    kernel:  process_one_work+0x26e/0x620
    kernel:  worker_thread+0x21c/0x440
    kernel: Freed in zcrypt_card_put+0x54/0x80 [zcrypt] age=9024 cpu=3 pid=43
    kernel:  kfree+0x37e/0x418
    kernel:  zcrypt_card_put+0x54/0x80 [zcrypt]
    kernel:  ap_device_remove+0x4c/0xe0
    kernel:  device_release_driver_internal+0x1c4/0x270
    kernel:  bus_remove_device+0x100/0x188
    kernel:  device_del+0x164/0x3c0
    kernel:  device_unregister+0x30/0x90
    kernel:  ap_scan_adapter+0xc8/0x7c0
    kernel:  ap_scan_bus+0x5a/0x3b0
    kernel:  ap_scan_bus_wq_callback+0x40/0x60
    kernel:  process_one_work+0x26e/0x620
    kernel:  worker_thread+0x21c/0x440
    kernel:  kthread+0x150/0x168
    kernel:  __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x58
    kernel:  ret_from_fork+0xa/0x30
    kernel: Slab 0x00000372022169c0 objects=20 used=18 fp=0x00000000885a7c88 flags=0x3ffff00000000a00(workingset|slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1ffff)
    kernel: Object 0x00000000885a74b8 @offset=1208 fp=0x00000000885a7c88
    kernel: Redzone  00000000885a74b0: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb                          ........
    kernel: Object   00000000885a74b8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
    kernel: Object   00000000885a74c8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
    kernel: Object   00000000885a74d8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
    kernel: Object   00000000885a74e8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
    kernel: Object   00000000885a74f8: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b  kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk
    kernel: Object   00000000885a7508: 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 68 4b 6b 6b 6b a5  kkkkkkkkkkhKkkk.
    kernel: Redzone  00000000885a7518: bb bb bb bb bb bb bb bb                          ........
    kernel: Padding  00000000885a756c: 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a 5a              ZZZZZZZZZZZZ
    kernel: CPU: 0 PID: 387 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 6.8.0-HF #2
    kernel: Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (KVM/Linux)
    kernel: Call Trace:
    kernel:  [<00000000ca5ab5b8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x90/0x120
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d78bc>] check_bytes_and_report+0x114/0x140
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d53cc>] check_object+0x334/0x3f8
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d820c>] alloc_debug_processing+0xc4/0x1f8
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d852e>] get_partial_node.part.0+0x1ee/0x3e0
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d94ec>] ___slab_alloc+0xaf4/0x13c8
    kernel:  [<00000000c99d9e38>] __slab_alloc.constprop.0+0x78/0xb8
    kernel:  [<00000000c99dc8dc>] __kmalloc+0x434/0x590
    kernel:  [<00000000c9b4c0ce>] ext4_htree_store_dirent+0x4e/0x1c0
    kernel:  [<00000000c9b908a2>] htree_dirblock_to_tree+0x17a/0x3f0
    kernel:  [<00000000c9b919dc>] ext4_htree_fill_tree+0x134/0x400
    kernel:  [<00000000c9b4b3d0>] ext4_dx_readdir+0x160/0x2f0
    kernel:  [<00000000c9b4bedc>] ext4_readdir+0x5f4/0x760
    kernel:  [<00000000c9a7efc4>] iterate_dir+0xb4/0x280
    kernel:  [<00000000c9a7f1ea>] __do_sys_getdents64+0x5a/0x120
    kernel:  [<00000000ca5d6946>] __do_syscall+0x256/0x310
    kernel:  [<00000000ca5eea10>] system_call+0x70/0x98
    kernel: INFO: lockdep is turned off.
    kernel: FIX kmalloc-96: Restoring Poison 0x00000000885a7512-0x00000000885a7513=0x6b
    kernel: FIX kmalloc-96: Marking all objects used

The fix is simple: Before use of the queue not only the queue object
but also the card object needs to increase it's reference count
with a call to zcrypt_card_get(). Similar after use of the queue
not only the queue but also the card object's reference count is
decreased with zcrypt_card_put().

Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 1, 2024
@KAGA-KOKO @bp3tk0v
x86/cpu: Ensure that CPU info updates are propagated on UP
c90399f 
The boot sequence evaluates CPUID information twice:

  1) During early boot

  2) When finalizing the early setup right before
     mitigations are selected and alternatives are patched.

In both cases the evaluation is stored in boot_cpu_data, but on UP the
copying of boot_cpu_data to the per CPU info of the boot CPU happens
between #1 and #2. So any update which happens in #2 is never propagated to
the per CPU info instance.

Consolidate the whole logic and copy boot_cpu_data right before applying
alternatives as that's the point where boot_cpu_data is in it's final
state and not supposed to change anymore.

This also removes the voodoo mb() from smp_prepare_cpus_common() which
had absolutely no purpose.

Fixes: 71eb489 ("x86/percpu: Cure per CPU madness on UP")
Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240322185305.127642785@linutronix.de
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@f0rm2l1n @jmberg-intel
wifi: nl80211: fix NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_ID off-by-one
2e3dbf9 
Since the netlink attribute range validation provides inclusive
checking, the *max* of attribute NL80211_ATTR_MLO_LINK_ID should be
IEEE80211_MLD_MAX_NUM_LINKS - 1 otherwise causing an off-by-one.

One crash stack for demonstration:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in ieee80211_tx_control_port+0x3b6/0xca0 net/mac80211/tx.c:5939
Read of size 6 at addr 001102080000000c by task fuzzer.386/9508

CPU: 1 PID: 9508 Comm: syz.1.386 Not tainted 6.1.70 #2
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x177/0x231 lib/dump_stack.c:106
 print_report+0xe0/0x750 mm/kasan/report.c:398
 kasan_report+0x139/0x170 mm/kasan/report.c:495
 kasan_check_range+0x287/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
 memcpy+0x25/0x60 mm/kasan/shadow.c:65
 ieee80211_tx_control_port+0x3b6/0xca0 net/mac80211/tx.c:5939
 rdev_tx_control_port net/wireless/rdev-ops.h:761 [inline]
 nl80211_tx_control_port+0x7b3/0xc40 net/wireless/nl80211.c:15453
 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0x22e/0x320 net/netlink/genetlink.c:756
 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:833 [inline]
 genl_rcv_msg+0x539/0x740 net/netlink/genetlink.c:850
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1de/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508
 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:861
 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1326 [inline]
 netlink_unicast+0x74b/0x8c0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1352
 netlink_sendmsg+0x882/0xb90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1874
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:728 [inline]
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5cc/0x8f0 net/socket.c:2499
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x21c/0x290 net/socket.c:2553
 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2582 [inline]
 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2591 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmsg+0x19e/0x270 net/socket.c:2589
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x45/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Update the policy to ensure correct validation.

Fixes: 7b0a0e3 ("wifi: cfg80211: do some rework towards MLO link APIs")
Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn>
Suggested-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241130170526.96698-1-linma@zju.edu.cn
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@acmel @namhyung
perf machine: Initialize machine->env to address a segfault
88a6e2f 
Its used from trace__run(), for the 'perf trace' live mode, i.e. its
strace-like, non-perf.data file processing mode, the most common one.

The trace__run() function will set trace->host using machine__new_host()
that is supposed to give a machine instance representing the running
machine, and since we'll use perf_env__arch_strerrno() to get the right
errno -> string table, we need to use machine->env, so initialize it in
machine__new_host().

