Khadas VIM: Docker support added #1
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Hi, @umiddelb |
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The 3.14.29 had issues when using Docker on my ODROID C2 which didn't appear with 3.14.79. |
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Did you try to run a recent mainline kernel on the Khadas VIM? I only need a few patches for my C2 to have basic HW support (which is sufficient to run Docker, Kubernetes, etc. on it). You may check if you better take some effort there instead. |
after applying the AUFS patches against 3.14.29. Signed-off-by: Uli Middelberg <uli@middelberg.de>
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Hi Gouwa, I was able to get rid of the compiler errors. Now I have an idea why you've build all drivers as build-in modules, but I was able to fix this as well. To accomplish this I needed to disable some of the previously enabled kernel options. IMHO the kernel sources aren't in a very good shape. If you have the chance to, you might try to combine the HK sources with your device tree. Cheers PS: Something has gone wrong with my community account, could you please unlock it again. |
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Hi, @umiddelb It is not good idea to use HK sources. HK sources is a fork from very old original Amlogic kernel with a lot of changes coming from Debian kernel. There are a lot of differences in the OSD driver, eMMC partition table, and etc... between HK and Amlogic/Khadas kernels. Also some code of kernel depends from U-Boot. I think I would be better if you will suggest changes for Khadas kernel related to Khadas HW instead of suggesting to port HK kernel to Khadas HW. Hardkernel has their own aims. Best Regards, |
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Hi, @umiddelb If you have some compiler errors, please try to use another toolchains. For example, ftp://ftp.radix.pro/toolchains/x86_64/1.1.2/ |
I get these errors when I compile the kernel sources with gcc-5 which is the Ubuntu default C compiler now. |
gouwa
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Sep 1, 2017
mpi: Fix NULL ptr dereference in mpi_powm() [ver #3] This fixes CVE-2016-8650. If mpi_powm() is given a zero exponent, it wants to immediately return either 1 or 0, depending on the modulus. However, if the result was initalised with zero limb space, no limbs space is allocated and a NULL-pointer exception ensues. Fix this by allocating a minimal amount of limb space for the result when the 0-exponent case when the result is 1 and not touching the limb space when the result is 0. This affects the use of RSA keys and X.509 certificates that carry them. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 3014 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6-fscache+ #278 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 task: ffff8804011944c0 task.stack: ffff880401294000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8138ce5d>] [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP: 0018:ffff880401297ad8 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88040868bec0 RCX: ffff88040868bba0 RDX: ffff88040868b260 RSI: ffff88040868bec0 RDI: ffff88040868bee0 RBP: ffff880401297ba8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000047 R11: ffffffff8183b210 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8804087c7600 R14: 000000000000001f R15: ffff880401297c50 FS: 00007f7a7918c700(0000) GS:ffff88041fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000401250000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Stack: ffff88040868bec0 0000000000000020 ffff880401297b00 ffffffff81376cd4 0000000000000100 ffff880401297b10 ffffffff81376d12 ffff880401297b30 ffffffff81376f37 0000000000000100 0000000000000000 ffff880401297ba8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81376cd4>] ? __sg_page_iter_next+0x43/0x66 [<ffffffff81376d12>] ? sg_miter_get_next_page+0x1b/0x5d [<ffffffff81376f37>] ? sg_miter_next+0x17/0xbd [<ffffffff8138ba3a>] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0xf2/0x146 [<ffffffff8132a95c>] rsa_verify+0x9d/0xee [<ffffffff8132acca>] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0x2e/0xbb [<ffffffff8132af40>] pkcs1pad_verify+0xc0/0xe1 [<ffffffff8133cb5e>] public_key_verify_signature+0x1b0/0x228 [<ffffffff8133d974>] x509_check_for_self_signed+0xa1/0xc4 [<ffffffff8133cdde>] x509_cert_parse+0x167/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133d609>] x509_key_preparse+0x21/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133c3d7>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x34/0x61 [<ffffffff812fc9f3>] key_create_or_update+0x145/0x399 [<ffffffff812fe227>] SyS_add_key+0x154/0x19e [<ffffffff81001c2b>] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x191 [<ffffffff816825e4>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 81 ec a8 00 00 00 44 8b 71 04 8b 42 04 4c 8b 67 18 45 85 f6 89 45 80 0f 84 b4 06 00 00 85 c0 75 2f 41 ff ce <49> c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 b0 01 75 0b 48 8b 41 18 48 83 38 01 0f RIP [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP <ffff880401297ad8> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace d82015255d4a5d8d ]--- Basically, this is a backport of a libgcrypt patch: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=patch;h=6e1adb05d290aeeb1c230c763970695f4a538526 Change-Id: I3df1228f5a72165ed015eb64ddfedc4df02c1d53 Fixes: cdec9cb ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
nicknumb
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Jan 22, 2018
mpi: Fix NULL ptr dereference in mpi_powm() [ver khadas#3] This fixes CVE-2016-8650. If mpi_powm() is given a zero exponent, it wants to immediately return either 1 or 0, depending on the modulus. However, if the result was initalised with zero limb space, no limbs space is allocated and a NULL-pointer exception ensues. Fix this by allocating a minimal amount of limb space for the result when the 0-exponent case when the result is 1 and not touching the limb space when the result is 0. This affects the use of RSA keys and X.509 certificates that carry them. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null) IP: [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 PGD 0 Oops: 0002 [khadas#1] SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 3 PID: 3014 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.9.0-rc6-fscache+ #278 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014 task: ffff8804011944c0 task.stack: ffff880401294000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8138ce5d>] [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP: 0018:ffff880401297ad8 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88040868bec0 RCX: ffff88040868bba0 RDX: ffff88040868b260 RSI: ffff88040868bec0 RDI: ffff88040868bee0 RBP: ffff880401297ba8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000047 R11: ffffffff8183b210 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8804087c7600 R14: 000000000000001f R15: ffff880401297c50 FS: 00007f7a7918c700(0000) GS:ffff88041fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000401250000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Stack: ffff88040868bec0 0000000000000020 ffff880401297b00 ffffffff81376cd4 0000000000000100 ffff880401297b10 ffffffff81376d12 ffff880401297b30 ffffffff81376f37 0000000000000100 0000000000000000 ffff880401297ba8 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81376cd4>] ? __sg_page_iter_next+0x43/0x66 [<ffffffff81376d12>] ? sg_miter_get_next_page+0x1b/0x5d [<ffffffff81376f37>] ? sg_miter_next+0x17/0xbd [<ffffffff8138ba3a>] ? mpi_read_raw_from_sgl+0xf2/0x146 [<ffffffff8132a95c>] rsa_verify+0x9d/0xee [<ffffffff8132acca>] ? pkcs1pad_sg_set_buf+0x2e/0xbb [<ffffffff8132af40>] pkcs1pad_verify+0xc0/0xe1 [<ffffffff8133cb5e>] public_key_verify_signature+0x1b0/0x228 [<ffffffff8133d974>] x509_check_for_self_signed+0xa1/0xc4 [<ffffffff8133cdde>] x509_cert_parse+0x167/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133d609>] x509_key_preparse+0x21/0x1a1 [<ffffffff8133c3d7>] asymmetric_key_preparse+0x34/0x61 [<ffffffff812fc9f3>] key_create_or_update+0x145/0x399 [<ffffffff812fe227>] SyS_add_key+0x154/0x19e [<ffffffff81001c2b>] do_syscall_64+0x80/0x191 [<ffffffff816825e4>] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Code: 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 81 ec a8 00 00 00 44 8b 71 04 8b 42 04 4c 8b 67 18 45 85 f6 89 45 80 0f 84 b4 06 00 00 85 c0 75 2f 41 ff ce <49> c7 04 24 01 00 00 00 b0 01 75 0b 48 8b 41 18 48 83 38 01 0f RIP [<ffffffff8138ce5d>] mpi_powm+0x32/0x7e6 RSP <ffff880401297ad8> CR2: 0000000000000000 ---[ end trace d82015255d4a5d8d ]--- Basically, this is a backport of a libgcrypt patch: http://git.gnupg.org/cgi-bin/gitweb.cgi?p=libgcrypt.git;a=patch;h=6e1adb05d290aeeb1c230c763970695f4a538526 Change-Id: I3df1228f5a72165ed015eb64ddfedc4df02c1d53 Fixes: cdec9cb ("crypto: GnuPG based MPI lib - source files (part 1)") Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com> cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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Jan 22, 2018
KEYS: Fix short sprintf buffer in /proc/keys show function This fixes CVE-2016-7042. Fix a short sprintf buffer in proc_keys_show(). If the gcc stack protector is turned on, this can cause a panic due to stack corruption. The problem is that xbuf[] is not big enough to hold a 64-bit timeout rendered as weeks: (gdb) p 0xffffffffffffffffULL/(60*60*24*7) $2 = 30500568904943 That's 14 chars plus NUL, not 11 chars plus NUL. Expand the buffer to 16 chars. I think the unpatched code apparently works if the stack-protector is not enabled because on a 32-bit machine the buffer won't be overflowed and on a 64-bit machine there's a 64-bit aligned pointer at one side and an int that isn't checked again on the other side. The panic incurred looks something like: Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: ffffffff81352ebe CPU: 0 PID: 1692 Comm: reproducer Not tainted 4.7.2-201.fc24.x86_64 khadas#1 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011 0000000000000086 00000000fbbd2679 ffff8800a044bc00 ffffffff813d941f ffffffff81a28d58 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc88 ffffffff811b2cb6 ffff880000000010 ffff8800a044bc98 ffff8800a044bc30 00000000fbbd2679 Call Trace: [<ffffffff813d941f>] dump_stack+0x63/0x84 [<ffffffff811b2cb6>] panic+0xde/0x22a [<ffffffff81352ebe>] ? proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff8109f7f9>] __stack_chk_fail+0x19/0x30 [<ffffffff81352ebe>] proc_keys_show+0x3ce/0x3d0 [<ffffffff81350410>] ? key_validate+0x50/0x50 [<ffffffff8134db30>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20 [<ffffffff8126b31c>] seq_read+0x2cc/0x390 [<ffffffff812b6b12>] proc_reg_read+0x42/0x70 [<ffffffff81244fc7>] __vfs_read+0x37/0x150 [<ffffffff81357020>] ? security_file_permission+0xa0/0xc0 [<ffffffff81246156>] vfs_read+0x96/0x130 [<ffffffff81247635>] SyS_read+0x55/0xc0 [<ffffffff817eb872>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa4 Change-Id: I5facaef3e732e2f8e1053c357cc9a960ef60962f Reported-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ondrej Kozina <okozina@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
nicknumb
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Jan 22, 2018
staging: binder: add vm_fault handler An issue was observed when a userspace task exits. The page which hits error here is the zero page. In binder mmap, the whole of vma is not mapped. On a task crash, when debuggerd reads the binder regions, the unmapped areas fall to do_anonymous_page in handle_pte_fault, due to the absence of a vm_fault handler. This results in zero page being mapped. Later in zap_pte_range, vm_normal_page returns zero page in the case of VM_MIXEDMAP and it results in the error. BUG: Bad page map in process mediaserver pte:9dff379f pmd:9bfbd831 page:c0ed8e60 count:1 mapcount:-1 mapping: (null) index:0x0 page flags: 0x404(referenced|reserved) addr:40c3f000 vm_flags:10220051 anon_vma: (null) mapping:d9fe0764 index:fd vma->vm_ops->fault: (null) vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap: binder_mmap+0x0/0x274 CPU: 0 PID: 1463 Comm: mediaserver Tainted: G W 3.10.17+ khadas#1 [<c001549c>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0x11c) from [<c001200c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [<c001200c>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) from [<c0103d78>] (print_bad_pte+0x158/0x190) [<c0103d78>] (print_bad_pte+0x158/0x190) from [<c01055f0>] (unmap_single_vma+0x2e4/0x598) [<c01055f0>] (unmap_single_vma+0x2e4/0x598) from [<c010618c>] (unmap_vmas+0x34/0x50) [<c010618c>] (unmap_vmas+0x34/0x50) from [<c010a9e4>] (exit_mmap+0xc8/0x1e8) [<c010a9e4>] (exit_mmap+0xc8/0x1e8) from [<c00520f0>] (mmput+0x54/0xd0) [<c00520f0>] (mmput+0x54/0xd0) from [<c005972c>] (do_exit+0x360/0x990) [<c005972c>] (do_exit+0x360/0x990) from [<c0059ef0>] (do_group_exit+0x84/0xc0) [<c0059ef0>] (do_group_exit+0x84/0xc0) from [<c0066de0>] (get_signal_to_deliver+0x4d4/0x548) [<c0066de0>] (get_signal_to_deliver+0x4d4/0x548) from [<c0011500>] (do_signal+0xa8/0x3b8) Add a vm_fault handler which returns VM_FAULT_SIGBUS, and prevents the wrong fallback to do_anonymous_page. Change-Id: Icec2b2cb10ed5e18363b77efadca974fedc70416 Signed-off-by: Vinayak Menon <vinayakm.list@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Yixun Lan <yixun.lan@amlogic.com>
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This patch fixes the following warning:
[ 2.226264] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:620
[ 2.226341] in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
[ 2.226366] 4 locks held by swapper/0/1:
[ 2.226385] #0: (&dev->mutex){......}, at: [<ffffff800851c664>] __device_attach+0x3c/0x134
[ 2.226515] #1: (cpu_hotplug.lock){......}, at: [<ffffff800809feb0>] get_online_cpus+0x38/0x9c
[ 2.226594] #2: (subsys mutex#7){......}, at: [<ffffff800851b0e4>] subsys_interface_register+0x54/0xfc
[ 2.226684] #3: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<ffffff800845c764>] rockchip_adjust_power_scale+0x88/0x450
[ 2.226771] CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.4.132 #600
[ 2.226790] Hardware name: Rockchip PX30 evb ddr3 board (DT)
[ 2.226809] Call trace:
[ 2.226840] [<ffffff800808a0d4>] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x1ec
[ 2.226889] [<ffffff800808a2d4>] show_stack+0x14/0x1c
[ 2.226918] [<ffffff80083c41b4>] dump_stack+0x94/0xbc
[ 2.226946] [<ffffff80080cb708>] ___might_sleep+0x108/0x118
[ 2.226972] [<ffffff80080cb788>] __might_sleep+0x70/0x80
[ 2.227001] [<ffffff8008b6d1d0>] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x38c
[ 2.227031] [<ffffff8008858714>] __of_clk_get_from_provider+0x44/0xec
[ 2.227061] [<ffffff8008852814>] __of_clk_get_by_name+0xd4/0x14c
[ 2.227112] [<ffffff80088528a4>] of_clk_get_by_name+0x18/0x28
[ 2.227140] [<ffffff800845c980>] rockchip_adjust_power_scale+0x2a4/0x450
[ 2.227171] [<ffffff800877f630>] cpufreq_init+0x154/0x394
[ 2.227199] [<ffffff8008776ac4>] cpufreq_online+0x1b0/0x68c
[ 2.227225] [<ffffff8008777040>] cpufreq_add_dev+0x3c/0x94
[ 2.227253] [<ffffff800851b168>] subsys_interface_register+0xd8/0xfc
[ 2.227281] [<ffffff80087772d8>] cpufreq_register_driver+0x10c/0x1a8
[ 2.227332] [<ffffff800877f93c>] dt_cpufreq_probe+0xcc/0xe8
[ 2.227360] [<ffffff800851e7b8>] platform_drv_probe+0x54/0xa8
[ 2.227385] [<ffffff800851c924>] driver_probe_device+0x194/0x278
[ 2.227411] [<ffffff800851cb40>] __device_attach_driver+0x60/0x9c
[ 2.227439] [<ffffff800851ae14>] bus_for_each_drv+0x9c/0xbc
[ 2.227464] [<ffffff800851c6f0>] __device_attach+0xc8/0x134
[ 2.227488] [<ffffff800851ccb8>] device_initial_probe+0x10/0x18
[ 2.227514] [<ffffff800851bcec>] bus_probe_device+0x2c/0x90
[ 2.227541] [<ffffff8008519e90>] device_add+0x44c/0x510
[ 2.227570] [<ffffff800851e4d4>] platform_device_add+0xa0/0x1e4
[ 2.227597] [<ffffff800851ef28>] platform_device_register_full+0xa4/0xe4
[ 2.227627] [<ffffff80090f8680>] rockchip_cpufreq_driver_init+0xd4/0x31c
[ 2.227654] [<ffffff8008083468>] do_one_initcall+0x84/0x1a4
[ 2.227682] [<ffffff80090c0e98>] kernel_init_freeable+0x260/0x264
[ 2.227708] [<ffffff8008b6ab68>] kernel_init+0x10/0xf8
[ 2.227734] [<ffffff80080832a0>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x30
Fixes: 197a2d3 ("soc: rockchip: opp_select: add missing rcu lock")
Change-Id: Ib52b6f7bc77bb207a1c8c6880f7a5e916fa3d2ee
Signed-off-by: Finley Xiao <finley.xiao@rock-chips.com>
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[ 1.644632] rockchip-spi ff190000.spi: no high_speed pinctrl state [ 1.646337] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000005 [ 1.647412] pgd = ffffff80093b9000 [ 1.647873] [00000005] *pgd=00000000feffe003, *pud=00000000feffe003, *pmd=0000000000000000 [ 1.649019] Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP [ 1.649643] Modules linked in: [ 1.650065] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.4.120-rockchip-ayufan-195 #1 [ 1.651042] Hardware name: Pine64 Rock64 (DT) [ 1.651603] task: ffffffc0f5d48000 task.stack: ffffffc0f5d44000 [ 1.652366] PC is at pinctrl_select_state+0x3c/0x12c [ 1.653004] LR is at pinctrl_select_state+0x7c/0x12c [ 1.653641] pc : [<ffffff8008596840>] lr : [<ffffff8008596880>] pstate: 60000045 [ 1.654574] sp : ffffffc0f5d47420 patch from:rockchip-linux/kernel@c9dc2ab Change-Id: Ie2926a505288d7198a4d49c2abf5a4207281c89d Signed-off-by: Huibin Hong <huibin.hong@rock-chips.com>
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[ Upstream commit a8d7aa1 ] syzbot reported a crash in tasklet_action_common() caused by dccp. dccp needs to make sure socket wont disappear before tasklet handler has completed. This patch takes a reference on the socket when arming the tasklet, and moves the sock_put() from dccp_write_xmit_timer() to dccp_write_xmitlet() kernel BUG at kernel/softirq.c:514! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 17 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #30 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:tasklet_action_common.isra.19+0x6db/0x700 kernel/softirq.c:515 RSP: 0018:ffff8801d9b3faf8 EFLAGS: 00010246 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread RAX: 1ffff1003b367f6b RBX: ffff8801daf1f3f0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff8801cf895498 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffff8801d9b3fc40 R08: ffffed0039f12a95 R09: ffffed0039f12a94 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread R10: ffffed0039f12a94 R11: ffff8801cf8954a3 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff8801d9b3fc18 R14: dffffc0000000000 R15: ffff8801cf895490 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2bc28000 CR3: 00000001a08a9000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: tasklet_action+0x1d/0x20 kernel/softirq.c:533 __do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285 dccp_close: ABORT with 65423 bytes unread run_ksoftirqd+0x86/0x100 kernel/softirq.c:646 smpboot_thread_fn+0x417/0x870 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x345/0x410 kernel/kthread.c:238 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:412 Code: 48 8b 85 e8 fe ff ff 48 8b 95 f0 fe ff ff e9 94 fb ff ff 48 89 95 f0 fe ff ff e8 81 53 6e 00 48 8b 95 f0 fe ff ff e9 62 fb ff ff <0f> 0b 48 89 cf 48 89 8d e8 fe ff ff e8 64 53 6e 00 48 8b 8d e8 RIP: tasklet_action_common.isra.19+0x6db/0x700 kernel/softirq.c:515 RSP: ffff8801d9b3faf8 Fixes: dc841e3 ("dccp: Extend CCID packet dequeueing interface") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Cc: Gerrit Renker <gerrit@erg.abdn.ac.uk> Cc: dccp@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2c5d5b1 ] syzbot loves to set very small mtu on devices, since it brings joy. We must make llc_ui_sendmsg() fool proof. usercopy: Kernel memory overwrite attempt detected to wrapped address (offset 0, size 18446612139802320068)! kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:100! