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<html>
<head>
<title>Stand: Defining Digital Freedoms In The UK</title>
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<div id="top">
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<div class="titletomski">Frequently Asked Questions - ID Card Proposals</div>
<div id="page-body">
<div id="main">
<UL>
<LI><A HREF="#money">You Say It's Worth The Money - But It will cost over 1.4 billion</A>
<LI><A HREF="#compulsary">You Say It's Not Compulsory - But Everyone Will Have To Have One?</A>
<LI><A HREF="#leak">You Say It Won't Leak My Information - But How Can You Stop It?</A>
<LI><A HREF="#fraud">You Say It'll Stop Identity Fraud - But It Won't</A>
<LI><A HREF="#immigrants">You Say It'll Stop Illegal Immigrant Workers - But It Won't</A>
<LI><A HREF="#biometrics">You Say You Want Biometrics But Biometrics Don't Work</A>
<LI><A HREF="#abuses">You Say You Care, But You Won't Punish Abuses</A>
<LI><A HREF="#mandate">You Say You've Got A Mandate, But Not From Me You Ain't</A>
</UL>
<A NAME="money"></A><P>
<div class="titletomski">You Say It's Worth The Money - But It will cost over 1.5 billion</div>
The government's consultation paper tells us "Over a three year period
of developing the systems and a ten year period during which the cards
would be valid, the total cost of a scheme would be around £1.5
billion."
<P>
The history of ID card cost estimates in other countries (notably
Australia and the Philippines) has risen sharply toward the
implementation stage. The government has failed to successfully
implement almost every large IT system it has ever undertaken. David
Blunkett told Parliament: "I agree that it is important to recognise the
past failures of Government technology systems".
<P>
It's a rather large amount of money to waste on something that won't
serve the purpose, don't you think?
<A NAME="compulsary"></A>
<P>
<A HREF="#top">top</A>
<P>
<div class="titletomski">You Say It's Not Compulsory - But Everyone Will Have To Have One?</div>
Despite the assurance, in paragraph 2.12, that the card scheme could not
dictate that service providers require the card, we believe that, once
created, central government would find it very difficult not to lay
pressure onto central government-controlled public services, such as the
NHS and the Inland Revenue, not to make use of the card. It stretches
belief that, after the investment of large sums of money, the government
would not find itself under political pressure to show that the scheme
was worthwhile and presenting efficiency savings, no matter how
contrived.
And chances are, you'll <A HREF="http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/idcard/uk/uk-idcard-faq.html#compulsory">be legally obliged to apply for the card</A>
<A NAME="leak"></A>
<P>
<A HREF="#top">top</A>
<P>
<div class="titletomski">You Say It Won't Leak My Information - But How Can You Stop It?</div>
Well, the record sure ain't good thus far. There is no shortage of stories about police officers
abusing criminal records databases. Read some <A HREF="http://www.techtv.com/cybercrime/privacy/story/0,23008,3387549,00.html">here</A>
<P>
But for our money, the <A HREF="http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic/integ7.pdf">Home Office's very own report</A>
(PDF) on Police Integrity makes for the most interesting reading.
<BLOCKQUOTE>
THE INTEGRITY OF INFORMATION<BR>
6.6 Most police intelligence is now stored on computers and, with many members of staff
being able to access it through their own terminal, it is a daunting task to try and protect it. To
illustrate the potential problem, the Inspection Team is aware a spot audit in one force revealed
that within 24 hours of the arrest of a high profile criminal for alleged murder, 67 officers
accessed his intelligence record. When interviewed, most acknowledged they did it purely out of
curiosity but it would have been equally possible for an unscrupulous member of staff to leak
the information unlawfully to other criminals or the press.
</BLOCKQUOTE>
If that's the culture right now inside the police regarding *criminal* data,
it's doesn't bode well.
<A NAME="fraud"></A>
<P>
<A HREF="#top">top</A>
<P>
<div class="titletomski">You Say It'll Stop Identity Fraud - But It Won't</div>
If the cards have any value whatsoever, then people will find a way to
forge them or to acquire them dishonestly. This point is quite certain.
The technology gap between governments and organised crime worldwide has
now narrowed to such an extent that even the most highly secure cards
are available as blanks weeks within weeks of their introduction.
One should bear in mind, also, that criminal use of fake identity
documents does not necessarily involve the use of counterfeiting
techniques. In 1999, a former accountant was charged in London with
obtaining up to 500 passports under false identities. The scam was
merely a manipulation of the primary documentation procedure.
