ext/pcntl: pcntl_exec() using execveat whenever possible instead. #17834
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I don't really know much about Linux API, maybe @NattyNarwhal has a better idea? |
Allows at least to avoid original process file descriptor to leak in the new process image. Then with Linux 6.14, we can add another layer of security to check beforehand if the executable can be actually safely executed.
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| #ifdef AT_EXECVE_CHECK | ||
| // Linux >= 6.14 allows to check if `path` is allowed | ||
| // for execution per kernel security policy (w/o actually running it) | ||
| if (execveat(fd, "", argv, envp, AT_EMPTY_PATH | AT_EXECVE_CHECK) < 0) { |
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If we consider that the check is successful most of the time, does this really makes much sense?
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Allows at least to avoid original process file descriptor to leak in the new process image.
Then with Linux 6.14, we can add another layer of security to check beforehand if the executable can be actually safely executed.