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 17464 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #36 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort+0xbb/0xbd mm/usercopy.c:88 RSP: 0018:ffff8801868bf800 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 000000000000006c RBX: ffffffff87d2fb00 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000006c RSI: ffffffff81610731 RDI: ffffed0030d17ef6 RBP: ffff8801868bf858 R08: ffff88018daa4200 R09: ffffed003b5c4fb0 R10: ffffed003b5c4fb0 R11: ffff8801dae27d87 R12: ffffffff87d2f8e0 R13: ffffffff87d2f7a0 R14: ffffffff87d2f7a0 R15: ffffffff87d2f7a0 FS: 00007f56a14ac700(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000001b2bc21000 CR3: 00000001abeb1000 CR4: 00000000001426f0 DR0: 0000000020000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000030602 Call Trace: check_bogus_address mm/usercopy.c:153 [inline] __check_object_size+0x5d9/0x5d9 mm/usercopy.c:256 check_object_size include/linux/thread_info.h:108 [inline] check_copy_size include/linux/thread_info.h:139 [inline] copy_from_iter_full include/linux/uio.h:121 [inline] memcpy_from_msg include/linux/skbuff.h:3305 [inline] llc_ui_sendmsg+0x4b1/0x1530 net/llc/af_llc.c:941 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:629 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x120 net/socket.c:639 __sys_sendto+0x3d7/0x670 net/socket.c:1789 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1801 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:1797 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1797 do_syscall_64+0x1b1/0x800 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x455979 RSP: 002b:00007f56a14abc68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f56a14ac6d4 RCX: 0000000000455979 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000000 RDI: 0000000000000018 RBP: 000000000072bea0 R08: 00000000200012c0 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff R13: 0000000000000548 R14: 00000000006fbf60 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 55 c0 e8 c0 55 bb ff ff 75 c8 48 8b 55 c0 4d 89 f9 ff 75 d0 4d 89 e8 48 89 d9 4c 89 e6 41 56 48 c7 c7 80 fa d2 87 e8 a0 0b a3 ff <0f> 0b e8 95 55 bb ff e8 c0 a8 f7 ff 8b 95 14 ff ff ff 4d 89 e8 RIP: usercopy_abort+0xbb/0xbd mm/usercopy.c:88 RSP: ffff8801868bf800 Fixes: 1da177e ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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…s found [ Upstream commit 72f17ba ] If an OVS_ATTR_NESTED attribute type is found while walking through netlink attributes, we call nlattr_set() recursively passing the length table for the following nested attributes, if different from the current one. However, once we're done with those sub-nested attributes, we should continue walking through attributes using the current table, instead of using the one related to the sub-nested attributes. For example, given this sequence: 1 OVS_KEY_ATTR_PRIORITY 2 OVS_KEY_ATTR_TUNNEL 3 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_ID 4 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_SRC 5 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_IPV4_DST 6 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TTL 7 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_SRC 8 OVS_TUNNEL_KEY_ATTR_TP_DST 9 OVS_KEY_ATTR_IN_PORT 10 OVS_KEY_ATTR_SKB_MARK 11 OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS we switch to the 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' table on attribute #3, and we don't switch back to 'ovs_key_lens' while setting attributes #9 to #11 in the sequence. As OVS_KEY_ATTR_MPLS evaluates to 21, and the array size of 'ovs_tunnel_key_lens' is 15, we also get this kind of KASan splat while accessing the wrong table: [ 7654.586496] ================================================================== [ 7654.594573] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.603214] Read of size 4 at addr ffffffffc169ecf0 by task handler29/87430 [ 7654.610983] [ 7654.612644] CPU: 21 PID: 87430 Comm: handler29 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 3.10.0-866.el7.test.x86_64 #1 [ 7654.623030] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.1.7 06/16/2016 [ 7654.631379] Call Trace: [ 7654.634108] [<ffffffffb65a7c50>] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b [ 7654.639843] [<ffffffffb53ff373>] print_address_description+0x33/0x290 [ 7654.647129] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] ? nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.654607] [<ffffffffb53ff812>] kasan_report.part.3+0x242/0x330 [ 7654.661406] [<ffffffffb53ff9b4>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x34/0x40 [ 7654.668789] [<ffffffffc169b37b>] nlattr_set+0x164/0xde9 [openvswitch] [ 7654.676076] [<ffffffffc167ef68>] ovs_nla_get_match+0x10c8/0x1900 [openvswitch] [ 7654.684234] [<ffffffffb61e9cc8>] ? genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 [ 7654.689968] [<ffffffffb61e7733>] ? netlink_unicast+0x3f3/0x590 [ 7654.696574] [<ffffffffc167dea0>] ? ovs_nla_put_tunnel_info+0xb0/0xb0 [openvswitch] [ 7654.705122] [<ffffffffb4f41b50>] ? unwind_get_return_address+0xb0/0xb0 [ 7654.712503] [<ffffffffb65d9355>] ? system_call_fastpath+0x1c/0x21 [ 7654.719401] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.726298] [<ffffffffb4f41d79>] ? update_stack_state+0x229/0x370 [ 7654.733195] [<ffffffffb53fe4b5>] ? kasan_unpoison_shadow+0x35/0x50 [ 7654.740187] [<ffffffffb53fe62a>] ? kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xe0 [ 7654.746406] [<ffffffffb53fec32>] ? kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 [ 7654.752914] [<ffffffffb53fe711>] ? memset+0x31/0x40 [ 7654.758456] [<ffffffffc165bf92>] ovs_flow_cmd_new+0x2b2/0xf00 [openvswitch] [snip] [ 7655.132484] The buggy address belongs to the variable: [ 7655.138226] ovs_tunnel_key_lens+0xf0/0xffffffffffffd400 [openvswitch] [ 7655.145507] [ 7655.147166] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 7655.152514] ffffffffc169eb80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa [ 7655.160585] ffffffffc169ec00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.168644] >ffffffffc169ec80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fa fa [ 7655.176701] ^ [ 7655.184372] ffffffffc169ed00: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 05 [ 7655.192431] ffffffffc169ed80: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 7655.200490] ================================================================== Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Fixes: 982b527 ("openvswitch: Fix mask generation for nested attributes.") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 48fb6f4 upstream. Commit 65d8fc7 ("futex: Remove requirement for lock_page() in get_futex_key()") removed an unnecessary lock_page() with the side-effect that page->mapping needed to be treated very carefully. Two defensive warnings were added in case any assumption was missed and the first warning assumed a correct application would not alter a mapping backing a futex key. Since merging, it has not triggered for any unexpected case but Mark Rutland reported the following bug triggering due to the first warning. kernel BUG at kernel/futex.c:679! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 3695 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc3-00020-g307fec773ba3 #3 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) task: ffff80001e271780 task.stack: ffff000010908000 PC is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679 LR is at get_futex_key+0x6a4/0xcf0 kernel/futex.c:679 pc : [<ffff00000821ac14>] lr : [<ffff00000821ac14>] pstate: 80000145 The fact that it's a bug instead of a warning was due to an unrelated arm64 problem, but the warning itself triggered because the underlying mapping changed. This is an application issue but from a kernel perspective it's a recoverable situation and the warning is unnecessary so this patch removes the warning. The warning may potentially be triggered with the following test program from Mark although it may be necessary to adjust NR_FUTEX_THREADS to be a value smaller than the number of CPUs in the system. #include <linux/futex.h> #include <pthread.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <unistd.h> #define NR_FUTEX_THREADS 16 pthread_t threads[NR_FUTEX_THREADS]; void *mem; #define MEM_PROT (PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE) #define MEM_SIZE 65536 static int futex_wrapper(int *uaddr, int op, int val, const struct timespec *timeout, int *uaddr2, int val3) { syscall(SYS_futex, uaddr, op, val, timeout, uaddr2, val3); } void *poll_futex(void *unused) { for (;;) { futex_wrapper(mem, FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI, 1, NULL, mem + 4, 1); } } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int i; mem = mmap(NULL, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT, MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); printf("Mapping @ %p\n", mem); printf("Creating futex threads...\n"); for (i = 0; i < NR_FUTEX_THREADS; i++) pthread_create(&threads[i], NULL, poll_futex, NULL); printf("Flipping mapping...\n"); for (;;) { mmap(mem, MEM_SIZE, MEM_PROT, MAP_FIXED | MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); } return 0; } Reported-and-tested-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.7+ Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 69af7e2 upstream. Since get_kprobe_ctlblk() uses smp_processor_id() to access per-cpu variable, it hits smp_processor_id sanity check as below. [ 7.006928] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: swapper/0/1 [ 7.007859] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x24 [ 7.008438] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1-00192-g4eb17253e4b5 #1 [ 7.008890] Hardware name: Generic DT based system [ 7.009917] [<c0313f0c>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c030e6d8>] (show_stack+0x20/0x24) [ 7.010473] [<c030e6d8>] (show_stack) from [<c0c64694>] (dump_stack+0x84/0x98) [ 7.010990] [<c0c64694>] (dump_stack) from [<c071ca5c>] (check_preemption_disabled+0x138/0x13c) [ 7.011592] [<c071ca5c>] (check_preemption_disabled) from [<c071ca80>] (debug_smp_processor_id+0x20/0x24) [ 7.012214] [<c071ca80>] (debug_smp_processor_id) from [<c03335e0>] (optimized_callback+0x2c/0xe4) [ 7.013077] [<c03335e0>] (optimized_callback) from [<bf0021b0>] (0xbf0021b0) To fix this issue, call get_kprobe_ctlblk() right after irq-disabled since that disables preemption. Fixes: 0dc016d ("ARM: kprobes: enable OPTPROBES for ARM 32") Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7f582b2 ] syzkaller found a reliable way to crash the host, hitting a BUG() in __tcp_retransmit_skb() Malicous MSG_FASTOPEN is the root cause. We need to purge write queue in tcp_connect_init() at the point we init snd_una/write_seq. This patch also replaces the BUG() by a less intrusive WARN_ON_ONCE() kernel BUG at net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2837! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 5276 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.17.0-rc3+ #51 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:__tcp_retransmit_skb+0x2992/0x2eb0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2837 RSP: 0000:ffff8801dae06ff8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff8801b9fe61c0 RBX: 00000000ffc18a16 RCX: ffffffff864e1a49 RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: ffffffff864e2e12 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff8801dae073a0 R08: ffff8801b9fe61c0 R09: ffffed0039c40dd2 R10: ffffed0039c40dd2 R11: ffff8801ce206e93 R12: 00000000421eeaad R13: ffff8801ce206d4e R14: ffff8801ce206cc0 R15: ffff8801cd4f4a80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801dae00000(0063) knlGS:00000000096bc900 CS: 0010 DS: 002b ES: 002b CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 00000001c47b6000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <IRQ> tcp_retransmit_skb+0x2e/0x250 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:2923 tcp_retransmit_timer+0xc50/0x3060 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:488 tcp_write_timer_handler+0x339/0x960 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:573 tcp_write_timer+0x111/0x1d0 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:593 call_timer_fn+0x230/0x940 kernel/time/timer.c:1326 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline] __run_timers+0x79e/0xc50 kernel/time/timer.c:1666 run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692 __do_softirq+0x2e0/0xaf5 kernel/softirq.c:285 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline] irq_exit+0x1d1/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:525 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x17e/0x710 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052 apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:863 Fixes: cf60af0 ("net-tcp: Fast Open client - sendmsg(MSG_FASTOPEN)") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit fba9eb7 ] Add a header with macros usable in assembler files to emit alternative code sequences. It works analog to the alternatives for inline assmeblies in C files, with the same restrictions and capabilities. The syntax is ALTERNATIVE "<default instructions sequence>", \ "<alternative instructions sequence>", \ "<features-bit>" and ALTERNATIVE_2 "<default instructions sequence>", \ "<alternative instructions sqeuence #1>", \ "<feature-bit #1>", "<alternative instructions sqeuence #2>", \ "<feature-bit #2>" Reviewed-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5bdd0c6 ] If jffs2_iget() fails for a newly-allocated inode, jffs2_do_clear_inode() can get called twice in the error handling path, the first call in jffs2_iget() itself and the second through iget_failed(). This can result to a use-after-free error in the second jffs2_do_clear_inode() call, such as shown by the oops below wherein the second jffs2_do_clear_inode() call was trying to free node fragments that were already freed in the first jffs2_do_clear_inode() call. [ 78.178860] jffs2: error: (1904) jffs2_do_read_inode_internal: CRC failed for read_inode of inode 24 at physical location 0x1fc00c [ 78.178914] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b7b [ 78.185871] pgd = ffffffc03a567000 [ 78.188794] [6b6b6b6b6b6b6b7b] *pgd=0000000000000000, *pud=0000000000000000 [ 78.194968] Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ... [ 78.513147] PC is at rb_first_postorder+0xc/0x28 [ 78.516503] LR is at jffs2_kill_fragtree+0x28/0x90 [jffs2] [ 78.520672] pc : [<ffffff8008323d28>] lr : [<ffffff8000eb1cc8>] pstate: 60000105 [ 78.526757] sp : ffffff800cea38f0 [ 78.528753] x29: ffffff800cea38f0 x28: ffffffc01f3f8e80 [ 78.532754] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffffff800cea3c70 [ 78.536756] x25: 00000000dc67c8ae x24: ffffffc033d6945d [ 78.540759] x23: ffffffc036811740 x22: ffffff800891a5b8 [ 78.544760] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000 [ 78.548762] x19: ffffffc037d48910 x18: ffffff800891a588 [ 78.552764] x17: 0000000000000800 x16: 0000000000000c00 [ 78.556766] x15: 0000000000000010 x14: 6f2065646f6e695f [ 78.560767] x13: 6461657220726f66 x12: 2064656c69616620 [ 78.564769] x11: 435243203a6c616e x10: 7265746e695f6564 [ 78.568771] x9 : 6f6e695f64616572 x8 : ffffffc037974038 [ 78.572774] x7 : bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb x6 : 0000000000000008 [ 78.576775] x5 : 002f91d85bd44a2f x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 78.580777] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 000000403755e000 [ 78.584779] x1 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b x0 : 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b ... [ 79.038551] [<ffffff8008323d28>] rb_first_postorder+0xc/0x28 [ 79.042962] [<ffffff8000eb5578>] jffs2_do_clear_inode+0x88/0x100 [jffs2] [ 79.048395] [<ffffff8000eb9ddc>] jffs2_evict_inode+0x3c/0x48 [jffs2] [ 79.053443] [<ffffff8008201ca8>] evict+0xb0/0x168 [ 79.056835] [<ffffff8008202650>] iput+0x1c0/0x200 [ 79.060228] [<ffffff800820408c>] iget_failed+0x30/0x3c [ 79.064097] [<ffffff8000eba0c0>] jffs2_iget+0x2d8/0x360 [jffs2] [ 79.068740] [<ffffff8000eb0a60>] jffs2_lookup+0xe8/0x130 [jffs2] [ 79.073434] [<ffffff80081f1a28>] lookup_slow+0x118/0x190 [ 79.077435] [<ffffff80081f4708>] walk_component+0xfc/0x28c [ 79.081610] [<ffffff80081f4dd0>] path_lookupat+0x84/0x108 [ 79.085699] [<ffffff80081f5578>] filename_lookup+0x88/0x100 [ 79.089960] [<ffffff80081f572c>] user_path_at_empty+0x58/0x6c [ 79.094396] [<ffffff80081ebe14>] vfs_statx+0xa4/0x114 [ 79.098138] [<ffffff80081ec44c>] SyS_newfstatat+0x58/0x98 [ 79.102227] [<ffffff800808354c>] __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4 [ 79.106489] Code: d65f03c0 f9400001 b40000e1 aa0103e0 (f9400821) The jffs2_do_clear_inode() call in jffs2_iget() is unnecessary since iget_failed() will eventually call jffs2_do_clear_inode() if needed, so just remove it. Fixes: 5451f79 ("iget: stop JFFS2 from using iget() and read_inode()") Reviewed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Jake Daryll Obina <jake.obina@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2c0aa08 ] Scenario: 1. Port down and do fail over 2. Ap do rds_bind syscall PID: 47039 TASK: ffff89887e2fe640 CPU: 47 COMMAND: "kworker/u:6" #0 [ffff898e35f159f0] machine_kexec at ffffffff8103abf9 #1 [ffff898e35f15a60] crash_kexec at ffffffff810b96e3 #2 [ffff898e35f15b30] oops_end at ffffffff8150f518 #3 [ffff898e35f15b60] no_context at ffffffff8104854c #4 [ffff898e35f15ba0] __bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff81048675 #5 [ffff898e35f15bf0] bad_area_nosemaphore at ffffffff810487d3 #6 [ffff898e35f15c00] do_page_fault at ffffffff815120b8 #7 [ffff898e35f15d10] page_fault at ffffffff8150ea95 [exception RIP: unknown or invalid address] RIP: 0000000000000000 RSP: ffff898e35f15dc8 RFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: 00000000fffffffe RBX: ffff889b77f6fc00 RCX:ffffffff81c99d88 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff896019ee08e8 RDI:ffff889b77f6fc00 RBP: ffff898e35f15df0 R8: ffff896019ee08c8 R9:0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000400 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:ffff896019ee08c0 R13: ffff889b77f6fe68 R14: ffffffff81c99d80 R15: ffffffffa022a1e0 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff CS: 0010 SS: 0018 #8 [ffff898e35f15dc8] cma_ndev_work_handler at ffffffffa022a228 [rdma_cm] #9 [ffff898e35f15df8] process_one_work at ffffffff8108a7c6 #10 [ffff898e35f15e58] worker_thread at ffffffff8108bda0 #11 [ffff898e35f15ee8] kthread at ffffffff81090fe6 PID: 45659 TASK: ffff880d313d2500 CPU: 31 COMMAND: "oracle_45659_ap" #0 [ffff881024ccfc98] __schedule at ffffffff8150bac4 #1 [ffff881024ccfd40] schedule at ffffffff8150c2cf #2 [ffff881024ccfd50] __mutex_lock_slowpath at ffffffff8150cee7 #3 [ffff881024ccfdc0] mutex_lock at ffffffff8150cdeb #4 [ffff881024ccfde0] rdma_destroy_id at ffffffffa022a027 [rdma_cm] #5 [ffff881024ccfe10] rds_ib_laddr_check at ffffffffa0357857 [rds_rdma] #6 [ffff881024ccfe50] rds_trans_get_preferred at ffffffffa0324c2a [rds] #7 [ffff881024ccfe80] rds_bind at ffffffffa031d690 [rds] #8 [ffff881024ccfeb0] sys_bind at ffffffff8142a670 PID: 45659 PID: 47039 rds_ib_laddr_check /* create id_priv with a null event_handler */ rdma_create_id rdma_bind_addr cma_acquire_dev /* add id_priv to cma_dev->id_list */ cma_attach_to_dev cma_ndev_work_handler /* event_hanlder is null */ id_priv->id.event_handler Signed-off-by: Guanglei Li <guanglei.li@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Honglei Wang <honglei.wang@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Yanjun Zhu <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Acked-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b6dd4d8 ] The pr_debug() in gic-v3 gic_send_sgi() can trigger a circular locking warning: GICv3: CPU10: ICC_SGI1R_EL1 5000400 ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 4.15.0+ #1 Tainted: G W ------------------------------------------------------ dynamic_debug01/1873 is trying to acquire lock: ((console_sem).lock){-...}, at: [<0000000099c891ec>] down_trylock+0x20/0x4c but task is already holding lock: (&rq->lock){-.-.}, at: [<00000000842e1587>] __task_rq_lock+0x54/0xdc which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #2 (&rq->lock){-.-.}: __lock_acquire+0x3b4/0x6e0 lock_acquire+0xf4/0x2a8 _raw_spin_lock+0x4c/0x60 task_fork_fair+0x3c/0x148 sched_fork+0x10c/0x214 copy_process.isra.32.part.33+0x4e8/0x14f0 _do_fork+0xe8/0x78c kernel_thread+0x48/0x54 rest_init+0x34/0x2a4 start_kernel+0x45c/0x488 -> #1 (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}: __lock_acquire+0x3b4/0x6e0 lock_acquire+0xf4/0x2a8 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x58/0x70 try_to_wake_up+0x48/0x600 wake_up_process+0x28/0x34 __up.isra.0+0x60/0x6c up+0x60/0x68 __up_console_sem+0x4c/0x7c console_unlock+0x328/0x634 vprintk_emit+0x25c/0x390 dev_vprintk_emit+0xc4/0x1fc dev_printk_emit+0x88/0xa8 __dev_printk+0x58/0x9c _dev_info+0x84/0xa8 usb_new_device+0x100/0x474 hub_port_connect+0x280/0x92c hub_event+0x740/0xa84 process_one_work+0x240/0x70c worker_thread+0x60/0x400 kthread+0x110/0x13c ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18 -> #0 ((console_sem).lock){-...}: validate_chain.isra.34+0x6e4/0xa20 __lock_acquire+0x3b4/0x6e0 lock_acquire+0xf4/0x2a8 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x58/0x70 down_trylock+0x20/0x4c __down_trylock_console_sem+0x3c/0x9c console_trylock+0x20/0xb0 vprintk_emit+0x254/0x390 vprintk_default+0x58/0x90 vprintk_func+0xbc/0x164 printk+0x80/0xa0 __dynamic_pr_debug+0x84/0xac gic_raise_softirq+0x184/0x18c smp_cross_call+0xac/0x218 smp_send_reschedule+0x3c/0x48 resched_curr+0x60/0x9c check_preempt_curr+0x70/0xdc wake_up_new_task+0x310/0x470 _do_fork+0x188/0x78c SyS_clone+0x44/0x50 __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4 other info that might help us debug this: Chain exists of: (console_sem).lock --> &p->pi_lock --> &rq->lock Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&rq->lock); lock(&p->pi_lock); lock(&rq->lock); lock((console_sem).lock); *** DEADLOCK *** 2 locks held by dynamic_debug01/1873: #0: (&p->pi_lock){-.-.}, at: [<000000001366df53>] wake_up_new_task+0x40/0x470 #1: (&rq->lock){-.-.