Before the patch:

  (gdb) run trace --errno-summary -a sleep 1
  <SNIP>
   Summary of events:

   gvfs-afc-volume (3187), 2 events, 0.0%

     syscall            calls  errors  total       min       avg       max       stddev
                                       (msec)    (msec)    (msec)    (msec)        (%)
     --------------- --------  ------ -------- --------- --------- ---------     ------
     pselect6               1      0     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000      0.00%

   GUsbEventThread (3519), 2 events, 0.0%

     syscall            calls  errors  total       min       avg       max       stddev
                                       (msec)    (msec)    (msec)    (msec)        (%)
     --------------- --------  ------ -------- --------- --------- ---------     ------
     poll                   1      0     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000      0.00%
  <SNIP>
  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
  478		if (env->arch_strerrno == NULL)
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00000000005caba0 in perf_env__arch_strerrno (env=0x0, err=110) at util/env.c:478
  #1  0x00000000004b75d2 in thread__dump_stats (ttrace=0x14f58f0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4673
  #2  0x00000000004b78bf in trace__fprintf_thread (fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>, thread=0x10fa0b0, trace=0x7fffffffa5b0) at builtin-trace.c:4708
  #3  0x00000000004b7ad9 in trace__fprintf_thread_summary (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, fp=0x7ffff6ff74e0 <_IO_2_1_stderr_>) at builtin-trace.c:4747
  #4  0x00000000004b656e in trace__run (trace=0x7fffffffa5b0, argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:4456
  #5  0x00000000004ba43e in cmd_trace (argc=2, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at builtin-trace.c:5487
  #6  0x00000000004c0414 in run_builtin (p=0xec3068 <commands+648>, argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:351
  #7  0x00000000004c06bb in handle_internal_command (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:404
  #8  0x00000000004c0814 in run_argv (argcp=0x7fffffffdc4c, argv=0x7fffffffdc40) at perf.c:448
  torvalds#9  0x00000000004c0b5d in main (argc=5, argv=0x7fffffffde60) at perf.c:560
  (gdb)

After:

  root@number:~# perf trace -a --errno-summary sleep 1
  <SNIP>
     pw-data-loop (2685), 1410 events, 16.0%

     syscall            calls  errors  total       min       avg       max       stddev
                                       (msec)    (msec)    (msec)    (msec)        (%)
     --------------- --------  ------ -------- --------- --------- ---------     ------
     epoll_wait           188      0   983.428     0.000     5.231    15.595      8.68%
     ioctl                 94      0     0.811     0.004     0.009     0.016      2.82%
     read                 188      0     0.322     0.001     0.002     0.006      5.15%
     write                141      0     0.280     0.001     0.002     0.018      8.39%
     timerfd_settime       94      0     0.138     0.001     0.001     0.007      6.47%

   gnome-control-c (179406), 1848 events, 20.9%

     syscall            calls  errors  total       min       avg       max       stddev
                                       (msec)    (msec)    (msec)    (msec)        (%)
     --------------- --------  ------ -------- --------- --------- ---------     ------
     poll                 222      0   959.577     0.000     4.322    21.414     11.40%
     recvmsg              150      0     0.539     0.001     0.004     0.013      5.12%
     write                300      0     0.442     0.001     0.001     0.007      3.29%
     read                 150      0     0.183     0.001     0.001     0.009      5.53%
     getpid               102      0     0.101     0.000     0.001     0.008      7.82%

  root@number:~#

Fixes: 54373b5 ("perf env: Introduce perf_env__arch_strerrno()")
Reported-by: Veronika Molnarova <vmolnaro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Veronika Molnarova <vmolnaro@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Michael Petlan <mpetlan@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Z0XffUgNSv_9OjOi@x1
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@lkpdn
virtio_net: correct netdev_tx_reset_queue() invocation point
3ddccbe 
When virtnet_close is followed by virtnet_open, some TX completions can
possibly remain unconsumed, until they are finally processed during the
first NAPI poll after the netdev_tx_reset_queue(), resulting in a crash
[1]. Commit b96ed2c ("virtio_net: move netdev_tx_reset_queue() call
before RX napi enable") was not sufficient to eliminate all BQL crash
cases for virtio-net.

This issue can be reproduced with the latest net-next master by running:
`while :; do ip l set DEV down; ip l set DEV up; done` under heavy network
TX load from inside the machine.

netdev_tx_reset_queue() can actually be dropped from virtnet_open path;
the device is not stopped in any case. For BQL core part, it's just like
traffic nearly ceases to exist for some period. For stall detector added
to BQL, even if virtnet_close could somehow lead to some TX completions
delayed for long, followed by virtnet_open, we can just take it as stall
as mentioned in commit 6025b91 ("net: dqs: add NIC stall detector
based on BQL"). Note also that users can still reset stall_max via sysfs.

So, drop netdev_tx_reset_queue() from virtnet_enable_queue_pair(). This
eliminates the BQL crashes. As a result, netdev_tx_reset_queue() is now
explicitly required in freeze/restore path. This patch adds it to
immediately after free_unused_bufs(), following the rule of thumb:
netdev_tx_reset_queue() should follow any SKB freeing not followed by
netdev_tx_completed_queue(). This seems the most consistent and
streamlined approach, and now netdev_tx_reset_queue() runs whenever
free_unused_bufs() is done.

[1]:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1598 Comm: ip Tainted: G    N 6.12.0net-next_main+ #2
Tainted: [N]=TEST
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), \
BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
Code: b7 c2 49 89 e9 44 89 da 89 c6 4c 89 d7 e8 ed 17 47 00 58 65 ff 0d
4d 27 90 7e 0f 85 fd fe ff ff e8 ea 53 8d ff e9 f3 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 01
d2 44 89 d1 29 d1 ba 00 00 00 00 0f 48 ca e9 28 ff ff ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc900002b0d08 EFLAGS: 00010297
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102398c80 RCX: 0000000080190009
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000006a RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff888102398c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000000ca R11: 0000000000015681 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffffc900002b0d68 R14: ffff88811115e000 R15: ffff8881107aca40
FS:  00007f41ded69500(0000) GS:ffff888667dc0000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000556ccc2dc1a0 CR3: 0000000104fd8003 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 ? die+0x32/0x80
 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100
 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
 ? do_error_trap+0x6d/0xb0
 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60
 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
 __free_old_xmit+0xff/0x170 [virtio_net]
 free_old_xmit+0x54/0xc0 [virtio_net]
 virtnet_poll+0xf4/0xe30 [virtio_net]
 ? __update_load_avg_cfs_rq+0x264/0x2d0
 ? update_curr+0x35/0x260
 ? reweight_entity+0x1be/0x260
 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x28/0x1c0
 net_rx_action+0x329/0x420
 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x35/0x90
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80
 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20
 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30
 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20
 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30
 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x1a0
 handle_softirqs+0x138/0x3e0
 do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa7/0xb0
 virtnet_open+0xc8/0x310 [virtio_net]
 __dev_open+0xfa/0x1b0
 __dev_change_flags+0x1de/0x250
 dev_change_flags+0x22/0x60
 do_setlink.isra.0+0x2df/0x10b0
 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0
 ? netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
 ? netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390
 ? netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490
 ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350
 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0
 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110
 ? __nla_validate_parse+0x5f/0xee0
 ? __pfx___probestub_irq_enable+0x3/0x10
 ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90
 ? security_capable+0x3b/0x70
 rtnl_newlink+0x784/0xaf0
 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0
 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110
 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x24/0x6d0
 ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink+0x10/0x10
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0
 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
 netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390
 netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350
 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x86/0xd0
 ? __pte_offset_map+0x17/0x160
 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0
 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x147/0x610
 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0
 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0
 ? _raw_spin_trylock+0x13/0x60
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80
 __sys_sendmsg+0x66/0xc0
 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f41defe5b34
Code: 15 e1 12 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00
f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 95 0f 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00
f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 89 55
RSP: 002b:00007ffe5336ecc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f41defe5b34
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe5336ed30 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffe5336eda0 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 00007ffe5336f6f9 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 0000000067452259 R14: 0000556ccc28b040 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>
[...]

Fixes: c8bd1f7 ("virtio_net: add support for Byte Queue Limits")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.11+
Signed-off-by: Koichiro Den <koichiro.den@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com>
[ pabeni: trimmed possibly troublesome separator ]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
Merge branch 'virtio_net-correct-netdev_tx_reset_queue-invocation-poi…
00301ef 
…nts'

Koichiro Den says:

====================
virtio_net: correct netdev_tx_reset_queue() invocation points

When virtnet_close is followed by virtnet_open, some TX completions can
possibly remain unconsumed, until they are finally processed during the
first NAPI poll after the netdev_tx_reset_queue(), resulting in a crash
[1]. Commit b96ed2c ("virtio_net: move netdev_tx_reset_queue() call
before RX napi enable") was not sufficient to eliminate all BQL crash
scenarios for virtio-net.

This issue can be reproduced with the latest net-next master by running:
`while :; do ip l set DEV down; ip l set DEV up; done` under heavy network
TX load from inside the machine.

