From 0153500e805c37ea522c1acce620dc0499b41cc3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wendell Piez "
-
+
`
\*\*\*
Here's a markdown string.
-This `string should *break` (overlap)*
-`code` may occasionally turn up `in the middle`.
-Here's a ***really interesting*** markdown string.
-Some paragraphs might have [links elsewhere](https://link.org).
+ +This `string should *break` (overlap)*
+ +`code` may occasionally turn up `in the middle`.
+ +Here's a ***really interesting*** markdown string.
+ +Some paragraphs might have [links elsewhere](https://link.org).
\ No newline at end of file diff --git a/build/metaschema/lib/metaschema-check.sch b/build/metaschema/lib/metaschema-check.sch index 222bec1bba..fc57141527 100644 --- a/build/metaschema/lib/metaschema-check.sch +++ b/build/metaschema/lib/metaschema-check.sch @@ -20,7 +20,6 @@Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider defines the time period for non-user accounts (e.g., accounts associated with devices). The time periods are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO. Where user management is a function of the service, reports of activity of consumer users shall be made available.
+The service provider defines the time period for non-user accounts (e.g., accounts associated with devices). The time periods are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO. Where user management is a function of the service, reports of activity of consumer users shall be made available.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: Should use a shorter timeframe than AC-12.
+Should use a shorter timeframe than AC-12.
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Required if shared/group accounts are deployed
+Required if shared/group accounts are deployed
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Required if shared/group accounts are deployed
+Required if shared/group accounts are deployed
+NIST added this control to the NIST High Baseline during the 1/15/2015
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(a) Guidance: Required for privileged accounts.
-(b) Guidance: Required for privileged accounts.
+Required for privileged accounts.
+Required for privileged accounts.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. If there is a significant high-impact risk of inadvertent or intentional data leakage with a system deployed in a shared-service environment, this control is justified to mitigate that risk. Similar justification applies when an organization needs to ensure data isolation between different types of information enclaves within the organization.
-ANALYSIS. Although this control is usually employed to control flows between different classified enclaves, it can also apply to non-classified scenarios (e.g., the need to isolate legal, personnel, health-related, financial, or other information or files deemed sensitive.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Sensitive free-text information passes from the personnel department to the rest of the organization. Law-enforcement sensitive information is inadvertently pulled from the organization's general counsel case management system and passed outside the department to users without authorization to view that information. HIPAA-protected health information flows freely from the HR department to all employees. Privacy-Act information flows from an HR system into a publicly released report.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Integrity-Assured, Adaptive, Manageable, Assessed, Auditable, Regulated, Controlled, Monitored, Providing Good Data Stewardship, Assured, Competent, Confidential, Data Controllable, Access-Controlled.
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: CSPs have the option to provide a separation of duties matrix as an attachment to the SSP.
+Guidance: CSPs have the option to provide a separation of duties matrix as an attachment to the SSP.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: Examples of security functions include but are not limited to: establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters, system programming, system and security administration, other privileged functions.
+Examples of security functions include but are not limited to: establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters, system programming, system and security administration, other privileged functions.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-CSP Insider Threat mitigation; Good housekeeping and a best business practice for the protection of the CSP and customer alike. In a cloud environment, the power (and potentially harm) of the privileged users is greatly magnified because of the scale. For that reason periodic review of privileges is important.
-Priority for adding to FedRAMP-M: HIGH
-This control is not part of the NIST high baseline and was added for FedRAMP at the recommendation of DoD and NIST. This is a CNSSI 1253 control.
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. If an organization's mobile devices carry information whose loss would have a high impact, this control is warranted in order to mitigate the risk of such loss.
-ANALYSIS. The technologies associated with this control are well established COTS hardware and software.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Mobile device is lost, falls into the hands of people without authorization to view the information contained on the device.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Integrity-Assured, Usable, Adaptive, Manageable, Agile, Supported, Assessed, Auditable, Regulated, Controlled, Monitored, Providing Good Data Stewardship, Assured, Confidential, Data Controllable, Access-Controlled, Mission Assured.
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider shall determine elements of the cloud environment that require the System Use Notification control. The elements of the cloud environment that require System Use Notification are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
-Requirement: The service provider shall determine how System Use Notification is going to be verified and provide appropriate periodicity of the check. The System Use Notification verification and periodicity are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
-Guidance: If performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then the % of items requiring setting that are checked and that pass (or fail) check can be provided.
-Requirement: If not performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then there must be documented agreement on how to provide results of verification and the necessary periodicity of the verification by the service provider. The documented agreement on how to provide verification of the results are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+The service provider shall determine elements of the cloud environment that require the System Use Notification control. The elements of the cloud environment that require System Use Notification are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+The service provider shall determine how System Use Notification is going to be verified and provide appropriate periodicity of the check. The System Use Notification verification and periodicity are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO. If performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then the % of items requiring setting that are checked and that pass (or fail) check can be provided.
+If not performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then there must be documented agreement on how to provide results of verification and the necessary periodicity of the verification by the service provider. The documented agreement on how to provide verification of the results are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Recommended by High Baseline Tiger Team. vulnerabilities associated with not having a logout button are well-documented.
-Guidance: https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_logout_functionality_%28OTG-SESS-006%29
+https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Testing_for_logout_functionality_%28OTG-SESS-006%29
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Rationale for Selection: Best business practice for the protection of the CSP and customer alike " when not intended for use". This is an unanticipated vector for attack if present and active. While probably not an issue with data center servers and networking devices, wireless is becoming embedded in many components and devices such as printers, fax devices, copiers, scanners, communications devices, etc. There is the additional potential that wireless capabilities may become available in air conditioners, power centers, power controllers, lighting, alarm systems, etc. There is a potential that these capabilities could exist without organizational awareness. Selection drivedsawareness. It's better to perform the check than to make assumptions about what devices are in the IS.
-ECSB Supplemental Guidance as the C/CE relates to CSPs
-The application of this control enchancement should include all systems and devices in the CSP facility such as printers, fax devices, copiers, scanners, communications devices, air conditioners, power centers, power controllers, lighting, alarm systems, etc. Wireless networking capabilities should be disabled when they are near or networked with systems supporting customer's services.
-Priority for adding to FedRAMP-M: Moderate
-(Low L1/2)
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. High-impact systems warrant significantly elevated protection; one of these elevated protections is provided through simulated no-notice attacks that exercise users' ability to detect and respond correctly to attempts to steal internal information in their possession.
-ANALYSIS. These controls are well understood and widely installed; COTS components keep implementation time and cost low.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Cybersecurity staff do not know how to monitor, respond, and manage complex enforcement systems and subsystems. Cybersecurity staff is not properly trained to understand how the controls are to operate. Staff does not understand the event alarms/logs. Staff is not able to protect from unauthorized disclosure. Staff is careless with handling data, or unwilling to follow the established security protocols, or willing to cut corners to save time.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Integrity-Assured, Assessed, Auditable, Controlled, Monitored, Providing Good Data Stewardship, Assured, Competent, Confidential.
-NEED. High-impact systems warrant significantly elevated protection.
-ANALYSIS. These controls are well understood and widely installed.
-THREAT VECTORS ADDRESSED. Staff does not know how to monitor or manage complex systems in a way that supports effective management decision or control. Malicious actors manipulate the system to appear as if functioning normally when in reality, it is not. People fail to review event logs. People make unauthorized changes to event logger.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Integrity-Assured, Assessed, Auditable, Controlled, Monitored, Providing Good Data Stewardship, Assured, Competent, Confidential.
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: Annually or whenever changes in the threat environment are communicated to the service provider by the JAB/AO.
+Annually or whenever changes in the threat environment are communicated to the service provider by the JAB/AO.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: For client-server transactions, the number of bytes sent and received gives bidirectional transfer information that can be helpful during an investigation or inquiry.
+The service provider defines audit record types [FedRAMP Assignment: session, connection, transaction, or activity duration; for client-server transactions, the number of bytes received and bytes sent; additional informational messages to diagnose or identify the event; characteristics that describe or identify the object or resource being acted upon; individual identities of group account users; full-text of privileged commands]. The audit record types are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+For client-server transactions, the number of bytes sent and received gives bidirectional transfer information that can be helpful during an investigation or inquiry.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO. In multi-tennant environments, capability and means for providing review, analysis, and reporting to consumer for data pertaining to consumer shall be documented.
+Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO. In multi-tennant environments, capability and means for providing review, analysis, and reporting to consumer for data pertaining to consumer shall be documented.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
+ + + + +Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
+ + + + + + +The service provider selects primary and secondary time servers used by the NIST Internet time service. The secondary server is selected from a different geographic region than the primary server.
+The service provider synchronizes the system clocks of network computers that run operating systems other than Windows to the Windows Server Domain Controller emulator or to the same time source for that server.
+Synchronization of system clocks improves the accuracy of log analysis.
+NEED. Due to the complexity of independent systems exchanging security-related monitoring data, and high-impact systems implemented in shared-service environments, the responsible organization needs a centralized capability that integrates these various data sources into a unified whole permitting central review and analysis of diverse log data relevant to security audits.
-ANALYSIS. This control permits analysts and auditors to focus on their primary duty of analyzing log data, and relieves them of the usual burden of discovery, collection, validation, aggregation, and indexing of large log datasets relevant to system security. Since these latter collection tasks have been automated under this control, less time and funding will be required to execute this core audit/analysis activity.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Staff does not know how to monitor or manage complex systems in a way that supports effective management decision or control. Malicious actors manipulate the system to appear as if functioning normally, when it is not. People fail to review event logs. People make unauthorized changes to event logger."
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Monitored.
+ + + + + + +The service provider retains audit records on-line for at least ninety days and further preserves audit records off-line for a period that is in accordance with NARA requirements.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
+ + + + + +See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Annual Assessment Guidance https://www.fedramp.gov/documents/
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+ +For JAB Authorization, must use an accredited Third Party Assessment Organization (3PAO).
+This control is not part of the NIST high baseline and was added for FedRAMP.
+ +To include 'announced', 'vulnerability scanning'
+Rationale for Selection L3-6: In support of cyber security threat / incident response activities. Supports flexibility in auditing levels based on threat level. Supports CSP integration with DoD security architecture. The sensitivity of the information at levels 3-6 warrents the adjustment of auditing levels based on threat level.
-ECSB Supplemental Guidance as the C/CE relates to CSPs: This CE supports cyber security threat / incident response activities and flexibility in auditing levels based on threat level. This CE also supports CSP integration with DoD security architecture and the ability to respond to USCYBERCOM and DoD CNDSP alerts and directives.
-NOTE L1/2: The handling of alerts from US-CERT and other credible sources is sufficient to change auditing activities if this CE is tailored in via an SLA.
-NOTE: L3-6: The handling of alerts and directives from USCYBERCOM and DoD CNDSPs is required at these levels in addition to handling of alerts from US-CERTand other credible sources.
-Priority for adding to FedRAMP-M: High
+ + + +Refer to Appendix H - Cloud Considerations of the TIC 2.0 Reference Architecture document.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
+ +For JAB Authorization, CSPs shall include details of this control in their Architecture Briefing
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
+ +Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M) must be provided at least monthly.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M) Template Completion Guide https://www.fedramp.gov/documents/
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider selects primary and secondary time servers used by the NIST Internet time service. The secondary server is selected from a different geographic region than the primary server.
-Requirement: The service provider synchronizes the system clocks of network computers that run operating systems other than Windows to the Windows Server Domain Controller emulator or to the same time source for that server.
-Guidance: Synchronization of system clocks improves the accuracy of log analysis.
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider retains audit records on-line for at least ninety days and further preserves audit records off-line for a period that is in accordance with NARA requirements.
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Non-repudiation
-Non-repudiation
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: For JAB Authorization, must use an accredited 3PAO.
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: To include 'announced', 'vulnerability scanning'
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: Refer to Appendix H - Cloud Considerations of the TIC 2.0 Reference Architecture document.
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: For JAB Authorization, CSPs shall include details of this control in their Architecture Briefing
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: Requirement: POA&Ms must be provided at least monthly.
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(c) Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F. The service provider describes the types of changes to the information system or the environment of operations that would impact the risk posture. The types of changes are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+ +Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F. The service provider describes the types of changes to the information system or the environment of operations that would impact the risk posture. The types of changes are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: Operating System Scans: at least monthly Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually
-Guidance: CSPs must provide evidence of closure and remediation of high vulnerabilities within the timeframe for standard POA&M updates.
-Operating System Scans: at least monthly
-Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly
-All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually
+Operating System Scans: at least monthly. Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly. All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually.