}, at: [<00000000842e1587>] __task_rq_lock+0x54/0xdc stack backtrace: CPU: 10 PID: 1873 Comm: dynamic_debug01 Tainted: G W 4.15.0+ #1 Hardware name: GIGABYTE R120-T34-00/MT30-GS2-00, BIOS T48 10/02/2017 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x0/0x188 show_stack+0x24/0x2c dump_stack+0xa4/0xe0 print_circular_bug.isra.31+0x29c/0x2b8 check_prev_add.constprop.39+0x6c8/0x6dc validate_chain.isra.34+0x6e4/0xa20 __lock_acquire+0x3b4/0x6e0 lock_acquire+0xf4/0x2a8 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x58/0x70 down_trylock+0x20/0x4c __down_trylock_console_sem+0x3c/0x9c console_trylock+0x20/0xb0 vprintk_emit+0x254/0x390 vprintk_default+0x58/0x90 vprintk_func+0xbc/0x164 printk+0x80/0xa0 __dynamic_pr_debug+0x84/0xac gic_raise_softirq+0x184/0x18c smp_cross_call+0xac/0x218 smp_send_reschedule+0x3c/0x48 resched_curr+0x60/0x9c check_preempt_curr+0x70/0xdc wake_up_new_task+0x310/0x470 _do_fork+0x188/0x78c SyS_clone+0x44/0x50 __sys_trace_return+0x0/0x4 GICv3: CPU0: ICC_SGI1R_EL1 12000 This could be fixed with printk_deferred() but that might lessen its usefulness for debugging. So change it to pr_devel to keep it out of production kernels. Developers working on gic-v3 can enable it as needed in their kernels. Signed-off-by: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3de59bb ] In handle_write_finished(), if r1_bio->bios[m] != NULL, it thinks the corresponding conf->mirrors[m].rdev is also not NULL. But, it is not always true. Even if some io hold replacement rdev(i.e. rdev->nr_pending.count > 0), raid1_remove_disk() can also set the rdev as NULL. That means, bios[m] != NULL, but mirrors[m].rdev is NULL, resulting in NULL pointer dereference in handle_write_finished and sync_request_write. This patch can fix BUGs as follows: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000140 IP: [<ffffffff815bbbbd>] raid1d+0x2bd/0xfc0 PGD 12ab52067 PUD 12f587067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP CPU: 1 PID: 2008 Comm: md3_raid1 Not tainted 4.1.44+ #130 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1.fc26 04/01/2014 Call Trace: ? schedule+0x37/0x90 ? prepare_to_wait_event+0x83/0xf0 md_thread+0x144/0x150 ? wake_atomic_t_function+0x70/0x70 ? md_start_sync+0xf0/0xf0 kthread+0xd8/0xf0 ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160 ret_from_fork+0x42/0x70 ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160 BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000b8 IP: sync_request_write+0x9e/0x980 PGD 800000007c518067 P4D 800000007c518067 PUD 8002b067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 24 PID: 2549 Comm: md3_raid1 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #118 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1.fc26 04/01/2014 Call Trace: ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 ? sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0xb0 ? flush_pending_writes+0x3a/0xd0 ? pick_next_task_fair+0x4d5/0x5f0 ? __switch_to+0xa2/0x430 raid1d+0x65a/0x870 ? find_pers+0x70/0x70 ? find_pers+0x70/0x70 ? md_thread+0x11c/0x160 md_thread+0x11c/0x160 ? finish_wait+0x80/0x80 kthread+0x111/0x130 ? kthread_create_worker_on_cpu+0x70/0x70 ? do_syscall_64+0x6f/0x190 ? SyS_exit_group+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 Reviewed-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Yufen Yu <yuyufen@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <sh.li@alibaba-inc.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The commit in Fixes started adding INT3 after RETs as a mitigation against straight-line speculation. The fastop SETcc implementation in kvm's insn emulator uses macro magic to generate all possible SETcc functions and to jump to them when emulating the respective instruction. However, it hardcodes the size and alignment of those functions to 4: a three-byte SETcc insn and a single-byte RET. BUT, with SLS, there's an INT3 that gets slapped after the RET, which brings the whole scheme out of alignment: 15: 0f 90 c0 seto %al 18: c3 ret 19: cc int3 1a: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax) 1d: 0f 91 c0 setno %al 20: c3 ret 21: cc int3 22: 0f 1f 00 nopl (%rax) 25: 0f 92 c0 setb %al 28: c3 ret 29: cc int3 and this explodes like this: int3: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 2435 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8-sls #1 Hardware name: Dell Inc. Precision WorkStation T3400 /0TP412, BIOS A14 04/30/2012 RIP: 0010:setc+0x5/0x8 [kvm] Code: 00 00 0f 1f 00 0f b6 05 43 24 06 00 c3 cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 90 c0 c3 cc 0f \ 1f 00 0f 91 c0 c3 cc 0f 1f 00 0f 92 c0 c3 cc <0f> 1f 00 0f 93 c0 c3 cc 0f 1f 00 \ 0f 94 c0 c3 cc 0f 1f 00 0f 95 c0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? x86_emulate_insn [kvm] ? x86_emulate_instruction [kvm] ? vmx_handle_exit [kvm_intel] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run [kvm] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl [kvm] ? __x64_sys_ioctl ? do_syscall_64 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe </TASK> Raise the alignment value when SLS is enabled and use a macro for that instead of hard-coding naked numbers. Fixes: e463a09 ("x86: Add straight-line-speculation mitigation") Reported-by: Jamie Heilman <jamie@audible.transient.net> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Tested-by: Jamie Heilman <jamie@audible.transient.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/YjGzJwjrvxg5YZ0Z@audible.transient.net [Add a comment and a bit of safety checking, since this is going to be changed again for IBT support. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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If the system is restarted via kexec(), the peripherals do not start with a known state. If the previous system had enabled an IRQs we will receive unexected IRQs that can lock the system. [ 28.109251] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 26s! [swapper/0:0] [ 28.109263] Modules linked in: [ 28.109273] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.15.79-14458-g4b9edf7b1ac6 #1 9f2e76613148af94acccd64c609a552fb4b4354b [ 28.109284] Hardware name: Google Elm (DT) [ 28.109290] pstate: 40400005 (nZcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 28.109298] pc : __do_softirq+0xa0/0x388 [ 28.109309] lr : __do_softirq+0x70/0x388 [ 28.109316] sp : ffffffc008003ee0 [ 28.109321] x29: ffffffc008003f00 x28: 000000000000000a x27: 0000000000000080 [ 28.109334] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: ffffffefa7b350c0 x24: ffffffefa7b47480 [ 28.109346] x23: ffffffefa7b3d000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffffffefa7b0fa40 [ 28.109358] x20: ffffffefa7b005b0 x19: ffffffefa7b47480 x18: 0000000000065b6b [ 28.109370] x17: ffffffefa749c8b0 x16: 000000000000018c x15: 00000000000001b8 [ 28.109382] x14: 00000000000d3b6b x13: 0000000000000006 x12: 0000000000057e91 [ 28.109394] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffffefa7b47480 [ 28.109406] x8 : 00000000000000e0 x7 : 000000000f424000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 28.109418] x5 : ffffffefa7dfaca0 x4 : ffffffefa7dfadf0 x3 : 000000000000000f [ 28.109429] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000100 x0 : 0000000001ac65c5 [ 28.109441] Call trace: [ 28.109447] __do_softirq+0xa0/0x388 [ 28.109454] irq_exit+0xc0/0xe0 [ 28.109464] handle_domain_irq+0x68/0x90 [ 28.109473] gic_handle_irq+0xac/0xf0 [ 28.109480] call_on_irq_stack+0x28/0x50 [ 28.109488] do_interrupt_handler+0x44/0x58 [ 28.109496] el1_interrupt+0x30/0x58 [ 28.109506] el1h_64_irq_handler+0x18/0x24 [ 28.109512] el1h_64_irq+0x7c/0x80 [ 28.109519] arch_local_irq_enable+0xc/0x18 [ 28.109529] default_idle_call+0x40/0x140 [ 28.109539] do_idle+0x108/0x290 [ 28.109547] cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x30 [ 28.109554] rest_init+0xe8/0xf8 [ 28.109562] arch_call_rest_init+0x18/0x24 [ 28.109571] start_kernel+0x338/0x42c [ 28.109578] __primary_switched+0xbc/0xc4 [ 28.109588] Kernel panic - not syncing: softlockup: hung tasks Signed-off-by: Ricardo Ribalda <ribalda@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221122-mtk-pinctrl-v1-1-bedf5655a3d2@chromium.org Reviewed-by: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <angelogioacchino.delregno@collabora.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias Brugger <matthias.bgg@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
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Currently, in clang version of gcov code when module is getting removed gcov_info_add() incorrectly adds the sfn_ptr->counter to all the dst->functions and it result in the kernel panic in below crash report. Fix this by properly handling it. [ 8.899094][ T599] Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffffff80461cc000 [ 8.899100][ T599] Mem abort info: [ 8.899102][ T599] ESR = 0x9600004f [ 8.899103][ T599] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 8.899105][ T599] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 8.899107][ T599] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 8.899108][ T599] FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault [ 8.899110][ T599] Data abort info: [ 8.899111][ T599] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x0000004f [ 8.899113][ T599] CM = 0, WnR = 1 [ 8.899114][ T599] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 39-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000ab8de000 [ 8.899116][ T599] [ffffff80461cc000] pgd=18000009ffcde003, p4d=18000009ffcde003, pud=18000009ffcde003, pmd=18000009ffcad003, pte=00600000c61cc787 [ 8.899124][ T599] Internal error: Oops: 9600004f [#1] PREEMPT SMP [ 8.899265][ T599] Skip md ftrace buffer dump for: 0x1609e0 .... .., [ 8.899544][ T599] CPU: 7 PID: 599 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G S OE 5.15.41-android13-8-g38e9b1af6bce #1 [ 8.899547][ T599] Hardware name: XXX (DT) [ 8.899549][ T599] pstate: 82400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO +TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 8.899551][ T599] pc : gcov_info_add+0x9c/0xb8 [ 8.899557][ T599] lr : gcov_event+0x28c/0x6b8 [ 8.899559][ T599] sp : ffffffc00e733b00 [ 8.899560][ T599] x29: ffffffc00e733b00 x28: ffffffc00e733d30 x27: ffffffe8dc297470 [ 8.899563][ T599] x26: ffffffe8dc297000 x25: ffffffe8dc297000 x24: ffffffe8dc297000 [ 8.899566][ T599] x23: ffffffe8dc0a6200 x22: ffffff880f68bf20 x21: 0000000000000000 [ 8.899569][ T599] x20: ffffff880f68bf00 x19: ffffff8801babc00 x18: ffffffc00d7f9058 [ 8.899572][ T599] x17: 0000000000088793 x16: ffffff80461cbe00 x15: 9100052952800785 [ 8.899575][ T599] x14: 0000000000000200 x13: 0000000000000041 x12: 9100052952800785 [ 8.899577][ T599] x11: ffffffe8dc297000 x10: ffffffe8dc297000 x9 : ffffff80461cbc80 [ 8.899580][ T599] x8 : ffffff8801babe80 x7 : ffffffe8dc2ec000 x6 : ffffffe8dc2ed000 [ 8.899583][ T599] x5 : 000000008020001f x4 : fffffffe2006eae0 x3 : 000000008020001f [ 8.899586][ T599] x2 : ffffff8027c49200 x1 : ffffff8801babc20 x0 : ffffff80461cb3a0 [ 8.899589][ T599] Call trace: [ 8.899590][ T599] gcov_info_add+0x9c/0xb8 [ 8.899592][ T599] gcov_module_notifier+0xbc/0x120 [ 8.899595][ T599] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0xa0/0x11c [ 8.899598][ T599] do_init_module+0x2a8/0x33c [ 8.899600][ T599] load_module+0x23cc/0x261c [ 8.899602][ T599] __arm64_sys_finit_module+0x158/0x194 [ 8.899604][ T599] invoke_syscall+0x94/0x2bc [ 8.899607][ T599] el0_svc_common+0x1d8/0x34c [ 8.899609][ T599] do_el0_svc+0x40/0x54 [ 8.899611][ T599] el0_svc+0x94/0x2f0 [ 8.899613][ T599] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x88/0xec [ 8.899615][ T599] el0t_64_sync+0x1b4/0x1b8 [ 8.899618][ T599] Code: f905f56c f86e69ec f86e6a0f 8b0c01ec (f82e6a0c) [ 8.899620][ T599] ---[ end trace ed5218e9e5b6e2e6 ]--- Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1668020497-13142-1-git-send-email-quic_mojha@quicinc.com Fixes: e178a5b ("gcov: clang support") Signed-off-by: Mukesh Ojha <quic_mojha@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Peter Oberparleiter <oberpar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.2+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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When logging an inode in full mode, or when logging xattrs or when logging
the dir index items of a directory, we are modifying the log tree while
holding a read lock on a leaf from the fs/subvolume tree. This can lead to
a deadlock in rare circumstances, but it is a real possibility, and it was
recently reported by syzbot with the following trace from lockdep:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.1.0-rc5-next-20221116-syzkaller #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.1/16154 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88807e3084a0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0xa1/0xf30 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256
but task is already holding lock:
ffff88807df33078 (btrfs-log-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x32/0x3d0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:197
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (btrfs-log-00){++++}-{3:3}:
down_read_nested+0x9e/0x450 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1634
__btrfs_tree_read_lock+0x32/0x350 fs/btrfs/locking.c:135
btrfs_tree_read_lock fs/btrfs/locking.c:141 [inline]
btrfs_read_lock_root_node+0x82/0x3a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:280
btrfs_search_slot_get_root fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1678 [inline]
btrfs_search_slot+0x3ca/0x2c70 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1998
btrfs_lookup_csum+0x116/0x3f0 fs/btrfs/file-item.c:209
btrfs_csum_file_blocks+0x40e/0x1370 fs/btrfs/file-item.c:1021
log_csums.isra.0+0x244/0x2d0 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4258
copy_items.isra.0+0xbfb/0xed0 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4403
copy_inode_items_to_log+0x13d6/0x1d90 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:5873
btrfs_log_inode+0xb19/0x4680 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6495
btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x890/0x2a20 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6982
btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x59/0x80 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7083
btrfs_sync_file+0xa41/0x13c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1921
vfs_fsync_range+0x13e/0x230 fs/sync.c:188
generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2856 [inline]
iomap_dio_complete+0x73a/0x920 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:128
btrfs_direct_write fs/btrfs/file.c:1536 [inline]
btrfs_do_write_iter+0xba2/0x1470 fs/btrfs/file.c:1668
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2160 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x20b/0x3b0 fs/read_write.c:735
do_iter_write+0x182/0x700 fs/read_write.c:861
vfs_iter_write+0x74/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902
iter_file_splice_write+0x745/0xc90 fs/splice.c:686
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:764 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0x114/0x180 fs/splice.c:931
splice_direct_to_actor+0x335/0x8a0 fs/splice.c:886
do_splice_direct+0x1ab/0x280 fs/splice.c:974
do_sendfile+0xb19/0x1270 fs/read_write.c:1255
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x259/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:1309
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
-> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}:
__lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5382 [inline]
lock_release+0x371/0x810 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5688
up_write+0x2a/0x520 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1614
btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline]
btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x1e3/0x290 fs/btrfs/locking.c:238
search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1832 [inline]
btrfs_search_slot+0x265e/0x2c70 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2074
btrfs_insert_empty_items+0xbd/0x1c0 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4133
btrfs_insert_delayed_item+0x826/0xfa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746
btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline]
__btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111 [inline]
__btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x280/0x590 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153
flush_space+0x147/0xe90 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:728
btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x541/0xc10 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1086
process_one_work+0x9bf/0x1710 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x669/0x1090 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x2e8/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308
-> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3097 [inline]
check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3216 [inline]
validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3831 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x2a43/0x56d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5055
lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5668 [inline]
lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x630 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5633
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:603 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0x12f/0x1360 kernel/locking/mutex.c:747
__btrfs_release_delayed_node.part.0+0xa1/0xf30 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256
__btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:251 [inline]
btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline]
btrfs_remove_delayed_node+0x52/0x60 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1285
btrfs_evict_inode+0x511/0xf30 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5554
evict+0x2ed/0x6b0 fs/inode.c:664
dispose_list+0x117/0x1e0 fs/inode.c:697
prune_icache_sb+0xeb/0x150 fs/inode.c:896
super_cache_scan+0x391/0x590 fs/super.c:106
do_shrink_slab+0x464/0xce0 mm/vmscan.c:843
shrink_slab_memcg mm/vmscan.c:912 [inline]
shrink_slab+0x388/0x660 mm/vmscan.c:991
shrink_node_memcgs mm/vmscan.c:6088 [inline]
shrink_node+0x93d/0x1f30 mm/vmscan.c:6117
shrink_zones mm/vmscan.c:6355 [inline]
do_try_to_free_pages+0x3b4/0x17a0 mm/vmscan.c:6417
try_to_free_mem_cgroup_pages+0x3a4/0xa70 mm/vmscan.c:6732
reclaim_high.constprop.0+0x182/0x230 mm/memcontrol.c:2393
mem_cgroup_handle_over_high+0x190/0x520 mm/memcontrol.c:2578
try_charge_memcg+0xe0c/0x12f0 mm/memcontrol.c:2816
try_charge mm/memcontrol.c:2827 [inline]
charge_memcg+0x90/0x3b0 mm/memcontrol.c:6889
__mem_cgroup_charge+0x2b/0x90 mm/memcontrol.c:6910
mem_cgroup_charge include/linux/memcontrol.h:667 [inline]
__filemap_add_folio+0x615/0xf80 mm/filemap.c:852
filemap_add_folio+0xaf/0x1e0 mm/filemap.c:934
__filemap_get_folio+0x389/0xd80 mm/filemap.c:1976
pagecache_get_page+0x2e/0x280 mm/folio-compat.c:104
find_or_create_page include/linux/pagemap.h:612 [inline]
alloc_extent_buffer+0x2b9/0x1580 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:4588
btrfs_init_new_buffer fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4869 [inline]
btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x2e1/0x1320 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:4988
__btrfs_cow_block+0x3b2/0x1420 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:440
btrfs_cow_block+0x2fa/0x950 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:595
btrfs_search_slot+0x11b0/0x2c70 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2038
btrfs_update_root+0xdb/0x630 fs/btrfs/root-tree.c:137
update_log_root fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:2841 [inline]
btrfs_sync_log+0xbfb/0x2870 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:3064
btrfs_sync_file+0xdb9/0x13c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1947
vfs_fsync_range+0x13e/0x230 fs/sync.c:188
generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2856 [inline]
iomap_dio_complete+0x73a/0x920 fs/iomap/direct-io.c:128
btrfs_direct_write fs/btrfs/file.c:1536 [inline]
btrfs_do_write_iter+0xba2/0x1470 fs/btrfs/file.c:1668
call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2160 [inline]
do_iter_readv_writev+0x20b/0x3b0 fs/read_write.c:735
do_iter_write+0x182/0x700 fs/read_write.c:861
vfs_iter_write+0x74/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902
iter_file_splice_write+0x745/0xc90 fs/splice.c:686
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:764 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0x114/0x180 fs/splice.c:931
splice_direct_to_actor+0x335/0x8a0 fs/splice.c:886
do_splice_direct+0x1ab/0x280 fs/splice.c:974
do_sendfile+0xb19/0x1270 fs/read_write.c:1255
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x259/0x2c0 fs/read_write.c:1309
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of:
&delayed_node->mutex --> btrfs-tree-00 --> btrfs-log-00
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(btrfs-log-00);
lock(btrfs-tree-00);
lock(btrfs-log-00);
lock(&delayed_node->mutex);
Holding a read lock on a leaf from a fs/subvolume tree creates a nasty
lock dependency when we are COWing extent buffers for the log tree and we
have two tasks modifying the log tree, with each one in one of the
following 2 scenarios:
1) Modifying the log tree triggers an extent buffer allocation while
holding a write lock on a parent extent buffer from the log tree.
Allocating the pages for an extent buffer, or the extent buffer
struct, can trigger inode eviction and finally the inode eviction
will trigger a release/remove of a delayed node, which requires
taking the delayed node's mutex;
2) Allocating a metadata extent for a log tree can trigger the async
reclaim thread and make us wait for it to release enough space and
unblock our reservation ticket. The reclaim thread can start flushing
delayed items, and that in turn results in the need to lock delayed
node mutexes and in the need to write lock extent buffers of a
subvolume tree - all this while holding a write lock on the parent
extent buffer in the log tree.
So one task in scenario 1) running in parallel with another task in
scenario 2) could lead to a deadlock, one wanting to lock a delayed node
mutex while having a read lock on a leaf from the subvolume, while the
other is holding the delayed node's mutex and wants to write lock the same
subvolume leaf for flushing delayed items.
Fix this by cloning the leaf of the fs/subvolume tree, release/unlock the
fs/subvolume leaf and use the clone leaf instead.