<P>
It is worth considering some inevitable formulae that apply across the
board to the black-market economy. Whenever governments, worldwide,
attempt to introduce an ID card, it is always based, at least in part,
on the aim of eliminating false identity. The higher the integrity or
infallibility of a card, the greater is its value to criminals and
illegal immigrants. A high value card naturally attracts substantially
larger investment in corruption and counterfeit activity. The equation
is simple - a higher value ID document equates to greater criminal
activity. Criminals and terrorists can, in reality, move much more
freely, safely and confidently with several fake "official" identities
than they ever could in a country using multiple forms of "low value" ID
such as birth certificates, as the UK does currently.
<A NAME="immigrants"></A>
<P>
<A HREF="#top">top</A>
<P>
<div class="titletomski">You Say It'll Stop Illegal Immigrant Workers - But It Won't</div>
One of the govt's suggestion, rather predictably, is that the card might
help combat illegal immigration. Of course, as plenty of people will be
able to enter the country without a card -- not least as casual tourists
-- this is largely fallacious.
<P>
The perception that people would be able
illegally to enter the UK and to gain employment here, having done so,
is unlikely to be suppressed by the introduction of a card proving
lawful residence. Especially, given that many of the kinds of people who
employ illegal immigrants -- individuals seeking cleaners, parts of the
construction industry seeking casual labourers and so on - are not in
the least bit concerned by the legality of such practices and are
unlikely to request their employees' ID cards before offering
employment.
<P>
Indeed, the mental image of transit vans pulling up to
groups of young men waiting patiently on the kerb-side at dawn and
asking for their ID cards before whisking them off to a construction
site as casual labour is somewhat risible.
<P>
Black markets, by definition,
operate illegally and have operated since society first tried to
regulate markets; they have little reason to be worried that another
hurdle has been placed in their path. In the same fashion, unscrupulous
employers just wouldn't care whether they have not checked their
employees' ID.
<A NAME="biometrics"></A>
<P>
<A HREF="#top">top</A>
<P>
<div class="titletomski">You Say You Want Biometrics But Biometrics Don't Work</div>
The government sets itself, in paragraph 5.21, three standards that much
be met before it would be comfortable with implementing a biometric
scheme with the ID card. These three standards are that the biometric
technology or technologies in question:
<UL>
<LI> would be sufficiently mature and reliable</LI>
<LI> could be implemented at a cost which justified the benefits</LI>
<LI>were acceptable to members of the public</LI>
</UL>
We feel that none of these conditions could be met, now or in the
foreseeable future.
<P>
For more informtaion, take a look at
<A HREF="http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0205.html#5">Bruce Schneier's coverage</A> of the
gummi fingerprints or the <A HREF="http://archive.aclu.org/issues/privacy/drawing_blank.pdf">ACLU's report</A> (PDF)
on a facial recognition study in Florida.
<A NAME="abuses"></A>
<P>
<A HREF="#top">top</A>
<P>
<div class="titletomski">You Say You Care, But You Won't Punish Abuses</div>
We are also very disappointed that the government does not seem to
consider it necessary to include criminal sanctions for unauthorised
access to or misuse of individuals' data, something that is worryingly
typical of the way in which the Civil Service seems to address issues of
individuals' rights to privacy in the UK.
<P>
We consider that, in order to provide any level of public confidence in
any scheme, there should be far greater sanctions for such abuses of the
scheme than there should be for the relatively trivial 'offences' of
forgetting to tell the central government that one has moved house. As
the Home Office was reminded in Summer 2002 with the badly thought-out
Standing Order to extend RIP Act section 22 powers, there are many cases
where state officials with access to sensitive data about citizens have
abused that power. See
<A NAME="mandate"></A>
<P>
<A HREF="#top">top</A>
<P>
<div class="titletomski">You Say You've Got A Mandate, But Not From Me You Ain't</div>
ID Cards are one of those ideas
that the public never votes on, but governments always
propose. There is no mention of them in the
<A HREF="http://www.labour.org.uk/generalelectionmanifesto/">Labour Party's manifesto</A>.
<P>
But it's OK.
<P>
You will not be required to use a card unless you wish to work, use the banking or health system,
vote, buy a house, drive, travel or receive benefits.<P>
As Mr Blunkett advised Parliament: "The issuing of a card does not force
anyone to use it, although in terms of drivers or passport users,
or if services - whether public or private - required some proof of
identity before expenditure was laid out, without proof of identity and
therefore entitlement to do it I doubt whether non-use of it would last very long."
<P>
<div class="titletomski">Want to know even more?</A>
The <A HREF="http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/idcard/uk/uk-idcard-faq.html">Privacy International FAQ</A>
on the ID Card proposals is well worth a read.
<P>
<P>
<P>
<P>
<P>
<P>
<P>
</div>
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