+CSPs must provide evidence of closure and remediation of high vulnerabilities within the timeframe for standard POA&M updates.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide https://www.fedramp.gov/documents/
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. Organization requires independent data to validate that current security monitoring continues to target the right data, and that no gaps have opened between what is currently measured and what needs to be measured given the constantly evolving threat environment. In particular, the organization determines that security management will need trend analytics tuned to the current security climate to ensure the organization's security officials maintain general situational awareness of larger security trends that may pose a threat to the organization's high-impact systems fielded in shared-service environments.
-ANALYSIS. Implementation of this control should provide security management with a technical advantage by forcing them to maintain continual current awareness of the larger security threat-scape, rather than become lost in the lower-level details of specific security metrics.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS ADDRESSED. Stakeholders do not have the information they need to make sound decisions due to technology capability. System fails to send alarms, logs, and other pertinent data to the event manager. Control processes involve too many layers of review, concurrence, and revision to support effective and timely conveyance of relevant information to decision-makers. Monitoring not effectively linked to control processes.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Monitored, Controlled
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Penetration Test Guidance https://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(a) Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F, page F-7.
+Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F, page F-7.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider establishes a central means of communicating major changes to or developments in the information system or environment of operations that may affect its services to the federal government and associated service consumers (e.g., electronic bulletin board, web status page). The means of communication are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
-(e) Guidance: In accordance with record retention policies and procedures.
+The service provider establishes a central means of communicating major changes to or developments in the information system or environment of operations that may affect its services to the federal government and associated service consumers (e.g., electronic bulletin board, web status page). The means of communication are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+In accordance with record retention policies and procedures.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Rationale for De-Selection L1/2: The sensitivity of the information at these levels may not require a information security representative to be a member of the organization-defined configuration change control element.
-Rationale for Selection L3-6: This is a best business practice for the protection of the CSP and customer alike in that the security representative will be more aware of IA issues that configuration changes can introduce and he/she can more easily provide IA guidance for issues spotted.
-Rationale for SA L1: Cryptographic mechanisms are only required at this level for priviledged user (system administrator / SA) access control and the transport of privileged commands or configuration files. Not the publicly released information served at this level.
-Rationale for Selection L2-6: Best practice. Supplemental guidance for this CE refers primarily to the processes surrounding the management of the cryptographic mechanisms used. These processes need to be under change management that addresses security concerns to ensure they remain secure.
-CE supplemental guidance.
-Regardless of the cryptographic means employed (e.g., public key, private key, shared secrets), organizations ensure that there are processes and procedures in place to effectively manage those means. For example, if devices use certificates as a basis for identification and authentication, there needs to be a process in place to address the expiration of those certificates.
-Priority for adding to FedRAMP-M: High
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: If digital signatures/certificates are unavailable, alternative cryptographic integrity checks (hashes, self-signed certs, etc.) can be utilized.
+If digital signatures/certificates are unavailable, alternative cryptographic integrity checks (hashes, self-signed certs, etc.) can be utilized.
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(a)-1 Requirement 1: The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish configuration settings or establishes its own configuration settings if USGCB is not available.
-(a)-2 Requirement 2: The service provider shall ensure that checklists for configuration settings are Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) validated or SCAP compatible (if validated checklists are not available).
-(a) Guidance: Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc
+The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish configuration settings or establishes its own configuration settings if USGCB is not available.
+The service provider shall ensure that checklists for configuration settings are Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) (http://scap.nist.gov/) validated or SCAP compatible (if validated checklists are not available).
+Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/United-States-Government-Configuration-Baseline.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(b) Requirement: The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services or establishes its own list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services if USGCB is not available.
-Guidance: Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc
-(Partially derived from AC-17(8).
+The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services or establishes its own list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services if USGCB is not available.
+Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc. Partially derived from AC-17(8).
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: This control shall be implemented in a technical manner on the information system to only allow programs to run that adhere to the policy (i.e. white listing). This control is not to be based off of strictly written policy on what is allowed or not allowed to run.
+This control shall be implemented in a technical manner on the information system to only allow programs to run that adhere to the policy (i.e. white listing). This control is not to be based off of strictly written policy on what is allowed or not allowed to run.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: must be provided at least monthly or when there is a change.
+Must be provided at least monthly or when there is a change.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. High-impact systems will require special measures to ensure users cannot place the overall system at risk by installing unauthorized software. This control supports that need.
-ANALYSIS. Implementation of these controls is well understood, and relies on capabilities provided in COTS operating systems.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. The system executes malicious and harmful software. Software updates could render the system unstable or cause it to function incorrectly. Software is not designed with adequate safeguards to protect PII and other sensitive information. Users could make mistakes in following policy. Users could intentionally install unapproved/unvetted software.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Quality Assured, Substantiated Integrity, Maintainable, Testable, Configuration Managed, Change Managed, Supported, Assessed, Auditable, Authorized, Regulated, Enforcement, Controlled, Reliable, Providing Good Data Stewardship, Assured, Confidential, Access-Controlled
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: For JAB authorizations the contingency lists include designated FedRAMP personnel.
+For JAB authorizations the contingency lists include designated FedRAMP personnel.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(a) Requirement: The service provider develops test plans in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-34 (as amended); plans are approved by the JAB/AO prior to initiating testing.
+The service provider develops test plans in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-34 (as amended); plans are approved by the JAB/AO prior to initiating testing.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(a) Requirement: The service provider defines a time period consistent with the recovery time objectives and business impact analysis.
+The service provider defines a time period consistent with the recovery time objectives and business impact analysis.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: The service provider may determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between the primary and alternate processing sites, based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites will be less relevant.
+The service provider may determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between the primary and alternate processing sites, based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites will be less relevant.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider defines a time period consistent with the recovery time objectives and business impact analysis.
+The service provider defines a time period consistent with the recovery time objectives and business impact analysis.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider shall determine what elements of the cloud environment require the Information System Backup control. The service provider shall determine how Information System Backup is going to be verified and appropriate periodicity of the check.
-(a) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of user-level information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.
-(b) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of system-level information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.
-(c) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of information system documentation including security information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.
+The service provider shall determine what elements of the cloud environment require the Information System Backup control. The service provider shall determine how Information System Backup is going to be verified and appropriate periodicity of the check.
+The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of user-level information (at least one of which is available online).
+The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of system-level information (at least one of which is available online).
+The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of information system documentation including security information (at least one of which is available online).
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: PIV=separate device. Please refer to NIST SP 800-157 Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials.
+PIV=separate device. Please refer to NIST SP 800-157 Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: Include Common Access Card (CAC), i.e., the DoD technical implementation of PIV/FIPS 201/HSPD-12.
+Include Common Access Card (CAC), i.e., the DoD technical implementation of PIV/FIPS 201/HSPD-12.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(e) Requirement: The service provider defines the time period of inactivity for device identifiers.
-Guidance: For DoD clouds, see DoD cloud website for specific DoD requirements that go above and beyond FedRAMP http://iase.disa.mil/cloud_security/Pages/index.aspx.
+The service provider defines the time period of inactivity for device identifiers.
+For DoD clouds, see DoD cloud website for specific DoD requirements that go above and beyond FedRAMP http://iase.disa.mil/cloud_security/Pages/index.aspx.
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: Authenticators must be compliant with NIST SP 800-63-2 Electronic Authentication Guideline assurance Level 4 (Link http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63-2.pdf)
+Authenticators must be compliant with NIST SP 800-63-3 Digital Identity Guidelines IAL, AAL, FAL level 3. Link https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
+If password policies are compliant with NIST SP 800-63B Memorized Secret (Section 5.1.1) Guidance, the control may be considered compliant.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: If automated mechanisms which enforce password authenticator strength at creation are not used, automated mechanisms must be used to audit strength of created password authenticators.
+If automated mechanisms which enforce password authenticator strength at creation are not used, automated mechanisms must be used to audit strength of created password authenticators.
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. In those cases where an organization's user accounts authenticate to more than one system, and at least one of those systems is a high-impact system implemented in a shared-service environment, then this control is warranted as a baseline capability to guard against loss of high-impact, sensitive information.
-ANALYSIS. Organizations can use COTS tools and techniques to implement this control in many ways. Agencies should be prepared to document their plan and approach to this control technique.
-THREAT VECTORS ADDRESSED. A user's account password is cracked, permitting attackers to identify all systems to which the user has access, and to gain access to the information in those systems.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Monitored, Assessed
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Rationale for Selection: Best practice for authenticated web services and best business practice for the protection of the CSP and customer alike. ECSB sees this as a significant value add toward the protection of customer accounts on SaaS or customer service / managent interfaces/portals.
-L1 Rationale for SA: No authenticators are required for user access to public informationl. Info sensitivity does not warrant. However this CE would be required priviledged user access to manage the system server(s) containing public information.
-ECSB Supplemental Guidance as the C/CE relates to CSPs: CSP must minimally implement this control enhancement on all SaaS offerings and customer service / managent interfaces. The time period can be negotiated in the SLA.
-NOTE: while the browser or other client cashes the authenticator, the server must enforce its expiration if the client does not.
-Priority for adding to FedRAMP-M: Low
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
--2 Requirement: The service provider defines tests and/or exercises in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-61 (as amended). For JAB authorization, the service provider provides test plans to the JAB/AO annually. Test plans are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO prior to test commencing.
+The service provider defines tests and/or exercises in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-61 (as amended). For JAB authorization, the service provider provides test plans to the JAB/AO annually. Test plans are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO prior to test commencing.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider ensures that individuals conducting incident handling meet personnel security requirements commensurate with the criticality/sensitivity of the information being processed, stored, and transmitted by the information system.
+The service provider ensures that individuals conducting incident handling meet personnel security requirements commensurate with the criticality/sensitivity of the information being processed, stored, and transmitted by the information system.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. Organization requires near real-time subsystem reconfiguration for high-impact systems, especially those deployed wholly or partially into shared-service environments. This dynamic reconfiguration is required for core infrastructure components such as routers, firewalls, messaging gateways, or access control/authentication servers, especially when these core components are under cyber-attack.
-ANALYSIS. These critical cyber controls are well understood, and to some extent their automated capability has been established. Other aspects still require human decisions. Since this technology area is rapidly changing to meet new cyber-threat scenarios, it is expected that implementation of this control will be subject to significant change for the foreseeable future. Even so, its technology advantages are clear, especially for high-impact systems infrastructure.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. System does not have error-correcting or self-recovery capabilities. The system is not designed to allow for quick remediation of threats that will impact the system.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Survivable, Absorptive, Adaptive, Restorable
-NEED. Due to the direct connection between system function and critical mission/business capability, the system requires Continuity-of-Operations (COOP) controls.
-ANALYSIS. These critical cyber controls are well understood, and to some extent their automated capability has been established. Other aspects still require human decisions. Since this technology area is rapidly changing to meet new cyber-threat scenarios and also changes in subsystem technology, it is expected that implementation of this control will be subject to significant change for the foreseeable future. Even so, its technology advantages are fundamental, especially for high-impact systems infrastructure.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. The system does not have error-correcting or self-recovery capabilities. The system is not designed to allow for quick remediation of threats that will impact the system. Time does not allow for the design in error handling, self-recovery, or to capitalize on system diversity to restore a system. Also, the organization lacks the expertise to develop or implement a plan for restoring system. A malicious change may be implemented to counter the ability to restore the system.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Survivable, Absorptive, Adaptable, Restorable
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. High-impact systems will require special measures to ensure security incidents are correctly and effectively handled in a timely manner. This high-level control supports that need, and is therefore warranted as a baseline for high-impact systems in shared-service environments.
-ANALYSIS. Implementation of this general control is well understood among Departments and Agencies. However, it may require special funding and time to implement in a shared service environment, where response roles and responsibilities demand vigilant analysis and definition.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Insiders gain access to information for which they have no authorization. Insiders push sensitive information to outside networks not authorized to receive it. Insiders violate agency information-security policies. Insider actions are not monitored.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Agile, Owned, Enforcement
-This control was recommended ecommended by the High Baseline Tiger Team.
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: Reports security incident information according to FedRAMP Incident Communications Procedure.
+Report security incident information according to FedRAMP Incident Communications Procedure.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(b) Requirement: The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
-(e) Requirement: The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
+The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
+The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Rationale for Selection: Best practice business practice for the protection of the CSP and customer alike. Protects against unauthorized access and compromise of the CSP infrastructure. See Supplemental Guidance
-ECSB Supplemental Guidance as the C/CE relates to CSPs: While AC-17(2) is similar to this CE and implements cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions, System configuration, maintenance and diagnostic communications can be considered sensitive information and it is in DoD. Maintaining the confidrntiality and integrity of nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications helps maintain the health of the system, prevents unauthorized access from sniffing and MITM atacks, etc. While beneficial this selection may not be required for nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications over the CSP's private network and particularly if that network is out of band. Encryption is required if such communications are over a network external to the CSP (e.g., the Internet).