Reported-by: syzbot+9b7c21f486f5e7f8d029@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000ccc93c05edc4d8cf@google.com/
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.0+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
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make_mmu_pages_available() must be called with mmu_lock held for write. However, if the TDP MMU is used, it will be called with mmu_lock held for read. This function does nothing unless shadow pages are used, so there is no race unless nested TDP is used. Since nested TDP uses shadow pages, old shadow pages may be zapped by this function even when the TDP MMU is enabled. Since shadow pages are never allocated by kvm_tdp_mmu_map(), a race condition can be avoided by not calling make_mmu_pages_available() if the TDP MMU is currently in use. I encountered this when repeatedly starting and stopping nested VM. It can be artificially caused by allocating a large number of nested TDP SPTEs. For example, the following BUG and general protection fault are caused in the host kernel. pte_list_remove: 00000000cd54fc10 many->many ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:963! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:pte_list_remove.cold+0x16/0x48 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> drop_spte+0xe0/0x180 [kvm] mmu_page_zap_pte+0x4f/0x140 [kvm] __kvm_mmu_prepare_zap_page+0x62/0x3e0 [kvm] kvm_mmu_zap_oldest_mmu_pages+0x7d/0xf0 [kvm] direct_page_fault+0x3cb/0x9b0 [kvm] kvm_tdp_page_fault+0x2c/0xa0 [kvm] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x207/0x930 [kvm] npf_interception+0x47/0xb0 [kvm_amd] svm_invoke_exit_handler+0x13c/0x1a0 [kvm_amd] svm_handle_exit+0xfc/0x2c0 [kvm_amd] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xa79/0x1780 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x29b/0x6f0 [kvm] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x95/0xd0 do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x90 general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdead000000000122: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI RIP: 0010:kvm_mmu_commit_zap_page.part.0+0x4b/0xe0 [kvm] Call Trace: <TASK> kvm_mmu_zap_oldest_mmu_pages+0xae/0xf0 [kvm] direct_page_fault+0x3cb/0x9b0 [kvm] kvm_tdp_page_fault+0x2c/0xa0 [kvm] kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x207/0x930 [kvm] npf_interception+0x47/0xb0 [kvm_amd] CVE: CVE-2022-45869 Fixes: a2855af ("KVM: x86/mmu: Allow parallel page faults for the TDP MMU") Signed-off-by: Kazuki Takiguchi <takiguchi.kazuki171@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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test_bpf tail call tests end up as: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 85 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 111 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 145 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 170 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 190 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 BUG: Unable to handle kernel data access on write at 0xf1b4e000 Faulting instruction address: 0xbe86b710 Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] BE PAGE_SIZE=4K MMU=Hash PowerMac Modules linked in: test_bpf(+) CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #195 Hardware name: PowerMac3,1 750CL 0x87210 PowerMac NIP: be86b710 LR: be857e88 CTR: be86b704 REGS: f1b4df20 TRAP: 0300 Not tainted (6.1.0-rc4+) MSR: 00009032 <EE,ME,IR,DR,RI> CR: 28008242 XER: 00000000 DAR: f1b4e000 DSISR: 42000000 GPR00: 00000001 f1b4dfe0 c11d2280 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000002 00000000 GPR08: f1b4e000 be86b704 f1b4e000 00000000 00000000 100d816a f2440000 fe73baa8 GPR16: f2458000 00000000 c1941ae4 f1fe2248 00000045 c0de0000 f2458030 00000000 GPR24: 000003e8 0000000f f2458000 f1b4dc90 3e584b46 00000000 f24466a0 c1941a00 NIP [be86b710] 0xbe86b710 LR [be857e88] __run_one+0xec/0x264 [test_bpf] Call Trace: [f1b4dfe0] [00000002] 0x2 (unreliable) Instruction dump: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This is a tentative to write above the stack. The problem is encoutered with tests added by commit 38608ee ("bpf, tests: Add load store test case for tail call") This happens because tail call is done to a BPF prog with a different stack_depth. At the time being, the stack is kept as is when the caller tail calls its callee. But at exit, the callee restores the stack based on its own properties. Therefore here, at each run, r1 is erroneously increased by 32 - 16 = 16 bytes. This was done that way in order to pass the tail call count from caller to callee through the stack. As powerpc32 doesn't have a red zone in the stack, it was necessary the maintain the stack as is for the tail call. But it was not anticipated that the BPF frame size could be different. Let's take a new approach. Use register r4 to carry the tail call count during the tail call, and save it into the stack at function entry if required. This means the input parameter must be in r3, which is more correct as it is a 32 bits parameter, then tail call better match with normal BPF function entry, the down side being that we move that input parameter back and forth between r3 and r4. That can be optimised later. Doing that also has the advantage of maximising the common parts between tail calls and a normal function exit. With the fix, tail call tests are now successfull: test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 53 PASS test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 115 PASS test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 154 PASS test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 165 PASS test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 101 PASS test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 141 PASS test_bpf: #6 Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 994 PASS test_bpf: #7 Tail call count preserved across function calls jited:1 140975 PASS test_bpf: #8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 110 PASS test_bpf: #9 Tail call error path, index out of range jited:1 69 PASS test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 10 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [10/10 JIT'ed] Suggested-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Fixes: 51c66ad ("powerpc/bpf: Implement extended BPF on PPC32") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu> Tested-by: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/757acccb7fbfc78efa42dcf3c974b46678198905.1669278887.git.christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu
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There is an interesting reference bug when -ENOMEM occurs in calling of io_install_fixed_file(). KASan report like below: [ 14.057131] ================================================================== [ 14.059161] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90 [ 14.060975] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800b09cf20 by task kworker/u8:2/45 [ 14.062684] [ 14.062768] CPU: 2 PID: 45 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4 #1 [ 14.063099] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 14.063666] Workqueue: events_unbound io_ring_exit_work [ 14.063936] Call Trace: [ 14.064065] <TASK> [ 14.064175] dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x48 [ 14.064360] print_report+0x172/0x475 [ 14.064547] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x83/0xe0 [ 14.064758] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xef/0x170 [ 14.064975] ? unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90 [ 14.065167] kasan_report+0xad/0x130 [ 14.065353] ? unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90 [ 14.065553] unix_get_socket+0x10/0x90 [ 14.065744] __io_sqe_files_unregister+0x87/0x1e0 [ 14.065989] ? io_rsrc_refs_drop+0x1c/0xd0 [ 14.066199] io_ring_exit_work+0x388/0x6a5 [ 14.066410] ? io_uring_try_cancel_requests+0x5bf/0x5bf [ 14.066674] ? try_to_wake_up+0xdb/0x910 [ 14.066873] ? virt_to_head_page+0xbe/0xbe [ 14.067080] ? __schedule+0x574/0xd20 [ 14.067273] ? read_word_at_a_time+0xe/0x20 [ 14.067492] ? strscpy+0xb5/0x190 [ 14.067665] process_one_work+0x423/0x710 [ 14.067879] worker_thread+0x2a2/0x6f0 [ 14.068073] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710 [ 14.068284] kthread+0x163/0x1a0 [ 14.068454] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x20/0x20 [ 14.068697] ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 [ 14.068886] </TASK> [ 14.069000] [ 14.069088] Allocated by task 289: [ 14.069269] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 14.069463] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 14.069652] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x58/0x70 [ 14.069899] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc5/0x200 [ 14.070100] __alloc_file+0x20/0x160 [ 14.070283] alloc_empty_file+0x3b/0xc0 [ 14.070479] path_openat+0xc3/0x1770 [ 14.070689] do_filp_open+0x150/0x270 [ 14.070888] do_sys_openat2+0x113/0x270 [ 14.071081] __x64_sys_openat+0xc8/0x140 [ 14.071283] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 14.071466] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 14.071791] [ 14.071874] Freed by task 0: [ 14.072027] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 14.072224] kasan_set_track+0x21/0x30 [ 14.072415] kasan_save_free_info+0x2a/0x50 [ 14.072627] __kasan_slab_free+0x106/0x190 [ 14.072858] kmem_cache_free+0x98/0x340 [ 14.073075] rcu_core+0x427/0xe50 [ 14.073249] __do_softirq+0x110/0x3cd [ 14.073440] [ 14.073523] Last potentially related work creation: [ 14.073801] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 14.074017] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0 [ 14.074264] call_rcu+0x41/0x550 [ 14.074436] task_work_run+0xf4/0x170 [ 14.074619] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x113/0x120 [ 14.074858] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x40 [ 14.075092] do_syscall_64+0x48/0x90 [ 14.075272] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 14.075529] [ 14.075612] Second to last potentially related work creation: [ 14.075900] kasan_save_stack+0x1e/0x40 [ 14.076098] __kasan_record_aux_stack+0x97/0xb0 [ 14.076325] task_work_add+0x72/0x1b0 [ 14.076512] fput+0x65/0xc0 [ 14.076657] filp_close+0x8e/0xa0 [ 14.076825] __x64_sys_close+0x15/0x50 [ 14.077019] do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 [ 14.077199] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd [ 14.077448] [ 14.077530] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800b09cf00 [ 14.077530] which belongs to the cache filp of size 232 [ 14.078105] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of [ 14.078105] 232-byte region [ffff88800b09cf00, ffff88800b09cfe8) [ 14.078685] [ 14.078771] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 14.079046] page:000000001bd520e7 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88800b09de00 pfn:0xb09c [ 14.079575] head:000000001bd520e7 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 [ 14.079946] flags: 0x100000000010200(slab|head|node=0|zone=1) [ 14.080244] raw: 0100000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000001 ffff88800493cc80 [ 14.080629] raw: ffff88800b09de00 0000000080190018 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 14.081016] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 14.081293] [ 14.081376] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 14.081618] ffff88800b09ce00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 14.081974] ffff88800b09ce80: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 14.082336] >ffff88800b09cf00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 14.082690] ^ [ 14.082909] ffff88800b09cf80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc [ 14.083266] ffff88800b09d000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 14.083622] ================================================================== The actual tracing of this bug is shown below: commit 8c71fe7 ("io_uring: ensure fput() called correspondingly when direct install fails") adds an additional fput() in io_fixed_fd_install() when io_file_bitmap_get() returns error values. In that case, the routine will never make it to io_install_fixed_file() due to an early return. static int io_fixed_fd_install(...) { if (alloc_slot) { ... ret = io_file_bitmap_get(ctx); if (unlikely(ret < 0)) { io_ring_submit_unlock(ctx, issue_flags); fput(file); return ret; } ... } ... ret = io_install_fixed_file(req, file, issue_flags, file_slot); ... } In the above scenario, the reference is okay as io_fixed_fd_install() ensures the fput() is called when something bad happens, either via bitmap or via inner io_install_fixed_file(). However, the commit 61c1b44 ("io_uring: fix deadlock on iowq file slot alloc") breaks the balance because it places fput() into the common path for both io_file_bitmap_get() and io_install_fixed_file(). Since io_install_fixed_file() handles the fput() itself, the reference underflow come across then. There are some extra commits make the current code into io_fixed_fd_install() -> __io_fixed_fd_install() -> io_install_fixed_file() However, the fact that there is an extra fput() is called if io_install_fixed_file() calls fput(). Traversing through the code, I find that the existing two callers to __io_fixed_fd_install(): io_fixed_fd_install() and io_msg_send_fd() have fput() when handling error return, this patch simply removes the fput() in io_install_fixed_file() to fix the bug. Fixes: 61c1b44 ("io_uring: fix deadlock on iowq file slot alloc") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/be4ba4b.5d44.184a0a406a4.Coremail.linma@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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There is an interesting race condition of poll_refs which could result in a NULL pointer dereference. The crash trace is like: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 PID: 30781 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.0.0-g493ffd6605b2 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:io_poll_remove_entry io_uring/poll.c:154 [inline] RIP: 0010:io_poll_remove_entries+0x171/0x5b4 io_uring/poll.c:190 Code: ... RSP: 0018:ffff88810dfefba0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000040000 RDX: ffffc900030c4000 RSI: 000000000003ffff RDI: 0000000000040000 RBP: 0000000000000008 R08: ffffffff9764d3dd R09: fffffbfff3836781 R10: fffffbfff3836781 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff11003422d60 R13: ffff88801a116b04 R14: ffff88801a116ac0 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f9c07497700(0000) GS:ffff88811a600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffb5c00ea98 CR3: 0000000105680005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> io_apoll_task_func+0x3f/0xa0 io_uring/poll.c:299 handle_tw_list io_uring/io_uring.c:1037 [inline] tctx_task_work+0x37e/0x4f0 io_uring/io_uring.c:1090 task_work_run+0x13a/0x1b0 kernel/task_work.c:177 get_signal+0x2402/0x25a0 kernel/signal.c:2635 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x3b/0x660 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:869 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:166 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xc2/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:201 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:283 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x58/0x160 kernel/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd The root cause for this is a tiny overlooking in io_poll_check_events() when cocurrently run with poll cancel routine io_poll_cancel_req(). The interleaving to trigger use-after-free: CPU0 | CPU1 | io_apoll_task_func() | io_poll_cancel_req() io_poll_check_events() | // do while first loop | v = atomic_read(...) | // v = poll_refs = 1 | ... | io_poll_mark_cancelled() | atomic_or() | // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1 | atomic_sub_return(...) | // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | // loop continue | | | io_poll_execute() | io_poll_get_ownership() | // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1 | // gets the ownership v = atomic_read(...) | // poll_refs not change | | if (v & IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG) | return -ECANCELED; | // io_poll_check_events return | // will go into | // io_req_complete_failed() free req | | | io_apoll_task_func() | // also go into io_req_complete_failed() And the interleaving to trigger the kernel WARNING: CPU0 | CPU1 | io_apoll_task_func() | io_poll_cancel_req() io_poll_check_events() | // do while first loop | v = atomic_read(...) | // v = poll_refs = 1 | ... | io_poll_mark_cancelled() | atomic_or() | // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1 | atomic_sub_return(...) | // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | // loop continue | | v = atomic_read(...) | // v = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | | io_poll_execute() | io_poll_get_ownership() | // poll_refs = IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG | 1 | // gets the ownership | WARN_ON_ONCE(!(v & IO_POLL_REF_MASK))) | // v & IO_POLL_REF_MASK = 0 WARN | | | io_apoll_task_func() | // also go into io_req_complete_failed() By looking up the source code and communicating with Pavel, the implementation of this atomic poll refs should continue the loop of io_poll_check_events() just to avoid somewhere else to grab the ownership. Therefore, this patch simply adds another AND operation to make sure the loop will stop if it finds the poll_refs is exactly equal to IO_POLL_CANCEL_FLAG. Since io_poll_cancel_req() grabs ownership and will finally make its way to io_req_complete_failed(), the req will be reclaimed as expected. Fixes: aa43477 ("io_uring: poll rework") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com> [axboe: tweak description and code style] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
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I got a null-ptr-deref report as following when doing fault injection test: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 PID: 253 Comm: 507-spi-dm9051 Tainted: G B N 6.1.0-rc3+ Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:klist_put+0x2d/0xd0 Call Trace: <TASK> klist_remove+0xf1/0x1c0 device_release_driver_internal+0x23e/0x2d0 bus_remove_device+0x1bd/0x240 device_del+0x357/0x770 phy_device_remove+0x11/0x30 mdiobus_unregister+0xa5/0x140 release_nodes+0x6a/0xa0 devres_release_all+0xf8/0x150 device_unbind_cleanup+0x19/0xd0 //probe path: phy_device_register() device_add() phy_connect phy_attach_direct() //set device driver probe() //it's failed, driver is not bound device_bind_driver() // probe failed, it's not called //remove path: phy_device_remove() device_del() device_release_driver_internal() __device_release_driver() //dev->drv is not NULL klist_remove() <- knode_driver is not added yet, cause null-ptr-deref In phy_attach_direct(), after setting the 'dev->driver', probe() fails, device_bind_driver() is not called, so the knode_driver->n_klist is not set, then it causes null-ptr-deref in __device_release_driver() while deleting device. Fix this by setting dev->driver to NULL in the error path in phy_attach_direct(). Fixes: e139345 ("[PATCH] PHY Layer fixup") Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Matt reported a splat at msk close time:
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/mptcp/protocol.c:2877
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 155, name: packetdrill
preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
4 locks held by packetdrill/155:
#0: ffff888001536990 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#6){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __sock_release (net/socket.c:650)
#1: ffff88800b498130 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2973)
#2: ffff88800b49a130 (sk_lock-AF_INET/1){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __mptcp_close_ssk (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2363)
#3: ffff88800b49a0b0 (slock-AF_INET){+...}-{2:2}, at: __lock_sock_fast (include/net/sock.h:1820)
Preemption disabled at:
0x0
CPU: 1 PID: 155 Comm: packetdrill Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5 #365
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107 (discriminator 4))
__might_resched.cold (kernel/sched/core.c:9891)
__mptcp_destroy_sock (include/linux/kernel.h:110)
__mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2959)
mptcp_subflow_queue_clean (include/net/sock.h:1777)
__mptcp_close_ssk (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2363)
mptcp_destroy_common (net/mptcp/protocol.c:3170)
mptcp_destroy (include/net/sock.h:1495)
__mptcp_destroy_sock (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2886)
__mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2959)
mptcp_close (net/mptcp/protocol.c:2974)
inet_release (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:432)
__sock_release (net/socket.c:651)
sock_close (net/socket.c:1367)
__fput (fs/file_table.c:320)
task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:181 (discriminator 1))
exit_to_user_mode_prepare (include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49)
syscall_exit_to_user_mode (kernel/entry/common.c:130)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:87)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
We can't call mptcp_close under the 'fast' socket lock variant, replace
it with a sock_lock_nested() as the relevant code is already under the
listening msk socket lock protection.
Reported-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Closes: multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next#316
Fixes: 30e51b9 ("mptcp: fix unreleased socket in accept queue")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts <matthieu.baerts@tessares.net>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Walking the nvme_ns_head siblings list is protected by the head's srcu in nvme_ns_head_submit_bio() but not nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths(). Removing namespaces from the list also fails to synchronize the srcu. Concurrent scan work can therefore cause use-after-frees. Hold the head's srcu lock in nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths() and synchronize with the srcu, not the global RCU, in nvme_ns_remove(). Observed the following panic when making NVMe/RDMA connections with native multipath on the Rocky Linux 8.6 kernel (it seems the upstream kernel has the same race condition). Disassembly shows the faulting instruction is cmp 0x50(%rdx),%rcx; computing capacity != get_capacity(ns->disk). Address 0x50 is dereferenced because ns->disk is NULL. The NULL disk appears to be the result of concurrent scan work freeing the namespace (note the log line in the middle of the panic). [37314.206036] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000050 [37314.206036] nvme0n3: detected capacity change from 0 to 11811160064 [37314.299753] PGD 0 P4D 0 [37314.299756] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [37314.299759] CPU: 29 PID: 322046 Comm: kworker/u98:3 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W X --------- - - 4.18.0-372.32.1.el8test86.x86_64 #1 [37314.299762] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R720/0JP31P, BIOS 2.7.0 05/23/2018 [37314.299763] Workqueue: nvme-wq nvme_scan_work [nvme_core] [37314.299783] RIP: 0010:nvme_mpath_revalidate_paths+0x26/0xb0 [nvme_core] [37314.299790] Code: 1f 44 00 00 66 66 66 66 90 55 53 48 8b 5f 50 48 8b 83 c8 c9 00 00 48 8b 13 48 8b 48 50 48 39 d3 74 20 48 8d 42 d0 48 8b 50 20 <48> 3b 4a 50 74 05 f0 80 60 70 ef 48 8b 50 30 48 8d 42 d0 48 39 d3 [37315.058803] RSP: 0018:ffffabe28f913d10 EFLAGS: 00010202 [37315.121316] RAX: ffff927a077da800 RBX: ffff92991dd70000 RCX: 0000000001600000 [37315.206704] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff92991b719800 [37315.292106] RBP: ffff929a6b70c000 R08: 000000010234cd4a R09: c0000000ffff7fff [37315.377501] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffabe28f913a30 R12: 0000000000000000 [37315.462889] R13: ffff92992716600c R14: ffff929964e6e030 R15: ffff92991dd70000 [37315.548286] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92b87fb80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [37315.645111] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [37315.713871] CR2: 0000000000000050 CR3: 0000002208810006 CR4: 00000000000606e0 [37315.799267] Call Trace: [37315.828515] nvme_update_ns_info+0x1ac/0x250 [nvme_core] [37315.892075] nvme_validate_or_alloc_ns+0x2ff/0xa00 [nvme_core] [37315.961871] ? __blk_mq_free_request+0x6b/0x90 [37316.015021] nvme_scan_work+0x151/0x240 [nvme_core] [37316.073371] process_one_work+0x1a7/0x360 [37316.121318] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [37316.168227] worker_thread+0x30/0x390 [37316.212024] ? create_worker+0x1a0/0x1a0 [37316.258939] kthread+0x10a/0x120 [37316.297557] ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 [37316.347590] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [37316.390360] Modules linked in: nvme_rdma nvme_tcp(X) nvme_fabrics nvme_core netconsole iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp dm_queue_length dm_service_time nf_conntrack_netlink br_netfilter bridge stp llc overlay nft_chain_nat ipt_MASQUERADE nf_nat xt_addrtype xt_CT nft_counter xt_state xt_conntrack nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 xt_comment xt_multiport nft_compat nf_tables libcrc32c nfnetlink dm_multipath tg3 rpcrdma sunrpc rdma_ucm ib_srpt ib_isert iscsi_target_mod target_core_mod ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm intel_rapl_msr iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support dcdbas intel_rapl_common sb_edac x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel ipmi_ssif kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul mlx5_ib ghash_clmulni_intel ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate intel_uncore ib_core ipmi_si joydev mei_me pcspkr ipmi_devintf mei lpc_ich wmi ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter ext4 mbcache jbd2 sd_mod t10_pi sg mgag200 mlx5_core drm_kms_helper syscopyarea [37316.390419] sysfillrect ahci sysimgblt fb_sys_fops libahci drm crc32c_intel libata mlxfw pci_hyperv_intf tls i2c_algo_bit psample dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse [last unloaded: nvme_core] [37317.645908] CR2: 0000000000000050 Fixes: e7d6580 ("nvme-multipath: revalidate paths during rescan") Signed-off-by: Caleb Sander <csander@purestorage.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
