Skip to content

Commit

Permalink
Merge pull request #701 from andrewdavidwong/patch-1
Browse files Browse the repository at this point in the history
Update link to physical separation comparison
  • Loading branch information
conorsch authored May 25, 2021
2 parents 1713f74 + df082e3 commit 9a55c9b
Showing 1 changed file with 1 addition and 1 deletion.
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ The Qubes OS approach addresses this at multiple levels:

- We can potentially add VMs that enable end-to-end encrypted communication with other SecureDrop journalists, intermediated by the SecureDrop server. This enables us to add software features that, for example, let journalists collaborate in categorizing submissions, assigning work, versioning changes to documents, and so on.

However, the Qubes OS approach is not without downsides. It stands and falls with the security of Qubes OS itself, which in turn may be impacted by Spectre/Meltdown type CPU level vulnerabilities, hypervisor vulnerabilities, and so on. These risks must be compared against the operational security risks of the current architecture, including the work that journalists do after downloading a submission. The Qubes OS website provides a useful [comparison of its security model with that of using a separate machine](https://www.qubes-os.org/intro/#how-does-qubes-os-compare-to-using-a-separate-physical-machine).
However, the Qubes OS approach is not without downsides. It stands and falls with the security of Qubes OS itself, which in turn may be impacted by Spectre/Meltdown type CPU level vulnerabilities, hypervisor vulnerabilities, and so on. These risks must be compared against the operational security risks of the current architecture, including the work that journalists do after downloading a submission. The Qubes OS website provides a useful [comparison of its security model with that of using a separate machine](https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/#how-does-qubes-os-compare-to-using-a-separate-physical-machine).

While we are strongly committed to piloting the use of Qubes OS for SecureDrop, no final decision has been made to move to this new architecture. This decision will require a full audit of this new approach, consideration of alternatives, and extensive validation with SecureDrop's current user community.

Expand Down

0 comments on commit 9a55c9b

Please sign in to comment.