-Priority for adding to FedRAMP-M: High
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(b) Guidance: Second parameter not-applicable
+Second parameter not-applicable
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(a) Requirement: The service provider defines controlled areas within facilities where the information and information system reside.
+The service provider defines controlled areas within facilities where the information and information system reside.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(a) Requirement: The service provider defines security measures to protect digital and non-digital media in transport. The security measures are approved and accepted by the JAB.
+The service provider defines security measures to protect digital and non-digital media in transport. The security measures are approved and accepted by the JAB.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: Equipment and procedures may be tested or validated for effectiveness
+Equipment and procedures may be tested or validated for effectiveness
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(a) Requirements: The service provider measures temperature at server inlets and humidity levels by dew point.
+The service provider measures temperature at server inlets and humidity levels by dew point.
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(b) Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F, page F-7.
+Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F, page F-7.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F.
-(d) Requirement: Include all Authoring Officials and FedRAMP ISSOs.
+Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F
+Include all Authorizing Officials; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
+An accredited independent assessor scans operating systems/infrastructure, web applications, and databases once annually.
(a) Requirement: an accredited independent assessor scans operating systems/infrastructure, web applications, and databases once annually.
-(e) Requirement: to include the Risk Executive; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP
+To include all Authorizing Officials; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP.
Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents> Vulnerability Scanning Requirements (https://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/)
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: include in Continuous Monitoring ISSO digest/report to JAB/AO
+Include in Continuous Monitoring ISSO digest/report to JAB/AO
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirements: This enhancement is required for all high vulnerability scan findings.
-Guidance: While scanning tools may label findings as high or critical, the intent of the control is based around NIST's definition of high vulnerability.
+This enhancement is required for all high vulnerability scan findings.
+While scanning tools may label findings as high or critical, the intent of the control is based around NIST's definition of high vulnerability.
+NEED. Organizations commonly run vulnerability scanning tools against diverse enterprise systems and subsystems. These tools are often attuned to the specific subsystems, and often provided by different manufacturers. Because there is no single-vendor consolidation of all scanning tools, organizations need to correlate the outputs of these tools in order to triangulate on potential threats that may be related, or identical at their source. When the security impact is high a shared-service environment may increase the number of independent scanning tools, implementation of this control is warranted.
-ANALYSIS. Although this control is well understood by vendors, its implementation takes many forms, depending on the scanning tools adopted by a particular organization.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Different scanning tools discover low-impact vulnerabilities in multiple subsystems of a system. Considered individually, none of them warrants immediate action,; yet when considered together, they constitute a significant attack pattern.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Interoperable, Change Managed, Agile, Supported, Assessed, Monitored
-Guidance: If multiple tools are not used, this control is not applicable.
+If multiple tools are not used, this control is not applicable.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: The use of Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) evaluated products is strongly preferred.
-See http://www.niap-ccevs.org/vpl or http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/products.html.
+The use of Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) evaluated products is strongly preferred. See http://www.niap-ccevs.org/vpl or http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/products.html.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: CSP must use the same security standards regardless of where the system component or information system service is acquired.
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
+ +CSP must use the same security standards regardless of where the system component or information system service is acquired.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-(e) Requirement: for JAB authorizations, track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and report findings to organization-defined personnel, to include FedRAMP.
+For JAB authorizations, track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and report findings to organization-defined personnel, to include FedRAMP.
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider documents in the Continuous Monitoring Plan, how newly developed code for the information system is reviewed.
+The service provider documents in the Continuous Monitoring Plan, how newly developed code for the information system is reviewed.
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider documents in the Continuous Monitoring Plan, how newly developed code for the information system is reviewed.
+The service provider documents in the Continuous Monitoring Plan, how newly developed code for the information system is reviewed.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. High-impact systems warrant careful attention to scenarios associated with exfiltration of sensitive organizational information. Different systems and implementation will trigger different scenarios, but regardless of the specific system context, organizations are warranted in establishing this control for high-impact systems with subsystems deployed into shared-service environments.
-ANALYSIS. Organizations should devote careful attention to design considerations relative to this control.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Authorized processes push very large volumes of data to external networks. Internal devices send address/status/security information to external networks.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES: Integrity-Assured, Absorptive, Survivable, Adaptive, Agile, Auditable, Monitored, Controlled, Data Controllable, Access-Controlled
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider defines key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components associated with system and security administration and isolates those tools, mechanisms, and support components from other internal information system components via physically or logically separate subnets.
-Guidance: Examples include: information security tools, mechanisms, and support components such as, but not limited to PKI, patching infrastructure, cyber defense tools, special purpose gateway, vulnerability tracking systems, internet access points (IAPs); network element and data center administrative/management traffic; Demilitarized Zones (DMZs), Server farms/computing centers, centralized audit log servers etc.
+The service provider defines key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components associated with system and security administration and isolates those tools, mechanisms, and support components from other internal information system components via physically or logically separate subnets.
+Examples include: information security tools, mechanisms, and support components such as, but not limited to PKI, patching infrastructure, cyber defense tools, special purpose gateway, vulnerability tracking systems, internet access points (IAPs); network element and data center administrative/management traffic; Demilitarized Zones (DMZs), Server farms/computing centers, centralized audit log servers etc.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. High-impact systems warrant careful attention to situations where specific sources or methods become suspect. Such situations can involve specific user accounts, messages, message payloads, data, applications, or even entire subsystems. Under these circumstances, a capability for dynamic segregation is highly justified.
-ANALYSIS. Isolation techniques are well understood in the cyber market, and constantly evolving. Example techniques include honey pots and honey nets. Both techniques can isolate a user, an autonomous application, or an entire subsystem.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Anomalous user behavior is detected Messages arrive from suspect domains. Messages arrive with suspect attachments. Applications begin to behave anomalously. Subsystems begin moving data anomalously.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Integrity-Assured, Absorptive, Survivable, Adaptive, Agile, Auditable, Monitored, Controlled, Data Controllable, Access-Controlled
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: Federally approved cryptography
+Federally approved and validated cryptography.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The information system provides disablement (instead of physical disconnect) of collaborative computing devices in a manner that supports ease of use.
+The information system provides disablement (instead of physical disconnect) of collaborative computing devices in a manner that supports ease of use.
+Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Rationale for Selection: Rationale for Selection for SA L1: At L1 this CE is only applicable to privileged user sessions.
-Rationale for Selection L1-6: Best Practice; APT. This CE mitigates the threat/vulnerability inherant in authenticated sessions whereby If an adversary captures a session identifier that remains valid after the session is terminated, the adversary could use it to reinitiate the session thus gaining unauthorized access to CSP and CSP customer resources and information/data.
-ECSB Supplemental Guidance as the C/CE relates to CSPs: If an adversary captures a session identifier that remains valid after the session is terminated, the adversary could use it to reinitiate the session thus gaining unauthorized access to CSP and/or CSP customer resources and information/data. While unnessary for user sessions at L1, this enhancement is selected for System Administrator sessions.
-Priority for adding to FedRAMP-M: High
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: The organization supports the capability to use cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest.
+The organization supports the capability to use cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest.
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: See US-CERT Incident Response Reporting Guidelines.
+See US-CERT Incident Response Reporting Guidelines.
+Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Guidance: In accordance with the incident response plan.
+In accordance with the incident response plan.
+NEED. When a high-impact system is implemented in a shared-service environment, organizations should ensure their sensitive data is properly protected against classic threats to the confidentiality of its sensitive information. This control partially meets that need.
-ANALYSIS. The tools and techniques for implementing this monitoring control are now well understood and embedded in COTS operating systems and software.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Large outbound file transfers execute without being detected. External malware network sites are accessed from within the organization without detection. Network sessions remain connected for long periods of time without detection. Esoteric protocols are active and undetected on ports not defined by the organization.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Monitored
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. When a high-impact system is implemented in a shared-service environment, organizations should ensure their sensitive data is properly protected against classic threats to the confidentiality of sensitive information. This control partially meets that need.
-ANALYSIS. The tools and techniques for implementing this monitoring control are now well understood, and embedded in COTS operating systems and software.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Large outbound files are disguised to transfer without being detected. Communications with external malware network sites are embedded to avoid detection.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Substantiated Integrity, Monitored, Assessed
-Rationale for De-Selection L1-3: The information sensitivity at these levels does not seem to warrant implementation of this CE. The costs for instituting fine-grained monitoring per individual far may outweigh the risks
-Rationale for selection L4-6: SP Insider Threat mitigation; The information sensitivity at these levels warrants implementation of this CE.Best business practice for the protection of the CSP and customer alike. This enhancement works in conjunction with AC-2 (13) account disablement for such individuals and IR-4 (6).
-ECSB Supplemental Guidance as the C/CE relates to CSPs: This enhancement works in conjunction with or opposite of AC-2 (13) which requires acount disablement within a specific time frame of discovering or identifying an individual posing a significant insider threat. In some instances the best action is not to terminate the individual's account, but rather to monitor their actions. This allows for the ability to collect evidence (for prosecution) and obtain insight into the TTPs that they may be using and others they may working with. Termination of the account is often best left as a final act.
-Priority for adding to FedRAMP-M: Moderate
-Rationale for Selection: Best business practice for the protection of the CSP and customer alike. Given the scale of a cloud, the possible harm by an malicious insider is greatly magnified over normal systems.
-ECSB Supplemental Guidance as the C/CE relates to CSPs: his CE is on a par with SI-4 (9), IR-4 (6) and the various other insider threat Cs/CEs. Supports the mitigation of insider threat from those that can do the most damage. While CSPs typically claim they only have privileged users in their infrastructure (other than customers), this CEadds value for privilege users that have higher privilege than others. These higher privileged users should be subject to additional monitoring.
-Priority for adding to FedRAMP-M: High
-NEED. When a high-impact system is implemented across networks in a shared-service environment, organizations should monitor network services to protect against unauthorized services capable of exfiltrating sensitive information. This control meets that monitoring need.
-ANALYSIS. The tools and techniques for implementing this monitoring control are well understood, and embedded in COTS operating systems and software.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Systems daemons and application services running in the background, exfiltrating sensitive information to external networks.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Monitored, Assessed
-Included in FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-NEED. When a high-impact system is implemented across networks in a shared-service environment, organizations should aggressively monitor for symptoms that system integrity has been compromised. This control addresses that monitoring need.
-ANALYSIS. The tools and techniques for implementing this monitoring control are no longer unusual, but their implementation still requires careful initial analysis of tools, standards, and sources for indicators of compromise (IOC) data. This capability is not a simple matter of installing COTS software and watching for alerts. Rather, it requires staff to maintain a keen understanding of the threat-scape in order to properly understand the alerts coming from the IOC subsystem.
-SAMPLE THREAT VECTORS. Temporary files appear but are not associated with any known system processes; independent security services warn of new surveillance techniques appearing globally; evidence of those new techniques appears in an organization's event logs. Reports on the payload of a new botnet indicate that the system has been touched by the botnet.
-RELEVANT SECURITY CONTROL ATTRIBUTES. Monitored, Assessed
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Included in NIST High Baseline, Rev 4 and FedRAMP Moderate Baseline, Rev 4
-Requirement: The service provider shall determine elements of the cloud environment that require the System Use Notification control. The elements of the cloud environment that require System Use Notification are approved and accepted by the JAB.
-Requirement: The service provider shall determine how System Use Notification is going to be verified and provide appropriate periodicity of the check. The System Use Notification verification and periodicity are approved and accepted by the JAB.
-Guidance: If performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then the % of items requiring setting that are checked and that pass (or fail) check can be provided. AC-8 Requirement: If not performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then there must be documented agreement on how to provide results of verification and the necessary periodicity of the verification by the service provider. The documented agreement on how to provide verification of the results are approved and accepted by the JAB.
+The service provider shall determine elements of the cloud environment that require the System Use Notification control. The elements of the cloud environment that require System Use Notification are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+The service provider shall determine how System Use Notification is going to be verified and provide appropriate periodicity of the check. The System Use Notification verification and periodicity are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO. If performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then the % of items requiring setting that are checked and that pass (or fail) check can be provided.
+If not performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then there must be documented agreement on how to provide results of verification and the necessary periodicity of the verification by the service provider. The documented agreement on how to provide verification of the results are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Requirement: Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Requirement: Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO. In multi-tennant environments, capability and means for providing review, analysis, and reporting to consumer for data pertaining to consumer shall be documented.
+Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO. In multi-tennant environments, capability and means for providing review, analysis, and reporting to consumer for data pertaining to consumer shall be documented.