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Syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref bug: NILFS (loop0): segctord starting. Construction interval = 5 seconds, CP frequency < 30 seconds general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 1 PID: 3603 Comm: segctord Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-syzkaller-00105-gb229b6ca5abb #0 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/11/2022 RIP: 0010:nilfs_palloc_commit_free_entry+0xe5/0x6b0 fs/nilfs2/alloc.c:608 Code: 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 cd 05 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 73 08 49 8d 7e 10 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 26 05 00 00 49 8b 46 10 be a6 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 RSP: 0018:ffffc90003dff830 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88802594e218 RCX: 000000000000000d RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 0000000000002000 RDI: 0000000000000010 RBP: ffff888071880222 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000003f R10: 000000000000000d R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888071880158 R13: ffff88802594e220 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fb1c08316a8 CR3: 0000000018560000 CR4: 0000000000350ee0 Call Trace: <TASK> nilfs_dat_commit_free fs/nilfs2/dat.c:114 [inline] nilfs_dat_commit_end+0x464/0x5f0 fs/nilfs2/dat.c:193 nilfs_dat_commit_update+0x26/0x40 fs/nilfs2/dat.c:236 nilfs_btree_commit_update_v+0x87/0x4a0 fs/nilfs2/btree.c:1940 nilfs_btree_commit_propagate_v fs/nilfs2/btree.c:2016 [inline] nilfs_btree_propagate_v fs/nilfs2/btree.c:2046 [inline] nilfs_btree_propagate+0xa00/0xd60 fs/nilfs2/btree.c:2088 nilfs_bmap_propagate+0x73/0x170 fs/nilfs2/bmap.c:337 nilfs_collect_file_data+0x45/0xd0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:568 nilfs_segctor_apply_buffers+0x14a/0x470 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1018 nilfs_segctor_scan_file+0x3f4/0x6f0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1067 nilfs_segctor_collect_blocks fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1197 [inline] nilfs_segctor_collect fs/nilfs2/segment.c:1503 [inline] nilfs_segctor_do_construct+0x12fc/0x6af0 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2045 nilfs_segctor_construct+0x8e3/0xb30 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2379 nilfs_segctor_thread_construct fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2487 [inline] nilfs_segctor_thread+0x3c3/0xf30 fs/nilfs2/segment.c:2570 kthread+0x2e4/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:376 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:306 </TASK> ... If DAT metadata file is corrupted on disk, there is a case where req->pr_desc_bh is NULL and blocknr is 0 at nilfs_dat_commit_end() during a b-tree operation that cascadingly updates ancestor nodes of the b-tree, because nilfs_dat_commit_alloc() for a lower level block can initialize the blocknr on the same DAT entry between nilfs_dat_prepare_end() and nilfs_dat_commit_end(). If this happens, nilfs_dat_commit_end() calls nilfs_dat_commit_free() without valid buffer heads in req->pr_desc_bh and req->pr_bitmap_bh, and causes the NULL pointer dereference above in nilfs_palloc_commit_free_entry() function, which leads to a crash. Fix this by adding a NULL check on req->pr_desc_bh and req->pr_bitmap_bh before nilfs_palloc_commit_free_entry() in nilfs_dat_commit_free(). This also calls nilfs_error() in that case to notify that there is a fatal flaw in the filesystem metadata and prevent further operations. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/00000000000097c20205ebaea3d6@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221114040441.1649940-1-zhangpeng362@huawei.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221119120542.17204-1-konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com Signed-off-by: ZhangPeng <zhangpeng362@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com> Reported-by: syzbot+ebe05ee8e98f755f61d0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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When running as a Xen PV guests commit eed9a32 ("mm: x86: add CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG") can cause a protection violation in pmdp_test_and_clear_young(): BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8880083374d0 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0003) - permissions violation PGD 3026067 P4D 3026067 PUD 3027067 PMD 7fee5067 PTE 8010000008337065 Oops: 0003 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 PID: 158 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-20221118-doflr+ #1 RIP: e030:pmdp_test_and_clear_young+0x25/0x40 This happens because the Xen hypervisor can't emulate direct writes to page table entries other than PTEs. This can easily be fixed by introducing arch_has_hw_nonleaf_pmd_young() similar to arch_has_hw_pte_young() and test that instead of CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221123064510.16225-1-jgross@suse.com Fixes: eed9a32 ("mm: x86: add CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_NONLEAF_PMD_YOUNG") Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Reported-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Acked-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Tested-by: Sander Eikelenboom <linux@eikelenboom.it> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> [core changes] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Wei Chen reported a NULL deref in sk_user_ns() [0][1], and Paolo diagnosed the root cause: in unix_diag_get_exact(), the newly allocated skb does not have sk. [2] We must get the user_ns from the NETLINK_CB(in_skb).sk and pass it to sk_diag_fill(). [0]: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000270 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 12bbce067 P4D 12bbce067 PUD 12bc40067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP CPU: 0 PID: 27942 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5-next-20221118 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.13.0-48-gd9c812dda519-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:sk_user_ns include/net/sock.h:920 [inline] RIP: 0010:sk_diag_dump_uid net/unix/diag.c:119 [inline] RIP: 0010:sk_diag_fill+0x77d/0x890 net/unix/diag.c:170 Code: 89 ef e8 66 d4 2d fd c7 44 24 40 00 00 00 00 49 8d 7c 24 18 e8 54 d7 2d fd 49 8b 5c 24 18 48 8d bb 70 02 00 00 e8 43 d7 2d fd <48> 8b 9b 70 02 00 00 48 8d 7b 10 e8 33 d7 2d fd 48 8b 5b 10 48 8d RSP: 0018:ffffc90000d67968 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffff88812badaa48 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff840d481d RDX: 0000000000000465 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000270 RBP: ffffc90000d679a8 R08: 0000000000000277 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0001ffffffffffff R11: 0001c90000d679a8 R12: ffff88812ac03800 R13: ffff88812c87c400 R14: ffff88812ae42210 R15: ffff888103026940 FS: 00007f08b4e6f700(0000) GS:ffff88813bc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000270 CR3: 000000012c58b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> unix_diag_get_exact net/unix/diag.c:285 [inline] unix_diag_handler_dump+0x3f9/0x500 net/unix/diag.c:317 __sock_diag_cmd net/core/sock_diag.c:235 [inline] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x237/0x250 net/core/sock_diag.c:266 netlink_rcv_skb+0x13e/0x250 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2564 sock_diag_rcv+0x24/0x40 net/core/sock_diag.c:277 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1330 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x5e9/0x6b0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1356 netlink_sendmsg+0x739/0x860 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1932 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:714 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:734 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x38f/0x500 net/socket.c:2476 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2530 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x197/0x230 net/socket.c:2559 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2568 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2566 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2566 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x4697f9 Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f08b4e6ec48 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000077bf80 RCX: 00000000004697f9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000004d29e9 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000077bf80 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 000000000077bf80 R15: 00007ffdb36bc6c0 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000270 [1]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAO4mrfdvyjFpokhNsiwZiP-wpdSD0AStcJwfKcKQdAALQ9_2Qw@mail.gmail.com/ [2]: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/e04315e7c90d9a75613f3993c2baf2d344eef7eb.camel@redhat.com/ Fixes: cae9910 ("net: Add UNIX_DIAG_UID to Netlink UNIX socket diagnostics.") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Reported-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com> Diagnosed-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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The test prog dumps a single AF_UNIX socket's UID with and without unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) and checks if it matches the result of getuid(). Without the preceding patch, the test prog is killed by a NULL deref in sk_diag_dump_uid(). # ./diag_uid TAP version 13 1..2 # Starting 2 tests from 3 test cases. # RUN diag_uid.uid.1 ... BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000270 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 105212067 P4D 105212067 PUD 1051fe067 PMD 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.amzn2022.0.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:sk_diag_fill (./include/net/sock.h:920 net/unix/diag.c:119 net/unix/diag.c:170) ... # 1: Test terminated unexpectedly by signal 9 # FAIL diag_uid.uid.1 not ok 1 diag_uid.uid.1 # RUN diag_uid.uid_unshare.1 ... # 1: Test terminated by timeout # FAIL diag_uid.uid_unshare.1 not ok 2 diag_uid.uid_unshare.1 # FAILED: 0 / 2 tests passed. # Totals: pass:0 fail:2 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:0 error:0 With the patch, the test succeeds. # ./diag_uid TAP version 13 1..2 # Starting 2 tests from 3 test cases. # RUN diag_uid.uid.1 ... # OK diag_uid.uid.1 ok 1 diag_uid.uid.1 # RUN diag_uid.uid_unshare.1 ... # OK diag_uid.uid_unshare.1 ok 2 diag_uid.uid_unshare.1 # PASSED: 2 / 2 tests passed. # Totals: pass:2 fail:0 xfail:0 xpass:0 skip:0 error:0 Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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If coretemp_add_core() gets an error then pdata->core_data[indx] is already NULL and has been kfreed. Don't pass that to sysfs_remove_group() as that will crash in sysfs_remove_group(). [Shortened for readability] [91854.020159] sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/devices/platform/coretemp.0/hwmon/hwmon2/temp20_label' <cpu offline> [91855.126115] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000188 [91855.165103] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [91855.194506] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [91855.224445] PGD 0 P4D 0 [91855.238508] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI ... [91855.342716] RIP: 0010:sysfs_remove_group+0xc/0x80 ... [91855.796571] Call Trace: [91855.810524] coretemp_cpu_offline+0x12b/0x1dd [coretemp] [91855.841738] ? coretemp_cpu_online+0x180/0x180 [coretemp] [91855.871107] cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x105/0x4b0 [91855.893432] cpuhp_thread_fun+0x8e/0x150 ... Fix this by checking for NULL first. Signed-off-by: Phil Auld <pauld@redhat.com> Cc: linux-hwmon@vger.kernel.org Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Jean Delvare <jdelvare@suse.com> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117162313.3164803-1-pauld@redhat.com Fixes: 199e0de ("hwmon: (coretemp) Merge pkgtemp with coretemp") Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
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QAT devices on Intel Sapphire Rapids and Emerald Rapids have a defect in address translation service (ATS). These devices may inadvertently issue ATS invalidation completion before posted writes initiated with translated address that utilized translations matching the invalidation address range, violating the invalidation completion ordering. This patch adds an extra device TLB invalidation for the affected devices, it is needed to ensure no more posted writes with translated address following the invalidation completion. Therefore, the ordering is preserved and data-corruption is prevented. Device TLBs are invalidated under the following six conditions: 1. Device driver does DMA API unmap IOVA 2. Device driver unbind a PASID from a process, sva_unbind_device() 3. PASID is torn down, after PASID cache is flushed. e.g. process exit_mmap() due to crash 4. Under SVA usage, called by mmu_notifier.invalidate_range() where VM has to free pages that were unmapped 5. userspace driver unmaps a DMA buffer 6. Cache invalidation in vSVA usage (upcoming) For #1 and #2, device drivers are responsible for stopping DMA traffic before unmap/unbind. For #3, iommu driver gets mmu_notifier to invalidate TLB the same way as normal user unmap which will do an extra invalidation. The dTLB invalidation after PASID cache flush does not need an extra invalidation. Therefore, we only need to deal with #4 and #5 in this patch. #1 is also covered by this patch due to common code path with #5. Tested-by: Yuzhang Luo <yuzhang.luo@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221130062449.1360063-1-jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
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A NAPI is setup for each network sring to poll data to kernel The sring with source host is destroyed before live migration and new sring with target host is setup after live migration. The NAPI for the old sring is not deleted until setup new sring with target host after migration. With busy_poll/busy_read enabled, the NAPI can be polled before got deleted when resume VM. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000008 IP: xennet_poll+0xae/0xd20 PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI Call Trace: finish_task_switch+0x71/0x230 timerqueue_del+0x1d/0x40 hrtimer_try_to_cancel+0xb5/0x110 xennet_alloc_rx_buffers+0x2a0/0x2a0 napi_busy_loop+0xdb/0x270 sock_poll+0x87/0x90 do_sys_poll+0x26f/0x580 tracing_map_insert+0x1d4/0x2f0 event_hist_trigger+0x14a/0x260 finish_task_switch+0x71/0x230 __schedule+0x256/0x890 recalc_sigpending+0x1b/0x50 xen_sched_clock+0x15/0x20 __rb_reserve_next+0x12d/0x140 ring_buffer_lock_reserve+0x123/0x3d0 event_triggers_call+0x87/0xb0 trace_event_buffer_commit+0x1c4/0x210 xen_clocksource_get_cycles+0x15/0x20 ktime_get_ts64+0x51/0xf0 SyS_ppoll+0x160/0x1a0 SyS_ppoll+0x160/0x1a0 do_syscall_64+0x73/0x130 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x41/0xa6 ... RIP: xennet_poll+0xae/0xd20 RSP: ffffb4f041933900 CR2: 0000000000000008 ---[ end trace f8601785b354351c ]--- xen frontend should remove the NAPIs for the old srings before live migration as the bond srings are destroyed There is a tiny window between the srings are set to NULL and the NAPIs are disabled, It is safe as the NAPI threads are still frozen at that time Signed-off-by: Lin Liu <lin.liu@citrix.com> Fixes: 4ec2411 ([NET]: Do not check netif_running() and carrier state in ->poll()) Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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When booting a arm 32-bit kernel with config CONFIG_AHCI_DWC enabled on a am57xx-evm board. This happens when the clock references are unnamed in DT, the strcmp() produces a NULL pointer dereference, see the following oops, NULL pointer dereference: [ 4.673950] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 [ 4.682098] [00000000] *pgd=00000000 [ 4.685699] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] SMP ARM [ 4.690338] Modules linked in: [ 4.693420] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7 #1 [ 4.699615] Hardware name: Generic DRA74X (Flattened Device Tree) [ 4.705749] PC is at strcmp+0x0/0x34 [ 4.709350] LR is at ahci_platform_find_clk+0x3c/0x5c [ 4.714416] pc : [<c130c494>] lr : [<c0c230e0>] psr: 20000013 [ 4.720703] sp : f000dda8 ip : 00000001 fp : c29b1840 [ 4.725952] r10: 00000020 r9 : c1b23380 r8 : c1b23368 [ 4.731201] r7 : c1ab4cc4 r6 : 00000001 r5 : c3c66040 r4 : 00000000 [ 4.737762] r3 : 00000080 r2 : 00000080 r1 : c1ab4cc4 r0 : 00000000 [...] [ 4.998870] strcmp from ahci_platform_find_clk+0x3c/0x5c [ 5.004302] ahci_platform_find_clk from ahci_dwc_probe+0x1f0/0x54c [ 5.010589] ahci_dwc_probe from platform_probe+0x64/0xc0 [ 5.016021] platform_probe from really_probe+0xe8/0x41c [ 5.021362] really_probe from __driver_probe_device+0xa4/0x204 [ 5.027313] __driver_probe_device from driver_probe_device+0x38/0xc8 [ 5.033782] driver_probe_device from __driver_attach+0xb4/0x1ec [ 5.039825] __driver_attach from bus_for_each_dev+0x78/0xb8 [ 5.045532] bus_for_each_dev from bus_add_driver+0x17c/0x220 [ 5.051300] bus_add_driver from driver_register+0x90/0x124 [ 5.056915] driver_register from do_one_initcall+0x48/0x1e8 [ 5.062591] do_one_initcall from kernel_init_freeable+0x1cc/0x234 [ 5.068817] kernel_init_freeable from kernel_init+0x20/0x13c [ 5.074584] kernel_init from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c [ 5.079681] Exception stack(0xf000dfb0 to 0xf000dff8) [ 5.084747] dfa0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 5.092956] dfc0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 5.101165] dfe0: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000013 00000000 [ 5.107818] Code: e5e32001 e3520000 1afffffb e12fff1e (e4d03001) [ 5.114013] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Add an extra check in the if-statement if hpriv-clks[i].id. Fixes: 6ce73f3 ("ata: libahci_platform: Add function returning a clock-handle by id") Suggested-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Damien Le Moal <damien.lemoal@opensource.wdc.com>
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The LTP test pty03 is causing a crash in slcan: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 348 Comm: kworker/0:3 Not tainted 6.0.8-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 9d20364b934f5aab0a9bdf84e8f45cfdfae39dab Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.15.0-0-g2dd4b9b-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: 0x0 (events) RIP: 0010:process_one_work (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:706 /home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2185) Code: 49 89 ff 41 56 41 55 41 54 55 53 48 89 f3 48 83 ec 10 48 8b 06 48 8b 6f 48 49 89 c4 45 30 e4 a8 04 b8 00 00 00 00 4c 0f 44 e0 <49> 8b 44 24 08 44 8b a8 00 01 00 00 41 83 e5 20 f6 45 10 04 75 0e RSP: 0018:ffffaf7b40f47e98 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d644e1b8b48 RCX: ffff9d649e439968 RDX: 00000000ffff8455 RSI: ffff9d644e1b8b48 RDI: ffff9d64764aa6c0 RBP: ffff9d649e4335c0 R08: 0000000000000c00 R09: ffff9d64764aa734 R10: 0000000000000007 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff9d649e4335e8 R14: ffff9d64490da780 R15: ffff9d64764aa6c0 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9d649e400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 0000000036424000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> worker_thread (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/workqueue.c:2436) kthread (/home/rich/kernel/linux/kernel/kthread.c:376) ret_from_fork (/home/rich/kernel/linux/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:312) Apparently, the slcan's tx_work is freed while being scheduled. While slcan_netdev_close() (netdev side) calls flush_work(&sl->tx_work), slcan_close() (tty side) does not. So when the netdev is never set UP, but the tty is stuffed with bytes and forced to wakeup write, the work is scheduled, but never flushed. So add an additional flush_work() to slcan_close() to be sure the work is flushed under all circumstances. The Fixes commit below moved flush_work() from slcan_close() to slcan_netdev_close(). What was the rationale behind it? Maybe we can drop the one in slcan_netdev_close()? I see the same pattern in can327. So it perhaps needs the very same fix. Fixes: cfcb446 ("can: slcan: remove legacy infrastructure") Link: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1205597 Reported-by: Richard Palethorpe <richard.palethorpe@suse.com> Tested-by: Petr Vorel <petr.vorel@suse.com> Cc: Dario Binacchi <dario.binacchi@amarulasolutions.com> Cc: Wolfgang Grandegger <wg@grandegger.com> Cc: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Max Staudt <max@enpas.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby (SUSE) <jirislaby@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Max Staudt <max@enpas.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221201073426.17328-1-jirislaby@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
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When sending packets between nodes in netns, it calls tipc_lxc_xmit() for
peer node to receive the packets where tipc_sk_mcast_rcv()/tipc_sk_rcv()
might be called, and it's pretty much like in tipc_rcv().
Currently the local 'node rw lock' is held during calling tipc_lxc_xmit()
to protect the peer_net not being freed by another thread. However, when
receiving these packets, tipc_node_add_conn() might be called where the
peer 'node rw lock' is acquired. Then a dead lock warning is triggered by
lockdep detector, although it is not a real dead lock:
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
--------------------------------------------
conn_server/1086 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880065cb020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \
at: tipc_node_add_conn.cold.76+0xaa/0x211 [tipc]
but task is already holding lock:
ffff8880065cd020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \
at: tipc_node_xmit+0x285/0xb30 [tipc]
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(&n->lock#2);
lock(&n->lock#2);
*** DEADLOCK ***
May be due to missing lock nesting notation
4 locks held by conn_server/1086:
#0: ffff8880036d1e40 (sk_lock-AF_TIPC){+.+.}-{0:0}, \
at: tipc_accept+0x9c0/0x10b0 [tipc]
#1: ffff8880036d5f80 (sk_lock-AF_TIPC/1){+.+.}-{0:0}, \
at: tipc_accept+0x363/0x10b0 [tipc]
#2: ffff8880065cd020 (&n->lock#2){++--}-{2:2}, \
at: tipc_node_xmit+0x285/0xb30 [tipc]
#3: ffff888012e13370 (slock-AF_TIPC){+...}-{2:2}, \
at: tipc_sk_rcv+0x2da/0x1b40 [tipc]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5b
__lock_acquire.cold.77+0x1f2/0x3d7
lock_acquire+0x1d2/0x610
_raw_write_lock_bh+0x38/0x80
tipc_node_add_conn.cold.76+0xaa/0x211 [tipc]
tipc_sk_finish_conn+0x21e/0x640 [tipc]
tipc_sk_filter_rcv+0x147b/0x3030 [tipc]
tipc_sk_rcv+0xbb4/0x1b40 [tipc]
tipc_lxc_xmit+0x225/0x26b [tipc]
tipc_node_xmit.cold.82+0x4a/0x102 [tipc]
__tipc_sendstream+0x879/0xff0 [tipc]
tipc_accept+0x966/0x10b0 [tipc]
do_accept+0x37d/0x590
This patch avoids this warning by not holding the 'node rw lock' before
calling tipc_lxc_xmit(). As to protect the 'peer_net', rcu_read_lock()
should be enough, as in cleanup_net() when freeing the netns, it calls
synchronize_rcu() before the free is continued.
Also since tipc_lxc_xmit() is like the RX path in tipc_rcv(), it makes
sense to call it under rcu_read_lock(). Note that the right lock order
must be:
rcu_read_lock();
tipc_node_read_lock(n);
tipc_node_read_unlock(n);
tipc_lxc_xmit();
rcu_read_unlock();
instead of:
tipc_node_read_lock(n);
rcu_read_lock();
tipc_node_read_unlock(n);
tipc_lxc_xmit();
rcu_read_unlock();
and we have to call tipc_node_read_lock/unlock() twice in
tipc_node_xmit().