This patch series resolves the issue and also addresses similar existing
problems:

(a). Drop netdev_tx_reset_queue() from open/close path. This eliminates the
     BQL crashes due to the problematic open/close path.

(b). As a result of (a), netdev_tx_reset_queue() is now explicitly required
     in freeze/restore path. Add netdev_tx_reset_queue() immediately after
     free_unused_bufs() invocation.

(c). Fix missing resetting in virtnet_tx_resize().
     virtnet_tx_resize() has lacked proper resetting since commit
     c8bd1f7 ("virtio_net: add support for Byte Queue Limits").

(d). Fix missing resetting in the XDP_SETUP_XSK_POOL path.
     Similar to (c), this path lacked proper resetting. Call
     netdev_tx_reset_queue() when virtqueue_reset() has actually recycled
     unused buffers.

This patch series consists of six commits:
  [1/6]: Resolves (a) and (b).                      # also -stable 6.11.y
  [2/6]: Minor fix to make [4/6] streamlined.
  [3/6]: Prerequisite for (c).                      # also -stable 6.11.y
  [4/6]: Resolves (c) (incl. Prerequisite for (d))  # also -stable 6.11.y
  [5/6]: Preresuisite for (d).
  [6/6]: Resolves (d).

Changes for v4:
  - move netdev_tx_reset_queue() out of free_unused_bufs()
  - submit to net, not net-next
Changes for v3:
  - replace 'flushed' argument with 'recycle_done'
Changes for v2:
  - add tx queue resetting for (b) to (d) above

v3: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241204050724.307544-1-koichiro.den@canonical.com/
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241203073025.67065-1-koichiro.den@canonical.com/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241130181744.3772632-1-koichiro.den@canonical.com/

[1]:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:99!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1598 Comm: ip Tainted: G    N 6.12.0net-next_main+ #2
Tainted: [N]=TEST
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), \
BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
Code: b7 c2 49 89 e9 44 89 da 89 c6 4c 89 d7 e8 ed 17 47 00 58 65 ff 0d
4d 27 90 7e 0f 85 fd fe ff ff e8 ea 53 8d ff e9 f3 fe ff ff <0f> 0b 01
d2 44 89 d1 29 d1 ba 00 00 00 00 0f 48 ca e9 28 ff ff ff
RSP: 0018:ffffc900002b0d08 EFLAGS: 00010297
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102398c80 RCX: 0000000080190009
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000006a RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffff888102398c00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00000000000000ca R11: 0000000000015681 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: ffffc900002b0d68 R14: ffff88811115e000 R15: ffff8881107aca40
FS:  00007f41ded69500(0000) GS:ffff888667dc0000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000556ccc2dc1a0 CR3: 0000000104fd8003 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 ? die+0x32/0x80
 ? do_trap+0xd9/0x100
 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
 ? do_error_trap+0x6d/0xb0
 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
 ? exc_invalid_op+0x4c/0x60
 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
 ? dql_completed+0x26b/0x290
 __free_old_xmit+0xff/0x170 [virtio_net]
 free_old_xmit+0x54/0xc0 [virtio_net]
 virtnet_poll+0xf4/0xe30 [virtio_net]
 ? __update_load_avg_cfs_rq+0x264/0x2d0
 ? update_curr+0x35/0x260
 ? reweight_entity+0x1be/0x260
 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x28/0x1c0
 net_rx_action+0x329/0x420
 ? enqueue_hrtimer+0x35/0x90
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80
 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20
 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30
 ? kvm_sched_clock_read+0xd/0x20
 ? sched_clock+0xc/0x30
 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xd/0x1a0
 handle_softirqs+0x138/0x3e0
 do_softirq.part.0+0x89/0xc0
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 __local_bh_enable_ip+0xa7/0xb0
 virtnet_open+0xc8/0x310 [virtio_net]
 __dev_open+0xfa/0x1b0
 __dev_change_flags+0x1de/0x250
 dev_change_flags+0x22/0x60
 do_setlink.isra.0+0x2df/0x10b0
 ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0
 ? netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
 ? netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390
 ? netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490
 ? ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350
 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0
 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110
 ? __nla_validate_parse+0x5f/0xee0
 ? __pfx___probestub_irq_enable+0x3/0x10
 ? __create_object+0x5e/0x90
 ? security_capable+0x3b/0x7�[I0
 rtnl_newlink+0x784/0xaf0
 ? avc_has_perm_noaudit+0x67/0xf0
 ? cred_has_capability.isra.0+0x75/0x110
 ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x24/0x6d0
 ? __pfx_rtnl_newlink+0x10/0x10
 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x34f/0x3f0
 ? do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180
 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
 netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
 netlink_unicast+0x23e/0x390
 netlink_sendmsg+0x21e/0x490
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x31b/0x350
 ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0
 ___sys_sendmsg+0x86/0xd0
 ? __pte_offset_map+0x17/0x160
 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0
 ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x147/0x610
 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0
 ? preempt_count_add+0x69/0xa0
 ? _raw_spin_trylock+0x13/0x60
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1d/0x80
 __sys_sendmsg+0x66/0xc0
 do_syscall_64+0x6c/0x180
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f41defe5b34
Code: 15 e1 12 0f 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff eb bf 0f 1f 44 00 00
f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d 35 95 0f 00 00 74 13 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00
f0 ff ff 77 4c c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 89 55
RSP: 002b:00007ffe5336ecc8 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f41defe5b34
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe5336ed30 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007ffe5336eda0 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 00007ffe5336f6f9 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 0000000067452259 R14: 0000556ccc28b040 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>
[...]
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241206011047.923923-1-koichiro.den@canonical.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@bonzini
Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.13-2' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/lin…
3154bdd 
…ux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.13, part #2

 - Fix confusion with implicitly-shifted MDCR_EL2 masks breaking
   SPE/TRBE initialization

 - Align nested page table walker with the intended memory attribute
   combining rules of the architecture

 - Prevent userspace from constraining the advertised ASID width,
   avoiding horrors of guest TLBIs not matching the intended context in
   hardware

 - Don't leak references on LPIs when insertion into the translation
   cache fails
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@bjorn-rivos @palmer-dabbelt
riscv: mm: Do not call pmd dtor on vmemmap page table teardown
21f1b85 
The vmemmap's, which is used for RV64 with SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, page
tables are populated using pmd (page middle directory) hugetables.
However, the pmd allocation is not using the generic mechanism used by
the VMA code (e.g. pmd_alloc()), or the RISC-V specific
create_pgd_mapping()/alloc_pmd_late(). Instead, the vmemmap page table
code allocates a page, and calls vmemmap_set_pmd(). This results in
that the pmd ctor is *not* called, nor would it make sense to do so.

Now, when tearing down a vmemmap page table pmd, the cleanup code
would unconditionally, and incorrectly call the pmd dtor, which
results in a crash (best case).

This issue was found when running the HMM selftests:

  | tools/testing/selftests/mm# ./test_hmm.sh smoke
  | ... # when unloading the test_hmm.ko module
  | page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x10915b
  | flags: 0x1000000000000000(node=0|zone=1)
  | raw: 1000000000000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000
  | raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
  | page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(ptdesc->pmd_huge_pte)
  | ------------[ cut here ]------------
  | kernel BUG at include/linux/mm.h:3080!
  | Kernel BUG [#1]
  | Modules linked in: test_hmm(-) sch_fq_codel fuse drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks backlight dm_mod
  | CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 514 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G        W          6.12.0-00982-gf2a4f1682d07 #2
  | Tainted: [W]=WARN
  | Hardware name: riscv-virtio qemu/qemu, BIOS 2024.10 10/01/2024
  | epc : remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070
  |  ra : remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070
  | epc : ffffffff80010a68 ra : ffffffff80010a68 sp : ff20000000a73940
  |  gp : ffffffff827b2d88 tp : ff6000008785da40 t0 : ffffffff80fbce04
  |  t1 : 0720072007200720 t2 : 706d756420656761 s0 : ff20000000a73a50
  |  s1 : ff6000008915cff8 a0 : 0000000000000039 a1 : 0000000000000008
  |  a2 : ff600003fff0de20 a3 : 0000000000000000 a4 : 0000000000000000
  |  a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : c0000000ffffefff a7 : ffffffff824469b8
  |  s2 : ff1c0000022456c0 s3 : ff1ffffffdbfffff s4 : ff6000008915c000
  |  s5 : ff6000008915c000 s6 : ff6000008915c000 s7 : ff1ffffffdc00000
  |  s8 : 0000000000000001 s9 : ff1ffffffdc00000 s10: ffffffff819a31f0
  |  s11: ffffffffffffffff t3 : ffffffff8000c950 t4 : ff60000080244f00
  |  t5 : ff60000080244000 t6 : ff20000000a73708
  | status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ffffffff80010a68 cause: 0000000000000003
  | [<ffffffff80010a68>] remove_pgd_mapping+0xbec/0x1070
  | [<ffffffff80fd238e>] vmemmap_free+0x14/0x1e
  | [<ffffffff8032e698>] section_deactivate+0x220/0x452
  | [<ffffffff8032ef7e>] sparse_remove_section+0x4a/0x58
  | [<ffffffff802f8700>] __remove_pages+0x7e/0xba
  | [<ffffffff803760d8>] memunmap_pages+0x2bc/0x3fe
  | [<ffffffff02a3ca28>] dmirror_device_remove_chunks+0x2ea/0x518 [test_hmm]
  | [<ffffffff02a3e026>] hmm_dmirror_exit+0x3e/0x1018 [test_hmm]
  | [<ffffffff80102c14>] __riscv_sys_delete_module+0x15a/0x2a6
  | [<ffffffff80fd020c>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x1f2/0x266
  | [<ffffffff80fde0a2>] _new_vmalloc_restore_context_a0+0xc6/0xd2
  | Code: bf51 7597 0184 8593 76a5 854a 4097 0029 80e7 2c00 (9002) 7597
  | ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  | Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

Add a check to avoid calling the pmd dtor, if the calling context is
vmemmap_free().

Fixes: c75a74f ("riscv: mm: Add memory hotplugging support")
Signed-off-by: Björn Töpel <bjorn@rivosinc.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti <alexghiti@rivosinc.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241120131203.1859787-1-bjorn@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@rivosinc.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@Vudentz
Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix sleeping function called from invalid context
4d94f05 
This reworks hci_cb_list to not use mutex hci_cb_list_lock to avoid bugs
like the bellow:

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:585
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 5070, name: kworker/u9:2
preempt_count: 0, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 1, expected: 0
4 locks held by kworker/u9:2/5070:
 #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline]
 #0: ffff888015be3948 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x8e0/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3230 [inline]
 #1: ffffc90003b6fd00 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x91b/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 #2: ffff8880665d0078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xcf/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6914
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:298 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:750 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e132020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0xdb/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6915
CPU: 0 PID: 5070 Comm: kworker/u9:2 Not tainted 6.8.0-syzkaller-08073-g480e035fc4c7 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Workqueue: hci0 hci_rx_work
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
 __might_resched+0x5d4/0x780 kernel/sched/core.c:10187
 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:585 [inline]
 __mutex_lock+0xc1/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
 hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2004 [inline]
 hci_le_create_big_complete_evt+0x3d9/0xae0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:6939
 hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7514 [inline]
 hci_event_packet+0xa53/0x1540 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7569
 hci_rx_work+0x3e8/0xca0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4171
 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3254 [inline]
 process_scheduled_works+0xa00/0x1770 kernel/workqueue.c:3335
 worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3416
 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
 </TASK>

Reported-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Tested-by: syzbot+2fb0835e0c9cefc34614@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=2fb0835e0c9cefc34614
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@iulia-tanasescu @Vudentz
Bluetooth: iso: Fix circular lock in iso_listen_bis
168e283 
This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by
releasing the socket lock before enterning iso_listen_bis, to
avoid any potential deadlock with hdev lock.

[   75.307983] ======================================================
[   75.307984] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   75.307985] 6.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#22 Not tainted
[   75.307987] ------------------------------------------------------
[   75.307987] kworker/u81:2/2623 is trying to acquire lock:
[   75.307988] ffff8fde1769da58 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO)
               at: iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth]
[   75.308021]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   75.308022] ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock)
               at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[   75.308053]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[   75.308054]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   75.308055]
               -> #1 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[   75.308057]        __mutex_lock+0xad/0xc50
[   75.308061]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[   75.308063]        iso_sock_listen+0x143/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[   75.308085]        __sys_listen_socket+0x49/0x60
[   75.308088]        __x64_sys_listen+0x4c/0x90
[   75.308090]        x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0
[   75.308092]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[   75.308095]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[   75.308098]
               -> #0 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[   75.308100]        __lock_acquire+0x155e/0x25f0
[   75.308103]        lock_acquire+0xc9/0x300
[   75.308105]        lock_sock_nested+0x32/0x90
[   75.308107]        iso_connect_cfm+0x253/0x840 [bluetooth]
[   75.308128]        hci_connect_cfm+0x6c/0x190 [bluetooth]
[   75.308155]        hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x27b/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[   75.308180]        hci_le_meta_evt+0xe7/0x200 [bluetooth]
[   75.308206]        hci_event_packet+0x21f/0x5c0 [bluetooth]
[   75.308230]        hci_rx_work+0x3ae/0xb10 [bluetooth]
[   75.308254]        process_one_work+0x212/0x740
[   75.308256]        worker_thread+0x1bd/0x3a0
[   75.308258]        kthread+0xe4/0x120
[   75.308259]        ret_from_fork+0x44/0x70
[   75.308261]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[   75.308263]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[   75.308264]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[   75.308264]        CPU0                CPU1
[   75.308265]        ----                ----
[   75.308265]   lock(&hdev->lock);
[   75.308267]                            lock(sk_lock-
                                                AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
[   75.308268]                            lock(&hdev->lock);
[   75.308269]   lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
[   75.308270]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[   75.308271] 4 locks held by kworker/u81:2/2623:
[   75.308272]  #0: ffff8fdd66e52148 ((wq_completion)hci0#2){+.+.}-{0:0},
                at: process_one_work+0x443/0x740
[   75.308276]  #1: ffffafb488b7fe48 ((work_completion)(&hdev->rx_work)),
                at: process_one_work+0x1ce/0x740
[   75.308280]  #2: ffff8fdd61a10078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}
                at: hci_le_per_adv_report_evt+0x47/0x2f0 [bluetooth]
[   75.308304]  #3: ffffffffb6ba4900 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2},
                at: hci_connect_cfm+0x29/0x190 [bluetooth]

Fixes: 02171da ("Bluetooth: ISO: Add hcon for listening bis sk")
Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <iulia.tanasescu@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@iulia-tanasescu @Vudentz
Bluetooth: iso: Fix circular lock in iso_conn_big_sync
7a17308 
This fixes the circular locking dependency warning below, by reworking
iso_sock_recvmsg, to ensure that the socket lock is always released
before calling a function that locks hdev.

[  561.670344] ======================================================
[  561.670346] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[  561.670349] 6.12.0-rc6+ torvalds#26 Not tainted
[  561.670351] ------------------------------------------------------
[  561.670353] iso-tester/3289 is trying to acquire lock:
[  561.670355] ffff88811f600078 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3},
               at: iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth]
[  561.670405]
               but task is already holding lock:
[  561.670407] ffff88815af58258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0},
               at: iso_sock_recvmsg+0xbf/0x500 [bluetooth]
[  561.670450]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[  561.670452]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[  561.670453]
               -> #2 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  561.670458]        lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0
[  561.670463]        lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0
[  561.670467]        bt_accept_dequeue+0x1a5/0x4d0 [bluetooth]
[  561.670510]        iso_sock_accept+0x271/0x830 [bluetooth]
[  561.670547]        do_accept+0x3dd/0x610
[  561.670550]        __sys_accept4+0xd8/0x170
[  561.670553]        __x64_sys_accept+0x74/0xc0
[  561.670556]        x64_sys_call+0x17d6/0x25f0
[  561.670559]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[  561.670563]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  561.670567]
               -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[  561.670571]        lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0
[  561.670574]        lock_sock_nested+0x3b/0xf0
[  561.670577]        iso_sock_listen+0x2de/0xf30 [bluetooth]
[  561.670617]        __sys_listen_socket+0xef/0x130
[  561.670620]        __x64_sys_listen+0xe1/0x190
[  561.670623]        x64_sys_call+0x2517/0x25f0
[  561.670626]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[  561.670629]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  561.670632]
               -> #0 (&hdev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[  561.670636]        __lock_acquire+0x32ad/0x6ab0
[  561.670639]        lock_acquire.part.0+0x118/0x360
[  561.670642]        lock_acquire+0x7c/0xc0
[  561.670644]        __mutex_lock+0x18d/0x12f0
[  561.670647]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[  561.670651]        iso_conn_big_sync+0x73/0x260 [bluetooth]
[  561.670687]        iso_sock_recvmsg+0x3e9/0x500 [bluetooth]
[  561.670722]        sock_recvmsg+0x1d5/0x240
[  561.670725]        sock_read_iter+0x27d/0x470
[  561.670727]        vfs_read+0x9a0/0xd30
[  561.670731]        ksys_read+0x1a8/0x250
[  561.670733]        __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0
[  561.670736]        x64_sys_call+0x1b12/0x25f0
[  561.670738]        do_syscall_64+0x87/0x150
[  561.670741]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[  561.670744]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[  561.670745] Chain exists of:
&hdev->lock --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO --> sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH

[  561.670751]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[  561.670753]        CPU0                    CPU1
[  561.670754]        ----                    ----
[  561.670756]   lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH);
[  561.670758]                                lock(sk_lock
                                              AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_ISO);
[  561.670761]                                lock(sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH);
[  561.670764]   lock(&hdev->lock);
[  561.670767]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

Fixes: 07a9342 ("Bluetooth: ISO: Send BIG Create Sync via hci_sync")
Signed-off-by: Iulia Tanasescu <iulia.tanasescu@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@ctmarinas
arm64: stacktrace: Skip reporting LR at exception boundaries
32ed120 
Aishwarya reports that warnings are sometimes seen when running the
ftrace kselftests, e.g.

| WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 2066 at arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:141 arch_stack_walk+0x4a0/0x4c0
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 2066 Comm: ftracetest Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2 #2
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 604000c5 (nZCv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : arch_stack_walk+0x4a0/0x4c0
| lr : arch_stack_walk+0x248/0x4c0
| sp : ffff800083643d20
| x29: ffff800083643dd0 x28: ffff00007b891400 x27: ffff00007b891928
| x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 00000000000000c0 x24: ffff800082f39d80
| x23: ffff80008003ee8c x22: ffff80008004baa8 x21: ffff8000800533e0
| x20: ffff800083643e10 x19: ffff80008003eec8 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffff800083640000 x15: 0000000000000000
| x14: 02a37a802bbb8a92 x13: 00000000000001a9 x12: 0000000000000001
| x11: ffff800082ffad60 x10: ffff800083643d20 x9 : ffff80008003eed0
| x8 : ffff80008004baa8 x7 : ffff800086f2be80 x6 : ffff0000057cf000
| x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff800086f2b690
| x2 : ffff80008004baa8 x1 : ffff80008004baa8 x0 : ffff80008004baa8
| Call trace:
|  arch_stack_walk+0x4a0/0x4c0 (P)
|  arch_stack_walk+0x248/0x4c0 (L)
|  profile_pc+0x44/0x80
|  profile_tick+0x50/0x80 (F)
|  tick_nohz_handler+0xcc/0x160 (F)
|  __hrtimer_run_queues+0x2ac/0x340 (F)
|  hrtimer_interrupt+0xf4/0x268 (F)
|  arch_timer_handler_virt+0x34/0x60 (F)
|  handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x88/0x220 (F)
|  generic_handle_domain_irq+0x34/0x60 (F)
|  gic_handle_irq+0x54/0x140 (F)
|  call_on_irq_stack+0x24/0x58 (F)
|  do_interrupt_handler+0x88/0x98
|  el1_interrupt+0x34/0x68 (F)
|  el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x28
|  el1h_64_irq+0x6c/0x70
|  queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x78/0x460 (P)

The warning in question is:

  WARN_ON_ONCE(state->common.pc == orig_pc))

... in kunwind_recover_return_address(), which is triggered when
return_to_handler() is encountered in the trace, but
ftrace_graph_ret_addr() cannot find a corresponding original return
address on the fgraph return stack.

This happens because the stacktrace code encounters an exception
boundary where the LR was not live at the time of the exception, but the
LR happens to contain return_to_handler(); either because the task
recently returned there, or due to unfortunate usage of the LR at a
scratch register. In such cases attempts to recover the return address
via ftrace_graph_ret_addr() may fail, triggering the WARN_ON_ONCE()
above and aborting the unwind (hence the stacktrace terminating after
reporting the PC at the time of the exception).

Handling unreliable LR values in these cases is likely to require some
larger rework, so for the moment avoid this problem by restoring the old
behaviour of skipping the LR at exception boundaries, which the
stacktrace code did prior to commit:

  c2c6b27 ("arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries")

This commit is effectively a partial revert, keeping the structures and
logic to explicitly identify exception boundaries while still skipping
reporting of the LR. The logic to explicitly identify exception
boundaries is still useful for general robustness and as a building
block for future support for RELIABLE_STACKTRACE.

Fixes: c2c6b27 ("arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reported-by: Aishwarya TCV <aishwarya.tcv@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241211140704.2498712-2-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@ctmarinas
arm64: stacktrace: Don't WARN when unwinding other tasks
65ac33b 
The arm64 stacktrace code has a few error conditions where a
WARN_ON_ONCE() is triggered before the stacktrace is terminated and an
error is returned to the caller. The conditions shouldn't be triggered
when unwinding the current task, but it is possible to trigger these
when unwinding another task which is not blocked, as the stack of that
task is concurrently modified. Kent reports that these warnings can be
triggered while running filesystem tests on bcachefs, which calls the
stacktrace code directly.

To produce a meaningful stacktrace of another task, the task in question
should be blocked, but the stacktrace code is expected to be robust to
cases where it is not blocked. Note that this is purely about not
unuduly scaring the user and/or crashing the kernel; stacktraces in such
cases are meaningless and may leak kernel secrets from the stack of the
task being unwound.

Ideally we'd pin the task in a blocked state during the unwind, as we do
for /proc/${PID}/wchan since commit:

  42a20f8 ("sched: Add wrapper for get_wchan() to keep task blocked")

... but a bunch of places don't do that, notably /proc/${PID}/stack,
where we don't pin the task in a blocked state, but do restrict the
output to privileged users since commit:

  f8a00ce ("proc: restrict kernel stack dumps to root")

... and so it's possible to trigger these warnings accidentally, e.g. by
reading /proc/*/stack (as root):

| for n in $(seq 1 10); do
|     while true; do cat /proc/*/stack > /dev/null 2>&1; done &
| done
| ------------[ cut here ]------------
| WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 166 at arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:207 arch_stack_walk+0x1c8/0x370
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 166 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2-00003-g3dafa7a7925d #2
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 81400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
| pc : arch_stack_walk+0x1c8/0x370
| lr : arch_stack_walk+0x1b0/0x370
| sp : ffff800080773890
| x29: ffff800080773930 x28: fff0000005c44500 x27: fff00000058fa038
| x26: 000000007ffff000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
| x23: ffffa35a8d9600ec x22: 0000000000000000 x21: fff00000043a33c0
| x20: ffff800080773970 x19: ffffa35a8d960168 x18: 0000000000000000
| x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000
| x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
| x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000
| x8 : ffff8000807738e0 x7 : ffff8000806e3800 x6 : ffff8000806e3818
| x5 : ffff800080773920 x4 : ffff8000806e4000 x3 : ffff8000807738e0
| x2 : 0000000000000018 x1 : ffff8000806e3800 x0 : 0000000000000000
| Call trace:
|  arch_stack_walk+0x1c8/0x370 (P)
|  stack_trace_save_tsk+0x8c/0x108
|  proc_pid_stack+0xb0/0x134
|  proc_single_show+0x60/0x120
|  seq_read_iter+0x104/0x438
|  seq_read+0xf8/0x140
|  vfs_read+0xc4/0x31c
|  ksys_read+0x70/0x108
|  __arm64_sys_read+0x1c/0x28
|  invoke_syscall+0x48/0x104
|  el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
|  do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
|  el0_svc+0x30/0xcc
|  el0t_64_sync_handler+0x10c/0x138
|  el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
| ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Fix this by only warning when unwinding the current task. When unwinding
another task the error conditions will be handled by returning an error
without producing a warning.