+Requirement: The service provider retains audit records on-line for at least ninety days and further preserves audit records off-line for a period that is in accordance with NARA requirements.
+The service provider retains audit records on-line for at least ninety days and further preserves audit records off-line for a period that is in accordance with NARA requirements.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Annual Assessment Guidance https://www.fedramp.gov/documents/
+Requirement: Must use an accredited 3PAO for JAB authorization
+For JAB Authorization, must use an accredited Third Party Assessment Organization (3PAO).
+Guidance: Requirement: POA&Ms must be provided at least monthly.
+Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M) must be provided at least monthly.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M) Template Completion Guide https://www.fedramp.gov/documents/
+-c. Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F. The service provider describes the types of changes to the information system or the environment of operations that would impact the risk posture. The types of changes are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F. The service provider describes the types of changes to the information system or the environment of operations that would impact the risk posture. The types of changes are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Requirement: Operating System Scans: at least monthly Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually
-Guidance: CSPs must provide evidence of closure and remediation of high vulnerabilities within the timeframe for standard POA&M updates.
-Operating System Scans: at least monthly
-Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly
-All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually
+Operating System Scans: at least monthly. Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly. All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually.
+CSPs must provide evidence of closure and remediation of high vulnerabilities within the timeframe for standard POA&M updates.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide https://www.fedramp.gov/documents/
+(a) Requirement 1: The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish configuration settings or establishes its own configuration settings if USGCB is not available.
-(a) Requirement 2: The service provider shall ensure that checklists for configuration settings are Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) validated or SCAP compatible (if validated checklists are not available).
-(a) Guidance: Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc
+The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish configuration settings or establishes its own configuration settings if USGCB is not available.
+The service provider shall ensure that checklists for configuration settings are Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) (http://scap.nist.gov/) validated or SCAP compatible (if validated checklists are not available).
+Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/United-States-Government-Configuration-Baseline.
+(b) Requirement: The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services or establishes its own list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services if USGCB is not available.
-Guidance: Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc
-(Partially derived from AC-17(8).)
+The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services or establishes its own list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services if USGCB is not available.
+Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc + Partially derived from AC-17(8).
+Requirement: must be provided at least monthly or when there is a change.
+Must be provided at least monthly or when there is a change.
+Requirement: For JAB authorizations the contingency lists include designated FedRAMP personnel.
+For JAB authorizations the contingency lists include designated FedRAMP personnel.
+(a). Requirement: The service provider develops test plans in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-34 (as amended); plans are approved by the JAB/AO prior to initiating testing.
+The service provider develops test plans in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-34 (as amended); plans are approved by the JAB/AO prior to initiating testing.
+Requirement: The service provider shall determine what elements of the cloud environment require the Information System Backup control. The service provider shall determine how Information System Backup is going to be verified and appropriate periodicity of the check.
-(a) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of user-level information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.
-(b) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of system-level information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.
-(c) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of information system documentation including security information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.
+The service provider shall determine what elements of the cloud environment require the Information System Backup control. The service provider shall determine how Information System Backup is going to be verified and appropriate periodicity of the check.
+The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of user-level information (at least one of which is available online).
+The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of system-level information (at least one of which is available online).
+The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of information system documentation including security information (at least one of which is available online).
+Guidance: Include Common Access Card (CAC), i.e., the DoD technical implementation of PIV/FIPS 201/HSPD-12.
+Include Common Access Card (CAC), i.e., the DoD technical implementation of PIV/FIPS 201/HSPD-12.
+(e) Requirement: The service provider defines time period of inactivity for device identifiers.
-Guidance: For DoD clouds, see DoD cloud website for specific DoD requirements that go above and beyond FedRAMP http://iase.disa.mil/cloud_security/Pages/index.aspx.
+The service provider defines the time period of inactivity for device identifiers.
+For DoD clouds, see DoD cloud website for specific DoD requirements that go above and beyond FedRAMP http://iase.disa.mil/cloud_security/Pages/index.aspx.
+Authenticators must be compliant with NIST SP 800-63-3 Digital Identity Guidelines IAL, AAL, FAL level 1. Link https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3.
+If password policies are compliant with NIST SP 800-63B Memorized Secret (Section 5.1.1) Guidance, the control may be considered compliant.
+Requirement: The service provider ensures that individuals conducting incident handling meet personnel security requirements commensurate with the criticality/sensitivity of the information being processed, stored, and transmitted by the information system.
+The service provider ensures that individuals conducting incident handling meet personnel security requirements commensurate with the criticality/sensitivity of the information being processed, stored, and transmitted by the information system.
+Requirement: Reports security incident information according to FedRAMP Incident Communications Procedure.
+Report security incident information according to FedRAMP Incident Communications Procedure.
+(b) Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance: The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
-(e) Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance: The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
+The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
+The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
+(a). Requirements: The service provider measures temperature at server inlets and humidity levels by dew point.
+The service provider measures temperature at server inlets and humidity levels by dew point.
+Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F.
+Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F
+Include all Authorizing Officials; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP.
+(a) Requirement: an accredited independent assessor scans operating systems/infrastructure, web applications, and databases once annually.
-(e) Requirement: to include the Risk Executive; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP
+An accredited independent assessor scans operating systems/infrastructure, web applications, and databases once annually.
+To include all Authorizing Officials; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents> Vulnerability Scanning Requirements (https://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/)
+Guidance: The use of Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) evaluated products is strongly preferred.
-See http://www.niap-ccevs.org/vpl or http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/products.html.
+The use of Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) evaluated products is strongly preferred. See http://www.niap-ccevs.org/vpl or http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/products.html.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents> Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide https://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents
+Independent Assessors should assess the risk associated with the use of external services. See the FedRAMP page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents>FedRAMP Authorization Boundary Guidance
+Guidance: Federally approved cryptography
+Federally approved and validated cryptography.
+Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance:
-Requirement: The information system provides disablement (instead of physical disconnect) of collaborative computing devices in a manner that supports ease of use.
+The information system provides disablement (instead of physical disconnect) of collaborative computing devices in a manner that supports ease of use.
+Guidance: See US-CERT Incident Response Reporting Guidelines.
+See US-CERT Incident Response Reporting Guidelines.
+Guidance: should use a shorter timeframe than AC-12.
+Should use a shorter timeframe than AC-12.
+Required if shared/group accounts are deployed
+Required if shared/group accounts are deployed
+Required if shared/group accounts are deployed
+Required if shared/group accounts are deployed
+(a) Guidance: Required for privileged accounts.
-(b) Guidance: Required for privileged accounts.
+Required for privileged accounts.
+Required for privileged accounts.
+Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance:
-Guidance: CSPs have the option to provide a separation of duties matrix as an attachment to the SSP.
+Guidance: CSPs have the option to provide a separation of duties matrix as an attachment to the SSP.
+Guidance: Examples of security functions include but are not limited to: establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters, system programming, system and security administration, other privileged functions.
+Examples of security functions include but are not limited to: establishing system accounts, configuring access authorizations (i.e., permissions, privileges), setting events to be audited, and setting intrusion detection parameters, system programming, system and security administration, other privileged functions.
+Requirement: The service provider shall determine elements of the cloud environment that require the System Use Notification control. The elements of the cloud environment that require System Use Notification are approved and accepted by the JAB.
-Requirement: The service provider shall determine how System Use Notification is going to be verified and provide appropriate periodicity of the check. The System Use Notification verification and periodicity are approved and accepted by the JAB.
-Guidance: If performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then the % of items requiring setting that are checked and that pass (or fail) check can be provided. AC-8 Requirement: If not performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then there must be documented agreement on how to provide results of verification and the necessary periodicity of the verification by the service provider. The documented agreement on how to provide verification of the results are approved and accepted by the JAB.
+The service provider shall determine elements of the cloud environment that require the System Use Notification control. The elements of the cloud environment that require System Use Notification are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+The service provider shall determine how System Use Notification is going to be verified and provide appropriate periodicity of the check. The System Use Notification verification and periodicity are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO. If performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then the % of items requiring setting that are checked and that pass (or fail) check can be provided.
+If not performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then there must be documented agreement on how to provide results of verification and the necessary periodicity of the verification by the service provider. The documented agreement on how to provide verification of the results are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Requirement: Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Guidance: Annually or whenever changes in the threat environment are communicated to the service provider by the JAB.
+Annually or whenever changes in the threat environment are communicated to the service provider by the JAB/AO.
Requirement: The service provider defines audit record types. The audit record types are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO. Guidance: For client-server transactions, the number of bytes sent and received gives bidirectional transfer information that can be helpful during an investigation or inquiry.
+The service provider defines audit record types [FedRAMP Assignment: session, connection, transaction, or activity duration; for client-server transactions, the number of bytes received and bytes sent; additional informational messages to diagnose or identify the event; characteristics that describe or identify the object or resource being acted upon; individual identities of group account users; full-text of privileged commands]. The audit record types are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+For client-server transactions, the number of bytes sent and received gives bidirectional transfer information that can be helpful during an investigation or inquiry.
+Requirement: Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO. In multi-tennant environments, capability and means for providing review, analysis, and reporting to consumer for data pertaining to consumer shall be documented.
+Coordination between service provider and consumer shall be documented and accepted by the JAB/AO. In multi-tennant environments, capability and means for providing review, analysis, and reporting to consumer for data pertaining to consumer shall be documented.
+Requirement: The service provider selects primary and secondary time servers used by the NIST Internet time service. The secondary server is selected from a different geographic region than the primary server.
-Requirement: The service provider synchronizes the system clocks of network computers that run operating systems other than Windows to the Windows Server Domain Controller emulator or to the same time source for that server.
-Guidance: Synchronization of system clocks improves the accuracy of log analysis.
+The service provider selects primary and secondary time servers used by the NIST Internet time service. The secondary server is selected from a different geographic region than the primary server.
+The service provider synchronizes the system clocks of network computers that run operating systems other than Windows to the Windows Server Domain Controller emulator or to the same time source for that server.
+Synchronization of system clocks improves the accuracy of log analysis.
+Requirement: The service provider retains audit records on-line for at least ninety days and further preserves audit records off-line for a period that is in accordance with NARA requirements.
+The service provider retains audit records on-line for at least ninety days and further preserves audit records off-line for a period that is in accordance with NARA requirements.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Annual Assessment Guidance https://www.fedramp.gov/documents/
+Requirement: Must use an accredited 3PAO for JAB authorization
+For JAB Authorization, must use an accredited Third Party Assessment Organization (3PAO).
+Requirement: To include 'announced', 'vulnerability scanning'
+To include 'announced', 'vulnerability scanning'
+Guidance: Refer to Appendix H - Cloud Considerations of the TIC 2.0 Reference Architecture document.
+Refer to Appendix H - Cloud Considerations of the TIC 2.0 Reference Architecture document.
+For JAB Authorization, CSPs shall include details of this control in their Architecture Briefing
+For JAB Authorization, CSPs shall include details of this control in their Architecture Briefing
+Guidance: Requirement: POA&Ms must be provided at least monthly.
+Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M) must be provided at least monthly.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M) Template Completion Guide https://www.fedramp.gov/documents/
+-c. Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F. The service provider describes the types of changes to the information system or the environment of operations that would impact the risk posture. The types of changes are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F. The service provider describes the types of changes to the information system or the environment of operations that would impact the risk posture. The types of changes are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Requirement: Operating System Scans: at least monthly Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually
-Guidance: CSPs must provide evidence of closure and remediation of high vulnerabilities within the timeframe for standard POA&M updates.
-Operating System Scans: at least monthly
-Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly
-All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually
+Operating System Scans: at least monthly. Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly. All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually.
+CSPs must provide evidence of closure and remediation of high vulnerabilities within the timeframe for standard POA&M updates.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide https://www.fedramp.gov/documents/
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Penetration Test Guidance https://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/
+Requirement: The service provider establishes a central means of communicating major changes to or developments in the information system or environment of operations that may affect its services to the federal government and associated service consumers (e.g., electronic bulletin board, web status page). The means of communication are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
--e Guidance: In accordance with record retention policies and procedures.
+The service provider establishes a central means of communicating major changes to or developments in the information system or environment of operations that may affect its services to the federal government and associated service consumers (e.g., electronic bulletin board, web status page). The means of communication are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+In accordance with record retention policies and procedures.
+Guidance: If digital signatures/certificates are unavailable, alternative cryptographic integrity checks (hashes, self-signed certs, etc.) can be utilized.
+If digital signatures/certificates are unavailable, alternative cryptographic integrity checks (hashes, self-signed certs, etc.) can be utilized.
+(a) Requirement 1: The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish configuration settings or establishes its own configuration settings if USGCB is not available.