Fixes: f73b128 ("tipc: improve throughput between nodes in netns")
Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5bdd1f8fee9db695cfff4528a48c9b9d0523fb00.1670110641.git.lucien.xin@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
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If a cookie expires from the LRU and the LRU_DISCARD flag is set, but the state machine has not run yet, it's possible another thread can call fscache_use_cookie and begin to use it. When the cookie_worker finally runs, it will see the LRU_DISCARD flag set, transition the cookie->state to LRU_DISCARDING, which will then withdraw the cookie. Once the cookie is withdrawn the object is removed the below oops will occur because the object associated with the cookie is now NULL. Fix the oops by clearing the LRU_DISCARD bit if another thread uses the cookie before the cookie_worker runs. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 ... CPU: 31 PID: 44773 Comm: kworker/u130:1 Tainted: G E 6.0.0-5.dneg.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/26/2022 Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work [netfs] RIP: 0010:cachefiles_prepare_write+0x28/0x90 [cachefiles] ... Call Trace: netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work+0x11c/0x320 [netfs] process_one_work+0x217/0x3e0 worker_thread+0x4a/0x3b0 kthread+0xd6/0x100 Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning") Reported-by: Daire Byrne <daire.byrne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Wysochanski <dwysocha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Daire Byrne <daire@dneg.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117115023.1350181-1-dwysocha@redhat.com/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221117142915.1366990-1-dwysocha@redhat.com/ # v2 Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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KASAN found that addr was dereferenced after br2dev_event_work was freed. ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in qeth_l2_br2dev_worker+0x5ba/0x6b0 Read of size 1 at addr 00000000fdcea440 by task kworker/u760:4/540 CPU: 17 PID: 540 Comm: kworker/u760:4 Tainted: G E 6.1.0-20221128.rc7.git1.5aa3bed4ce83.300.fc36.s390x+kasan #1 Hardware name: IBM 8561 T01 703 (LPAR) Workqueue: 0.0.8000_event qeth_l2_br2dev_worker Call Trace: [<000000016944d4ce>] dump_stack_lvl+0xc6/0xf8 [<000000016942cd9c>] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x34/0x2a0 [<000000016942d118>] print_report+0x110/0x1f8 [<0000000167a7bd04>] kasan_report+0xfc/0x128 [<000000016938d79a>] qeth_l2_br2dev_worker+0x5ba/0x6b0 [<00000001673edd1e>] process_one_work+0x76e/0x1128 [<00000001673ee85c>] worker_thread+0x184/0x1098 [<000000016740718a>] kthread+0x26a/0x310 [<00000001672c606a>] __ret_from_fork+0x8a/0xe8 [<00000001694711da>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 Allocated by task 108338: kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68 kasan_set_track+0x36/0x48 __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xc0 qeth_l2_switchdev_event+0x25a/0x738 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xf8 br_switchdev_fdb_notify+0xf4/0x110 fdb_notify+0x122/0x180 fdb_add_entry.constprop.0.isra.0+0x312/0x558 br_fdb_add+0x59e/0x858 rtnl_fdb_add+0x58a/0x928 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x5f8/0x8d8 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1f2/0x408 netlink_unicast+0x570/0x790 netlink_sendmsg+0x752/0xbe0 sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 ____sys_sendmsg+0x510/0x6a8 ___sys_sendmsg+0x12a/0x180 __sys_sendmsg+0xe6/0x168 __do_sys_socketcall+0x3c8/0x468 do_syscall+0x22c/0x328 __do_syscall+0x94/0xf0 system_call+0x82/0xb0 Freed by task 540: kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68 kasan_set_track+0x36/0x48 kasan_save_free_info+0x4c/0x68 ____kasan_slab_free+0x14e/0x1a8 __kasan_slab_free+0x24/0x30 __kmem_cache_free+0x168/0x338 qeth_l2_br2dev_worker+0x154/0x6b0 process_one_work+0x76e/0x1128 worker_thread+0x184/0x1098 kthread+0x26a/0x310 __ret_from_fork+0x8a/0xe8 ret_from_fork+0xa/0x40 Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 insert_work+0x56/0x2e8 __queue_work+0x4ce/0xd10 queue_work_on+0xf4/0x100 qeth_l2_switchdev_event+0x520/0x738 atomic_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xf8 br_switchdev_fdb_notify+0xf4/0x110 fdb_notify+0x122/0x180 fdb_add_entry.constprop.0.isra.0+0x312/0x558 br_fdb_add+0x59e/0x858 rtnl_fdb_add+0x58a/0x928 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x5f8/0x8d8 netlink_rcv_skb+0x1f2/0x408 netlink_unicast+0x570/0x790 netlink_sendmsg+0x752/0xbe0 sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 ____sys_sendmsg+0x510/0x6a8 ___sys_sendmsg+0x12a/0x180 __sys_sendmsg+0xe6/0x168 __do_sys_socketcall+0x3c8/0x468 do_syscall+0x22c/0x328 __do_syscall+0x94/0xf0 system_call+0x82/0xb0 Second to last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x40/0x68 __kasan_record_aux_stack+0xbe/0xd0 kvfree_call_rcu+0xb2/0x760 kernfs_unlink_open_file+0x348/0x430 kernfs_fop_release+0xc2/0x320 __fput+0x1ae/0x768 task_work_run+0x1bc/0x298 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1a0/0x1a8 __do_syscall+0x94/0xf0 system_call+0x82/0xb0 The buggy address belongs to the object at 00000000fdcea400 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 64 bytes inside of 96-byte region [00000000fdcea400, 00000000fdcea460) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:000000005a9c26e8 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0xfdcea flags: 0x3ffff00000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1ffff) raw: 3ffff00000000200 0000000000000000 0000000100000122 000000008008cc00 raw: 0000000000000000 0020004100000000 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: 00000000fdcea300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00000000fdcea380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc >00000000fdcea400: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ^ 00000000fdcea480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00000000fdcea500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Fixes: f7936b7 ("s390/qeth: Update MACs of LEARNING_SYNC device") Reported-by: Thorsten Winkler <twinkler@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandra Winter <wintera@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Wenjia Zhang <wenjia@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Thorsten Winkler <twinkler@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221207105304.20494-1-wintera@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The following program will trigger the BUG_ON that this patch removes,
because the user can munmap() mm->brk:
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void *brk_now(void)
{
return (void *)syscall(SYS_brk, 0);
}
static void brk_set(void *b)
{
assert(syscall(SYS_brk, b) != -1);
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
void *b = brk_now();
brk_set(b + 4096);
assert(munmap(b - 4096, 4096 * 2) == 0);
brk_set(b);
return 0;
}
Compile that with musl, since glibc actually uses brk(), and then
execute it, and it'll hit this splat:
kernel BUG at mm/mmap.c:229!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 12 PID: 1379 Comm: a.out Tainted: G S U 6.1.0-rc7+ #419
RIP: 0010:__do_sys_brk+0x2fc/0x340
Code: 00 00 4c 89 ef e8 04 d3 fe ff eb 9a be 01 00 00 00 4c 89 ff e8 35 e0 fe ff e9 6e ff ff ff 4d 89 a7 20>
RSP: 0018:ffff888140bc7eb0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00000000007e7000 RCX: ffff8881020fe000
RDX: ffff8881020fe001 RSI: ffff8881955c9b00 RDI: ffff8881955c9b08
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffff8881955c9b00 R09: 00007ffc77844000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 00000000007e8000
R13: 00000000007e8000 R14: 00000000007e7000 R15: ffff8881020fe000
FS: 0000000000604298(0000) GS:ffff88901f700000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000603fe0 CR3: 000000015ba9a005 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_syscall_64+0x2b/0x50
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
RIP: 0033:0x400678
Code: 10 4c 8d 41 08 4c 89 44 24 10 4c 8b 01 8b 4c 24 08 83 f9 2f 77 0a 4c 8d 4c 24 20 4c 01 c9 eb 05 48 8b>
RSP: 002b:00007ffc77863890 EFLAGS: 00000212 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000000c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000040031b RCX: 0000000000400678
RDX: 00000000004006a1 RSI: 00000000007e6000 RDI: 00000000007e7000
RBP: 00007ffc77863900 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000007e6000
R10: 00007ffc77863930 R11: 0000000000000212 R12: 00007ffc77863978
R13: 00007ffc77863988 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Instead, just return the old brk value if the original mapping has been
removed.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix changelog, per Liam]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221202162724.2009-1-Jason@zx2c4.com
Fixes: 2e7ce7d ("mm/mmap: change do_brk_flags() to expand existing VMA and add do_brk_munmap()")
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Liam R. Howlett <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: SeongJae Park <sj@kernel.org>
Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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We use "unsigned long" to store a PFN in the kernel and phys_addr_t to store a physical address. On a 64bit system, both are 64bit wide. However, on a 32bit system, the latter might be 64bit wide. This is, for example, the case on x86 with PAE: phys_addr_t and PTEs are 64bit wide, while "unsigned long" only spans 32bit. The current definition of SWP_PFN_BITS without MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS misses that case, and assumes that the maximum PFN is limited by an 32bit phys_addr_t. This implies, that SWP_PFN_BITS will currently only be able to cover 4 GiB - 1 on any 32bit system with 4k page size, which is wrong. Let's rely on the number of bits in phys_addr_t instead, but make sure to not exceed the maximum swap offset, to not make the BUILD_BUG_ON() in is_pfn_swap_entry() unhappy. Note that swp_entry_t is effectively an unsigned long and the maximum swap offset shares that value with the swap type. For example, on an 8 GiB x86 PAE system with a kernel config based on Debian 11.5 (-> CONFIG_FLATMEM=y, CONFIG_X86_PAE=y), we will currently fail removing migration entries (remove_migration_ptes()), because mm/page_vma_mapped.c:check_pte() will fail to identify a PFN match as swp_offset_pfn() wrongly masks off PFN bits. For example, split_huge_page_to_list()->...->remap_page() will leave migration entries in place and continue to unlock the page. Later, when we stumble over these migration entries (e.g., via /proc/self/pagemap), pfn_swap_entry_to_page() will BUG_ON() because these migration entries shouldn't exist anymore and the page was unlocked. [ 33.067591] kernel BUG at include/linux/swapops.h:497! [ 33.067597] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 33.067602] CPU: 3 PID: 742 Comm: cow Tainted: G E 6.1.0-rc8+ #16 [ 33.067605] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.fc36 04/01/2014 [ 33.067606] EIP: pagemap_pmd_range+0x644/0x650 [ 33.067612] Code: 00 00 00 00 66 90 89 ce b9 00 f0 ff ff e9 ff fb ff ff 89 d8 31 db e8 48 c6 52 00 e9 23 fb ff ff e8 61 83 56 00 e9 b6 fe ff ff <0f> 0b bf 00 f0 ff ff e9 38 fa ff ff 3e 8d 74 26 00 55 89 e5 57 31 [ 33.067615] EAX: ee394000 EBX: 00000002 ECX: ee394000 EDX: 00000000 [ 33.067617] ESI: c1b0ded4 EDI: 00024a00 EBP: c1b0ddb4 ESP: c1b0dd68 [ 33.067619] DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 33.067624] CR0: 80050033 CR2: b7a00000 CR3: 01bbbd20 CR4: 00350ef0 [ 33.067625] Call Trace: [ 33.067628] ? madvise_free_pte_range+0x720/0x720 [ 33.067632] ? smaps_pte_range+0x4b0/0x4b0 [ 33.067634] walk_pgd_range+0x325/0x720 [ 33.067637] ? mt_find+0x1d6/0x3a0 [ 33.067641] ? mt_find+0x1d6/0x3a0 [ 33.067643] __walk_page_range+0x164/0x170 [ 33.067646] walk_page_range+0xf9/0x170 [ 33.067648] ? __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x2a8/0x340 [ 33.067653] pagemap_read+0x124/0x280 [ 33.067658] ? default_llseek+0x101/0x160 [ 33.067662] ? smaps_account+0x1d0/0x1d0 [ 33.067664] vfs_read+0x90/0x290 [ 33.067667] ? do_madvise.part.0+0x24b/0x390 [ 33.067669] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x12/0x20 [ 33.067673] ksys_pread64+0x58/0x90 [ 33.067675] __ia32_sys_ia32_pread64+0x1b/0x20 [ 33.067680] __do_fast_syscall_32+0x4c/0xc0 [ 33.067683] do_fast_syscall_32+0x29/0x60 [ 33.067686] do_SYSENTER_32+0x15/0x20 [ 33.067689] entry_SYSENTER_32+0x98/0xf1 Decrease the indentation level of SWP_PFN_BITS and SWP_PFN_MASK to keep it readable and consistent. [david@redhat.com: rely on sizeof(phys_addr_t) and min_t() instead] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221206105737.69478-1-david@redhat.com [david@redhat.com: use "int" for comparison, as we're only comparing numbers < 64] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1f157500-2676-7cef-a84e-9224ed64e540@redhat.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221205150857.167583-1-david@redhat.com Fixes: 0d206b5 ("mm/swap: add swp_offset_pfn() to fetch PFN from swap entry") Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yang Shi <shy828301@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
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Nov 7, 2024
For dax pud, pud_huge() returns true on x86. So the function works as long as hugetlb is configured. However, dax doesn't depend on hugetlb. Commit 414fd08 ("mm/gup: fix gup_pmd_range() for dax") fixed devmap-backed huge PMDs, but missed devmap-backed huge PUDs. Fix this as well. This fixes the below kernel panic: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x69e7c000cc478: 0000 [#1] SMP < snip > Call Trace: <TASK> get_user_pages_fast+0x1f/0x40 iov_iter_get_pages+0xc6/0x3b0 ? mempool_alloc+0x5d/0x170 bio_iov_iter_get_pages+0x82/0x4e0 ? bvec_alloc+0x91/0xc0 ? bio_alloc_bioset+0x19a/0x2a0 blkdev_direct_IO+0x282/0x480 ? __io_complete_rw_common+0xc0/0xc0 ? filemap_range_has_page+0x82/0xc0 generic_file_direct_write+0x9d/0x1a0 ? inode_update_time+0x24/0x30 __generic_file_write_iter+0xbd/0x1e0 blkdev_write_iter+0xb4/0x150 ? io_import_iovec+0x8d/0x340 io_write+0xf9/0x300 io_issue_sqe+0x3c3/0x1d30 ? sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x6c/0x80 __io_queue_sqe+0x33/0x240 ? fget+0x76/0xa0 io_submit_sqes+0xe6a/0x18d0 ? __fget_light+0xd1/0x100 __x64_sys_io_uring_enter+0x199/0x880 ? __context_tracking_enter+0x1f/0x70 ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x24/0x30 ? irqentry_exit+0x1d/0x30 ? __context_tracking_exit+0xe/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb RIP: 0033:0x7fc97c11a7be < snip > </TASK> ---[ end trace 48b2e0e67debcaeb ]--- RIP: 0010:internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x340/0x990 < snip > Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: disabled Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1670392853-28252-1-git-send-email-ssengar@linux.microsoft.com Fixes: 414fd08 ("mm/gup: fix gup_pmd_range() for dax") Signed-off-by: John Starks <jostarks@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Saurabh Sengar <ssengar@linux.microsoft.com> Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com> Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Alistair Popple <apopple@nvidia.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
123Xiong-Zhang
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that referenced
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Nov 7, 2024
Wei Chen reports a kernel bug as blew:
INFO: task syz-executor.0:29056 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Not tainted 5.15.0-rc5 #1
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz-executor.0 state:D stack:14632 pid:29056 ppid: 6574 flags:0x00000004
Call Trace:
__schedule+0x4a1/0x1720
schedule+0x36/0xe0
rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x322/0x7a0
fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy+0x11f/0x2a0
__f2fs_ioctl+0x1a9f/0x5780
f2fs_ioctl+0x89/0x3a0
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xe8/0x140
do_syscall_64+0x34/0xb0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Eric did some investigation on this issue, quoted from reply of Eric:
"Well, the quality of this bug report has a lot to be desired (not on
upstream kernel, reproducer is full of totally irrelevant stuff, not
sent to the mailing list of the filesystem whose disk image is being
fuzzed, etc.). But what is going on is that f2fs_empty_dir() doesn't
consider the case of a directory with an extremely large i_size on a
malicious disk image.
Specifically, the reproducer mounts an f2fs image with a directory
that has an i_size of 14814520042850357248, then calls
FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY on it.
That results in a call to f2fs_empty_dir() to check whether the
directory is empty. f2fs_empty_dir() then iterates through all
3616826182336513 blocks the directory allegedly contains to check
whether any contain anything. i_rwsem is held during this, so
anything else that tries to take it will hang."
In order to solve this issue, let's use f2fs_get_next_page_offset()
to speed up iteration by skipping holes for all below functions:
- f2fs_empty_dir
- f2fs_readdir
- find_in_level
The way why we can speed up iteration was described in
'commit 3cf4574 ("f2fs: introduce get_next_page_offset to speed
up SEEK_DATA")'.
Meanwhile, in f2fs_empty_dir(), let's use f2fs_find_data_page()
instead f2fs_get_lock_data_page(), due to i_rwsem was held in
caller of f2fs_empty_dir(), there shouldn't be any races, so it's
fine to not lock dentry page during lookuping dirents in the page.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/536944df-a0ae-1dd8-148f-510b476e1347@kernel.org/T/
Reported-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
123Xiong-Zhang
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that referenced
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Nov 7, 2024
commit f7f291e upstream. When running xfstests against Azure the following oops occurred on an arm64 system Unable to handle kernel write to read-only memory at virtual address ffff0001221cf000 Mem abort info: ESR = 0x9600004f EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits SET = 0, FnV = 0 EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 FSC = 0x0f: level 3 permission fault Data abort info: ISV = 0, ISS = 0x0000004f CM = 0, WnR = 1 swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000294f3000 [ffff0001221cf000] pgd=18000001ffff8003, p4d=18000001ffff8003, pud=18000001ff82e003, pmd=18000001ff71d003, pte=00600001221cf787 Internal error: Oops: 9600004f [#1] PREEMPT SMP ... pstate: 80000005 (Nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO BTYPE=--) pc : __memcpy+0x40/0x230 lr : scatterwalk_copychunks+0xe0/0x200 sp : ffff800014e92de0 x29: ffff800014e92de0 x28: ffff000114f9de80 x27: 0000000000000008 x26: 0000000000000008 x25: ffff800014e92e78 x24: 0000000000000008 x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000040000000000 x21: ffff000000000000 x20: 0000000000000001 x19: ffff0001037c4488 x18: 0000000000000014 x17: 235e1c0d6efa9661 x16: a435f9576b6edd6c x15: 0000000000000058 x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000008 x12: ffff000114f2e590 x11: ffffffffffffffff x10: 0000040000000000 x9 : ffff8000105c3580 x8 : 2e9413b10000001a x7 : 534b4410fb86b005 x6 : 534b4410fb86b005 x5 : ffff0001221cf008 x4 : ffff0001037c4490 x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : ffff0001037c4488 x0 : ffff0001221cf000 Call trace: __memcpy+0x40/0x230 scatterwalk_map_and_copy+0x98/0x100 crypto_ccm_encrypt+0x150/0x180 crypto_aead_encrypt+0x2c/0x40 crypt_message+0x750/0x880 smb3_init_transform_rq+0x298/0x340 smb_send_rqst.part.11+0xd8/0x180 smb_send_rqst+0x3c/0x100 compound_send_recv+0x534/0xbc0 smb2_query_info_compound+0x32c/0x440 smb2_set_ea+0x438/0x4c0 cifs_xattr_set+0x5d4/0x7c0 This is because in scatterwalk_copychunks(), we attempted to write to a buffer (@sign) that was allocated in the stack (vmalloc area) by crypt_message() and thus accessing its remaining 8 (x2) bytes ended up crossing a page boundary. To simply fix it, we could just pass @sign kmalloc'd from crypt_message() and then we're done. Luckily, we don't seem to pass any other vmalloc'd buffers in smb_rqst::rq_iov... Instead, let's map the correct pages and offsets from vmalloc buffers as well in cifs_sg_set_buf() and then avoiding such oopses. Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara (SUSE) <pc@cjr.nz> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
JacobZang
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to JacobZang/linux
that referenced
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Nov 28, 2024
rootcause: Access NULL rkvenc_ccu in some no ccu platform. [ 1591.262830][ T105] CPU: 2 PID: 105 Comm: mpp_worker_1 Tainted: G OE 6.1.90-android14-11-g0a5333c8b527-ab12287675 khadas#1 [ 1591.264400][ T105] Hardware name: Rockchip RK3562 EVB2 DDR4 V10 Board (DT) [ 1591.265037][ T105] pstate: 604000c5 (nZCv daIF +PAN UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-) [ 1591.265732][ T105] pc : _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x80/0xb0 [ 1591.266299][ T105] lr : rkvenc_reset+0x17c/0x3bc [rk_vcodec] [ 1591.267258][ T105] sp : ffffffc00a96bc50 [ 1591.267629][ T105] x29: ffffffc00a96bc50 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffffc001b89000 [ 1591.268366][ T105] x26: 0000000000000100 x25: ffffffc001b89000 x24: ffffffc001baafb0 [ 1591.269085][ T105] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffff800b436c40 x21: ffffffc001b89000 [ 1591.269795][ T105] x20: 000000000000002c x19: 0000000000000000 x18: ffffffc00a88d040 [ 1591.270511][ T105] x17: 00000000a488ebfc x16: 00000000a488ebfc x15: 0000000000000004 [ 1591.271230][ T105] x14: ffffffc009fefd88 x13: 00000000000890f2 x12: 0000000029aaaaab [ 1591.271951][ T105] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000001 x9 : 0000000000000000 [ 1591.272669][ T105] x8 : 0000000000000050 x7 : 205b5d3830333431 x6 : 322e31393531205b [ 1591.273395][ T105] x5 : 0000000000000024 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffffffc0088f9b58 [ 1591.274116][ T105] x2 : ffffffc00a6a1128 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 0000000000000050 [ 1591.274837][ T105] Call trace: [ 1591.275147][ T105] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x80/0xb0 [ 1591.275794][ T105] rkvenc_reset+0x17c/0x3bc [rk_vcodec] [ 1591.280105][ T105] mpp_dev_reset+0x120/0x19c [rk_vcodec] [ 1591.280811][ T105] mpp_task_finish+0x84/0x1c4 [rk_vcodec] [ 1591.281461][ T105] rkvenc_isr+0xdc/0x2c0 [rk_vcodec] [ 1591.282112][ T105] mpp_task_worker_default+0x128/0x5bc [rk_vcodec] [ 1591.282945][ T105] kthread_worker_fn+0x10c/0x244 [ 1591.283472][ T105] kthread+0x104/0x1d4 [ 1591.283886][ T105] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [ 1591.284319][ T105] Code: d65f03c0 aa1f03e9 5280002a f9800111 (885ffd01) [ 1591.284950][ T105] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- Change-Id: Ia8c5c66c1e07a3181210e7428889f6428c33f546 Signed-off-by: Yandong Lin <yandong.lin@rock-chips.com>
NegXuan
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that referenced
this pull request
Dec 27, 2024
Arm has introduced a new v10 GPU architecture that replaces the Job Manager
interface with a new Command Stream Frontend. It adds firmware driven
command stream queues that can be used by kernel and user space to submit
jobs to the GPU.
Add the initial schema for the device tree that is based on support for
RK3588 SoC. The minimum number of clocks is one for the IP, but on Rockchip
platforms they will tend to expose the semi-independent clocks for better
power management.
v5:
- Move the opp-table node under the gpu node
v4:
- Fix formatting issue
v3:
- Cleanup commit message to remove redundant text
- Added opp-table property and re-ordered entries
- Clarified power-domains and power-domain-names requirements for RK3588.
- Cleaned up example
Note: power-domains and power-domain-names requirements for other platforms
are still work in progress, hence the bindings are left incomplete here.
v2:
- New commit
Signed-off-by: Liviu Dudau <liviu.dudau@arm.com>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski+dt@linaro.org>
Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org>
Cc: Conor Dooley <conor+dt@kernel.org>
Cc: devicetree@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org>
drm: execution context for GEM buffers v7
This adds the infrastructure for an execution context for GEM buffers
which is similar to the existing TTMs execbuf util and intended to replace
it in the long term.
The basic functionality is that we abstracts the necessary loop to lock
many different GEM buffers with automated deadlock and duplicate handling.
v2: drop xarray and use dynamic resized array instead, the locking
overhead is unnecessary and measurable.
v3: drop duplicate tracking, radeon is really the only one needing that.
v4: fixes issues pointed out by Danilo, some typos in comments and a
helper for lock arrays of GEM objects.
v5: some suggestions by Boris Brezillon, especially just use one retry
macro, drop loop in prepare_array, use flags instead of bool
v6: minor changes suggested by Thomas, Boris and Danilo
v7: minor typos pointed out by checkpatch.pl fixed
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230711133122.3710-2-christian.koenig@amd.com
drm: manager to keep track of GPUs VA mappings
Add infrastructure to keep track of GPU virtual address (VA) mappings
with a decicated VA space manager implementation.
New UAPIs, motivated by Vulkan sparse memory bindings graphics drivers
start implementing, allow userspace applications to request multiple and
arbitrary GPU VA mappings of buffer objects. The DRM GPU VA manager is
intended to serve the following purposes in this context.
1) Provide infrastructure to track GPU VA allocations and mappings,
using an interval tree (RB-tree).
2) Generically connect GPU VA mappings to their backing buffers, in
particular DRM GEM objects.
3) Provide a common implementation to perform more complex mapping
operations on the GPU VA space. In particular splitting and merging
of GPU VA mappings, e.g. for intersecting mapping requests or partial
unmap requests.
Acked-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Tested-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Tested-by: Donald Robson <donald.robson@imgtec.com>
Suggested-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230720001443.2380-2-dakr@redhat.com
drm: manager: Fix printk format for size_t
sizeof() returns a size_t which may be different to an unsigned long.
Use the correct format specifier of '%zu' to prevent compiler warnings.
Fixes: e6303f323b1a ("drm: manager to keep track of GPUs VA mappings")
Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/2bf64010-c40a-8b84-144c-5387412b579e@arm.com
drm/gpuva_mgr: remove unused prev pointer in __drm_gpuva_sm_map()
The prev pointer in __drm_gpuva_sm_map() was used to implement automatic
merging of mappings. Since automatic merging did not make its way
upstream, remove this leftover.
Fixes: e6303f323b1a ("drm: manager to keep track of GPUs VA mappings")
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230823233119.2891-1-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: rename struct drm_gpuva_manager to struct drm_gpuvm
Rename struct drm_gpuva_manager to struct drm_gpuvm including
corresponding functions. This way the GPUVA manager's structures align
very well with the documentation of VM_BIND [1] and VM_BIND locking [2].
It also provides a better foundation for the naming of data structures
and functions introduced for implementing a common dma-resv per GPU-VM
including tracking of external and evicted objects in subsequent
patches.
[1] Documentation/gpu/drm-vm-bind-async.rst
[2] Documentation/gpu/drm-vm-bind-locking.rst
Cc: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230920144343.64830-2-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: allow building as module
HB:
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/Kconfig
skipped because there is no gpuvm support of nouveau in 6.1
Currently, the DRM GPUVM does not have any core dependencies preventing
a module build.