The two warnings in kunwind_next_frame_record_meta() were added recently
as part of commit:

  c2c6b27 ("arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries")

The warning when recovering the fgraph return address has changed form
many times, but was originally introduced back in commit:

  9f41631 ("arm64: fix unwind_frame() for filtered out fn for function graph tracing")

Fixes: c2c6b27 ("arm64: stacktrace: unwind exception boundaries")
Fixes: 9f41631 ("arm64: fix unwind_frame() for filtered out fn for function graph tracing")
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reported-by: Kent Overstreet <kent.overstreet@linux.dev>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241211140704.2498712-3-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@LuBaolu @joergroedel
iommu/vt-d: Remove cache tags before disabling ATS
1f2557e 
The current implementation removes cache tags after disabling ATS,
leading to potential memory leaks and kernel crashes. Specifically,
CACHE_TAG_DEVTLB type cache tags may still remain in the list even
after the domain is freed, causing a use-after-free condition.

This issue really shows up when multiple VFs from different PFs
passed through to a single user-space process via vfio-pci. In such
cases, the kernel may crash with kernel messages like:

 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000014
 PGD 19036a067 P4D 1940a3067 PUD 136c9b067 PMD 0
 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
 CPU: 74 UID: 0 PID: 3183 Comm: testCli Not tainted 6.11.9 #2
 RIP: 0010:cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  ? __die+0x1f/0x60
  ? page_fault_oops+0x163/0x590
  ? exc_page_fault+0x72/0x190
  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
  ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x9b/0x250
  ? cache_tag_flush_range+0x5d/0x250
  intel_iommu_tlb_sync+0x29/0x40
  intel_iommu_unmap_pages+0xfe/0x160
  __iommu_unmap+0xd8/0x1a0
  vfio_unmap_unpin+0x182/0x340 [vfio_iommu_type1]
  vfio_remove_dma+0x2a/0xb0 [vfio_iommu_type1]
  vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0xafa/0x18e0 [vfio_iommu_type1]

Move cache_tag_unassign_domain() before iommu_disable_pci_caps() to fix
it.

Fixes: 3b1d9e2 ("iommu/vt-d: Add cache tag assignment interface")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241129020506.576413-1-baolu.lu@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@shroffni @axboe
block: Fix potential deadlock while freezing queue and acquiring sysf…
be26ba9 
…s_lock

For storing a value to a queue attribute, the queue_attr_store function
first freezes the queue (->q_usage_counter(io)) and then acquire
->sysfs_lock. This seems not correct as the usual ordering should be to
acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue. This incorrect ordering
causes the following lockdep splat which we are able to reproduce always
simply by accessing /sys/kernel/debug file using ls command:

[   57.597146] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   57.597154] 6.12.0-10553-gb86545e02e8c torvalds#20 Tainted: G        W
[   57.597162] ------------------------------------------------------
[   57.597168] ls/4605 is trying to acquire lock:
[   57.597176] c00000003eb56710 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}, at: __might_fault+0x58/0xc0
[   57.597200]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   57.597207] c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4
[   57.597226]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[   57.597233]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   57.597241]
               -> #5 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}:
[   57.597255]        down_write+0x6c/0x18c
[   57.597264]        start_creating+0xb4/0x24c
[   57.597274]        debugfs_create_dir+0x2c/0x1e8
[   57.597283]        blk_register_queue+0xec/0x294
[   57.597292]        add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548
[   57.597302]        brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338
[   57.597309]        brd_init+0x100/0x178
[   57.597317]        do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4
[   57.597326]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0
[   57.597334]        kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc
[   57.597342]        ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c
[   57.597350]
               -> #4 (&q->debugfs_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[   57.597362]        __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0
[   57.597370]        blk_register_queue+0xd4/0x294
[   57.597379]        add_disk_fwnode+0x2e4/0x548
[   57.597388]        brd_alloc+0x2c8/0x338
[   57.597395]        brd_init+0x100/0x178
[   57.597402]        do_one_initcall+0x88/0x3e4
[   57.597410]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cc/0x6e0
[   57.597418]        kernel_init+0x34/0x1cc
[   57.597426]        ret_from_kernel_user_thread+0x14/0x1c
[   57.597434]
               -> #3 (&q->sysfs_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
[   57.597446]        __mutex_lock+0xfc/0x12a0
[   57.597454]        queue_attr_store+0x9c/0x110
[   57.597462]        sysfs_kf_write+0x70/0xb0
[   57.597471]        kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x1b0/0x2ac
[   57.597480]        vfs_write+0x3dc/0x6e8
[   57.597488]        ksys_write+0x84/0x140
[   57.597495]        system_call_exception+0x130/0x360
[   57.597504]        system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
[   57.597516]
               -> #2 (&q->q_usage_counter(io)torvalds#21){++++}-{0:0}:
[   57.597530]        __submit_bio+0x5ec/0x828
[   57.597538]        submit_bio_noacct_nocheck+0x1e4/0x4f0
[   57.597547]        iomap_readahead+0x2a0/0x448
[   57.597556]        xfs_vm_readahead+0x28/0x3c
[   57.597564]        read_pages+0x88/0x41c
[   57.597571]        page_cache_ra_unbounded+0x1ac/0x2d8
[   57.597580]        filemap_get_pages+0x188/0x984
[   57.597588]        filemap_read+0x13c/0x4bc
[   57.597596]        xfs_file_buffered_read+0x88/0x17c
[   57.597605]        xfs_file_read_iter+0xac/0x158
[   57.597614]        vfs_read+0x2d4/0x3b4
[   57.597622]        ksys_read+0x84/0x144
[   57.597629]        system_call_exception+0x130/0x360
[   57.597637]        system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
[   57.597647]
               -> #1 (mapping.invalidate_lock#2){++++}-{4:4}:
[   57.597661]        down_read+0x6c/0x220
[   57.597669]        filemap_fault+0x870/0x100c
[   57.597677]        xfs_filemap_fault+0xc4/0x18c
[   57.597684]        __do_fault+0x64/0x164
[   57.597693]        __handle_mm_fault+0x1274/0x1dac
[   57.597702]        handle_mm_fault+0x248/0x484
[   57.597711]        ___do_page_fault+0x428/0xc0c
[   57.597719]        hash__do_page_fault+0x30/0x68
[   57.597727]        do_hash_fault+0x90/0x35c
[   57.597736]        data_access_common_virt+0x210/0x220
[   57.597745]        _copy_from_user+0xf8/0x19c
[   57.597754]        sel_write_load+0x178/0xd54
[   57.597762]        vfs_write+0x108/0x6e8
[   57.597769]        ksys_write+0x84/0x140
[   57.597777]        system_call_exception+0x130/0x360
[   57.597785]        system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
[   57.597794]
               -> #0 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{4:4}:
[   57.597806]        __lock_acquire+0x17cc/0x2330
[   57.597814]        lock_acquire+0x138/0x400
[   57.597822]        __might_fault+0x7c/0xc0
[   57.597830]        filldir64+0xe8/0x390
[   57.597839]        dcache_readdir+0x80/0x2d4
[   57.597846]        iterate_dir+0xd8/0x1d4
[   57.597855]        sys_getdents64+0x88/0x2d4
[   57.597864]        system_call_exception+0x130/0x360
[   57.597872]        system_call_common+0x160/0x2c4
[   57.597881]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[   57.597888] Chain exists of:
                 &mm->mmap_lock --> &q->debugfs_mutex --> &sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3

[   57.597905]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[   57.597911]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   57.597917]        ----                    ----
[   57.597922]   rlock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3);
[   57.597932]                                lock(&q->debugfs_mutex);
[   57.597940]                                lock(&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3);
[   57.597950]   rlock(&mm->mmap_lock);
[   57.597958]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[   57.597965] 2 locks held by ls/4605:
[   57.597971]  #0: c0000000137c12f8 (&f->f_pos_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: fdget_pos+0xcc/0x154
[   57.597989]  #1: c0000018e27c6810 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#3){++++}-{4:4}, at: iterate_dir+0x94/0x1d4