-(a) Requirement 2: The service provider shall ensure that checklists for configuration settings are Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) validated or SCAP compatible (if validated checklists are not available).
-(a) Guidance: Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc
+The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish configuration settings or establishes its own configuration settings if USGCB is not available.
+The service provider shall ensure that checklists for configuration settings are Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) (http://scap.nist.gov/) validated or SCAP compatible (if validated checklists are not available).
+Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/United-States-Government-Configuration-Baseline.
+(b) Requirement: The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services or establishes its own list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services if USGCB is not available.
-Guidance: Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc
-(Partially derived from AC-17(8).)
+The service provider shall use the Center for Internet Security guidelines (Level 1) to establish list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services or establishes its own list of prohibited or restricted functions, ports, protocols, and/or services if USGCB is not available.
+Information on the USGCB checklists can be found at: http://usgcb.nist.gov/usgcb_faq.html#usgcbfaq_usgcbfdcc. Partially derived from AC-17(8).
+Guidance: This control shall be implemented in a technical manner on the information system to only allow programs to run that adhere to the policy (i.e. white listing). This control is not to be based off of strictly written policy on what is allowed or not allowed to run.
+This control shall be implemented in a technical manner on the information system to only allow programs to run that adhere to the policy (i.e. white listing). This control is not to be based off of strictly written policy on what is allowed or not allowed to run.
+Requirement: must be provided at least monthly or when there is a change.
+Must be provided at least monthly or when there is a change.
+Requirement: For JAB authorizations the contingency lists include designated FedRAMP personnel.
+For JAB authorizations the contingency lists include designated FedRAMP personnel.
+(a). Requirement: The service provider develops test plans in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-34 (as amended); plans are approved by the JAB/AO prior to initiating testing.
+The service provider develops test plans in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-34 (as amended); plans are approved by the JAB/AO prior to initiating testing.
+(a). Requirement: The service provider defines a time period consistent with the recovery time objectives and business impact analysis.
+The service provider defines a time period consistent with the recovery time objectives and business impact analysis.
+Guidance: The service provider may determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between the primary and alternate processing sites, based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites will be less relevant.
+The service provider may determine what is considered a sufficient degree of separation between the primary and alternate processing sites, based on the types of threats that are of concern. For one particular type of threat (i.e., hostile cyber attack), the degree of separation between sites will be less relevant.
+Requirement: The service provider defines a time period consistent with the recovery time objectives and business impact analysis.
+The service provider defines a time period consistent with the recovery time objectives and business impact analysis.
+Requirement: The service provider shall determine what elements of the cloud environment require the Information System Backup control. The service provider shall determine how Information System Backup is going to be verified and appropriate periodicity of the check.
-(a) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of user-level information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.
-(b) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of system-level information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.
-(c) Requirement: The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of information system documentation including security information (at least one of which is available online) or provides an equivalent alternative.
+The service provider shall determine what elements of the cloud environment require the Information System Backup control. The service provider shall determine how Information System Backup is going to be verified and appropriate periodicity of the check.
+The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of user-level information (at least one of which is available online).
+The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of system-level information (at least one of which is available online).
+The service provider maintains at least three backup copies of information system documentation including security information (at least one of which is available online).
+Guidance: PIV=separate device. Please refer to NIST SP 800-157 Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials.
+PIV=separate device. Please refer to NIST SP 800-157 Guidelines for Derived Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Credentials.
+Guidance: Include Common Access Card (CAC), i.e., the DoD technical implementation of PIV/FIPS 201/HSPD-12.
+Include Common Access Card (CAC), i.e., the DoD technical implementation of PIV/FIPS 201/HSPD-12.
+(e) Requirement: The service provider defines time period of inactivity for device identifiers.
-Guidance: For DoD clouds, see DoD cloud website for specific DoD requirements that go above and beyond FedRAMP http://iase.disa.mil/cloud_security/Pages/index.aspx.
+The service provider defines the time period of inactivity for device identifiers.
+For DoD clouds, see DoD cloud website for specific DoD requirements that go above and beyond FedRAMP http://iase.disa.mil/cloud_security/Pages/index.aspx.
+Authenticators must be compliant with NIST SP 800-63-3 Digital Identity Guidelines IAL, AAL, FAL level 2. Link https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3.
+If password policies are compliant with NIST SP 800-63B Memorized Secret (Section 5.1.1) Guidance, the control may be considered compliant.
+Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance: Guidance: If automated mechanisms which enforce password authenticator strength at creation are not used, automated mechanisms must be used to audit strength of created password authenticators.
+If automated mechanisms which enforce password authenticator strength at creation are not used, automated mechanisms must be used to audit strength of created password authenticators.
+-2 Requirement 1: The service provider defines tests and/or exercises in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-61 (as amended).
--2 Requirement 2: For JAB Authorization, the service provider provides test plans to the JAB/AO annually.
--2 Requirement 3: Test plans are approved and accepted by the Authorizing Official (AO) prior to test commencing.
+The service provider defines tests and/or exercises in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-61 (as amended). For JAB authorization, the service provider provides test plans to the JAB/AO annually. Test plans are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO prior to test commencing.
+Requirement: The service provider ensures that individuals conducting incident handling meet personnel security requirements commensurate with the criticality/sensitivity of the information being processed, stored, and transmitted by the information system.
+The service provider ensures that individuals conducting incident handling meet personnel security requirements commensurate with the criticality/sensitivity of the information being processed, stored, and transmitted by the information system.
+Requirement: Reports security incident information according to FedRAMP Incident Communications Procedure.
+Report security incident information according to FedRAMP Incident Communications Procedure.
+(b) Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance: The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
-(e) Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance: The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
+The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
+The service provider defines a list of incident response personnel (identified by name and/or by role) and organizational elements. The incident response list includes designated FedRAMP personnel.
+Requirement: Only MA-5 (1)(a)(1) is required by FedRAMP Moderate Baseline
+Only MA-5 (1)(a)(1) is required by FedRAMP Moderate Baseline
+(b) Guidance: Second parameter not-applicable
+Second parameter not-applicable
+(a) Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance: Requirement: The service provider defines controlled areas within facilities where the information and information system reside.
+The service provider defines controlled areas within facilities where the information and information system reside.
+(a) Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance:
-Requirement: The service provider defines security measures to protect digital and non-digital media in transport. The security measures are approved and accepted by the JAB.
+The service provider defines security measures to protect digital and non-digital media in transport. The security measures are approved and accepted by the JAB.
+Guidance: Equipment and procedures may be tested or validated for effectiveness
+Equipment and procedures may be tested or validated for effectiveness
+(a). Requirements: The service provider measures temperature at server inlets and humidity levels by dew point.
+The service provider measures temperature at server inlets and humidity levels by dew point.
+(b) Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F, page F-7.
+Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F, page F-7.
+Guidance: Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F.
-(d) Requirement: Include all Authoring Officials and FedRAMP ISSOs.
+Significant change is defined in NIST Special Publication 800-37 Revision 1, Appendix F
+Include all Authorizing Officials; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP.
+(a) Requirement: an accredited independent assessor scans operating systems/infrastructure, web applications, and databases once annually.
-(e) Requirement: to include the Risk Executive; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP
+An accredited independent assessor scans operating systems/infrastructure, web applications, and databases once annually.
+To include all Authorizing Officials; for JAB authorizations to include FedRAMP.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents> Vulnerability Scanning Requirements (https://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/)
+Guidance: include in Continuous Monitoring ISSO digest/report to JAB/AO
+Include in Continuous Monitoring ISSO digest/report to JAB/AO
+Requirements: This enhancement is required for all high vulnerability scan findings. Guidance: While scanning tools may label findings as high or critical, the intent of the control is based around NIST's definition of high vulnerability.
+This enhancement is required for all high vulnerability scan findings.
+While scanning tools may label findings as high or critical, the intent of the control is based around NIST's definition of high vulnerability.
+Guidance: The use of Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) evaluated products is strongly preferred.
-See http://www.niap-ccevs.org/vpl or http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/products.html.
+The use of Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408) evaluated products is strongly preferred. See http://www.niap-ccevs.org/vpl or http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/products.html.
+Guidance: CSP must use the same security standards regardless of where the system component or information system service is acquired.
+CSP must use the same security standards regardless of where the system component or information system service is acquired.
+(e) Requirement: for JAB authorizations, track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and report findings to organization-defined personnel, to include FedRAMP.
+For JAB authorizations, track security flaws and flaw resolution within the system, component, or service and report findings to organization-defined personnel, to include FedRAMP.
+Requirement: The service provider documents in the Continuous Monitoring Plan, how newly developed code for the information system is reviewed.
+The service provider documents in the Continuous Monitoring Plan, how newly developed code for the information system is reviewed.
+Requirement: The service provider documents in the Continuous Monitoring Plan, how newly developed code for the information system is reviewed.
+The service provider documents in the Continuous Monitoring Plan, how newly developed code for the information system is reviewed.
+Requirement: The service provider defines key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components associated with system and security administration and isolates those tools, mechanisms, and support components from other internal information system components via physically or logically separate subnets.
+The service provider defines key information security tools, mechanisms, and support components associated with system and security administration and isolates those tools, mechanisms, and support components from other internal information system components via physically or logically separate subnets.
+Guidance: Federally approved cryptography
+Federally approved and validated cryptography.
+Additional FedRAMP Requirements and Guidance:
-Requirement: The information system provides disablement (instead of physical disconnect) of collaborative computing devices in a manner that supports ease of use.
+The information system provides disablement (instead of physical disconnect) of collaborative computing devices in a manner that supports ease of use.
+Guidance: The organization supports the capability to use cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest.
+The organization supports the capability to use cryptographic mechanisms to protect information at rest.
+Guidance: See US-CERT Incident Response Reporting Guidelines.
+See US-CERT Incident Response Reporting Guidelines.
+Guidance: In accordance with the incident response plan.
+In accordance with the incident response plan.
+No notes.
+The service provider shall determine elements of the cloud environment that require the System Use Notification control. The elements of the cloud environment that require System Use Notification are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+The service provider shall determine how System Use Notification is going to be verified and provide appropriate periodicity of the check. The System Use Notification verification and periodicity are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO. If performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then the % of items requiring setting that are checked and that pass (or fail) check can be provided.
+If not performed as part of a Configuration Baseline check, then there must be documented agreement on how to provide results of verification and the necessary periodicity of the verification by the service provider. The documented agreement on how to provide verification of the results are approved and accepted by the JAB/AO.
+Operating System Scans: at least monthly
+Database and Web Application Scans: at least monthly
+All scans performed by Independent Assessor: at least annually
+CSPs must provide evidence of closure and remediation of a high vulnerability within the timeframe for standard POA&M updates.
+See the FedRAMP Documents page under Key Cloud Service Provider (CSP) Documents, Continuous Monitoring Strategy Guide https://www.FedRAMP.gov/documents/
+The information system provides disablement (instead of physical disconnect) of collaborative computing devices in a manner that supports ease of use.