Also, new features from subsequent patches require helpers (namely
drm_exec) which can be built as module.
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230920144343.64830-3-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: convert WARN() to drm_WARN() variants
HB:
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c
skipped since 6.1 does not support gpuvm on nv
Use drm_WARN() and drm_WARN_ON() variants to indicate drivers the
context the failing VM resides in.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-2-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: don't always WARN in drm_gpuvm_check_overflow()
Don't always WARN in drm_gpuvm_check_overflow() and separate it into a
drm_gpuvm_check_overflow() and a dedicated
drm_gpuvm_warn_check_overflow() variant.
This avoids printing warnings due to invalid userspace requests.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-3-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: export drm_gpuvm_range_valid()
Drivers may use this function to validate userspace requests in advance,
hence export it.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-4-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: add common dma-resv per struct drm_gpuvm
hb:
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c
skipped
Provide a common dma-resv for GEM objects not being used outside of this
GPU-VM. This is used in a subsequent patch to generalize dma-resv,
external and evicted object handling and GEM validation.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-6-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: add drm_gpuvm_flags to drm_gpuvm
HB:
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c
skipped
Introduce flags for struct drm_gpuvm, this required by subsequent
commits.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-8-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: reference count drm_gpuvm structures
HB:
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c
skipped
Implement reference counting for struct drm_gpuvm.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-10-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: add an abstraction for a VM / BO combination
HB:
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c
skipped
Add an abstraction layer between the drm_gpuva mappings of a particular
drm_gem_object and this GEM object itself. The abstraction represents a
combination of a drm_gem_object and drm_gpuvm. The drm_gem_object holds
a list of drm_gpuvm_bo structures (the structure representing this
abstraction), while each drm_gpuvm_bo contains list of mappings of this
GEM object.
This has multiple advantages:
1) We can use the drm_gpuvm_bo structure to attach it to various lists
of the drm_gpuvm. This is useful for tracking external and evicted
objects per VM, which is introduced in subsequent patches.
2) Finding mappings of a certain drm_gem_object mapped in a certain
drm_gpuvm becomes much cheaper.
3) Drivers can derive and extend the structure to easily represent
driver specific states of a BO for a certain GPUVM.
The idea of this abstraction was taken from amdgpu, hence the credit for
this idea goes to the developers of amdgpu.
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-11-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: track/lock/validate external/evicted objects
Currently the DRM GPUVM offers common infrastructure to track GPU VA
allocations and mappings, generically connect GPU VA mappings to their
backing buffers and perform more complex mapping operations on the GPU VA
space.
However, there are more design patterns commonly used by drivers, which
can potentially be generalized in order to make the DRM GPUVM represent
a basis for GPU-VM implementations. In this context, this patch aims
at generalizing the following elements.
1) Provide a common dma-resv for GEM objects not being used outside of
this GPU-VM.
2) Provide tracking of external GEM objects (GEM objects which are
shared with other GPU-VMs).
3) Provide functions to efficiently lock all GEM objects dma-resv the
GPU-VM contains mappings of.
4) Provide tracking of evicted GEM objects the GPU-VM contains mappings
of, such that validation of evicted GEM objects is accelerated.
5) Provide some convinience functions for common patterns.
Big thanks to Boris Brezillon for his help to figure out locking for
drivers updating the GPU VA space within the fence signalling path.
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Suggested-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231108001259.15123-12-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: fall back to drm_exec_lock_obj()
Fall back to drm_exec_lock_obj() if num_fences is zero for the
drm_gpuvm_prepare_* function family.
Otherwise dma_resv_reserve_fences() would actually allocate slots even
though num_fences is zero.
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Acked-by: Donald Robson <donald.robson@imgtec.com>
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231129220835.297885-2-dakr@redhat.com
drm/gpuvm: Let drm_gpuvm_bo_put() report when the vm_bo object is destroyed
Some users need to release resources attached to the vm_bo object when
it's destroyed. In Panthor's case, we need to release the pin ref so
BO pages can be returned to the system when all GPU mappings are gone.
This could be done through a custom drm_gpuvm::vm_bo_free() hook, but
this has all sort of locking implications that would force us to expose
a drm_gem_shmem_unpin_locked() helper, not to mention the fact that
having a ::vm_bo_free() implementation without a ::vm_bo_alloc() one
seems odd. So let's keep things simple, and extend drm_gpuvm_bo_put()
to report when the object is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231204151406.1977285-1-boris.brezillon@collabora.com
drm/exec: Pass in initial # of objects
HB: skipped
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_amdkfd_gpuvm.c
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_csa.c
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_gem.c
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_mes.c
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_umsch_mm.c
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdkfd/kfd_svm.c
drivers/gpu/drm/imagination/pvr_job.c
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_uvmm.c
In cases where the # is known ahead of time, it is silly to do the table
resize dance.
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/568338/
drm/gem-shmem: When drm_gem_object_init failed, should release object
when goto err_free, the object had init, so it should be release when fail.
Signed-off-by: ChunyouTang <tangchunyou@163.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221119064131.364-1-tangchunyou@163.com
drm: Remove usage of deprecated DRM_DEBUG_PRIME
drm_print.h says DRM_DEBUG_PRIME is deprecated in favor of
drm_dbg_prime().
Signed-off-by: Siddh Raman Pant <code@siddh.me>
Reviewed-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
Signed-off-by: Simon Ser <contact@emersion.fr>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/cd663b1bc42189e55898cddecdb3b73c591b341a.1673269059.git.code@siddh.me
drm/shmem: Cleanup drm_gem_shmem_create_with_handle()
Once we create the handle, the handle owns the reference. Currently
nothing was doing anything with the shmem ptr after the handle was
created, but let's change drm_gem_shmem_create_with_handle() to not
return the pointer, so-as to not encourage problematic use of this
function in the future. As a bonus, it makes the code a bit cleaner.
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230123154831.3191821-1-robdclark@gmail.com
drm/shmem-helper: Fix locking for drm_gem_shmem_get_pages_sgt()
Other functions touching shmem->sgt take the pages lock, so do that here
too. drm_gem_shmem_get_pages() & co take the same lock, so move to the
_locked() variants to avoid recursive locking.
Discovered while auditing locking to write the Rust abstractions.
Fixes: 2194a63a818d ("drm: Add library for shmem backed GEM objects")
Fixes: 4fa3d66f132b ("drm/shmem: Do dma_unmap_sg before purging pages")
Signed-off-by: Asahi Lina <lina@asahilina.net>
Reviewed-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230205125124.2260-1-lina@asahilina.net
drm/shmem-helper: Switch to use drm_* debug helpers
Ease debugging of a multi-GPU system by using drm_WARN_*() and
drm_dbg_kms() helpers that print out DRM device name corresponding
to shmem GEM.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Suggested-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230108210445.3948344-6-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com/
drm/shmem-helper: Don't use vmap_use_count for dma-bufs
DMA-buf core has its own refcounting of vmaps, use it instead of drm-shmem
counting. This change prepares drm-shmem for addition of memory shrinker
support where drm-shmem will use a single dma-buf reservation lock for
all operations performed over dma-bufs.
Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230108210445.3948344-7-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com/
drm/shmem-helper: Switch to reservation lock
Replace all drm-shmem locks with a GEM reservation lock. This makes locks
consistent with dma-buf locking convention where importers are responsible
for holding reservation lock for all operations performed over dma-bufs,
preventing deadlock between dma-buf importers and exporters.
Suggested-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Acked-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230108210445.3948344-8-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com/
drm/shmem-helper: Revert accidental non-GPL export
The referenced commit added a wrapper for drm_gem_shmem_get_pages_sgt(),
but in the process it accidentally changed the export type from GPL to
non-GPL. Switch it back to GPL.
Reported-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
Fixes: ddddedaa0db9 ("drm/shmem-helper: Fix locking for drm_gem_shmem_get_pages_sgt()")
Signed-off-by: Asahi Lina <lina@asahilina.net>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230227-shmem-export-fix-v1-1-8880b2c25e81@asahilina.net
Revert "drm/shmem-helper: Switch to reservation lock"
This reverts commit 67b7836d4458790f1261e31fe0ce3250989784f0.
The locking appears incomplete. A caller of SHMEM helper's pin
function never acquires the dma-buf reservation lock. So we get
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 967 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:243 drm_gem_shmem_pin+0x42/0x90 [drm_shmem_helper]
Signed-off-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Acked-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230228152612.19971-1-tzimmermann@suse.de
drm/shmem-helper: Switch to reservation lock
Replace all drm-shmem locks with a GEM reservation lock. This makes locks
consistent with dma-buf locking convention where importers are responsible
for holding reservation lock for all operations performed over dma-bufs,
preventing deadlock between dma-buf importers and exporters.
Suggested-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Acked-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Emil Velikov <emil.l.velikov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230529223935.2672495-7-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com
drm/shmem-helper: Reset vma->vm_ops before calling dma_buf_mmap()
The dma-buf backend is supposed to provide its own vm_ops, but some
implementation just have nothing special to do and leave vm_ops
untouched, probably expecting this field to be zero initialized (this
is the case with the system_heap implementation for instance).
Let's reset vma->vm_ops to NULL to keep things working with these
implementations.
Fixes: 26d3ac3cb04d ("drm/shmem-helpers: Redirect mmap for imported dma-buf")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Reported-by: Roman Stratiienko <r.stratiienko@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Tested-by: Roman Stratiienko <r.stratiienko@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Zimmermann <tzimmermann@suse.de>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230724112610.60974-1-boris.brezillon@collabora.com
iommu: Allow passing custom allocators to pgtable drivers
This will be useful for GPU drivers who want to keep page tables in a
pool so they can:
- keep freed page tables in a free pool and speed-up upcoming page
table allocations
- batch page table allocation instead of allocating one page at a time
- pre-reserve pages for page tables needed for map/unmap operations,
to ensure map/unmap operations don't try to allocate memory in paths
they're allowed to block or fail
It might also be valuable for other aspects of GPU and similar
use-cases, like fine-grained memory accounting and resource limiting.
We will extend the Arm LPAE format to support custom allocators in a
separate commit.
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231124142434.1577550-2-boris.brezillon@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
iommu: Extend LPAE page table format to support custom allocators
We need that in order to implement the VM_BIND ioctl in the GPU driver
targeting new Mali GPUs.
VM_BIND is about executing MMU map/unmap requests asynchronously,
possibly after waiting for external dependencies encoded as dma_fences.
We intend to use the drm_sched framework to automate the dependency
tracking and VM job dequeuing logic, but this comes with its own set
of constraints, one of them being the fact we are not allowed to
allocate memory in the drm_gpu_scheduler_ops::run_job() to avoid this
sort of deadlocks:
- VM_BIND map job needs to allocate a page table to map some memory
to the VM. No memory available, so kswapd is kicked
- GPU driver shrinker backend ends up waiting on the fence attached to
the VM map job or any other job fence depending on this VM operation.
With custom allocators, we will be able to pre-reserve enough pages to
guarantee the map/unmap operations we queued will take place without
going through the system allocator. But we can also optimize
allocation/reservation by not free-ing pages immediately, so any
upcoming page table allocation requests can be serviced by some free
page table pool kept at the driver level.
I might also be valuable for other aspects of GPU and similar
use-cases, like fine-grained memory accounting and resource limiting.
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231124142434.1577550-3-boris.brezillon@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
drm/sched: Add FIFO sched policy to run queue
When many entities are competing for the same run queue
on the same scheduler, we observe an unusually long wait
times and some jobs get starved. This has been observed on GPUVis.
The issue is due to the Round Robin policy used by schedulers
to pick up the next entity's job queue for execution. Under stress
of many entities and long job queues within entity some
jobs could be stuck for very long time in it's entity's
queue before being popped from the queue and executed
while for other entities with smaller job queues a job
might execute earlier even though that job arrived later
then the job in the long queue.
Fix:
Add FIFO selection policy to entities in run queue, chose next entity
on run queue in such order that if job on one entity arrived
earlier then job on another entity the first job will start
executing earlier regardless of the length of the entity's job
queue.
v2:
Switch to rb tree structure for entities based on TS of
oldest job waiting in the job queue of an entity. Improves next
entity extraction to O(1). Entity TS update
O(log N) where N is the number of entities in the run-queue
Drop default option in module control parameter.
v3:
Various cosmetical fixes and minor refactoring of fifo update function. (Luben)
v4:
Switch drm_sched_rq_select_entity_fifo to in order search (Luben)
v5: Fix up drm_sched_rq_select_entity_fifo loop (Luben)
v6: Add missing drm_sched_rq_remove_fifo_locked
v7: Fix ts sampling bug and more cosmetic stuff (Luben)
v8: Fix module parameter string (Luben)
Cc: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Direct Rendering Infrastructure - Development <dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>
Cc: AMD Graphics <amd-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Yunxiang Li (Teddy) <Yunxiang.Li@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20220930041258.1050247-1-luben.tuikov@amd.com
drm/scheduler: Set the FIFO scheduling policy as the default
The currently default Round-Robin GPU scheduling can result in starvation
of entities which have a large number of jobs, over entities which have
a very small number of jobs (single digit).
This can be illustrated in the following diagram, where jobs are
alphabetized to show their chronological order of arrival, where job A is
the oldest, B is the second oldest, and so on, to J, the most recent job to
arrive.
---> entities
j | H-F-----A--E--I--
o | --G-----B-----J--
b | --------C--------
s\/ --------D--------
WLOG, assuming all jobs are "ready", then a R-R scheduling will execute them
in the following order (a slice off of the top of the entities' list),
H, F, A, E, I, G, B, J, C, D.
However, to mitigate job starvation, we'd rather execute C and D before E,
and so on, given, of course, that they're all ready to be executed.
So, if all jobs are ready at this instant, the order of execution for this
and the next 9 instances of picking the next job to execute, should really
be,
A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J,
which is their chronological order. The only reason for this order to be
broken, is if an older job is not yet ready, but a younger job is ready, at
an instant of picking a new job to execute. For instance if job C wasn't
ready at time 2, but job D was ready, then we'd pick job D, like this:
0 +1 +2 ...
A, B, D, ...
And from then on, C would be preferred before all other jobs, if it is ready
at the time when a new job for execution is picked. So, if C became ready
two steps later, the execution order would look like this:
......0 +1 +2 ...
A, B, D, E, C, F, G, H, I, J
This is what the FIFO GPU scheduling algorithm achieves. It uses a
Red-Black tree to keep jobs sorted in chronological order, where picking
the oldest job is O(1) (we use the "cached" structure), and balancing the
tree is O(log n). IOW, it picks the *oldest ready* job to execute now.
The implementation is already in the kernel, and this commit only changes
the default GPU scheduling algorithm to use.
This was tested and achieves about 1% faster performance over the Round
Robin algorithm.
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <Alexander.Deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Direct Rendering Infrastructure - Development <dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221024212634.27230-1-luben.tuikov@amd.com
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
drm/scheduler: add drm_sched_job_add_resv_dependencies
Add a new function to update job dependencies from a resv obj.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221014084641.128280-3-christian.koenig@amd.com
drm/scheduler: remove drm_sched_dependency_optimized
Not used any more.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221014084641.128280-12-christian.koenig@amd.com
drm/scheduler: rework entity flush, kill and fini
This was buggy because when we had to wait for entities which were
killed as well we would just deadlock.
Instead move all the dependency handling into the callbacks so that
will all happen asynchronously.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221014084641.128280-13-christian.koenig@amd.com
drm/scheduler: rename dependency callback into prepare_job
This now matches much better what this is doing.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221014084641.128280-14-christian.koenig@amd.com
drm/amdgpu: revert "implement tdr advanced mode"
This reverts commit e6c6338f393b74ac0b303d567bb918b44ae7ad75.
This feature basically re-submits one job after another to
figure out which one was the one causing a hang.
This is obviously incompatible with gang-submit which requires
that multiple jobs run at the same time. It's also absolutely
not helpful to crash the hardware multiple times if a clean
recovery is desired.
For testing and debugging environments we should rather disable
recovery alltogether to be able to inspect the state with a hw
debugger.
Additional to that the sw implementation is clearly buggy and causes
reference count issues for the hardware fence.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
drm/scheduler: Fix lockup in drm_sched_entity_kill()
The drm_sched_entity_kill() is invoked twice by drm_sched_entity_destroy()
while userspace process is exiting or being killed. First time it's invoked
when sched entity is flushed and second time when entity is released. This
causes a lockup within wait_for_completion(entity_idle) due to how completion
API works.
Calling wait_for_completion() more times than complete() was invoked is a
error condition that causes lockup because completion internally uses
counter for complete/wait calls. The complete_all() must be used instead
in such cases.
This patch fixes lockup of Panfrost driver that is reproducible by killing
any application in a middle of 3d drawing operation.
Fixes: 2fdb8a8f07c2 ("drm/scheduler: rework entity flush, kill and fini")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221123001303.533968-1-dmitry.osipenko@collabora.com
drm/scheduler: deprecate drm_sched_resubmit_jobs
This interface is not working as it should.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20221109095010.141189-5-christian.koenig@amd.com
drm/scheduler: track GPU active time per entity
Track the accumulated time that jobs from this entity were active
on the GPU. This allows drivers using the scheduler to trivially
implement the DRM fdinfo when the hardware doesn't provide more
specific information than signalling job completion anyways.
[Bagas: Append missing colon to @elapsed_ns]
Signed-off-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Andrey Grodzovsky <andrey.grodzovsky@amd.com>
drm/sched: Create wrapper to add a syncobj dependency to job
In order to add a syncobj's fence as a dependency to a job, it is
necessary to call drm_syncobj_find_fence() to find the fence and then
add the dependency with drm_sched_job_add_dependency(). So, wrap these
steps in one single function, drm_sched_job_add_syncobj_dependency().
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <mcanal@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Maíra Canal <mairacanal@riseup.net>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230209124447.467867-2-mcanal@igalia.com
drm/scheduler: Fix variable name in function description
Compiling AMD GPU drivers displays two warnings:
drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c:738: warning: Function parameter or member 'file' not described in 'drm_sched_job_add_syncobj_dependency'
drivers/gpu/drm/scheduler/sched_main.c:738: warning: Excess function
parameter 'file_private' description in
'drm_sched_job_add_syncobj_dependency'
Get rid of them by renaming the variable name on the function description
Signed-off-by: Caio Novais <caionovais@usp.br>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230325131532.6356-1-caionovais@usp.br
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
drm/scheduler: Add fence deadline support
As the finished fence is the one that is exposed to userspace, and
therefore the one that other operations, like atomic update, would
block on, we need to propagate the deadline from from the finished
fence to the actual hw fence.
v2: Split into drm_sched_fence_set_parent() (ckoenig)
v3: Ensure a thread calling drm_sched_fence_set_deadline_finished() sees
fence->parent set before drm_sched_fence_set_parent() does this
test_bit(DMA_FENCE_FLAG_HAS_DEADLINE_BIT).
Signed-off-by: Rob Clark <robdclark@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Revert "drm/scheduler: track GPU active time per entity"
This reverts commit df622729ddbf as it introduces a use-after-free,
which isn't easy to fix without going back to the design drawing board.
Reported-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
drm/scheduler: Fix UAF race in drm_sched_entity_push_job()
After a job is pushed into the queue, it is owned by the scheduler core
and may be freed at any time, so we can't write nor read the submit
timestamp after that point.
Fixes oopses observed with the drm/asahi driver, found with kASAN.
Signed-off-by: Asahi Lina <lina@asahilina.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230406-scheduler-uaf-2-v1-1-972531cf0a81@asahilina.net
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
drm/sched: Check scheduler ready before calling timeout handling
During an IGT GPU reset test we see the following oops,
[ +0.000003] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ +0.000000] WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 0 at kernel/workqueue.c:1656 __queue_delayed_work+0x6d/0xa0
[ +0.000004] Modules linked in: iptable_filter bpfilter amdgpu(OE) nls_iso8859_1 snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic intel_rapl_msr ledtrig_audio snd_hda_codec_hdmi intel_rapl_common snd_hda_intel edac_mce_amd snd_intel_dspcfg snd_intel_sdw_acpi snd_hda_codec snd_hda_core iommu_v2 gpu_sched(OE) kvm_amd drm_buddy snd_hwdep kvm video drm_ttm_helper snd_pcm ttm snd_seq_midi drm_display_helper snd_seq_midi_event snd_rawmidi cec crct10dif_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel sha512_ssse3 snd_seq aesni_intel rc_core crypto_simd cryptd binfmt_misc drm_kms_helper rapl snd_seq_device input_leds joydev snd_timer i2c_algo_bit syscopyarea snd ccp sysfillrect sysimgblt wmi_bmof k10temp soundcore mac_hid sch_fq_codel msr parport_pc ppdev drm lp parport ramoops reed_solomon pstore_blk pstore_zone efi_pstore ip_tables x_tables autofs4 hid_generic usbhid hid r8169 ahci xhci_pci gpio_amdpt realtek i2c_piix4 wmi crc32_pclmul xhci_pci_renesas libahci gpio_generic
[ +0.000070] CPU: 9 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/9 Tainted: G W OE 6.1.11+ #2
[ +0.000003] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. AB350-Gaming 3/AB350-Gaming 3-CF, BIOS F7 06/16/2017
[ +0.000001] RIP: 0010:__queue_delayed_work+0x6d/0xa0
[ +0.000003] Code: 7a 50 48 01 c1 48 89 4a 30 81 ff 00 20 00 00 75 38 4c 89 cf e8 64 3e 0a 00 5d e9 1e c5 11 01 e8 99 f7 ff ff 5d e9 13 c5 11 01 <0f> 0b eb c1 0f 0b 48 81 7a 38 70 5c 0e 81 74 9f 0f 0b 48 8b 42 28
[ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffc90000398d60 EFLAGS: 00010007
[ +0.000002] RAX: ffff88810d589c60 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000002] RDX: ffff88810d589c58 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000002000
[ +0.000001] RBP: ffffc90000398d60 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88810d589c78
[ +0.000002] R10: 72705f305f39765f R11: 7866673a6d72645b R12: ffff88810d589c58
[ +0.000001] R13: 0000000000002000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ +0.000002] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8887fee40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ +0.000001] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ +0.000002] CR2: 00005562c4797fa0 CR3: 0000000110da0000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
[ +0.000002] Call Trace:
[ +0.000001] <IRQ>
[ +0.000001] mod_delayed_work_on+0x5e/0xa0
[ +0.000004] drm_sched_fault+0x23/0x30 [gpu_sched]
[ +0.000007] gfx_v9_0_fault.isra.0+0xa6/0xd0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000258] gfx_v9_0_priv_reg_irq+0x29/0x40 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000254] amdgpu_irq_dispatch+0x1ac/0x2b0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000243] amdgpu_ih_process+0x89/0x130 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000245] amdgpu_irq_handler+0x24/0x60 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000165] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4f/0x1a0
[ +0.000003] handle_irq_event_percpu+0x15/0x50
[ +0.000001] handle_irq_event+0x39/0x60
[ +0.000002] handle_edge_irq+0xa8/0x250
[ +0.000003] __common_interrupt+0x7b/0x150
[ +0.000002] common_interrupt+0xc1/0xe0
[ +0.000003] </IRQ>
[ +0.000000] <TASK>
[ +0.000001] asm_common_interrupt+0x27/0x40
[ +0.000002] RIP: 0010:native_safe_halt+0xb/0x10
[ +0.000003] Code: 46 ff ff ff cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc cc eb 07 0f 00 2d 69 f2 5e 00 f4 e9 f1 3b 3e 00 90 eb 07 0f 00 2d 59 f2 5e 00 fb f4 <e9> e0 3b 3e 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 53 e8 b1 d4 fe ff 66 90
[ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000018fdc8 EFLAGS: 00000246
[ +0.000002] RAX: 0000000000004000 RBX: 000000000002e5a8 RCX: 000000000000001f
[ +0.000001] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff888101298800 RDI: ffff888101298864
[ +0.000001] RBP: ffffc9000018fdd0 R08: 000000527f64bd8b R09: 000000000001dc90
[ +0.000001] R10: 000000000001dc90 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000001
[ +0.000001] R13: ffff888101298864 R14: ffffffff832d9e20 R15: ffff888193aa8c00
[ +0.000003] ? acpi_idle_do_entry+0x5e/0x70
[ +0.000002] acpi_idle_enter+0xd1/0x160
[ +0.000003] cpuidle_enter_state+0x9a/0x6e0
[ +0.000003] cpuidle_enter+0x2e/0x50
[ +0.000003] call_cpuidle+0x23/0x50
[ +0.000002] do_idle+0x1de/0x260
[ +0.000002] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x30
[ +0.000002] start_secondary+0x120/0x150
[ +0.000003] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb
[ +0.000004] </TASK>
[ +0.000000] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ +0.000003] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000102
[ +0.006233] [drm:amdgpu_job_timedout [amdgpu]] *ERROR* ring gfx_low timeout, signaled seq=3, emitted seq=4
[ +0.000734] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ +0.009670] [drm:amdgpu_job_timedout [amdgpu]] *ERROR* Process information: process amd_deadlock pid 2002 thread amd_deadlock pid 2002
[ +0.005135] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ +0.000002] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ +0.000002] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
[ +0.000002] CPU: 9 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/9 Tainted: G W OE 6.1.11+ #2
[ +0.000002] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. AB350-Gaming 3/AB350-Gaming 3-CF, BIOS F7 06/16/2017
[ +0.012101] amdgpu 0000:0c:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset begin!