Prevent the above lockdep warning by acquiring ->sysfs_lock before
freezing the queue while storing a queue attribute in queue_attr_store
function. Later, we also found[1] another function __blk_mq_update_nr_
hw_queues where we first freeze queue and then acquire the ->sysfs_lock.
So we've also updated lock ordering in __blk_mq_update_nr_hw_queues
function and ensured that in all code paths we follow the correct lock
ordering i.e. acquire ->sysfs_lock before freezing the queue.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAFj5m9Ke8+EHKQBs_Nk6hqd=LGXtk4mUxZUN5==ZcCjnZSBwHw@mail.gmail.com/

Reported-by: kjain@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: af28141 ("block: freeze the queue in queue_attr_store")
Tested-by: kjain@linux.ibm.com
Cc: hch@lst.de
Cc: axboe@kernel.dk
Cc: ritesh.list@gmail.com
Cc: ming.lei@redhat.com
Cc: gjoyce@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Nilay Shroff <nilay@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241210144222.1066229-1-nilay@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 24, 2024
@davem330
Merge branch 'smc-fixes'
c296c0b 
Guangguan Wang says:

====================
net: several fixes for smc

v1 -> v2:
rewrite patch #2 suggested by Paolo.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 31, 2024
@hmyneni @maddy-kerneldev
powerpc/pseries/vas: Add close() callback in vas_vm_ops struct
05aa156 
The mapping VMA address is saved in VAS window struct when the
paste address is mapped. This VMA address is used during migration
to unmap the paste address if the window is active. The paste
address mapping will be removed when the window is closed or with
the munmap(). But the VMA address in the VAS window is not updated
with munmap() which is causing invalid access during migration.

The KASAN report shows:
[16386.254991] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8
[16386.255043] Read of size 8 at addr c00000014a819670 by task drmgr/696928

[16386.255096] CPU: 29 UID: 0 PID: 696928 Comm: drmgr Kdump: loaded Tainted: G    B              6.11.0-rc5-nxgzip #2
[16386.255128] Tainted: [B]=BAD_PAGE
[16386.255148] Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX Power11 (architected) 0x820200 0xf000007 of:IBM,FW1110.00 (NH1110_016) hv:phyp pSeries
[16386.255181] Call Trace:
[16386.255202] [c00000016b297660] [c0000000018ad0ac] dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xe8 (unreliable)
[16386.255246] [c00000016b297690] [c0000000006e8a90] print_report+0x19c/0x764
[16386.255285] [c00000016b297760] [c0000000006e9490] kasan_report+0x128/0x1f8
[16386.255309] [c00000016b297880] [c0000000006eb5c8] __asan_load8+0xac/0xe0
[16386.255326] [c00000016b2978a0] [c00000000013f898] reconfig_close_windows+0x1a0/0x4e8
[16386.255343] [c00000016b297990] [c000000000140e58] vas_migration_handler+0x3a4/0x3fc
[16386.255368] [c00000016b297a90] [c000000000128848] pseries_migrate_partition+0x4c/0x4c4
...

[16386.256136] Allocated by task 696554 on cpu 31 at 16377.277618s:
[16386.256149]  kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256163]  kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80
[16386.256175]  kasan_save_alloc_info+0x58/0x74
[16386.256196]  __kasan_slab_alloc+0xb8/0xdc
[16386.256209]  kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x200/0x3d0
[16386.256225]  vm_area_alloc+0x44/0x150
[16386.256245]  mmap_region+0x214/0x10c4
[16386.256265]  do_mmap+0x5fc/0x750
[16386.256277]  vm_mmap_pgoff+0x14c/0x24c
[16386.256292]  ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x20c/0x348
[16386.256303]  sys_mmap+0xd0/0x160
...

[16386.256350] Freed by task 0 on cpu 31 at 16386.204848s:
[16386.256363]  kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256374]  kasan_save_track+0x34/0x80
[16386.256384]  kasan_save_free_info+0x64/0x10c
[16386.256396]  __kasan_slab_free+0x120/0x204
[16386.256415]  kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x450
[16386.256428]  vm_area_free_rcu_cb+0xa8/0xd8
[16386.256441]  rcu_do_batch+0x2c8/0xcf0
[16386.256458]  rcu_core+0x378/0x3c4
[16386.256473]  handle_softirqs+0x20c/0x60c
[16386.256495]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x6c/0x88
[16386.256509]  do_softirq_own_stack+0x58/0x88
[16386.256521]  __irq_exit_rcu+0x1a4/0x20c
[16386.256533]  irq_exit+0x20/0x38
[16386.256544]  interrupt_async_exit_prepare.constprop.0+0x18/0x2c
...

[16386.256717] Last potentially related work creation:
[16386.256729]  kasan_save_stack+0x34/0x68
[16386.256741]  __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xcc/0x12c
[16386.256753]  __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x94/0xd04
[16386.256766]  vm_area_free+0x28/0x3c
[16386.256778]  remove_vma+0xf4/0x114
[16386.256797]  do_vmi_align_munmap.constprop.0+0x684/0x870
[16386.256811]  __vm_munmap+0xe0/0x1f8
[16386.256821]  sys_munmap+0x54/0x6c
[16386.256830]  system_call_exception+0x1a0/0x4a0
[16386.256841]  system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec

[16386.256868] The buggy address belongs to the object at c00000014a819670
                which belongs to the cache vm_area_struct of size 168
[16386.256887] The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
                freed 168-byte region [c00000014a819670, c00000014a819718)

[16386.256915] The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
[16386.256928] page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14a81
[16386.256950] memcg:c0000000ba430001
[16386.256961] anon flags: 0x43ffff800000000(node=4|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff)
[16386.256975] page_type: 0xfdffffff(slab)
[16386.256990] raw: 043ffff800000000 c00000000501c080 0000000000000000 5deadbee00000001
[16386.257003] raw: 0000000000000000 00000000011a011a 00000001fdffffff c0000000ba430001
[16386.257018] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected

This patch adds close() callback in vas_vm_ops vm_operations_struct
which will be executed during munmap() before freeing VMA. The VMA
address in the VAS window is set to NULL after holding the window
mmap_mutex.

Fixes: 37e6764 ("powerpc/pseries/vas: Add VAS migration handler")
Signed-off-by: Haren Myneni <haren@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Madhavan Srinivasan <maddy@linux.ibm.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241214051758.997759-1-haren@linux.ibm.com
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 7, 2025
Merge remote-tracking branch 'drm/drm-next' into drm-misc-next-fixes
37ba6c7 
A regression was caused by commit e4b5ccd ("drm/v3d: Ensure job pointer is set to NULL
after job completion"), but this commit is not yet in next-fixes,
fast-forward it.

Try #2, first one didn't have v6.13 in it.

Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <dev@lankhorst.se>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 7, 2025
@etantilov @anguy11
idpf: add read memory barrier when checking descriptor done bit
396f016 
Add read memory barrier to ensure the order of operations when accessing
control queue descriptors. Specifically, we want to avoid cases where loads
can be reordered:

1. Load #1 is dispatched to read descriptor flags.
2. Load #2 is dispatched to read some other field from the descriptor.
3. Load #2 completes, accessing memory/cache at a point in time when the DD
   flag is zero.
4. NIC DMA overwrites the descriptor, now the DD flag is one.
5. Any fields loaded before step 4 are now inconsistent with the actual
   descriptor state.

Add read memory barrier between steps 1 and 2, so that load #2 is not
executed until load #1 has completed.

Fixes: 8077c72 ("idpf: add controlq init and reset checks")
Reviewed-by: Przemek Kitszel <przemyslaw.kitszel@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Sridhar Samudrala <sridhar.samudrala@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Lance Richardson <rlance@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Emil Tantilov <emil.s.tantilov@intel.com>
Tested-by: Krishneil Singh <krishneil.k.singh@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 7, 2025
@lenb
tools/power turbostat: Fix forked child affinity regression
b32c369 
In "one-shot" mode, turbostat
1. takes a counter snapshot
2. forks and waits for a child
3. takes the end counter snapshot and prints the result.

But turbostat counter snapshots currently use affinity to travel
around the system so that counter reads are "local", and this
affinity must be cleared between #1 and #2 above.

The offending commit removed that reset that allowed the child
to run on cpu_present_set.

Fix that issue, and improve upon the original by using
cpu_possible_set for the child.  This allows the child
to also run on CPUs that hotplug online during its runtime.