+automated mechanisms for implementing account management
Automated mechanisms implementing account management functions
Automated mechanisms implementing account management functions
Automated mechanisms implementing account management functions
users that must comply with inactivity logout policy
Information system implementing dynamic privilege management capabilities
automated mechanisms monitoring privileged role assignments
Automated mechanisms implementing account management functions
Automated mechanisms implementing management of shared/group accounts
Automated mechanisms implementing account management functions
Automated mechanisms implementing account management functions
Automated mechanisms implementing account management functions
Automated mechanisms implementing account management functions
Automated mechanisms implementing access control policy
Dual authorization mechanisms implementing access control policy
Automated mechanisms implementing mandatory access control
-Automated mechanisms implementing discretionary access control policy
-Automated mechanisms preventing access to security-relevant information within the information system
-Automated mechanisms implementing role-based access control policy
-Automated mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions
-Automated mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions
-Automated mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions
-Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
-Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
-Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Hardware mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Automated mechanisms enforcing the use of human reviews
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement policy
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement functions
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement functions
Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement functions
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement functions
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information flow enforcement functions
Automated mechanisms implementing least privilege functions
-Automated mechanisms implementing least privilege functions
-Automated mechanisms implementing least privilege functions
- -Automated mechanisms implementing least privilege functions
- -Automated mechanisms implementing least privilege functions
Automated mechanisms implementing least privilege functions
- -Automated mechanisms prohibiting privileged access to the information system
Automated mechanisms implementing review of user privileges
- -Automated mechanisms implementing least privilege functions for software execution
- -Automated mechanisms auditing the execution of least privilege functions
Automated mechanisms implementing least privilege functions for non-privileged users
Automated mechanisms implementing access control policy for unsuccessful logon attempts
-Automated mechanisms implementing access control policy for unsuccessful device logon attempts
- +Automated mechanisms implementing access control policy for previous logon notification
-Automated mechanisms implementing access control policy for previous logon notification
Automated mechanisms implementing access control policy for previous logon notification
- -Automated mechanisms implementing access control policy for previous logon notification
- +Automated mechanisms implementing access control policy for session lock
-Information system session lock mechanisms
Automated mechanisms implementing user session termination
-Information system session lock mechanisms
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
-Organizational capability supporting and maintaining the association of security attributes to information in storage, in process, and in transmission
-Automated mechanisms implementing dynamic association of security attributes to information
-Automated mechanisms permitting changes to values of security attributes
Automated mechanisms maintaining association and integrity of security attributes to information
- -Automated mechanisms supporting user associations of security attributes to information
- -System output devices displaying security attributes in human-readable form on each object
- -Automated mechanisms supporting associations of security attributes to subjects and objects
- -Automated mechanisms implementing access enforcement and information flow enforcement functions
Automated mechanisms implementing techniques or technologies associating security attributes to information
- -Automated mechanisms implementing techniques or procedures for reassigning association of security attributes to information
- -Automated mechanisms implementing capability for defining or changing security attributes
Remote access management capability for the information system
-Automated mechanisms monitoring and controlling remote access methods
Cryptographic mechanisms protecting confidentiality and integrity of remote access sessions
Automated mechanisms routing all remote accesses through managed network access control points
- -Automated mechanisms implementing remote access management
- -organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Automated mechanisms implementing capability to disconnect or disable remote access to information system
- +Wireless access management capability for the information system
-Automated mechanisms managing the disabling of wireless networking capabilities internally embedded within information system components
Automated mechanisms authorizing independent user configuration of wireless networking capabilities
Wireless access capability protecting usable signals from unauthorized access outside organization-controlled boundaries
Access control capability authorizing mobile device connections to organizational information systems
-Automated mechanisms prohibiting the use of internal or external modems or wireless interfaces with mobile devices
- -Automated mechanisms implementing terms and conditions on use of external information systems
-Automated mechanisms implementing limits on use of external information systems
Automated mechanisms prohibiting the use of network accessible storage devices in external information systems
- +Automated mechanisms or manual process implementing access authorizations supporting information sharing/user collaboration decisions
-Automated mechanisms implementing access authorizations supporting information sharing/user collaboration decisions
Information system search and retrieval services enforcing information sharing restrictions
- +Automated mechanisms applying established access control decisions and procedures
-Automated mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions
-Automated mechanisms implementing access enforcement functions
- +Automated mechanisms managing security awareness training
-Automated mechanisms implementing cyber attack simulations in practical exercises
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Automated mechanisms managing role-based security training
-organizational personnel with responsibilities for employing and operating environmental controls
-organizational personnel with responsibilities for employing and operating physical security controls
- -organizational personnel that participate in security awareness training
organizational personnel that participate in security awareness training
- +Automated mechanisms implementing information system auditing
-Automated mechanisms supporting review and update of auditable events
- -Automated mechanisms implementing information system auditing of auditable events
-Information system audit capability
-Information system capability implementing centralized management and configuration of audit record content
- +Audit record storage capacity and related configuration settings
-Automated mechanisms supporting transfer of audit records onto a different system
-Automated mechanisms implementing information system response to audit processing failures
-Automated mechanisms implementing audit storage limit warnings
-Automated mechanisms implementing real-time audit alerts when organization-defined audit failure events occur
- -organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
-Automated mechanisms integrating audit review, analysis, and reporting processes
Automated mechanisms supporting analysis and correlation of audit records
Information system capability to centralize review and analysis of audit records
Automated mechanisms implementing capability to correlate information from audit records with information from monitoring physical access
Automated mechanisms implementing capability to perform a full text analysis of audited privilege commands
Automated mechanisms implementing capability to correlate information from non-technical sources
Automated mechanisms supporting review, analysis, and reporting of audit information
Audit reduction and report generation capability
-Audit reduction and report generation capability
-Audit reduction and report generation capability
- +Automated mechanisms implementing time stamp generation
-Automated mechanisms implementing internal information system clock synchronization
-Automated mechanisms implementing internal information system clock authoritative time sources
Automated mechanisms implementing audit information protection
-Information system media storing audit trails
Automated mechanisms implementing the backing up of audit records
- -Cryptographic mechanisms protecting integrity of audit information and tools
Automated mechanisms managing access to audit functionality
- -Automated mechanisms managing access to audit information
- +Automated mechanisms implementing non-repudiation capability
-Automated mechanisms implementing non-repudiation capability
-Automated mechanisms implementing non-repudiation capability
- -Automated mechanisms implementing non-repudiation capability
Automated mechanisms implementing non-repudiation capability
- -system/network administrators
-Automated mechanisms implementing audit record retention capability
-Automated mechanisms implementing audit record generation capability
-Automated mechanisms implementing audit record generation capability
-Automated mechanisms implementing audit record generation capability
Automated mechanisms implementing audit record generation capability
- +Automated mechanisms implementing monitoring for information disclosure
-Automated mechanisms implementing monitoring for information disclosure
Automated mechanisms implementing monitoring for information disclosure
- +Automated mechanisms implementing user session auditing capability
-Automated mechanisms implementing user session auditing capability
Automated mechanisms implementing user session auditing capability
Automated mechanisms implementing user session auditing capability
Automated mechanisms implementing cross-organizational auditing (if applicable)
-Automated mechanisms implementing cross-organizational auditing (if applicable)
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- +Automated mechanisms supporting security assessment, security assessment plan development, and/or security assessment reporting
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
-Automated mechanisms supporting security control assessment
-personnel performing security assessments for the specified external organization
-personnel managing the system(s) to which the Interconnection Security Agreement applies
-Automated mechanisms supporting the management of external network connections
-Automated mechanisms supporting the management of external network connections
- -Automated mechanisms supporting the management of external network connections
- -Automated mechanisms supporting the management of public network connections
- -Automated mechanisms for developing, implementing, and maintaining plan of action and milestones
-Automated mechanisms for developing, implementing and maintaining plan of action and milestones
Mechanisms implementing continuous monitoring
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Automated mechanisms supporting penetration testing
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Automated mechanisms supporting employment of red team exercises
- +organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
-Automated mechanisms supporting compliance checks
automated mechanisms supporting configuration control of the baseline configuration
-automated mechanisms supporting review and update of the baseline configuration
-automated mechanisms implementing baseline configuration maintenance
Organizational processes for managing baseline configurations
-automated mechanisms implementing separate baseline configurations for development, test, and operational environments
Organizational processes for managing baseline configurations
-automated mechanisms that implement configuration change control
-automated mechanisms implementing configuration change control activities
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing testing, validating, and documenting information system changes
automated mechanisms implementing changes to current information system baseline
Organizational processes for configuration change control
- -automated mechanisms implementing security responses to changes to the baseline configurations
- -cryptographic mechanisms implementing organizational security safeguards
- +Organizational processes for security impact analysis
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing security impact analysis of changes
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing verification of security functions
automated mechanisms supporting/implementing/enforcing access restrictions associated with changes to the information system
-automated mechanisms supporting auditing of enforcement actions
automated mechanisms supporting/implementing information system reviews to determine whether unauthorized changes have occurred
- -automated mechanisms preventing installation of software and firmware components not signed with an organization-recognized and approved certificate
- -automated mechanisms implementing dual authorization enforcement
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing access restrictions for change
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing access restrictions for change
automated mechanisms that identify and/or document deviations from established configuration settings
-automated mechanisms implemented to centrally manage, apply, and verify information system configuration settings
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing security safeguards for response to unauthorized changes
- -automated mechanisms implementing restrictions or prohibition of functions, ports, protocols, and/or services
-automated mechanisms implementing review and disabling of nonsecure functions, ports, protocols, and/or services
-automated mechanisms implementing compliance with registration requirements for functions, ports, protocols, and/or services
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing blacklisting
- -automated mechanisms implementing whitelisting
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the information system component inventory
-automated mechanisms implementing updating of the information system component inventory
automated mechanisms implementing the information system component inventory
automated mechanisms implementing the detection of unauthorized information system components
- -automated mechanisms implementing the information system component inventory
automated mechanisms implementing the information system component inventory
Automated mechanisms implementing the information system component inventory in a centralized repository
automated mechanisms supporting tracking of information system components by geographic location
automated mechanisms implementing acknowledgment of assignment of acquired components to the information system
- +automated mechanisms for protecting the configuration management plan
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
automated mechanisms implementing and controlling the use of peer-to-peer files sharing technology
-automated mechanisms implementing restrictions on the use of open source software
-automated mechanisms monitoring policy compliance
-automated mechanisms for alerting personnel/roles when unauthorized installation of software is detected
-automated mechanisms for prohibiting installation of software without privileged status (e.g., access controls)
automated mechanisms for developing, reviewing, updating and/or protecting the contingency plan
-personnel with responsibility for related plans
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Organizational processes for resumption of missions and business functions
-Organizational processes for resumption of missions and business functions
-Organizational processes for continuing missions and business functions
Organizational processes for transfer of essential missions and business functions to alternate processing/storage sites
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Organizational processes for contingency training
-automated mechanisms for simulating contingency events
automated mechanisms for providing contingency training environments
automated mechanisms supporting the contingency plan and/or contingency plan testing
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
automated mechanisms supporting the contingency plan and/or contingency plan testing
automated mechanisms supporting contingency plan testing
automated mechanisms supporting recovery and reconstitution of the information system
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing storage and retrieval of information system backup information at the alternate storage site
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
automated mechanisms supporting recovery time/point objectives
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing recovery at the alternate processing site
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
organizational personnel with responsibility for acquisitions/contractual agreements
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing recovery at the alternate processing site
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Automated mechanisms supporting telecommunications
-Automated mechanisms supporting telecommunications
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
organizational personnel with responsibility for acquisitions/contractual agreements
- -Automated mechanisms supporting testing alternate telecommunications services
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information system backups
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information system backups
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information system backups
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information transfer to the alternate storage site
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information transfer to a redundant secondary system
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing deletion/destruction of backup information
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information system recovery and reconstitution operations
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing transaction recovery capability
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing recovery/reconstitution of information system information
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing protection of backup and restoration hardware, firmware, and software
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication capability
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing multifactor authentication capability
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing multifactor authentication capability
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing multifactor authentication capability
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing multifactor authentication capability
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing authentication capability for group accounts
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing multifactor authentication capability
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing multifactor authentication capability
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing replay resistant authentication mechanisms
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing replay resistant authentication mechanisms
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing single sign-on capability for information system accounts and services
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication capability
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing acceptance and verification of PIV credentials
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing out-of-band authentication capability
- +Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing device identification and authentication capability
-cryptographically based bidirectional authentication mechanisms
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implanting auditing of lease information
- -cryptographic mechanisms supporting device attestation
- +Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing dynamic identifier management
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identifier management
- -organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing authenticator management capability
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing password-based authenticator management capability
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing PKI-based, authenticator management capability
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- -automated tools for determining password strength
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing authenticator management capability
automated mechanisms protecting authenticators
automated mechanisms implementing authentication in applications
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing safeguards for authenticator management
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing safeguards for authenticator management
- -automated mechanisms implementing dynamic provisioning of identifiers
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing hardware token-based authenticator management capability
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing biometric-based authenticator management capability
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing authenticator management capability
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the PKI trust store capability
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication management capability for the information system
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication capability
-automated mechanisms that accept and verify PIV credentials
automated mechanisms that accept FICAM-approved credentials
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing identification and authentication capability
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing conformance with FICAM-issued profiles
automated mechanisms that accept and verify PIV-I credentials
Security safeguards implementing service identification and authentication capability
-Automated mechanisms implementing service identification and authentication capabilities
Automated mechanisms implementing service identification and authentication capabilities
- +organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
-Automated mechanisms that support and/or implement simulated events for incident response training
Automated mechanisms that provide a thorough and realistic incident response training environment
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
-Automated mechanisms that more thoroughly and effectively test the incident response capability
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Incident handling capability for the organization
-Automated mechanisms that support and/or implement the incident handling process
Automated mechanisms that support and/or implement dynamic reconfiguration of components as part of incident response
- -Automated mechanisms that support and/or implement continuity of operations
- -automated mechanisms that support and or implement correlation of incident response information with individual incident responses
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing automatic disabling of the information system
- -Incident handling capability for the organization
Organizational processes for coordinating incident handling
- -Organizational processes for coordinating incident handling information with external organizations
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the dynamic response capability for the organization
- -organizational personnel with supply chain responsibilities
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing tracking and documenting of system security incidents
-Automated mechanisms assisting in tracking of security incidents and in the collection and analysis of incident information
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing incident reporting
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing reporting of security incidents
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing reporting of vulnerabilities associated with security incidents
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing reporting of incident information involved in the supply chain
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing incident response assistance
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing an increase in the availability of incident response information and support
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information spillage response actions and related communications
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- -Organizational processes for post-spill operations
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing safeguards for personnel exposed to information not within assigned access authorizations
- +automated mechanisms implementing sanitization of information system components
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing production of records of maintenance and repair actions
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing approval, control, and/or monitoring of maintenance tools
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing inspection of maintenance tools
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing inspection of media used for maintenance
automated mechanisms supporting verification of media sanitization
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing restricted use of maintenance tools
automated mechanisms for terminating nonlocal maintenance sessions and network connections
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing audit and review of nonlocal maintenance
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing component sanitization and inspection
automated mechanisms implementing logically separated/encrypted communications paths
- -automated mechanisms supporting notification and approval of nonlocal maintenance
- -Cryptographic mechanisms protecting nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic communications
Automated mechanisms implementing remote disconnect verifications of terminated nonlocal maintenance and diagnostic sessions
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing authorization of maintenance personnel
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information storage component sanitization
Organizational processes for managing security clearances for maintenance personnel
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Organizational processes for managing foreign national maintenance personnel
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Organizational processes for ensuring timely maintenance
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing preventive maintenance
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing predictive maintenance
- -operations of the computer maintenance management system
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing media access restrictions
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing secure media storage/media protection
-automated mechanisms auditing access attempts and access granted to media storage areas
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing media storage/media protection
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Cryptographic mechanisms protecting information on digital media during transportation outside controlled areas
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing media sanitization
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing media sanitization
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing media sanitization
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing media sanitization
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing dual authorization
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing purge/wipe capabilities
- +automated mechanisms restricting or prohibiting use of information system media on information systems or system components
-automated mechanisms prohibiting use of media on information systems or system components
automated mechanisms prohibiting use of media on information systems or system components