[ +0.005136] RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x1f/0x4e0
[ +0.000004] Code: 87 cd 11 01 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 49 89 d5 41 54 49 89 f4 53 48 83 ec 10 89 7d d4 <f6> 86 02 01 00 00 01 0f 85 6c 03 00 00 e8 7f 36 08 00 8b 45 d4 48
For gfx_rings the schedulers may not be initialized by
amdgpu_device_init_schedulers() due to ring->no_scheduler flag being set to
true and thus the timeout_wq is NULL. As a result, since all ASICs call
drm_sched_fault() unconditionally even for schedulers which have not been
initialized, it is simpler to use the ready condition which indicates whether
the given scheduler worker thread runs and whether the timeout_wq of the reset
domain has been initialized.
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Prosyak <vitaly.prosyak@amd.com>
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230406200054.633379-1-luben.tuikov@amd.com
drm/scheduler: set entity to NULL in drm_sched_entity_pop_job()
It already happend a few times that patches slipped through which
implemented access to an entity through a job that was already removed
from the entities queue. Since jobs and entities might have different
lifecycles, this can potentially cause UAF bugs.
In order to make it obvious that a jobs entity pointer shouldn't be
accessed after drm_sched_entity_pop_job() was called successfully, set
the jobs entity pointer to NULL once the job is removed from the entity
queue.
Moreover, debugging a potential NULL pointer dereference is way easier
than potentially corrupted memory through a UAF.
Signed-off-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230418100453.4433-1-dakr@redhat.com
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
drm/scheduler: properly forward fence errors
When a hw fence is signaled with an error properly forward that to the
finished fence.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230420115752.31470-1-christian.koenig@amd.com
drm/scheduler: add drm_sched_entity_error and use rcu for last_scheduled
Switch to using RCU handling for the last scheduled job and add a
function to return the error code of it.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230420115752.31470-2-christian.koenig@amd.com
drm/scheduler: mark jobs without fence as canceled
When no hw fence is provided for a job that means that the job didn't executed.
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230427122726.1290170-1-christian.koenig@amd.com
drm/sched: Check scheduler work queue before calling timeout handling
During an IGT GPU reset test we see again oops despite of
commit 0c8c901aaaebc9 (drm/sched: Check scheduler ready before calling
timeout handling).
It uses ready condition whether to call drm_sched_fault which unwind
the TDR leads to GPU reset.
However it looks the ready condition is overloaded with other meanings,
for example, for the following stack is related GPU reset :
0 gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start
1 gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_resume
2 gfx_v9_0_cp_resume
3 gfx_v9_0_hw_init
4 gfx_v9_0_resume
5 amdgpu_device_ip_resume_phase2
does the following:
/* start the ring */
gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start(adev);
ring->sched.ready = true;
The same approach is for other ASICs as well :
gfx_v8_0_cp_gfx_resume
gfx_v10_0_kiq_resume, etc...
As a result, our GPU reset test causes GPU fault which calls unconditionally gfx_v9_0_fault
and then drm_sched_fault. However now it depends on whether the interrupt service routine
drm_sched_fault is executed after gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start is completed which sets the ready
field of the scheduler to true even for uninitialized schedulers and causes oops vs
no fault or when ISR drm_sched_fault is completed prior gfx_v9_0_cp_gfx_start and
NULL pointer dereference does not occur.
Use the field timeout_wq to prevent oops for uninitialized schedulers.
The field could be initialized by the work queue of resetting the domain.
v1: Corrections to commit message (Luben)
Fixes: 11b3b9f461c5c4 ("drm/sched: Check scheduler ready before calling timeout handling")
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Prosyak <vitaly.prosyak@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230510135111.58631-1-vitaly.prosyak@amd.com
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
drm/sched: Remove redundant check
The rq pointer points inside the drm_gpu_scheduler structure. Thus
it can't be NULL.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.
Fixes: c61cdbdbffc1 ("drm/scheduler: Fix hang when sched_entity released")
Signed-off-by: Vladislav Efanov <VEfanov@ispras.ru>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230517125247.434103-1-VEfanov@ispras.ru
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
drm/sched: Rename to drm_sched_can_queue()
Rename drm_sched_ready() to drm_sched_can_queue(). "ready" can mean many
things and is thus meaningless in this context. Instead, rename to a name
which precisely conveys what is being checked.
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <Alexander.Deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <Alexander.Deucher@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230517233550.377847-1-luben.tuikov@amd.com
drm/sched: Rename to drm_sched_wakeup_if_can_queue()
Rename drm_sched_wakeup() to drm_sched_wakeup_if_canqueue() since the former
is misleading, as it wakes up the GPU scheduler _only if_ more jobs can be
queued to the underlying hardware.
This distinction is important to make, since the wake conditional in the GPU
scheduler thread wakes up when other conditions are also true, e.g. when there
are jobs to be cleaned. For instance, a user might want to wake up the
scheduler only because there are more jobs to clean, but whether we can queue
more jobs is irrelevant.
v2: Separate "canqueue" to "can_queue". (Alex D.)
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <Alexander.Deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230517233550.377847-2-luben.tuikov@amd.com
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <Alexander.Deucher@amd.com>
drm/scheduler: avoid infinite loop if entity's dependency is a scheduled error fence
[Why]
drm_sched_entity_add_dependency_cb ignores the scheduled fence and return false.
If entity's dependency is a scheduler error fence and drm_sched_stop is called
due to TDR, drm_sched_entity_pop_job will wait for the dependency infinitely.
[How]
Do not wait or ignore the scheduled error fence, add drm_sched_entity_wakeup
callback for the dependency with scheduled error fence.
Signed-off-by: ZhenGuo Yin <zhenguo.yin@amd.com>
Acked-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
drm/sched: Make sure we wait for all dependencies in kill_jobs_cb()
drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() logic is omitting the last fence popped
from the dependency array that was waited upon before
drm_sched_entity_kill() was called (drm_sched_entity::dependency field),
so we're basically waiting for all dependencies except one.
In theory, this wait shouldn't be needed because resources should have
their users registered to the dma_resv object, thus guaranteeing that
future jobs wanting to access these resources wait on all the previous
users (depending on the access type, of course). But we want to keep
these explicit waits in the kill entity path just in case.
Let's make sure we keep all dependencies in the array in
drm_sched_job_dependency(), so we can iterate over the array and wait
in drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb().
We also make sure we wait on drm_sched_fence::finished if we were
originally asked to wait on drm_sched_fence::scheduled. In that case,
we assume the intent was to delegate the wait to the firmware/GPU or
rely on the pipelining done at the entity/scheduler level, but when
killing jobs, we really want to wait for completion not just scheduling.
v2:
- Don't evict deps in drm_sched_job_dependency()
v3:
- Always wait for drm_sched_fence::finished fences in
drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() when we see a sched_fence
v4:
- Fix commit message
- Fix a use-after-free bug
v5:
- Flag deps on which we should only wait for the scheduled event
at insertion time
v6:
- Back to v4 implementation
- Add Christian's R-b
Cc: Frank Binns <frank.binns@imgtec.com>
Cc: Sarah Walker <sarah.walker@imgtec.com>
Cc: Donald Robson <donald.robson@imgtec.com>
Cc: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: "Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Suggested-by: "Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: "Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Acked-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230619071921.3465992-1-boris.brezillon@collabora.com
drm/sched: Call drm_sched_fence_set_parent() from drm_sched_fence_scheduled()
Drivers that can delegate waits to the firmware/GPU pass the scheduled
fence to drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), and issue wait commands to
the firmware/GPU at job submission time. For this to be possible, they
need all their 'native' dependencies to have a valid parent since this
is where the actual HW fence information are encoded.
In drm_sched_main(), we currently call drm_sched_fence_set_parent()
after drm_sched_fence_scheduled(), leaving a short period of time
during which the job depending on this fence can be submitted.
Since setting parent and signaling the fence are two things that are
kinda related (you can't have a parent if the job hasn't been
scheduled),
it probably makes sense to pass the parent fence to
drm_sched_fence_scheduled() and let it call drm_sched_fence_set_parent()
before it signals the scheduled fence.
Here is a detailed description of the race we are fixing here:
Thread A Thread B
- calls drm_sched_fence_scheduled()
- signals s_fence->scheduled which
wakes up thread B
- entity dep signaled, checking
the next dep
- no more deps waiting
- entity is picked for job
submission by drm_gpu_scheduler
- run_job() is called
- run_job() tries to
collect native fence info from
s_fence->parent, but it's
NULL =>
BOOM, we can't do our native
wait
- calls drm_sched_fence_set_parent()
v2:
* Fix commit message
v3:
* Add a detailed description of the race to the commit message
* Add Luben's R-b
Signed-off-by: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Cc: Frank Binns <frank.binns@imgtec.com>
Cc: Sarah Walker <sarah.walker@imgtec.com>
Cc: Donald Robson <donald.robson@imgtec.com>
Cc: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Cc: David Airlie <airlied@gmail.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org>
Cc: "Christian König" <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230623075204.382350-1-boris.brezillon@collabora.com
dma-buf: add dma_fence_timestamp helper
When a fence signals there is a very small race window where the timestamp
isn't updated yet. sync_file solves this by busy waiting for the
timestamp to appear, but on other ocassions didn't handled this
correctly.
Provide a dma_fence_timestamp() helper function for this and use it in
all appropriate cases.
Another alternative would be to grab the spinlock when that happens.
v2 by teddy: add a wait parameter to wait for the timestamp to show up, in case
the accurate timestamp is needed and/or the timestamp is not based on
ktime (e.g. hw timestamp)
v3 chk: drop the parameter again for unified handling
Signed-off-by: Yunxiang Li <Yunxiang.Li@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Fixes: 1774baa64f93 ("drm/scheduler: Change scheduled fence track v2")
Reviewed-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20230929104725.2358-1-christian.koenig@amd.com
drm/sched: Convert the GPU scheduler to variable number of run-queues
The GPU scheduler has now a variable number of run-queues, which are set
up at
drm_sched_init() time. This way, each driver announces how many
run-queues it
requires (supports) per each GPU scheduler it creates. Note, that
run-queues
correspond to scheduler "priorities", thus if the number of run-queues
is set
to 1 at drm_sched_init(), then that scheduler supports a single
run-queue,
i.e. single "priority". If a driver further sets a single entity per
run-queue, then this creates a 1-to-1 correspondence between a scheduler
and
a scheduled entity.
Cc: Lucas Stach <l.stach@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Russell King <linux+etnaviv@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Qiang Yu <yuq825@gmail.com>
Cc: Rob Clark <robdclark@gmail.com>
Cc: Abhinav Kumar <quic_abhinavk@quicinc.com>
Cc: Dmitry Baryshkov <dmitry.baryshkov@linaro.org>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Cc: Boris Brezillon <boris.brezillon@collabora.com>
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Emma Anholt <emma@anholt.net>
Cc: etnaviv@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: lima@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: linux-arm-msm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: freedreno@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: nouveau@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Acked-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231023032251.164775-1-luben.tuikov@amd.com
drm/sched: Add drm_sched_wqueue_* helpers
Add scheduler wqueue ready, stop, and start helpers to hide the
implementation details of the scheduler from the drivers.
v2:
- s/sched_wqueue/sched_wqueue (Luben)
- Remove the extra white line after the return-statement (Luben)
- update drm_sched_wqueue_ready comment (Luben)
Cc: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231031032439.1558703-2-matthew.brost@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
drm/sched: Convert drm scheduler to use a work queue rather than kthread
In Xe, the new Intel GPU driver, a choice has made to have a 1 to 1
mapping between a drm_gpu_scheduler and drm_sched_entity. At first this
seems a bit odd but let us explain the reasoning below.
1. In Xe the submission order from multiple drm_sched_entity is not
guaranteed to be the same completion even if targeting the same hardware
engine. This is because in Xe we have a firmware scheduler, the GuC,
which allowed to reorder, timeslice, and preempt submissions. If a using
shared drm_gpu_scheduler across multiple drm_sched_entity, the TDR falls
apart as the TDR expects submission order == completion order. Using a
dedicated drm_gpu_scheduler per drm_sched_entity solve this problem.
2. In Xe submissions are done via programming a ring buffer (circular
buffer), a drm_gpu_scheduler provides a limit on number of jobs, if the
limit of number jobs is set to RING_SIZE / MAX_SIZE_PER_JOB we get flow
control on the ring for free.
A problem with this design is currently a drm_gpu_scheduler uses a
kthread for submission / job cleanup. This doesn't scale if a large
number of drm_gpu_scheduler are used. To work around the scaling issue,
use a worker rather than kthread for submission / job cleanup.
v2:
- (Rob Clark) Fix msm build
- Pass in run work queue
v3:
- (Boris) don't have loop in worker
v4:
- (Tvrtko) break out submit ready, stop, start helpers into own patch
v5:
- (Boris) default to ordered work queue
v6:
- (Luben / checkpatch) fix alignment in msm_ringbuffer.c
- (Luben) s/drm_sched_submit_queue/drm_sched_wqueue_enqueue
- (Luben) Update comment for drm_sched_wqueue_enqueue
- (Luben) Positive check for submit_wq in drm_sched_init
- (Luben) s/alloc_submit_wq/own_submit_wq
v7:
- (Luben) s/drm_sched_wqueue_enqueue/drm_sched_run_job_queue
v8:
- (Luben) Adjust var names / comments
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231031032439.1558703-3-matthew.brost@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
drm/sched: Split free_job into own work item
Rather than call free_job and run_job in same work item have a dedicated
work item for each. This aligns with the design and intended use of work
queues.
v2:
- Test for DMA_FENCE_FLAG_TIMESTAMP_BIT before setting
timestamp in free_job() work item (Danilo)
v3:
- Drop forward dec of drm_sched_select_entity (Boris)
- Return in drm_sched_run_job_work if entity NULL (Boris)
v4:
- Replace dequeue with peek and invert logic (Luben)
- Wrap to 100 lines (Luben)
- Update comments for *_queue / *_queue_if_ready functions (Luben)
v5:
- Drop peek argument, blindly reinit idle (Luben)
- s/drm_sched_free_job_queue_if_ready/drm_sched_free_job_queue_if_done (Luben)
- Update work_run_job & work_free_job kernel doc (Luben)
v6:
- Do not move drm_sched_select_entity in file (Luben)
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231031032439.1558703-4-matthew.brost@intel.com
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
drm/sched: Add drm_sched_start_timeout_unlocked helper
Also add a lockdep assert to drm_sched_start_timeout.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231031032439.1558703-5-matthew.brost@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
drm/sched: Add a helper to queue TDR immediately
Add a helper whereby a driver can invoke TDR immediately.
v2:
- Drop timeout args, rename function, use mod delayed work (Luben)
v3:
- s/XE/Xe (Luben)
- present tense in commit message (Luben)
- Adjust comment for drm_sched_tdr_queue_imm (Luben)
v4:
- Adjust commit message (Luben)
Cc: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <luben.tuikov@amd.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231031032439.1558703-6-matthew.brost@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
drm/sched: Rename drm_sched_get_cleanup_job to be more descriptive
"Get cleanup job" makes it sound like helper is returning a job which will
execute some cleanup, or something, while the kerneldoc itself accurately
says "fetch the next _finished_ job". So lets rename the helper to be self
documenting.
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Cc: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231102105538.391648-2-tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
drm/sched: Move free worker re-queuing out of the if block
Whether or not there are more jobs to clean up does not depend on the
existance of the current job, given both drm_sched_get_finished_job and
drm_sched_free_job_queue_if_done take and drop the job list lock.
Therefore it is confusing to make it read like there is a dependency.
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Cc: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231102105538.391648-3-tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
drm/sched: Rename drm_sched_free_job_queue to be more descriptive
The current name makes it sound like helper will free a queue, while what
it does is it enqueues the free job worker.
Rename it to drm_sched_run_free_queue to align with existing
drm_sched_run_job_queue.
Despite that creating an illusion there are two queues, while in reality
there is only one, at least it creates a consistent naming for the two
enqueuing helpers.
At the same time simplify the "if done" helper by dropping the suffix and
adding a double underscore prefix to the one which just enqueues.
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Cc: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231102105538.391648-4-tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
drm/sched: Rename drm_sched_run_job_queue_if_ready and clarify kerneldoc
"If ready" is not immediately clear what it means - is the scheduler
ready or something else? Drop the suffix, clarify kerneldoc, and employ
the same naming scheme as in drm_sched_run_free_queue:
- drm_sched_run_job_queue - enqueues if there is something to enqueue
*and* scheduler is ready (can queue)
- __drm_sched_run_job_queue - low-level helper to simply queue the job
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Cc: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231102105538.391648-5-tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
drm/sched: Drop suffix from drm_sched_wakeup_if_can_queue
Because a) helper is exported to other parts of the scheduler and
b) there isn't a plain drm_sched_wakeup to begin with, I think we can
drop the suffix and by doing so separate the intimiate knowledge
between the scheduler components a bit better.
Signed-off-by: Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@intel.com>
Cc: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Cc: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231102105538.391648-6-tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com
Reviewed-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
drm/sched: Don't disturb the entity when in RR-mode scheduling
Don't call drm_sched_select_entity() in drm_sched_run_job_queue(). In fact,
rename __drm_sched_run_job_queue() to just drm_sched_run_job_queue(), and let
it do just that, schedule the work item for execution.
The problem is that drm_sched_run_job_queue() calls drm_sched_select_entity()
to determine if the scheduler has an entity ready in one of its run-queues,
and in the case of the Round-Robin (RR) scheduling, the function
drm_sched_rq_select_entity_rr() does just that, selects the _next_ entity
which is ready, sets up the run-queue and completion and returns that
entity. The FIFO scheduling algorithm is unaffected.
Now, since drm_sched_run_job_work() also calls drm_sched_select_entity(), then
in the case of RR scheduling, that would result in drm_sched_select_entity()
having been called twice, which may result in skipping a ready entity if more
than one entity is ready. This commit fixes this by eliminating the call to
drm_sched_select_entity() from drm_sched_run_job_queue(), and leaves it only
in drm_sched_run_job_work().
v2: Rebased on top of Tvrtko's renames series of patches. (Luben)
Add fixes-tag. (Tvrtko)
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Fixes: f7fe64ad0f22ff ("drm/sched: Split free_job into own work item")
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231107041020.10035-2-ltuikov89@gmail.com
drm/sched: Qualify drm_sched_wakeup() by drm_sched_entity_is_ready()
Don't "wake up" the GPU scheduler unless the entity is ready, as well as we
can queue to the scheduler, i.e. there is no point in waking up the scheduler
for the entity unless the entity is ready.
Signed-off-by: Luben Tuikov <ltuikov89@gmail.com>
Fixes: bc8d6a9df99038 ("drm/sched: Don't disturb the entity when in RR-mode scheduling")
Reviewed-by: Danilo Krummrich <dakr@redhat.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20231110000123.72565-2-ltuikov89@gmail.com
drm/sched: implement dynamic job-flow control
Currently, job flow control is implemented simply by limiting the number
of jobs in flight. Therefore, a scheduler is initialized with a credit
limit that corresponds to the number of jobs w…
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This PR will add basic support for Docker on the ubuntu branch:
Not all Docker related requirements can be met at this time (e.g. CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT, CONFIG_CGROUP_PIDS and CONFIG_IPVLAN are left open). It should be easier with a more recent 3.14 kernel e.g. 3.14.79. I've seen that existing drivers aren't build as loadable kernel module, is there a reasoning for this?
Cheers
Uli