Reported-by: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com>
Fixes: 7bb3fe2 ("tools/power/turbostat: Obey allowed CPUs during startup")
Signed-off-by: Len Brown <len.brown@intel.com>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 7, 2025
@Sberm @namhyung
perf trace: Fix runtime error of index out of bounds
c7b87ce 
libtraceevent parses and returns an array of argument fields, sometimes
larger than RAW_SYSCALL_ARGS_NUM (6) because it includes "__syscall_nr",
idx will traverse to index 6 (7th element) whereas sc->fmt->arg holds 6
elements max, creating an out-of-bounds access. This runtime error is
found by UBsan. The error message:

  $ sudo UBSAN_OPTIONS=print_stacktrace=1 ./perf trace -a --max-events=1
  builtin-trace.c:1966:35: runtime error: index 6 out of bounds for type 'syscall_arg_fmt [6]'
    #0 0x5c04956be5fe in syscall__alloc_arg_fmts /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:1966
    #1 0x5c04956c0510 in trace__read_syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2110
    #2 0x5c04956c372b in trace__syscall_info /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:2436
    #3 0x5c04956d2f39 in trace__init_syscalls_bpf_prog_array_maps /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:3897
    #4 0x5c04956d6d25 in trace__run /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:4335
    #5 0x5c04956e112e in cmd_trace /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/builtin-trace.c:5502
    #6 0x5c04956eda7d in run_builtin /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:351
    #7 0x5c04956ee0a8 in handle_internal_command /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:404
    #8 0x5c04956ee37f in run_argv /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:448
    torvalds#9 0x5c04956ee8e9 in main /home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf.c:556
    torvalds#10 0x79eb3622a3b7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
    torvalds#11 0x79eb3622a47a in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
    torvalds#12 0x5c04955422d4 in _start (/home/howard/hw/linux-perf/tools/perf/perf+0x4e02d4) (BuildId: 5b6cab2d59e96a4341741765ad6914a4d784dbc6)

     0.000 ( 0.014 ms): Chrome_ChildIO/117244 write(fd: 238, buf: !, count: 1)                                      = 1

Fixes: 5e58fcf ("perf trace: Allow allocating sc->arg_fmt even without the syscall tracepoint")
Signed-off-by: Howard Chu <howardchu95@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250122025519.361873-1-howardchu95@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
neuschaefer pushed a commit that referenced this issue Feb 7, 2025
@akpm00
mm/vmscan: fix hard LOCKUP in function isolate_lru_folios
1c7b17c 
This fixes the following hard lockup in isolate_lru_folios() during memory
reclaim.  If the LRU mostly contains ineligible folios this may trigger
watchdog.

watchdog: Watchdog detected hard LOCKUP on cpu 173
RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x255/0x2a0
Call Trace:
	_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x31/0x40
	folio_lruvec_lock_irqsave+0x5f/0x90
	folio_batch_move_lru+0x91/0x150
	lru_add_drain_per_cpu+0x1c/0x40
	process_one_work+0x17d/0x350
	worker_thread+0x27b/0x3a0
	kthread+0xe8/0x120
	ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
	ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30

lruvec->lru_lock owner：

PID: 2865     TASK: ffff888139214d40  CPU: 40   COMMAND: "kswapd0"
 #0 [fffffe0000945e60] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffffa567a555
 #1 [fffffe0000945e68] nmi_handle at ffffffffa563b171
 #2 [fffffe0000945eb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffffa6575920
 #3 [fffffe0000945ed0] exc_nmi at ffffffffa6575af4
 #4 [fffffe0000945ef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffffa6601dde
    [exception RIP: isolate_lru_folios+403]
    RIP: ffffffffa597df53  RSP: ffffc90006fb7c28  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: 0000000000000001  RBX: ffffc90006fb7c60  RCX: ffffea04a2196f88
    RDX: ffffc90006fb7c60  RSI: ffffc90006fb7c60  RDI: ffffea04a2197048
    RBP: ffff88812cbd3010   R8: ffffea04a2197008   R9: 0000000000000001
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000001  R12: ffffea04a2197008
    R13: ffffea04a2197048  R14: ffffc90006fb7de8  R15: 0000000003e3e937
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
    <NMI exception stack>
 #5 [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53
 #6 [ffffc90006fb7cf8] shrink_active_list at ffffffffa597f788
 #7 [ffffc90006fb7da8] balance_pgdat at ffffffffa5986db0
 #8 [ffffc90006fb7ec0] kswapd at ffffffffa5987354
 torvalds#9 [ffffc90006fb7ef8] kthread at ffffffffa5748238
crash>

Scenario:
User processe are requesting a large amount of memory and keep page active.
Then a module continuously requests memory from ZONE_DMA32 area.
Memory reclaim will be triggered due to ZONE_DMA32 watermark alarm reached.
However pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from
the ZONE_NORMAL area.

Reproduce:
Terminal 1: Construct to continuously increase pages active(anon).
mkdir /tmp/memory
mount -t tmpfs -o size=1024000M tmpfs /tmp/memory
dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/memory/block bs=4M
tail /tmp/memory/block

Terminal 2:
vmstat -a 1
active will increase.
procs ---memory--- ---swap-- ---io---- -system-- ---cpu--- ...
 r  b   swpd   free  inact active   si   so    bi    bo
 1  0   0 1445623076 45898836 83646008    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 43450228 86094616    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 41003480 88541364    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 38557088 90987756    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445623076 36109688 93435156    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619552 33663256 95881632    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 31217140 98327792    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 28769988 100774944    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 26322348 103222584    0    0     0
 1  0   0 1445619804 23875592 105669340    0    0     0

cat /proc/meminfo | head
Active(anon) increase.
MemTotal:       1579941036 kB
MemFree:        1445618500 kB
MemAvailable:   1453013224 kB
Buffers:            6516 kB
Cached:         128653956 kB
SwapCached:            0 kB
Active:         118110812 kB
Inactive:       11436620 kB
Active(anon):   115345744 kB
Inactive(anon):   945292 kB

When the Active(anon) is 115345744 kB, insmod module triggers
the ZONE_DMA32 watermark.

perf record -e vmscan:mm_vmscan_lru_isolate -aR
perf script
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=2
nr_skipped=2 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0
nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844
nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=1 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=28835844
nr_skipped=28835844 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=29
nr_skipped=29 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon
isolate_mode=0 classzone=1 order=0 nr_requested=32 nr_scanned=0
nr_skipped=0 nr_taken=0 lru=active_anon

See nr_scanned=28835844.
28835844 * 4k = 115343376KB approximately equal to 115345744 kB.

If increase Active(anon) to 1000G then insmod module triggers
the ZONE_DMA32 watermark. hard lockup will occur.

In my device nr_scanned = 0000000003e3e937 when hard lockup.
Convert to memory size 0x0000000003e3e937 * 4KB = 261072092 KB.

   [ffffc90006fb7c28] isolate_lru_folios at ffffffffa597df53
    ffffc90006fb7c30: 0000000000000020 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7c40: ffffc90006fb7d40 ffff88812cbd3000
    ffffc90006fb7c50: ffffc90006fb7d30 0000000106fb7de8
    ffffc90006fb7c60: ffffea04a2197008 ffffea0006ed4a48
    ffffc90006fb7c70: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7c80: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7c90: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7ca0: 0000000000000000 0000000003e3e937
    ffffc90006fb7cb0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
    ffffc90006fb7cc0: 8d7c0b56b7874b00 ffff88812cbd3000

About the Fixes:
Why did it take eight years to be discovered?

The problem requires the following conditions to occur:
1. The device memory should be large enough.
2. Pages in the LRU(active_anon) list are mostly from the ZONE_NORMAL area.
3. The memory in ZONE_DMA32 needs to reach the watermark.

If the memory is not large enough, or if the usage design of ZONE_DMA32
area memory is reasonable, this problem is difficult to detect.

notes:
The problem is most likely to occur in ZONE_DMA32 and ZONE_NORMAL,
but other suitable scenarios may also trigger the problem.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241119060842.274072-1-liuye@kylinos.cn
Fixes: b2e1875 ("mm, vmscan: begin reclaiming pages on a per-node basis")
Signed-off-by: liuye <liuye@kylinos.cn>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Yang Shi <yang@os.amperecomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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