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing media downgrading
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing media downgrading
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing tests for downgrading equipment
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing media downgrading
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing media downgrading
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access authorizations
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access authorizations
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access authorizations
-physical access control devices
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access control for facility areas containing information system components
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing security checks for unauthorized exfiltration of information
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access control for the facility where the information system resides
Lockable physical casings
- -automated mechanisms/security safeguards supporting and/or implementing detection/prevention of physical tampering/alternation of information system hardware components
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing facility penetration testing
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing access control to output devices
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing access control to output devices
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing access control to output devices
- -Organizational processes for marking output devices
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing reviewing of physical access logs
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical intrusion alarms and surveillance equipment
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing recognition of classes/types of intrusions and initiation of a response
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing video surveillance
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical access monitoring for facility areas containing information system components
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing maintenance and review of visitor access records
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing maintenance and review of visitor access records
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing protection of power equipment/cabling
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing protection of power equipment/cabling
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing automatic voltage controls
- +Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing emergency power shutoff
-the uninterruptable power supply
-the alternate power supply
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing emergency lighting capability
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing emergency lighting capability
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing fire suppression/detection devices/systems
-automated notifications
-automated notifications
- -activation of fire suppression devices/systems (simulated)
organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- +Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing maintenance and monitoring of temperature and humidity levels
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing temperature and humidity levels
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing temperature and humidity monitoring
organizational process for activating master water-shutoff
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing water detection capability and alerts for the information system
-Organizational processes for positioning information system components
-Organizational processes for site planning
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing protection from information leakage due to electromagnetic signals emanations
-Information system components for compliance with national emissions and TEMPEST policies and procedures
automated mechanisms supporting the information system security plan
-organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the establishment, review, dissemination, and update of rules of behavior
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the establishment of rules of behavior
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the development, review, and update of the information security architecture
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the design of the information security architecture
-Organizational processes for obtaining information security safeguards from different suppliers
- +Organizational processes for personnel screening
-Organizational processes for clearing and indoctrinating personnel for access to classified information
Organizational processes for formal indoctrination for all relevant types of information to which personnel have access
organizational process for additional personnel screening for information requiring special protection
- +automated mechanisms for disabling information system access/revoking authenticators
-Organizational processes for post-employment requirements
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing personnel termination notifications
- +automated mechanisms supporting access agreements
-Organizational processes for access to classified information requiring special protection
automated mechanisms supporting notifications and individual acknowledgements of post-employment requirements
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing vulnerability scanning, analysis, remediation, and information sharing
-automated mechanisms/tools supporting and/or implementing vulnerability scanning
automated mechanisms/tools supporting and/or implementing vulnerability scanning
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing incident management and response
- -automated mechanisms/tools supporting and/or implementing vulnerability scanning
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing trend analysis of vulnerability scan results
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing audit record review
automated mechanisms implementing correlation of vulnerability scan results
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing acquisitions and inclusion of security requirements in contracts
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing acquisitions and inclusion of security requirements in contracts
Organizational processes for development methods, techniques, and processes
- -Automated mechanisms used to verify that the configuration of the information system, component, or service, as delivered, is as specified
- -Organizational processes for selecting and employing evaluated and/or validated information assurance products and services that compose an NSA-approved solution to protect classified information
Organizational processes for selecting and employing products/services evaluated against a NIAP-approved protection profile or FIPS-validated products
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing developer continuous monitoring
- -organizational personnel with information security responsibilities
Organizational processes for selecting and employing FIPS 201-approved products
Organizational processes for obtaining, protecting, and distributing information system administrator and user documentation
-automated mechanisms for monitoring security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing approval processes
-external providers of information system services
- -external providers of information system services
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing safeguards to ensure consistent interests with external service providers
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer configuration management
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer security testing and evaluation
-static code analysis tools
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer security testing and evaluation
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer security testing and evaluation
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer security testing and evaluation
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer security testing and evaluation
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer security testing and evaluation
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer security testing and evaluation
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of developer security testing and evaluation
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing safeguards for supply chain threats
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition and employment of tailored acquisition strategies, contract tools, and procurement methods
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing supplier reviews
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition and employment of safeguards to protect the organizational supply chain
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the conducting of assessments prior to selection, acceptance, or update
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the use of all-source analysis of suppliers and potential suppliers
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition and employment of OPSEC safeguards
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition and employment of validation safeguards
- -Organizational processes for establishing inter-organizational agreements and procedures with supply chain entities
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the security safeguards that ensure an adequate supply of critical information system components
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the definition, establishment, and retention of unique identification for supply chain elements, processes, and actors
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the addressing of weaknesses or deficiencies in supply chain elements
organizational personnel with responsibilities for performing criticality analysis for the information system
-system developer
-system developer
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing criticality analysis
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing development threat modeling and vulnerability analysis
- -Organizational processes for defining attack surface reduction thresholds
- -system developer
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing vulnerability analysis of information systems, system components, or information system services under development
- -system developer
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the approval, documentation, and control of the use of live data in development and test environments
system developer
system developer
organizational personnel with security architecture and design responsibilities
-organizational personnel with security architecture and design responsibilities
-organizational personnel with security architecture and design responsibilities
organizational personnel with security architecture and design responsibilities
organizational personnel with security architecture and design responsibilities
organizational personnel with security architecture and design responsibilities
organizational personnel with security architecture and design responsibilities
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the tamper protection program
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing anti-tamper technologies
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing tampering detection
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing anti-counterfeit detection, prevention, and reporting
-Organizational processes for anti-counterfeit training
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing configuration management
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system component disposal
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing anti-counterfeit scanning
- +automated mechanisms supporting developer screening
-automated mechanisms supporting developer screening
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing replacement of unsupported system components
-Separation of user functionality from information system management functionality
-Separation of user functionality from information system management functionality
Separation of security functions from nonsecurity functions within the information system
-Separation of security functions from nonsecurity functions within the information system
Isolation of security functions enforcing access and information flow control
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing an isolation boundary
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing security functions as independent modules
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing security functions as a layered structure
Automated mechanisms preventing unauthorized and unintended transfer of information via shared system resources
-Automated mechanisms preventing unauthorized transfer of information via shared system resources
- +Automated mechanisms protecting against or limiting the effects of denial of service attacks
-Automated mechanisms restricting the ability to launch denial of service attacks against other information systems
-Automated mechanisms implementing management of information system bandwidth, capacity, and redundancy to limit the effects of information flooding denial of service attacks
Automated mechanisms/tools implementing information system monitoring for denial of service attacks
- +Automated mechanisms implementing boundary protection capability
-automated mechanisms limiting the number of external network connections to the information system
managed interfaces implementing traffic flow policy
- -Automated mechanisms implementing traffic management at managed interfaces
automated mechanisms supporting/restricting non-remote connections
Automated mechanisms implementing traffic management through authenticated proxy servers at managed interfaces
- -automated mechanisms implementing auditing of outgoing communications traffic
preventing unauthorized exfiltration of information across managed interfaces
Automated mechanisms implementing boundary protection capabilities with respect to source/destination address pairs
- -Automated mechanisms implementing host-based boundary protection capabilities
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing isolation of information security tools, mechanisms, and support components
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing protection against unauthorized physical connections
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the routing of networked, privileged access through dedicated managed interfaces
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the prevention of discovery of system components at managed interfaces
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing enforcement of adherence to protocol formats
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing secure failure
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the blocking of inbound and outbound communications traffic between communication clients independently configured by end users and external service providers
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to dynamically isolate/segregate information system components
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to separate information system components supporting organizational missions and/or business functions
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing separate network addresses/different subnets
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the disabling of feedback to senders on protocol format validation failure
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing transmission confidentiality and/or integrity
-organizational processes for defining and implementing alternative physical safeguards
- -organizational processes for defining and implementing alternative physical safeguards
- +Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing trusted communications paths
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing trusted communications paths
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing cryptographic key establishment and management
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing cryptographic key establishment and management
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing cryptographic protection
-automated mechanisms providing an indication of use of collaborative computing devices
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing physical disconnect of collaborative computing devices
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to disable collaborative computing devices
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to indicate participants on collaborative computing devices
- +Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing transmission of security attributes between information systems
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing validation of the integrity of transmitted security attributes
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the monitoring of mobile code
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing mobile code detection, inspection, and corrective capability
-Organizational processes for the acquisition, development, and use of mobile code
- -Automated mechanisms preventing download and execution of unacceptable mobile code
- -automated mechanisms enforcing actions to be taken prior to the execution of the mobile code
- -Automated mechanisms allowing execution of permitted mobile code in confined virtual machine environments
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing secure name/address resolution service
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing data origin and integrity protection for internal name/address resolution service queries
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing data origin authentication and data integrity verification for name/address resolution services
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing session authenticity
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing session identifier invalidation upon session termination
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing randomness requirements
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing management of certificate authorities
- +Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing honey pots
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing confidentiality and integrity protections for information at rest
-Cryptographic mechanisms implementing confidentiality and integrity protections for information at rest
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing storage of information off-line
- +Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing employment of a diverse set of information technologies
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing virtualization techniques
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing concealment and misdirection techniques
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing randomness as a concealment and misdirection technique
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing changing processing and/or storage locations
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing employment of realistic, but misleading information about the security posture of information system components
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing techniques for concealment of system components
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to estimate the bandwidth of covert channels
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing testing of covert channels analysis
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the capability to measure the bandwidth of covert channels
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing loading and executing applications from hardware-enforced, read-only media
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing persistent non-writeable storage across component restart and power on/off
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing capability for protecting information integrity on read-only media prior to storage and after information has been recorded onto the media
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing hardware-based, write-protection for firmware
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing capability for distributing processing and storage across multiple physical locations
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing polling techniques
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing use of out-of-band channels
-automated mechanisms supporting/implementing safeguards to ensure delivery of designated information, system components, or devices
-Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing separate execution domains for each executing process
-Information system capability implementing underlying hardware separation mechanisms for process separation
Information system capability implementing a separate execution domain for each thread in multi-threaded processing
- +Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing protection of wireless links
-Cryptographic mechanisms enforcing protections against effects of intentional electromagnetic interference
-Cryptographic mechanisms enforcing protections to reduce detection of wireless links
- -Cryptographic mechanisms enforcing wireless link protections against imitative or manipulative communications deception
Cryptographic mechanisms preventing the identification of wireless transmitters
- +automated mechanisms implementing capability to indicate sensor use
-sensor data collection and reporting capability for the information system
-sensor information collection capability for the information system
- -organizational personnel with responsibility for sensor capability
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing testing software and firmware updates
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing central management of the flaw remediation process
Automated mechanisms used to determine the state of information system components with regard to flaw remediation
- -automated mechanisms used to measure the time between flaw identification and flaw remediation
- -Automated mechanisms implementing automatic software/firmware updates
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing removal of previous versions of software/firmware
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing malicious code scanning and subsequent actions
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing central management of malicious code protection mechanisms
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing automatic updates to malicious code protection capability
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing malicious code protection capability
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing testing and verification of malicious code protection capability
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing nonsignature-based malicious code protection capability
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing detection of unauthorized operating system commands through the kernel application programming interface
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing security safeguards to authenticate remote commands
- -tools and techniques for analysis of malicious code characteristics and behavior
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing information system monitoring capability
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing intrusion detection capability
automated mechanisms/tools supporting and/or implementing analysis of events
automated mechanisms/tools supporting and/or implementing integration of intrusion detection tools into access/flow control mechanisms
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing monitoring of inbound/outbound communications traffic
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing alerts for compromise indicators
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing actions to terminate suspicious events
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing testing of intrusion-monitoring tools
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing visibility of encrypted communications traffic to monitoring tools
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing analysis of communications traffic
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing automated alerts to security personnel
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing analysis of communications traffic/event patterns
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing wireless intrusion detection capability
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing wireless intrusion detection capability
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing correlation of information from monitoring tools
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing correlation of information from monitoring tools
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing analysis of outbound communications traffic
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system monitoring capability
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system monitoring capability
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing system monitoring capability
- -automated mechanisms for providing alerts
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing host-based monitoring capability
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the discovery, collection, distribution, and use of indicators of compromise
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing security directives
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing dissemination of security alerts and advisories
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing security function verification capability
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the management of distributed security testing
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing the reporting of security function verification results
- +Software, firmware, and information integrity verification tools
-Software, firmware, and information integrity verification tools
-automated mechanisms providing integrity discrepancy notifications
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing central management of integrity verification tools
cryptographic mechanisms implementing software, firmware, and information integrity
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing incorporation of detection of unauthorized security-relevant changes into the incident response capability
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing integrity verification of the boot process
- -safeguards implementing protection of the integrity of boot firmware
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing limited privileges in the confined environment
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing verification of the integrity of user-installed software prior to execution
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing approvals for execution of binary or machine-executable code
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing prohibition of the execution of binary or machine-executable code
Cryptographic mechanisms authenticating software/firmware prior to installation
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing time limits on process execution without supervision
- +automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing spam protection
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing central management of spam protection
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing automatic updates to spam protection mechanisms
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing spam protection mechanisms with a learning capability
Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing validity checks on information inputs
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing auditing of the use of manual override capability
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing review and resolution of input validation errors
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing predictable behavior when invalid inputs are received
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing responses to invalid inputs
automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing restriction of information inputs
- +Organizational processes for managing MTTF
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing transfer of component responsibilities to substitute components
-Organizational processes for managing MTTF and conducting the manual transfer between active and standby components
- -automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing alarms or system shutdown if component failures are detected
- -Automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing initiation and termination of non-persistent components
-automated mechanisms supporting and/or implementing component and service refreshes
-The OSCAL Control Catalog format can be used to describe a collection of security controls and related control enhancements (subcontrols), along with contextualizing documentation and metadata. The root of the Control Catalog format is catalog
.
The label value should be suitable for inline display in a rendered catalog.
-A value provided in a catalog can be redefined at any higher layer of OSCAL (e.g., Profile).
-.
-In a catalog, a parameter is typically used as a placeholder for the future assignment of a parameter value, although the OSCAL model allows for the direct assignment of a value if desired by the control author. The value
may be optionally used to specify one or more values. If no value is provided, then it is expected that the value will be provided at the Profile or Implementation layer.
A parameter can include a variety of metadata options that support the future solicitation of one or more values. A label
provides a textual placeholder that can be used in a tool to solicit parameter value input, or to display in catalog documentation. The desc
provides a short description of what the parameter is used for, which can be used in tooling to help a user understand how to use the parameter. A constraint
can be used to provide criteria for the allowed values. A guideline
provides a recommendation for the use of a parameter.
In a declaration, value
will commonly be given in groups, indicating a set of
- enumerated permissible values (i.e., for an element to be valid to a value constraint, it
- must equal one of the given values).
In a parameter, a value represents a value assignment to the parameter, overriding any
- value given at the point of insertion. When parameters are provided in OSCAL profiles, their
- values will override any values assigned lower down the stack
.
A part
provides for logical partitioning of prose, and can be thought of as a grouping structure (e.g., section). A part
can have child parts allowing for arbitrary nesting of prose content (e.g., statement hierarchy). A part
can contain prop
objects that allow for enriching prose text with structured name/value information.
A part
can be assigned an optional id
>, which allows for internal and external references to the textual concept contained within a part
. A id
provides a means for an OSCAL profile, or a higher layer OSCAL model to reference a specific part within a catalog
. For example, an id
can be used to reference or to make modifications to a control statement in a profile.
Use of part
and prop
provides for a wide degree of extensibility within the OSCAL catalog model. The optional ns
provides a means to qualify a part's name
, allowing for organization-specific vocabularies to be defined with clear semantics. Any organization that extends OSCAL in this way should consistently assign a ns
value that represents the organization, making a given namespace qualified name
unique to that organization. This allows the combination of ns
and name
to always be unique and unambiguous, even when mixed with extensions from other organizations. Each organization is responsible for governance of their own extensions, and is strongly encouraged to publish their extensions as standards to their user community. If no ns
is provided, the name is expected to be in the "OSCAL" namespace.
To ensure a ns
is unique to an organization and naming conflicts are avoided, a URI containing a DNS or other globally defined organization name should be used. For example, if FedRAMP and DoD both extend OSCAL, FedRAMP will use the ns
"https://fedramp.gov", while DoD will use the ns
"https://defense.gov" for any organization specific name
.
Tools that process OSCAL content are not required to interpret unrecognized OSCAL extensions; however, OSCAL-compliant tools should not modify or remove unrecognized extensions, unless there is a compelling reason to do so, such as data sensitivity.
-The label value should be suitable for inline display in a rendered catalog.
+A value provided in a catalog can be redefined at any higher layer of OSCAL (e.g., Profile).
+.
+In a catalog, a parameter is typically used as a placeholder for the future assignment of a parameter value, although the OSCAL model allows for the direct assignment of a value if desired by the control author. The value
may be optionally used to specify one or more values. If no value is provided, then it is expected that the value will be provided at the Profile or Implementation layer.
A parameter can include a variety of metadata options that support the future solicitation of one or more values. A label
provides a textual placeholder that can be used in a tool to solicit parameter value input, or to display in catalog documentation. The desc
provides a short description of what the parameter is used for, which can be used in tooling to help a user understand how to use the parameter. A constraint
can be used to provide criteria for the allowed values. A guideline
provides a recommendation for the use of a parameter.
In a declaration, value
will commonly be given in groups, indicating a set of
+ enumerated permissible values (i.e., for an element to be valid to a value constraint, it
+ must equal one of the given values).
In a parameter, a value represents a value assignment to the parameter, overriding any
+ value given at the point of insertion. When parameters are provided in OSCAL profiles, their
+ values will override any values assigned lower down the stack
.
A part
provides for logical partitioning of prose, and can be thought of as a grouping structure (e.g., section). A part
can have child parts allowing for arbitrary nesting of prose content (e.g., statement hierarchy). A part
can contain prop
objects that allow for enriching prose text with structured name/value information.
A part
can be assigned an optional id
>, which allows for internal and external references to the textual concept contained within a part
. A id
provides a means for an OSCAL profile, or a higher layer OSCAL model to reference a specific part within a catalog
. For example, an id
can be used to reference or to make modifications to a control statement in a profile.
Use of part
and prop
provides for a wide degree of extensibility within the OSCAL catalog model. The optional ns
provides a means to qualify a part's name
, allowing for organization-specific vocabularies to be defined with clear semantics. Any organization that extends OSCAL in this way should consistently assign a ns
value that represents the organization, making a given namespace qualified name
unique to that organization. This allows the combination of ns
and name
to always be unique and unambiguous, even when mixed with extensions from other organizations. Each organization is responsible for governance of their own extensions, and is strongly encouraged to publish their extensions as standards to their user community. If no ns
is provided, the name is expected to be in the "OSCAL" namespace.
To ensure a ns
is unique to an organization and naming conflicts are avoided, a URI containing a DNS or other globally defined organization name should be used. For example, if FedRAMP and DoD both extend OSCAL, FedRAMP will use the ns
"https://fedramp.gov", while DoD will use the ns
"https://defense.gov" for any organization specific name
.
Tools that process OSCAL content are not required to interpret unrecognized OSCAL extensions; however, OSCAL-compliant tools should not modify or remove unrecognized extensions, unless there is a compelling reason to do so, such as data sensitivity.
+A profile designates a selection and configuration of controls and subcontrols from one or more catalogs, along with a series of operations over the controls and subcontrols. The topmost element in the OSCAL profile XML schema is profile
.
A profile designates a selection and configuration of controls from one or more catalogs, along with a series of operations over them. The topmost element in the OSCAL profile XML schema is profile
.
import
), merged or (re)structured (merge
), and emended
(modify
). OSCAL profiles may select subsets of control sets, set parameter
- values for them in application, and even qualify the representation of controls and
- subcontrols as given in and by a catalog. They may also serve as sources for further
+ values for them in application, and even qualify the representation of controls as given
+ in and by a catalog. They may also serve as sources for further
modification in and by other profiles, that import them.
An import
indicates a source whose controls are to be included (referenced
and modified) in a profile. This source will either be a catalog whose controls are given
(by value
), or a profile with its own control imports (with possible settings.
The contents of the import
element indicate which controls and subcontrols
- from the source, will be included. Controls and subcontrols may be either selected (using
+
The contents of the import
element indicate which controls
+ from the source will be included. Controls may be either selected (using
an include
element) or de-selected (using an exclude
element)
from the source catalog or profile.
When no include
is given (whether an exclude
is given or not),
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
Whenever combining controls from multiple (import) pathways, an issue arises of what to do with - clashing invocations (multiple competing versions of a control or a subcontrol).
+ clashing invocations (multiple competing versions of a control).This setting permits a profile designer to apply a rule for the resolution of such cases. In a well-designed profile, such collisions would ordinarily be avoided, but this setting can be useful for defining what to do when it occurs.
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@This element provides an alternative to calling controls and subcontrols individually +
This element provides an alternative to calling controls individually
from a catalog. But this is also the default behavior when no include
element is given in an import
; so ordinarily one might not see this element
unless it is for purposes of including its @with-subcontrols='yes'
Inside include
, If @control-id
is used (to indicate the control
- being referenced), @subcontrol-id
cannot be used, and vice versa. (A single
- call
element is used for each control.) This constraint is enforced by the
- schema. Likewise, @with-subcontrols
can be used only along with
- @control-id
not with @subcontrol-id
.
If @with-subcontrols
is yes
on the call to a control, no sibling
- call
elements need to be used to call its subcontrols. Accordingly it may be
- more common to call subcontrols (enhancements) by ID only to exclude them, not to include
- them.
call
elements need to be used to call any controls appearing within it
+ (subcontrols. Since generally, this is how control enhancements are represented + (as controls within controls), this provides a way to include controls with all their + dependent controls (enhancements) without having to call them individually.
Use @control-id
or @subcontrol-id
to indicate the scope of alteration.
It is an error for two alter
elements to apply to the same control or subcontrol.
+
Use @control-id
to indicate the scope of alteration.
It is an error for two alter
elements to apply to the same control.
In practice, multiple alterations can be applied (together), but it creates confusion.
At present, no provision is made for altering many controls at once (for example, to systematically remove properties or add global properties); extending this element to match multiple control IDs could provide for this.
title
or prop
Use @class-ref
, @id-ref
or @item-name
to indicate
+
Use name-ref
, class-ref
, id-ref
or generic-identifier
to indicate
class tokens or ID reference, or the formal name, of the component to be removed or erased
- from a control or subcontrol, when a catalog is resolved. The control or subcontrol
- affected is indicated by the pointer on the removal's parent (containing)
- alter
element.
alter
element.
To change an element, use remove
to remove the element, then
add
to add it back again with changes.